D.2.2 Report on the state of the art of governance and conflict resolution literature

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D.2.2. State of the art of governance and conflict resolution literature


Contributors:

Central European University¹
Berghof Conflict Research
Jawaharlal Nehru University
Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group
Malaviya Centre for Peace Research, Banaras Hindu University
Peace Research Institute Oslo
Society for Participatory Research in Asia
The Institute for International Affairs
University of Delhi
University of St Andrews

¹ Workpackage leader (Michael Merlingen)
# Table of Contents

1. **Introduction: CORE Literature review** ................................................................. 4

2. **Conflict resolution/transformation** ................................................................. 5
   2.1 The concepts of conflict resolution and conflict transformation .......................... 5
   2.2 Trends in the literature .................................................................................... 6

3. **Peacebuilding** ......................................................................................... 8
   3.1 The concept of peacebuilding ......................................................................... 8
   3.2 Trends in the literature ................................................................................... 9
   3.3 Peacebuilding as statebuilding ...................................................................... 12

4. **Statebuilding** ................................................................................ 13
   4.1 The concept of statebuilding .......................................................................... 13
   4.2 Trends in the literature .................................................................................. 14

5. **Governance** ...................................................................................... 17
   5.1 The concept of governance ........................................................................... 17
   5.2 Trends in the literature on governance and conflict ........................................ 21

6. **Indian literature** ............................................................................. 26
   6.1 Governance .................................................................................................. 26
   6.2 Conflict transformation ................................................................................. 32

7. **Conclusion** .......................................................................................... 38

Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 39
1. Introduction: CORE Literature review

Examining the role of governance in the resolution of socioeconomic and political conflict in India and Europe, CORE has a broad basis is several strands of literature, most notably the literature on conflict transformation and on governance, including the curious junction between governance and conflict. Nonetheless, the project also touches upon issues for whose analysis the peacebuilding and statebuilding literatures offer valuable sources. Therefore, this literature review, setting the foundations for further research in the CORE case studies, covers four strands of literature: conflict transformation, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and governance. In addition, ensuring balance in the texts reviewed, two sections are dedicated to the governance and conflict transformation literature from India.

In general, the analysed texts in this literature review are organised following Robert Cox's (1981: 128) distinction between problem-solving and critical theories. In brief, as nicely summarized by Alex Bellamy (2004:18), in relation to conflict transformation, the two kinds of theories can be distinguished depending on their position on three issues:

- **Purpose:** problem-solving theories are predominantly instrumental and predicated on implicit normative assumptions whilst critical theories have an explicit normative agenda.

- **The nature of the social world:** problem-solving theories have an objectivist world-view that treats problems as pre-given and interventions as discrete acts while critical theories maintain that the social world and the problems that peace operations address are socially constructed.

- **The relationship between theory and practice:** problem-solving theories do not reflect on this relationship whereas critical theories uncover the ideological preferences of dominant theories and practices, and seek alternatives.

The traditional, or problem-solving, literature rests on several normative assumptions that are unquestioned. These include:

- international peace and security is a moral good in itself; violent conflict represents a ‘breakdown’ of normal social relations; the great majority of people prefer peace to war and need only be presented with ‘paths’ to peace; there is a direct link between international peace and good governance at the domestic level; and ‘good’ governance equates to Western-style statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active civil society (Bellamy, 2004: 19).

The critical literature, on the other hand, questions these assumptions, and goes even further, in addressing issues, as well as their conceptualization, that traditionally get left out of focus when dealing with conflict transformation.
2. Conflict resolution/transformation

2.1 The concepts of conflict resolution and conflict transformation

The field of study of conflict resolution dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, when it was promoted by scholars mainly from North America and Europe. In the post-Cold War era, the conflict resolution literature gained significantly more prominence. It moved beyond the international conflicts that shaped the world order and started to focus on the intrastate and ethnic conflict that many believe to have been caused, among other reasons, by the end of the bipolar world.

Parallel to the increased importance of the field of study itself, within it, discussions on defining the main concepts were ongoing. One discussion was certainly shaped along the line of distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution. According to Morrison et al. (1999), conflict management, rather than dealing with structural conditions, focuses on preventing the escalation of the conflict, as well as to reduce its destructive nature, while conflict resolution deals with the root causes of the conflict, satisfaction of basic needs, institutional changes, enemy perceptions, etc. In that sense, conflict management is based on the assumption that conflicts are long-term processes and cannot have a quick resolution. At the same time, however, the term ‘management’ implies that people can be controlled and directed. Conflict resolution, on the other hand, is to a large extent based on Burton’s (1968) view that ongoing conflicts are a result of unsatisfied human needs, such as security and justice, for instance, which is reflected in his approach to problem-solving conflict resolution and the human needs theory that he developed (1990). In essence, according to this approach, conflict resolution does not aim to end the conflict, but rather to transform it into a non-violent one.

On that note, the other notable discussion in the field is the one over the definitions of conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Some consider these two to be separate endeavours (Väyrynen, 1991; Rupesinghe, 1995; Jabri, 1996; Francis, 2002; Lederach, 2003). John Paul Lederach describes conflict transformation as a concept that relates to a natural occurrence. According to him, social conflict is naturally created through the relationships among people. Nevertheless, once a conflict occurs, it impacts and transforms the relationships and the people that led to the initial conflict. In that sense, the transformation goes both ways—from the relationships to the conflict, and from the conflict to the relationships and the people. It is precisely the latter that can be used to affect relationships and perceptions positively, i.e. transform them in a manner that they are improved, rather than destroyed by the conflict. In order for this to be achieved, conflict transformation should be focused on improving the mutual understanding between the previous conflict parties. On the distinction between conflict resolution and transformation, Lederach (2003) sees the former as being content-centred and aiming at immediate agreement, while the latter, in his view,
is relationship-centred and considers the dealing with the conflict as a long-term process.

Others see conflict transformation merely as the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall believe that the people dealing with conflict resolution and conflict transformation are essentially involved in the same endeavour. They outline four reasons for using conflict resolution in their work, as opposed to conflict transformation:

First, because it was the earliest term used to define the new field (the 1957 Journal of Conflict Resolution). Second, because it is still the most widely used term among analysts and practitioners – recent examples are Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman’s edited volume The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (2000), Peter Wallensteen’s Understanding Conflict Resolution (2007), and The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution (2009), edited by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William Zartman. Third, because ‘conflict resolution’ is the term that is most familiar in the media and among the general public. Fourth, because the term ‘conflict transformation’ is in itself inherently indeterminate unless further qualified – transformation in which direction? [...] Conflict resolution has from the start encompassed ‘conflict settlement’ at one end of the spectrum and ‘conflict transformation’ at the other.

### 2.2 Trends in the literature

The understanding of the goal of conflict resolution and transformation as dealing with the root causes of the conflict and satisfaction of the basic needs is based and closely linked to Johan Galtung’s concept of positive peace. Namely, Galtung, one of the founders of modern peace studies, makes the distinction between negative and positive peace. While for much of recorded history the commonly accepted definition of peace had been equated to absence of war, this is considered to be only the negative conception of peace. According to Galtung (1975), negative peace is “the absence of organized violence between such major human groups as nations (1975: 29),” but at the same time, absence of any form of interaction as well. This has also been labelled as ‘peaceful coexistence’.

In addition, Galtung introduced the idea of structural violence, linking in to the concept of positive peace. He argues that violence is not only direct, but can also be present in the structures, denying people access to physical and social well-being (Fetherson, 2000: 202). Positive peace has been defined as “a pattern of cooperation and integration between major human groups (Galtung, 1975: 29).” When it comes to positive peace Galtung prescribes peacebuilding, rather than peacemaking and peacekeeping, as the only option for addressing the structural causes. In other words, peacebuilding is linked to positive peace. It is indeed the concept of positive peace that allows for a critical form of theory and practice of conflict resolution, or often referred to as conflict transformation (Fetherson, 2000: 202).

While this remains at the core of conflict resolution and transformation nowadays, it is important to note that with the dominant type of conflict changing after the end of
the Cold War, so have conflict resolution/transition practices. According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2009: 16),

[Traditional conflict resolution techniques were operated from a state-centric perspective, where preservation of the status quo was the ultimate goal. Second-generation techniques contributed the notion of human security as opposed to state security, allowed for the inclusion of social movements, and attempted to address the root causes of conflict, thereby complementing traditional methods of conflict resolution. In recent years, non-traditional conflict resolution techniques have evolved in order to achieve greater contextual specificity, including both practical and normative aspects to conflict resolution, modern conflict management recognizes the importance and potential of local actors, the different ways war is experienced by men and women, and the need for both official and unofficial channels of communication.

The conflict resolution and conflict transformation literature, to a large extent, belongs to the problem-solving camp, with a number of texts dealing with the practice of conflict resolution/transformation and challenges that arise from it, aiming to improve the practice. For instance, the Berghof Conflict Research has produced handbooks in response to the contemporary challenges, which have to be faced by those who are working in and on violent conflict. One of them (Austin, Fischer and Ropers, 2004) aims is to give an overview of crucial developments in the field of conflict transformation from various perspectives: from academic analysts and practitioners, while another one (Austin, Fischer and Giessmann, 2011) reflects the debate from a variety of disciplines, advancing discussions on the theory and practice of conflict transformation; topics include, among others: global trends in organized violence, the role of gender relations and asymmetries in conflict, human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation. Similarly, in his latest book, Wallensteen (2011) reports on post-Cold War conflict resolution agreements in order to stimulate practice and research, by tracing the development of “increasingly established norms for the content of internationally acceptable peace agreements” including the principles of democracy, human rights, criminal justice and economic cooperation (2001: 11).

As noted, these are but a few of the scholars that, according to Cox’s distinction, would belong to the problem-solving strand of literature (see also Lederach, 1995, 1997, 2002; Mitchell and Banks, 1996; Jeong, 1999, 2010; Francis, 2002; Fisher, 2005; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011; Köppen, Ropers and Giessmann, 2011). It is undeniable that over the years, the work of these academics and practitioners has led to improvements in the actual practice of conflict resolution and conflict transformation. At the same time, however, while quantitatively less, there is also critical literature in regards to the practice of conflict resolution/transformation. To give but one example, Mark Duffield (1997) argues that the whole approach of contemporary conflict resolution is questionable because of the assumptions on which it is grounded. In particular, he has criticised the idea that civil war is an aberrant, irrational, and non-productive phenomenon and has suggested that contemporary internal conflicts may

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2 Parts of this paragraph have been taken verbatim from the BCR contribution.
actually represent “the emergence of entirely new types of social formation adapted for survival on the margins of the global economy (1997: 100).” The assumption that the origins of civil wars lie in localised misunderstandings, ignorance, and disagreements has, according to Duffield, led to a particular type of conflict resolution and to a ‘new aid paradigm’ with the effect of disqualifying local political projects as inadequate or lacking. Duffield believes that we are stuck with “a paradox that rests on unfounded assumptions about conflict that have given rise to a batch of ineffective conflict resolution and social reconstruction measures (1997: 35).”

In addition to those criticising the understanding of the basic premises of conflict and peace, as well as conflict resolution/ transformation, there are also those that criticise the products, or the side effects, of the practice as it is at present. For instance, when it comes to gender in conflict resolution/transformation, Väyrynen (2004) points out that the study of peacekeeping has been gender blind and, as a result, has contributed to the perpetuating marginalization of women based on gender. Notwithstanding the new thinking on human security and the attempts by the UN to ‘mainstream’ gender within its discourse, Väyrynen considers the UN to be “within the confines of modernity.” As a consequence, UN discourse on peacekeeping operations and conflict resolution produces “neoliberal modes of masculinity and femininity where the problem-solving epistemology gives priority to the ‘rationalist’ and managerialist masculinity and renders silent the variety of ambivalent and unsecured masculinities and femininities (2004: 135).” To that end, she concludes that “[i]t is not how gender can be integrated in the UN discourse and activities concerned with conflict resolution in general and peace support operations in particular, as the UN discourse problematises the issue to be. The question is how the UN discourse itself produces certain types of femininities and masculinities as hegemonic (2004: 125).”

3. Peacebuilding

3.1 The concept of peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions designed to prevent the eruption or recurrence of violent conflict in the long-term. The term ‘peacebuilding’ is most closely associated with An Agenda for Peace, a seminal 1992 United Nations document that sought to take stock and plan for the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era. In the document, ‘peacebuilding’ is defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (United Nations, 1992).” The document, which was adopted by the UN Security Council, advocated a comprehensive approach to conflict and saw ‘post-conflict peace-
building’ as a tool for the UN alongside preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and greater cooperation between regional and international organisations. An Agenda for Peace recognised the need to cement peace through broader socio-economic interventions. The document was also politically ambitious, noting that ‘There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities’ (United Nations, 1998: Section VI).

In the decades that have followed An Agenda for Peace, both the term and the practice of peacebuilding have experienced considerable stretching, and have attracted considerable scrutiny and controversy. Parallel to the development of the concept, for instance, several reports identified peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding as distinct, yet related activities in a post-violence setting (Hazen, 2007: 324). Nevertheless, the concept of peacebuilding remains without a single agreed-upon definition among scholars and practitioners. As noted, while some see it as distinct from peacekeeping and peacemaking, others use these terms interchangeably, yet others label all post-Cold War international interventions as peacebuilding (ibid.). Sometimes the concept is also used as nearly synonymous to development, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

To that end, today few practitioners would limit peacebuilding to the ‘post-conflict’ phase of a war, and the term has become something of a generic catch-all for any activity linked with peace. Given such definitional laxness, an incredibly diverse range of actors claim to be engaged in peacebuilding and approach their task from a broad ideological spectrum. In the minds of many commentators and actors, peacebuilding should have some sort of bottom-up and inclusive aspect. In many contexts, however, peacebuilding has evolved as a mainly top-down, elite-led, official process.

Of course, peacebuilding was not invented by the UN in 1992. The term dates from the late 1960s, and the practice of attempting to secure a peace settlement through political, economic and social instruments probably dates from the first organised conflicts.

3.2 Trends in the literature

The evolution of the literature on peacebuilding cannot be considered in isolation from the wider literature on peace, conflict and development (nor indeed from even wider changes in the social sciences). Peace Studies, and systemic attempts to understand conflict and approaches to minimising its effects have a long intellectual heritage. Given


5 Indeed, by 1995 the UN was accepting this broader view in its supplement to An Agenda for Peace.

that the corpus on peacebuilding has been multi-disciplinary, multilingual and very varied, it is impossible to piece together a neat genealogy. Instead, there has been a faddishness in the literature, with some concepts and methods of interpretation proving popular at one moment and dropped the next. Given the breadth of peacebuilding as a concept and practice, a broad range of issues are now associated with it. It is not proposed that this literature review attempts to cover all of them. Conceivably, the peacebuilding category could include the following issues, all of which have their own extensive theoretical and case study literatures: transitional justice, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), SSR (security sector reform), minority rights protection, refugee repatriation, truth recovery and reconciliation, economic reconstruction, governance interventions and state building/reform, democratisation, civil society capacity building. In very general terms, the past two decades have seen five trends in the literature connected with peacebuilding. All of these developments reflect policy and on-the-ground approaches to peacebuilding.

The first trend has been the emergence of two broad categories of literature. One can be called the problem-solving approach, the other the critical approach (Mac Ginty, 2011a). These categories are by no means discrete and were observed at least as long ago as the late 1960s (Schmidt, 1968).

The problem-solving orthodox approach is by far in the dominant position. Its focus on policy ‘solutions’, means that it finds approval and funding from international organisations, governments, research councils and the many INGOs that must compete for market share. It is compliant with the political, military, economic and cultural goals of the global north. Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the orthodox position is that many of its contributors are unable to see the politics of their position. They genuinely believe that they are objective observers attempting to ‘help’, ‘solve’ or ‘fix’ (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008) the problems of peace and conflict. They see ‘politics’ as something that people in civil war societies do, and something that is best avoided as it fosters civil war and tension. Rather than politics, the champions of the orthodox approach do ‘policy’, which they see as a noble activity directed by universal (though western-originating) values. The technocratic certainty finds no better illustration than the title


Standing against the orthodox approach is the critical perspective. This is largely European (indeed UK) based, though a growing number of scholars from the global south are contributing to its output (Richmond, 2005; Chandler, 2000; Chandler, 2006b; Cramer, 2006; Jabri, 2007; Jacoby, 2007; Keen, 2008; Paris, 2004). The critical perspective is sceptical of the motives and conduct of the global north in its peacebuilding interventions, and suspects that the hand of neo-colonialism is rarely far away from interventions that are top-down, insensitive to customary practices, and predicated on a worldview of liberal righteousness. Although guilty of a good deal of self-righteousness itself, the critical approach is aware of the politics of peace, conflict and post-war reconstruction. It is aware that ideology is hardwired into the essentially political tasks of statebuilding and liberal peace promotion. To its credit, it is aware of the need to include the local and the everyday into conceptualisations of peace.

In recent years, fine distinctions have become apparent within the critical school on the study of peace, peacebuilding and peace-support interventions. One of the original band of critics, for example, has now reined in his criticisms and advocates smarter peace interventions (Paris, 2010). Others remain sceptical of the ability of peacebuilding to be effective given its liberal premises, technocratic basis, and the maintenance of profoundly unequal power structures and relations (Chandler, 2011; Richmond, 2009). Still others, from a conservative perspective, are critical of the entire enterprise of peacebuilding (Steinberg, 2007).

A second trend in the literature has been the publication of a number of reflective pieces by peacebuilding practitioners. These do not necessarily conform to a ‘how to’ guidebook, but they contain on-the-ground insights and have added to our understanding of the complexity of peacebuilding (see Lederach, 1995; 1997; Francis, 2010; 2002; Ambrose, Large and Wierda, 2009).

A third trend has been an increasing awareness of the importance of the constituencies at which peacebuilding is aimed. Thus, and in keeping with similar trends in development studies, increased attention has been paid to issues of participation, local ownership, and bottom-up and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding. This trend can also be identified by the explosion of literature on civil society and its possibilities as a peacebuilder (Paffenholz, 2010; Donais, 2011; Lederach, 1997). Many policymakers and practitioners within international organisations, governments, INGOs and NGOs have come to a realisation that peacebuilding is likely to be more sustained and successful if it connects with local aspirations and practices. Yet the rhetorical realisation of the need for local voices to steer peacebuilding initiatives is not the same as the empowerment of local actors and a serious attempt to reform the structural impediments of their disempowerment (Cooke and Kothari, 2002). The agency of local communities is often seen through either the critical or problem-solving lenses, with the former more likely to see critical agency and the latter more likely to see local agency in the form of willing local helpmates.

A fourth trend in the literature on peacebuilding, and one accelerated by the War on Terror, has been the melding of peacebuilding and development discourses with
those on security. The realist security paradigm had softened somewhat in the post-Cold War era, and it seemed that the turn to human security had rebalanced much peace-support interventions towards development and human needs (Duffield, 2007). The securitisation of approaches to peace has been most evident in Afghanistan, but the phenomenon is much broader and involves the reorientation of many governments, donor bodies, INGOs and NGOs towards a worldview in which security actors and norms are mainstreamed into the thinking and practice of peacebuilding.

A final trend in the peacebuilding literature has been the continuing dominance of scholars and practitioners in the global north in the literature on peacebuilding. It is not the case that scholars and practitioners from the global south have little to say, it is simply that the power relations of the policy, media and academic worlds allow voices from the global north to have greater prominence (Mac Ginty, 2011b: 4-5). This means that Iraqi, Liberian and Timorese voices – the voices from the conflict zones – tend to missing from many considerations of peacebuilding. Many of those who do find a voice are co-opted by governments and INGOs anxious to have local endorsement of their policies. It is worth asking if the ‘voice’ they find is actually their own? To a large extent, the structures, concepts, and lexicon of the study of peace and conflict have been foisted upon the global south by the global north.

3.3 Peacebuilding as statebuilding

As already discussed, peacebuilding is a contested term. Some more conservative thinkers and many policy-makers see it as statebuilding, connected to agendas of failed, failing or weak states and the reconstruction of their Weberian sovereignty (see Paris and Sisk, 2010). Others view it in a normative sense, with a particular emphasis on its inherent liberalism in terms of human rights, democracy, and free trade. Some view it as an activity aimed at constructing a social contract and therefore requiring a close and potentially biopolitical relationship with civil society as conceptualised in much governance literature (or critiqued as ‘governmentality’) (Paffenholz, 2010). This underlines the breadth of the evolving conceptualisation of peacebuilding, as it is evidently concerned with international, regional, national, and local order, but also the tendency to use the concept in quite different ways.

What has become increasingly clear has been that while it represents Northern understandings of international and regional order, liberal conceptions of state and civil society, and Euro-Atlantic policy interests of intervention (humanitarian or rights oriented) it has been less proficient in representing or understanding the types of localised peace activities that are driven by local actors. Many of these local actors have often complained about being marginalised by the range of UN, IFI, donor agencies, and INGO actors that engage in externalised practices of peacebuilding. This raises the question of whether peacebuilding in now an empty signifier (a camouflage for

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Weberian states connected to hegemonic interests, global capitalism, but little concern for everyday life and economic rights), or whether it can be advanced or complemented by a new range of concepts (or alternatively a reconceptualisation). These might, if current and normally critical research is indicative respond to the concepts very significant gaps and its policy compliance preventing it from also acting as an umbrella for local practices of peace in the same way that (liberal) peacebuilding appears to have become an international umbrella for a variety of interventionist practices aimed mainly at security, political rights and institutions, and neoliberal versions of the state. If peacebuilding is now predominantly aimed at regional and national level peace, more needs to be done on how peace forms in context and how legitimacy is built for peace locally, rather than predominantly at the state or regional level.

4. Statebuilding\(^9\)

4.1 The concept of statebuilding

Similarly to the previous concepts discussed in this literature review, it is the end of the bipolar world that is seen to have given rise to the practice of statebuilding, which provided a certain artificial stability to some states, compensating for their weaknesses. The numerous humanitarian crises that occurred in the post-Cold War period gave the impression that the state is in crisis and with that, paved the way for international statebuilding interventions. It is important to acknowledge that such interventions happen not only in cases of post-conflict states, but also in so-called weak states. According to conventional wisdom, the events of 9/11 even further strengthened the perception that the biggest threat to security nowadays is the weakening of the state power.

Like in the case of peacebuilding, there is no agreed definition when it comes to statebuilding either. According to Fukuyama (2004), the concept is usually considered to include at least building and strengthening of the state institutions. To that end, it can be perceived to constitute “an extension of the good governance agenda of development assistance, but with a more specific focus on the unique role of the state, and at the same time a broader perspective than poverty reduction as the objective of international engagement (Lotz, 2010: 221)”.

Additionally, statebuilding can also zero in on the strengthening of the legitimacy of the state (Paris and Sisk, 2010) and the relations between the state and the society (Jones and Chadran, 2008). Indeed, most authors have seen statebuilding as a way of securing 'negative peace' or the absence of war. Few have viewed statebuilding as a means of achieving a deeper 'positive peace' (the absence of both war and social injustice). While most of the literature analyses state legitimacy in relation to global

\(^9\) Some parts of this section have been taken verbatim from the contribution by IAI.
'best practice', Roberts (2008) focuses on the extent to which post-conflict policies are able to foster societal or domestic legitimacy, and proposes a revised approach to statebuilding accordingly.

Furthermore, Call and Wyeth (2008) define statebuilding as actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society, which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding, i.e. consolidated or institutionalised peace. In this case, as in the case with other statebuilding scholars, the authors draw on Max Weber’s understanding of the state, defining it as an entity of institutions that successfully claims the monopoly on legitimate authority and use of force over a given territory (Weber, 1946). ‘Stateness’ here is observed in two state functions: (1) the institutions guaranteeing a monopoly on the coercive use of force and (2) those institutions collecting revenues and govern expenditures (Tilly, 1975: 42).

Clearly, some of these definitions of the concept of statebuilding provide more space for inclusion of a wider spectrum of issues, such as culture, history and identity, than others.

On distinguishing statebuilding from other close concepts, Paris and Sisk (2008) argue that post-war statebuilding refers to the construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries emerging from conflicts. Statebuilding is not synonymous with nation-building, because it focuses primarily on public institutions, whereas nation-building refers to the strengthening of a national population’s collective identity, nor with peacebuilding, a process which combines a social, economic and political transition. According to them, statebuilding is a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of legitimate governmental institutions.

4.2 Trends in the literature

When it comes to the international politics of statebuilding and the impact it has on non-Western states, the majority of scholars and practitioners share the view that such interventions are necessary for stability and security of the international order, but also for safety and protection of the people of weak non-Western states. These problem-solving studies are based on two assumptions. One is that a certain type of state or system is to be promoted, often referred to as liberal democracy, and the other one is that statebuilding interventions will ultimately lead to the formation of states that will not only act as good governance managers, but also will be constrained and controlled by international norms (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010: 114)

In the attempt to construct zones of ‘stable peace’ (Boulding, 1978), among other goals, the theory and practice of statebuilding is informed by a commitment to liberal peace, built on the premises of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory is based on the observation that democratic states do not wage war on each other (Doyle, 1983). The explanations behind this that are often presented are shaped around the arguments that: (1) there are the institutional constraints on the leaders of
democratic countries to start a war, including both legislative and electorate constraints, (2) it is costly and irrational for states that trade with each to fight, and (3) waging war against another state clashes with the norms and ideas that underpin the very concept of liberal democracy.

Based on this, statebuilding practices have been focused on promoting and defending liberal political and economic practices. The concept derives from the American President Woodrow Wilson, when at the end of the World War I, argued in favour of liberal relations among states. This is what Bellamy, Williams and Griffin label as Westphalian conception of liberal-democratic peace (2004). However, the Wilsonian argument has been taken further to promote liberal modes of governance even within states, which constitutes the basis of statebuilding. This, on the other hand, Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) call post-Westphalian conception of liberal-democratic peace. Overall, the essential idea is to somehow mould non-Western states into a particular type of polity whose governance model meets the standards established by the West (see Ignatieff 2003; Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2010).

The success of this approach is debateable, both in relation to post-conflict and weak states. The examples of Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though at a different scale, are but a few in the long list of failures of the international community to establish secure, yet democratic states. Nevertheless, the West still strongly stands behind the idea and the fit of liberal democratic peace.

The critical approaches, on the other hand, question both the ideology behind and the practice of statebuilding. One of the issues around which some of the critical approaches are shaped is that of sovereignty, and related, internationalisation and depoliticization of weak and post-conflict states.

Conventional sovereignty has three fundamental elements: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty. The very first signs of failure of the conventional sovereignty are partial democracy, trade closure, economical underdevelopment signed by high infant mortality rates, deterioration of infrastructure, corruption, uncontrolled borders, widespread crime, and declining gross domestic product. In such environment political leaders’ paradoxically make a bad situation even worse. The distribution of wealth begins to depend on personal relationships rather than bureaucratic regulations. Nowadays weak and post-conflict states are considered as threats for common security, since they may provide territories for the terrorists, drug trafficking and/or transnational criminality.

For the last decade international organizations, the United States and some European countries have allocated resources in order to promote good governance in weak and post-conflict states. Sometimes the relations between donor and recipient countries became asymmetric through conditionality agreements. In such cases Westphalian sovereignty can be compromised. In some cases, the replacement of conventional sovereignty with shared sovereignty has gone as far as introducing transnational administrations and trusteeships. Consequently, “[t]he statebuilding practices of international administrations reveal a sovereignty paradox: international administrations compromise a fundamental aspect of a political community’s sovereignty by violating its right to self-governance, but do so with the aim of making it
sovereign with regard to the relations between state and society (Zaum, 2007: 27).” In addition, in the words of Richard Caplan, the contradiction between the goal and the means can also be seen in the lack of separation of power, with “executive, legislative, and judicial authority [being] vested in a single individual (the transitional administrator), whose decisions cannot be challenged by the local population, whose actions are not always transparent, and who cannot be removed from power by the community in whose interests he or she exercises authority ostensibly (2005: 196).”

Moreover, with the concept of sovereignty being blurred and international statebuilders deciding what the governance of these societies is to look like, the actual content of such weak and post-conflict states is not achieved through a process of negotiations and power struggles between social groups and state representatives (see Chandler, 2000, 2006a; Bickerton, 2007). This, along with international administrators having executive powers and making decisions that sometimes overrule those by the local elected representatives, leads to the foundations of a democratic society being undermined and a de-politicisation of the society. According to David Chandler, this leads to statebuilding practices resulting in the creation of ‘phantom states’ whose “lack of self-government prevents them from being recognised or legitimised as embodying a collective expression of their societies (Chandler, 2006: 44).”

This clearly raises the question of legitimacy. In that aspect, the overall statebuilding literature could largely be divided in two camps: transitionist, that concentrates on local legitimacy, and structuralist, which advocates for both internal societal consent and external legitimacy. The institutionalisation of the state’s legitimacy within its territory is largely connected with the successful elimination of the gap between state elites and civil society, rather than to develop modern institutions that gain external legitimacy but have little legitimacy in the eyes of local civil society and manipulated by elites. Nevertheless, while critical studies have shed light on how the legitimacy of the state might be hindered through external statebuilding interventions, the issues of local agency, as well as the social structures within those weak and post-conflict states where an intervention has taken place, appear to have been neglected (see Duffield, 2001; Bliesemann de Guevara, 2008).

Related, yet only marginally explored, some scholars have observed the international-local ‘interaction’. Highlighting what is often a large gap between donor interests and local agendas in a post-conflict setting, scholars point to the fact that recent international interventions have been criticized for creating “internationalized states rather than supporting local processes of state-formation (2010: 206)”. In order to begin bridging this ‘gap’, a closer appreciation of the historical and cultural realities of each given setting is needed, as well as an in depth knowledge of the role of the ‘state’ within these contexts. Furthermore, the necessity to differentiate between outside forces pursuing ‘statebuilding’ strategies and those local forces involved in processes of ‘state-formation’ from within is emphasised.
5. Governance

5.1 The concept of governance

In an otherwise rather diverse literature, the only point of argument with regards to the definition of governance is that it is somehow different from government. Then, depending on what aspect or definition of government is emphasized, the corresponding contours of governance also take different shapes. The main elements of definitions can still be clustered around roughly three core statements: a) the space of governance is different from that of government, straddling the gap between the state and citizens or other non-state or private actors; b) governance as a way of political ordering emerged with the waning or fragmentation of sovereignty; c) in governance government is (or should be) subjected to expert-knowledge, juridical power and to the nature of what there is to be governed. Problem-solving and critical research approach governance in obviously different ways. From the perspective of the former, governance is partly a new context for action generating new problems, but it is also a new way of solving problems that cannot be managed otherwise. In contrast, the critical perspectives try to de-naturalize the assumptions of the governance literature, in order to uncover how problems are constructed as amenable to technocratic and depoliticized solutions, and to see what it tells us about the way we think about politics and order.

Governance most generally stands for a move away from state- and government-centrism. The reasons for this are twofold. First, as state intervention and the potential abuse of state power are identified as core problems, the diffusion of governance to non-state actors can be seen as an important check on the government (UNDP, 1997). Second, the more and more complex and increasingly transnational(ized) challenges necessitate the same transformation in order to cope with the burden of managing them, especially since state capacity and sovereignty are increasingly questioned (Slaughter, 2004; Hurrell, 2008; Rosenau, 2009). From a problem-solving perspective, governance is understood to be fulfilling certain functions in society. It is portrayed as a method of accommodating diverse and conflicting interests or managing relationships, a way of conducting public affairs and achieving certain goals (The Commission on Global Governance 1995: 1; Karns and Mingst, 2004).

Governance is sometimes meant to signify a broader activity of which government and sovereignty is but one historically specific form (Majone 1997; Kratochwil 2011: 261). Keohane and Nye (2000: 12), for instance, define governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”, and add that “[g]overnment is the subset that acts with authority and creates formal obligations”. For most authors, however, governance is currently more important as an emerging alternative to sovereignty, a new mode of political ordering following from different material and ideational processes that weaken states and empower the actors of (world) society (Negri, 2011; Hurrell, 2008: 10).

It forces states, (but also international organizations and other centres of power) to disaggregate their parts and activities, to participate in networks and transnational forms of cooperation, and to rely on a wide range of non-state or private actors, in order to regain capacity both domestically and internationally (Slaughter, 2004; Wolf 1999; Doig and Tisne, 2009: 374). Although governance is intimately tied to such historical changes, some authors warn against neglecting the continued presence of state sovereignty (Thakur and Van Langenhove, 2008: 37; Weiss and Kamran, 2009: 82).

Official documents often stress governance as a link between the government and its citizens. The World Bank (2004: 3), for instance, defines governance as “the process and institutions through which decisions are made and authority in a country is exercised”. The Commission on Global Governance (1995: 1) states that “[g]overnance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. Brinkerhoff (2007: 2) provides a similar definition, with governance as “the nexus of state-society relations where governments and citizens interact”. In general, this leads to an interest in participation, in the ability of a strong civil society to check the power of the government and to partake in governance itself, and in working with horizontal networks instead of hierarchies. The exact relation between the state and the society is contested, however. The UNHCR (2007) stresses the role of the government, understanding governance as a “process, whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights”. Yet, for many, the space of governance is truly in-between the state and its citizens as it is for Brinkerhoff (2007), or encompasses both (UNDP, 1997: 1). It might even lay beyond the state, as a sort of supplement of “quasi-public authorities” that work with or against the government, enacting 'governance without government' (Thakur and Van Langenhove, 2008: 20; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Rosenau (2009: 8) argues that governance implies control and steering mechanisms whereby society steers itself, rather than command and hierarchy. Nevertheless, many of the official definitions suggest that even though a lot of emphasis seems to be put on the participation of civil society, at its core governance is conceived to be about a set of rather technocratic principles about policy-making and implementation, the operational capacity of public administration, regulatory power and channels of accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5).

The developments captured by the concept of governance can be seen as an overcoming, or displacement, of sovereignty (but see Williams, 2010), even though the evaluation of this movement typically sets problem-solving and critical approaches apart. For the former, governance is a way of coping with new challenges and problems brought about by globalization as well as a new and more progressive solution to old problems linked to the exercise and limitations of sovereignty (such as war, oppression or abuse of power, or the lack of ability to manage transnational challenges) (Young, 2005; Keohane and Nye 2000). By tying its hands with a network of expert-based or juridical institutions (such as central banks, national and transnational courts, expert committees), the state can be made more responsible and, therefore, more efficient (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Lohmann, 2003). The ensuing problems of flexibility are handled only as pragmatic issues that invite their own techniques of management.
A further difficulty arises regarding encounters between states and regions operating with different forms or uneven levels of governance (Cooper, 2000; Neumann, 2008).

From a critical perspective the same phenomenon appears in a very different light. One such take on the concept tries to unmask the discourse on governance as a rhetorical device that promotes and provides legitimation for certain political agendas (Pagden, 1998; for a neo-Gramscian view, see Sum, 2003). Selby (2003a: 3) points out that it was the World Bank who first introduced governance into the international policy discourse as a way of legitimating its neo-liberal interventions. Another widely discussed core issue is that of the sovereignty-governance relation. Although acknowledging the problems with sovereignty, many argue that giving it up brings along its own set of dangers. Koskenniemi (2011a: 68, 2007, 2011b), advocating for a return to sovereignty, writes that “the informal management of an increasing number of significant social problems within global expert regimes and outside the structures of formal statehood undermines the ability of human groups to constitute themselves and to live as ‘political communities’”, a claim that is echoed by many (Kratochwil, 2011a, b; Chandler, 2007; 2009). Negri (2011), in contrast, while voicing a similar criticism of governance, argues for a move beyond both sovereignty and governance, as he sees both to be antithetical to real forms of communal life. Others in the critical camp do not accept that governance would in any way displace sovereignty, and instead argue for the continuing relevance of the sovereign exception (Agamben, 2005) or of diffused and multiple practices of inclusion and exclusion (Walker, 2010).

Foucault, and Foucauldian scholars, argue that the concern with sovereignty is to a large extent misfocused, as power forms a decentralised, society-wide network in which forms of knowledge, political rationalities, problematisations, technologies of government and biopower play the crucial roles (Rose, 1996; Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996; Dean, 2010; Miller and Rose, 2008; Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Merlingen, 2006; Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2006; Bröckling, Krassmann and Lemke, 2011; Nadesan, 2008). Moreover, such power is not repressive, but productive of its subjects, and it is the nature and operation of this productivity that is at the centre of Foucauldian analyses (Foucault, 2003). Such an understanding of governance undermines the liberal belief in the emancipation of subjects pre-existing the discourse of governance, and underlines the connections between techniques of power and forms of knowledge. For Foucault liberal governmentality is about governing free subjects, even though the discourse on freedom and autonomy can already be interpreted as an authoritarian means of governance (Foucault, 2007; Dean, 2002; Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2005; Merlingen 2007). Others, like Hindess (2004, 2010), questioned the validity of this understanding of liberal governmentality, and argued that liberalism has always, and at its core, been dependent on the distinction between those who can be governed through freedom, and those who cannot.

Foucault’s ideas were appropriated by many postcolonial scholars who examined the ways forms of knowledge enabled colonialism and were also made possible by it, and how the colonised other was produced and controlled through orientalist representations (Said, 1978; Bhabha, 2004; Dirks, 1996; Noxolo, 2009). Also drawing on
other poststructuralist authors, like Derrida or Butler, postcolonialism stresses the role of silencing, self-other distinctions and other forms of discursive subjections inherent in practices and theories of governance (Kapoor, 2008; Spivak, 1988, 1999).

The recent years have witnessed a proliferation of the term 'governance' and its derivatives. Global governance has emerged as a concept to distinguish current trends of a 'patchwork-like' global political ordering from international governance still based primarily on states (Knight, 2009; Held and McGrew 2002). Both denote structures of governance functioning in the absence of a global sovereign, governance without government aimed at cooperative problem-solving (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Finkelstein, 1995). As under domestic conditions, global governance registers a shift away from states and other centres of authority to multiple sites of power, to non-state and other private actors, epistemic communities, etc. (Hurrell, 2008; Neumann and Sending, 2010). As Weiss and Kamran (2009: 69-70) stress, the term was originally meant to be descriptive and not normative, and did not aim at promoting certain forms of good practice. Critical scholars disagree with this statement, and emphasize the link between (neo-)liberal hegemony and global governance (Selby, 2003a; Soederberg 2006). Friedrichs (2009), however, points out that global liberal governance is not so much a reality as a political project, a set of working assumptions under which liberal-minded people operate. He warns about the dangers of equating a primarily transatlantic, and predominantly liberal civil society with global civil society, since it covers up the Western biases in the values promoted by 'global governance'. This is one facet of the multiple power relationships in global problem-solving activities that risk being glossed over by the optimistic liberal emphasis on a poly-centric 'governance' over 'government'. Recently, Foucault’s concept of governmentality has also been introduced in order to “problematise the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states”, with a focus on the political rationalities and technologies of global governmentality, and the role of IOs and NGOs (Merlingen, 2003; Larner and Walters, 2004: 2; Astrov, 2011; Neumann and Sending, 2010). Other voices were more cautious about the dangers of ‘scaling up’ Foucault’s work, or to use it in sweeping arguments about non-Western spaces (Selby, 2007; Joseph, 2009).

In policy discourse, a more normative understanding of governance dominates under the heading of 'good governance'. The USAID (2005: 3), for one, defines governance as “[c]ommitment to the rule of law, the public good, transparency and accountability, and effective delivery of public services”. For the World Bank (1994), the major criteria of good governance include transparency, accountabilty and predictability of the government, the professionalism of the bureaucracy, the strength and public participation of civil society, and the rule of law. Having its roots in questions of economic efficiency, it later transformed more into a concern about the abuse of political power and about the dangers of unrepresentative government (Corbridge et al., 2005: 153-157). Good governance has become a core concept in development policy, and has come under attack for placing the blame for failure of development or of international efforts on the local 'victims' instead of larger structures (Selby, 2003a: 3-4). Related qualified versions of governance include 'democratic governance', emphasizing both the importance of participation in governing and the link between democracy and
security (Mani and Krause, 2009); 'human governance', in the service of eternally true human values "transcending man-made rules and regulations" (Salleh, Azizuddin and Kumar, 2009: 28; Pirson and Turnbull, 2011), and 'self-governance', implying local autonomy, responsibility and ownership, but also self-regulation by reason (Chang, 2009).

5.2 Trends in the literature on governance and conflict
Problem-solving and critical approaches also showed distinctions on the more specific issue of conflict governance. The problem-solving approach does not question the basic (liberal) assumptions behind the belief that governance can provide solutions to a wide range of problems regarding violent conflicts. Instead, it aims at overcoming the difficulties faced by those trying to build up the correct structures of governance by treating these hurdles as non-political (or depoliticized), technical problems, with the goal of increasing the effectiveness of governance.

Problems with governance are often seen as major causes of conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011). The EU's 2003 Security Strategy (p. 4) stated that "[b]ad governance leads to threats – such as state-collapse, corruption and organised crime – and is undermining global governance and regional stability". At least since the emergence of the concept of 'complex emergencies' (IASC, 1994; Duffield, 1994), conflicts are thought to be embedded in a large number of factors (from humanitarian concerns to development and trade, from security to constitutional structure), which require more complex forms and tools of intervention. In governance terminology security, development and governance are positively linked (Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2009: 792), all being part of a complex management of conflicts and economies termed 'security-development nexus' (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). In this broader context, the World Bank blamed a 'crisis of governance' in Sub-Saharan Africa for the lack of development in the region (Nanda, 2006: 272).

The link from governance to conflict has two ideal-typical forms. First, it might originate from the lack of governance capacity over parts of the territory of a country (Herbst, 2000), or as a result of weak state-capacity or lack of state autonomy from the civil society (Williams, 2010: 403). Second, it might result from an overly strong, predatory state that abuses its power (Bates, 2008). In many cases, the two phenomena can be present within the same country, as can be exemplified with Sudan (Hassan, 2010). The direction of the causal link is not, however, thought to be unidirectional. It is also argued that conflicts lead to the breakdown of governance, and that a vicious circle forms between governance and conflict (Collier, 2007). Creating the conditions of good governance then becomes a crucial part of conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts, especially if framed in the broader goal of state- or nation-building (Miall, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2007).

The OECD DAC (2007) provides a useful classification of conflict-prevention efforts into three major categories: operational, structural and systemic. It is the latter two that are linked to local and global governance, respectively. Conflict resolution and peacebuilding are primarily connected to structural conflict prevention. It targets
specific states in order to build sound governance and institutions. According to Brinkerhoff (2007: 4), governance has three core functions: it assures security, it achieves effectiveness in the administrative-economic field, and it generates legitimacy in politics. Good governance here encompasses many areas, including constitution-making and democratic elections (Inbal and Lerner, 2007; Samuels, 2009; Björnlund, Cowan and Gallery, 2007), the reform of the civil service (Blair, 2007); the fight against corruption (Doig and Tisne, 2009), and in general a 'whole of the government' approach (Patrick and Brown, 2007).

Although democracy is often seen as a crucial part of good governance (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 2), 'democratic governance', the link between security and democracy, has come under attack recently by scholars arguing for more modest or more incremental steps (Mani and Krause, 2009; Ottaway, 2003; Call and Crook, 2003; Barnett, 2006). As Ponzio (2007: 268) puts it, 'democratic authority cannot be embedded in a society simply by signing a legal document that has been accorded international legitimacy'. It is argued that the strengthening of the security sector, seen as necessary for the provision of security, necessitates the parallel securing of political oversight and accountability (Ball, 2007) and that the police sector should also rely more on networks of governance (Gerspacher and Dupont, 2007). But it is not only the state that is targeted by governance reforms. Civil society needs to be nurtured and provided with resources in order to able to serve as a check on state power (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5; Williams, 2010), and a long list of wide-ranging concerns from environmental to economic governance can be added to the fields of reform (Conca and Wallace, 2009). In recent years questions of identification and surveillance emerged as an important new tool in conflict governance, especially through the use of biometrics (Lyon, 2010: 610; Dillon and Reid, 2001).

Given that military means are not sufficient for managing the multitude of problems, the literature stresses the importance of creating networks that include international agencies, private actors and NGOs as well as military actors (Williams, 2011: 130). It has been argued that these networks should also include commercial interests, especially larger companies (Haufler, 2007; Dietelhoff and Wolf, 2010) and diasporas (Brinkerhoff, 2007). This does not only create a serious challenge for coordination and sequencing (Paris, 2009); but also threatens with an intrusion of the military to the non-state and non-military sector by way of governance (Gheciu, 2011), and in practice questions the capacity of military actors to deal with this new environment (Schultz and Merrill, 2007).

One of the most contentious issues within the literature concerns the role of the state in the road to good governance. Some argue that too much focus on state capacity threatens with an increasing danger of abuse of power against citizens (Grindle, 2007: 560). Williams (2010: 404), however, writes that good governance is 'also about the constitution of the state as a governmental agency with the capacity to enact reforms on its society – in other words, the liberal state is one with significant autonomy and agency; and it also involves the engineering of that very “civil society” to which the state is to be made accountable', and Clapham (2003: 41) argues that 'there is no alternative to the state as the key regulatory agency at the local level'. Beyond this debate, there is
also the question of the usually understated but immense difficulties of actually defining and implementing practices of good governance to create an effective state, which leads to considerable gaps between theory and practice (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006).

Another important debate has emerged about the role of subnational local actors and decentralization in conflict governance. Some scholars argue that it is necessary, although not sufficient, to adjust governance to the de facto conditions in the territory through power-sharing agreements or by dispersing autonomy and authority to the local-regional level, especially in cases where existing governance capacity is in the hands of local warlords or armed groups (Bland, 2007; Forrest, 2007; Hechter and Kabiri, 2008; Lister and Wilder, 2007, Wennmann, 2009). Others, however, warn about reinforcing the existing cleavages through such agreements, and argue for more participatory forms of 'integrative governance', 'participatory intervention' or 'republican peacebuilding' (Sriram, 2008; Luckham et al, 2003: 45; Chopra and Hohe, 2004; Barnett, 2006). The emphasis on local, traditional or indigenous institutions in governance has also come under fire because it often involves a trade-off between these institutions and the democratic and emancipatory aspirations of liberal peacebuilding (Hohe, 2007; c.f. also Mac Ginty, 2010).

A third important debate centres on the proper role for international actors in governance-building efforts. Traditionally, international intervention was understood to be only supplementary to local capacities, but this view has been significantly revised as a result of repeated failures (Suhrke, 2011; Kühne, 2004: 105-107). Since the mid 1990s international organizations have frequently assumed direct responsibility for governing post-conflict territories, amounting to overt political engagement, and often not even aiming at the development of autonomous capacities (Caplan, 2005). It has been argued that in order to solve the problem of badly governed states, one has to give up on the ideal of full sovereignty and instead adopt different gradations of sovereignty, models of pooled or shared sovereignty, and in some cases straightforward trusteeship (Keohane, 2002: 757; Krasner, 2004: 85). Regional forms of governance are often seen as typically promising (Thakur and van Langenhove, 2008), with the EU’s model of governance regarded as the most successful model of security governance both internally, and in its external dimensions (Keohane, 2002; Belloni, 2007; Wagnsson; Sperling and Hallenberg, 2009; Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008). Considerable attention has been given to how to interact with local structures and capacities, how to enable and incorporate bottom-up forms of governance, how to adjust international efforts to be more in line with the local context, and thereby how to increase their legitimacy (Grindle, 2007; Ogbaharya, 2008). These interactions often go around the state and involve direct negotiations between the vertical operation of global governance, and the horizontal strategies based on kinship, patronage and profit networks employed by the local population (Large, 2003).

Conflict governance also has direct links to global governance. On the one hand, good governance in individual states is a core element of global governance. As Clapham (2003:41) writes, 'in place of the now unsustainable idea that “sovereign states form the autonomous building blocks from which an anarchical international system is constructed, states have been reconceptualised as the key intermediaries between the
norms according to which the new global system is expected to operate and the implementation of that system on the ground'. On the other hand, good global governance is a necessary condition of local stability, constituting the systemic dimension of conflict prevention as identified by the OECD DAC (2007). These efforts are crucial for blocking conflict-generating activities (like illegal trade), creating incentives for peaceful behaviour (using aid, or by the perspective of EU-accession) and to decrease the effects of commodity price shocks on countries (Rubin and Jones, 2007; Collier, 2007, Weiss and Thakur, 2010).

Critical scholars question the liberal consensus on governance in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in a number of ways. A central argument against the concept of good governance stresses its inherent vagueness, as its "apparent economic neutrality masks political interests, since there are no objective standards for good governance" (Nanda, 2006: 275). It is partly these political interests and partly the problems with liberal assumptions that critical approaches try to uncover. One possible starting point for this is to examine how the contemporary discourse on governance reproduces colonial discourses, practices and technologies of control. Hewitt (2009) traces the conceptual similarities between the idea of 'good government' flagged by the British Empire, and the contemporary discourse on good governance, showing that both are strategies of 'control at distance'. Williams and Young (2009) underline how the absence of order in the countries of Africa, and the ensuing impossibility of commerce and development provided important reasons for colonization. Duffield (2009) provides an intriguing parallel between the contemporary discourse on fragile states and the late-nineteenth century discourse of Native Administration, arguing that they share a willingness to accept despotism (as a form of the realism of 'good enough government') and the adjustment of the technologies of governance to the limits set by the culture of the governed.

David Chandler (2006a, 2008, 2010) identifies interests on the part of the Western states that are distinct from this colonialist mentality. He argues that, through statebuilding practices, states are reconfigured from being autonomous, self-governing political subjects to being responsible to their population and to the international community. Sovereignty is transformed from right to capacity and from freedom to responsibility while it is retained as the shell of legal sovereignty and formal equality. Such a constellation allows for the shifting of responsibilities to the non-Western states, protecting the programmes of liberal peace from criticism, while retaining control over the policy choices of the target countries through a more direct role within their internal governing mechanisms (see also Harrison, 2010). Others are more worried about the possibility that local governance projects can be hijacked by interests of a more systemic order (Di Muzio, 2008). Duffield (2007), for instance, argues that through the 'governance state', the sources of global instability, the ungoverned spaces and their populations are get contained and controlled. From another point of view, however, it can be argued that it is sometimes the reform of governance itself, especially in the dimension of economic liberalization, that can be identified as a major factor behind instability and the outbreak of conflicts (Gamage, 2009).
Moving from the systemic to the local level, critical approaches point to the restriction or emptying out of the local political space through the depoliticisation of the process of peacebuilding. As Hameiri (2010: 116) puts it, “through processes of state transformation social phenomena are framed and governed as technical problems to be fixed by experts away from political contestation and scrutiny”. Tadjbakhsh (2011:3-4) argues that “[w]hat unites the different critical approaches is the recognition that liberal peacebuilding through institutions, reduced to a ‘technocratic approach’, fails to recognize the agency and capacity of the ‘local’ and indigenous institution and often appears to be impositionary rather than a liberation”. As a result, it is not possible to talk about the peace process as a process of reconciliation, but rather as a system of governance, or ‘peace-as-governance’ (Richmond, 2010: 25).

The faith put in civil society and NGOs as a check against power also comes under critical scrutiny, through the questioning of the underlying assumption that these actors are somehow free from power, interests, and their own agendas (Cochrane, 2009). It is also pointed out that they might adopt governance and human rights talk only superficially in order to ensure their success with the donors, and that they are often incorporated into the dominant discourses and technologies of governance through the “donor funding of ‘acceptable’ organizations and/or the outright manufacture of such bodies (Taylor, 2010: 162)”. In a more general sense, the belief in the liberal assumptions about political subjectivity risks overlooking the effects of biopolitics and governmentality, as a range of Foucauldian analyses remind us (Chandler, 2010; Duffield, 2007; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006; Reid, 2010).

Finally, critical scholars reject the way problem-solving scholars tend to think about the incorporation of the local population into peacebuilding efforts in terms of either promoting the local, traditional institutions and actors, or, if they are not deemed appropriate, establishing parallel social realities into which the locals can socialize over time (as in Hohe, 2007). As Brown et al. (2010) argue, the spaces of post-conflict interventions are already hybrid political orders that cannot be subsumed under the Western models of state without undermining the possibility of a viable political community. These models are not “oriented towards the acknowledgement of, or interaction with, the forms of societal governance, or the sources of legitimacy, that may be at work” in the local environment (ibid.: 100). Moreover, as postcolonial scholars underline, these local voices and agencies are not only ignored, but also silenced. Liberal ‘peace-as-governance’ fails to “come to terms with the lived experiences of individuals and their needs in everyday life (Richmond, 2010: 25)”. As Richmond (2011: 11) stresses, liberal peace cannot be salvaged by even the most broadly locally representative technology of governance so long as it fails to come to terms with how the very subjects of such governance are produced by the liberal peacebuilding process itself. What is needed instead is an everyday form of peace, an emancipatory form of hybridity based on the infrapolitics of resistance, allowing a real space for the voice and the agency of the local.
6. Indian literature

6.1 Governance

India's historical experience, human geography and international political and economic position have allowed for the development of a unique perspective on the question of governance. India is a post-colonial country that is an ethnically and culturally diverse democracy, a would-be great power and a developing country all in one. These dimensions delineate the main concerns of the Indian literature of governance detailed below: the colonial experience and its (dis)continuity, the challenge of democratic governance in a multicultural country of great economic and social inequalities, and the interface between the local/national levels of governance and global governance.

The importance of the historical experience centres on the fact that the country's independence represents both a substantial break and a measure of continuity with its colonial history. Bidyut Chakrabarty (2008) argues that this constellation can be better understood as the confluence of three major ideological influences: colonialism, nationalism and democracy. After independence, the nationalists chose to embrace the institutions left behind by the British Raj, leading to significant continuity in practice with the colonial administration. An important reason for such a surprising choice lay in the challenge provided by widespread communal riots. In order to be able to keep them under control, the inexperienced new ruling class of India turned to tried and proven instruments inherited by the former colonizers (ibid. 2).

Chakrabarty documents how the 1935 constitution provided by the British administration served as a model for later constitutional provisions, most strikingly for the 'emergency provisions' that "enable the President to suspend democratically elected governments and fundamental rights of the citizens (ibid.: 3)". Moreover, a range of anti-terrorism and internal security acts of the 1970s and 1980s can also be traced back to the colonial provisions for 'preventive detention' of 'politically subversive individuals'. Thus, in short, from an institutional perspective India shows remarkable continuity with its colonial past. At the same time colonialism also prepared the space for a strong ideological break in the shape of nationalism. The nationalist vision of India was "inspired by values of social and economic justice, political equality and a respect for diversity, especially for the marginalized sections of society", and therefore it often provided strong support for democratic aspirations as well. In this sense, colonialism provided a considerable amount of space for democratisation, but at the same time left its trace on the future insofar as "the state had always operated at a level removed from the society which it governed (ibid.: 2)".

Mitra (2002) tackles the puzzle of the relative success of post-colonial India in the face of its enormous problems of governance with an eye on how this state-society distance influenced the outcome. As the success itself is linked back to the "benign elasticity of India's institutions", this in turn is interpreted as a result of effective governance (or orderly rule) (ibid.: 1). As he writes, "India’s decision-makers in politics, administration and the management of law and order, based in localities, regions and at
the national level, often owe their own origin and survival to their effectiveness as brokers between the modern state and traditional society” (ibid.). In the absence of cultural or national cohesion, it was this mediated form of governance that created the conditions for the relative stability and development of India in the post-independence period.

The state formation in India was slightly different from the prescribed ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘developmental’ models of state.11 The agenda of socioeconomic change was not the prerogative of a technocratic elite (Mitra, 2002: 12-13). The politics of allocation of resources served as the thread that linked the local elites to the centre as the government sought to gain legitimacy by spreading the benefits of development among its population (ibid.: 14-15). The difficulties in giving a concrete shape to the agendas of development with its twin commitment to democracy and economic growth reflected in the fluctuating economic policies (ibid.: 24). The fluctuation of policies and its attendant institutional innovations with its emphasis on different connotations of development greatly affected state-society relations. The 1950s saw an emphasis on the use of ‘community’ as a spatial and social unit of development targeted through community development programs. In the 1960s, in the wake of the green revolution, the emphasis shifted on centrally coordinated sectoral schemes. The 1970s, influenced by the populist slogans of ‘garibihatao’ saw the beginning of ‘target group approach’ to direct developmental funds towards vulnerable social groups. (Mitra, 2002: 24-26).

The government’s response to violent conflict has been dialectical at best. While the default response of the state is to activate the armed apparatuses of the state in the name of upholding ‘law and order’ (Prasad, 1975; Chaitanya, 1991; Devalle, 1992), the state has also undertaken some measures of reform. These policies, including the reservation policy (Sinha, 1996), the tribal sub-plan and joint forest management (Prakash, 2001), the garibihatao and 20 point welfare program (Prasad, 1975; Das, 1986; Chaitanya, 1991; Prakash, 2001), aimed to improve the condition of the ‘oppressed exploited classes’ (Prasad, 1975; Das, 1986; D.N., 1988; Chaitanya, 1991).

As Mitra argues, the state draws strength from protest movements by creating new institutions and undertaking new policy initiatives responsive to the local demand, thereby broadening its political base (Mitra, 2002: 9-10). Thus, by the turn of the twenty first century ‘security’ and ‘well being of the population’ emerged as the primary rationalities of any government initiative especially those dealing with conflict resolution. Chatterjee (2004) conceives of the legacy of colonialism and the state-society distance in more critical terms, stressing continuities from colonialism not just in terms of institutions, but also in technologies of governmentality. Chatterjee joins other postcolonial authors in pointing out that the technology of governmentality in the colonial world predates the rise of the modern state. Indeed, the generation and export/import of governance practices to and from the colonies is a well-established phenomenon, showing how easily certain technologies can be transmitted to and from the external to the internal ‘other’. As Cohn (1996: 3-4) writes, “the projects of state

11 This and the following two paragraphs are taken verbatim from the contribution by JNU.
building in both countries – documentation, legitimation, classification, and bounding, and the institutions therewith – often reflected theories, experiences, and practices worked out originally in India and then applied in Great Britain and vice versa”. The colonial ‘ethnographic state’, argues Chatterjee, used such classification, description and enumeration of population groups as objects of governmental policy (Chatterjee, 2004: 36). After independence, in adopting governmental technologies of modernization and development, old ethnographic conceptions of the field of knowledge about population continued to shape the form of political demand and development policies in India (Chatterjee, 2004: p 37). This directs attention to a form of colonial domination and legacy that goes beyond institutional issues and emergency provisions, and concerns the role of representations and silencing in Orientalist forms of governance. As Ashish Nandy (1983) argued, the success of colonialism was built on much more than simple physical or institutional subjugation. It involved efforts at culturally subjugating the population of the colony in order to facilitate governance activities. Such practices are, of course, not specific to colonialism, and their contemporary effects are further discussed by many of the authors below.

Chatterjee builds on Foucault's discussion of governmentality, stating that the philosophical discussion on the rights of the citizen in a modern state hovered around the concept of liberty and equality mediated through the concepts of property and community. However, the emergence of mass democracies in advanced industrial societies created a new distinction between the 'citizens' and 'population'. Citizens inhabit the domain of theory and carry the ethical connotation of participation in the sovereignty of the state. Population, inhabiting the domain of policy, is descriptive, empirical, classifiable and amenable to statistical techniques of census and survey. It provides the government functionaries with a set of instruments that are amenable to rational structuring to reach the inhabitants as targets of their policies (Chatterjee, 2004: 34). Thus, the contemporary power regime seeks legitimacy not by the participation of citizens in the matters of state but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population. Thus, governance became less about matter of politics and more about administrative policies (ibid.: 34-35).

The State emphasizes well-being and security of population using governmental technologies, independent of considerations of participation by citizens in the sovereignty of the state (Chatterjee, 2004: 41). Similarly, Gordon referring to what Foucault termed as ‘strategic reversibility’ argues that the terms of governmental practices are turned into “focus of resistance” by groups of human population (Gordon, 1991:5). Jonathan Inda adds that particular agents negotiate the collective identity promoted by the practices before they embrace, adapt or discard them (2005:11). We can see how this reflects Mitra's concern with the new governmental rationalities regarding conflict resolution, but also Chakrabarty's account. The latter argues that the 1999 and 2004 elections in India clearly showed that success in elections does not depend on the ideological platform offered, and, moreover, that a strong ideological bent can even seriously disadvantage a given party (Chakrabarty, 2008:8-13). Instead, it is governance as performance that decides the outcome of elections with a strong role also for sub-national issues and identities.
Not everybody agrees with such a negative assessment. Corbridge, Williams, Veron and Srivastava (2005) caution against overemphasising the dark sides of governance. While they do not want to suggest that the technologies of rule always achieve their desired effects, they reject the assumption that they always fail by necessity, or that they always lead to higher levels of subjugation and control over the population. In order to provide a more sophisticated account of the way governance operates in India, they rely on James Scott's *Seeing Like a State*. As they argue, it is important to pay attention to the extent to which the effectiveness and actual operation of technologies of rule “depend on the manner in which they are interpreted and put into play by lower-level government workers, elected representatives and others”, while these technologies are also “seized upon, understood, reworked and possibly contested by differently placed people within the population of ‘the poor’ (or the rural poor in this book) in both civil and political society (ibid.: 7)”. As a consequence of this, they argue, it is a mistake to assume that the new modes of administration in India do not open up spaces and opportunities for the empowerment of the men and women whose participation they rely on, and whom they target. An important part of learning more about the actual operation of governance and governmentality is to investigate how the state itself is seen, experienced and understood by the diverse actors who are in some way in contact with it. In other words, instead of the focus of the previous analysis on a top-down view of how to govern the disorderly society, and how the targets of governance are perceived by those in power, the current work turns this view upside down, shifting attention to how governance agencies are seen by their targets, and how governance itself is transformed by the agency of its targets (ibid.: 8).

While Corbridge, Williams, Veron and Srivastava (2005) analyse politics through the interaction between the technologies of governance and the governed, a different take on politics and governance starts from a focus on the question of democracy, the second focal point listed at the beginning regarding the literature of governance in India. While India's reputation has a lot to do with it being the world's largest democracy, democracy faces significant challenges in such a plural and large society as India. The precariousness of democracy in India and in the wider South Asian region is demonstrated by de Souza, Palshikar and Yadav (2008). In their survey of democratic barometers in the region, they find that “unlike in many longstanding democracies, in South Asia an affirmation of democratic government does not lead to the negation of authoritarian options (ibid.: 87)”. Even if India is the most democratic country of the region, the proportion of weak democrats in the society is larger than those of the strong democrats, and the percentage of non-democrats is close to the regional average.

To get to the core of the problem with democracy, Knight, Chigudu and Tandon (2002) follow a similar approach to that of Scott by focusing on how citizens view governance. Their interest, however, is primarily participation, or how to place citizens at the centre of governance. The major problem identified by the authors is the withdrawal of citizens from participating in politics (for example in voting), a serious disconnect between the government and the governed, a failure of the presumed social contract. The major reason for such a condition, they contend, is that current thinking
about governance tends to focus on the role of civil society, while leaving out its most important components, the citizens themselves. Civil society is portrayed as a crucial third force apart from the state and markets that should include not only NGOs but also ordinary people and their views about society. In conclusion, they state that the revival of democracy depends on greater citizen involvement in the public domain.

The concern with the lack of politically engaged citizens also appears in Jayal's (2001) review of democracy in India. Stressing the importance of democratic institutions for the negotiation of cultural differences in such a plural society as India, Jayal argues for the necessity of strong civil society for the good performance of democracy. Democracy, therefore, should not be confined to areas concerning the state or the government, but it should be coextensive with the space of society, as a principle that governs all forms of collective life within it. Similarly, Tandon and Mohanty (2003) argue that good governance should not be seen as the exclusive responsibility of the state. Instead, what counts as good governance should be based on direct citizen participation in the relevant fora of decision-making.

In any case, the problem with current democratic governance in India seems to go beyond the lack of citizen's participation in the sense that it concerns inequalities regarding participation. There are many disempowered social groups along ethnic, class or gender lines who do not have a real voice in Indian society (c.f. Faizal and Swarna, 2005). A suggested path towards the empowerment and increased participation of marginalized social groups is offered in the form of participatory research (Kak and Tandon, 2007). Offering a critical perspective on current forms of governance, linking back to the above-mentioned, partly post-colonial sensitivities, Tandon (2002) identifies a particular way of knowledge-production at the heart of problems with governance. He challenges the dominant view that strictly distinguishes between knowledge-forms based on mental and manual labour, and thereby provides legitimation for elite control over the production and use of knowledge. The poor are not only denied access to knowledge or the means of producing knowledge, but they are also controlled and exerted power over by and through knowledge. In order to break this 'monopoly of knowledge' existing in society, he proposes participatory research as a way to social transformation, empowerment and increasing participation. Participatory research, as outlined by Tandon, presents ordinary people as researchers themselves, who are able to formulate and answer questions regarding the everyday challenges they face, an approach that has strong links with Jacques Rancière's political thought.

India, with all its problems, is still a vivid democracy, with strong links to transnational civil society. Moreover, as a developing country, it is also a target of programmes by a large number of international governmental and non-governmental organizations. It is not surprising, then, that the question of global governance, and its links to national and local democracy, governance and empowerment, also feature highly among the issues investigated in Indian governance literature.

Heather Mackenzie's edited volume (2009) is written with the conviction that a new, participative form of global democracy is emerging, and that this global civil society constitutes a new global power that can influence a wide range of multilateral bodies, making them more accountable, more transparent while having a similar
positive effect on civil society itself, both global and local. Nevertheless, the volume also offers some caveats regarding the optimism about global civil society, warning that while the power of transnationally allied civil society is increasing, there are disconcerting signs that it has lost its connections to its social roots and with the citizens in whose interests they claim to operate. In order to counter the resulting loss of credibility, legitimacy and accountability, the authors of the volume argue for a further democratization of the public sphere.

Another edited volume by Gaventa and Tandon (2010) offers a more sober and detailed view of the role of global governance in the everyday lives of citizens. They take issue with the view that the new global conditions of governance, the emergence of transnational social movements, the delinking of citizenship from territorial boundaries, and the increasing involvement of non-state actors in governance leads to a new sense of global citizenship deepening and expanding democratic participation and ensuring the realization of human rights. For some citizens, there are indeed more opportunities but, as they write, “for many other ordinary citizens, changes in global authority may have the opposite effect, strengthening the layers and discourses of power that limit the possibilities for their local action, and constraining – or, at least, not enabling – a sense of citizen agency (ibid.: 4)”. At the same time, this does not imply a complete lack of agency on the part of the excluded. These localized patterns of resistance, however, are not motivated by global solidarity and citizenship, but rather by the more immediate issues of survival and fragility.

The authors of the volume also find that globalized governance does not imply a diminishing role for the nation state. Instead of such replacement, global governance encompasses multiple arenas that often overlap and compete. The ongoing transformation in such a direction leads to multilayered and multidimensional identities of citizenship, which are not necessarily inclusive, and might actually reinforce axes for greater exclusion. It is argued that the difference between winners and losers of globalized governance may be found in different forms of mobilization, in the role of mediators and in the politics of knowledge.

An important contribution of the volume is that it does not only focus on how and with what success local concerns are channelled into the activities of transnational civil society, but also with how the global bears on the national and local level decision-making processes. For instance, Thekuddan (2010) documents how a new public-private partnership promoted by the Indian government in partnership with the multilateral company Unilever, which aimed at funding grassroots-level women's self-help groups, showed very little accountability in the direction of those whose lives its activities often significantly affected.

Corbridge, Williams, Veron and Srivastava (2005: 12), although themselves echoing such criticism, still aim to show that the different agencies of global governance are “contested institutions which do respond, in part, to the reports of their field officers, academics and, indeed, some activists and intended beneficiaries”. Since these institutions and civil society actors are capable of learning, they argue, the adequate response to their failures and shortcomings is for the marginalized and the poor to politically engage them.
6.2 Conflict transformation

India has a rich legacy of peace ideas and values, which provide both a tradition to follow and a standard to live up to. Many leading canons of Indian civilization exemplify the norms of intercommunity peace and global citizenship and have inspired a range of thoughts and movements during modern times. Mahatma Gandhi’s visions of nonviolent world order and Jawaharlal Nehru’s articulation of nonalignment in the twentieth century illustrate the remarkable lineage of India’s peace perspectives — an image that resonates in India’s contemporary policy statements as well as when it is criticized for disowning it (Upadhyaya, 2010). This tradition notwithstanding, there is a wide range of views regarding the transformation of conflicts in the current Indian literature, informed to a large extent by the conflict with Pakistan and by the presence of violent movements within India’s borders. This historical and cultural context is reflected in the Indian literature on conflict transformation regarding all the main issue areas addressed below: the causes of conflict, the nature of peace, the actors of conflict transformation and the methods thereof. What nevertheless links the diverse academic perspectives together is a strong critical bent, often with a post-colonial take on Western-inspired ideologies and practices of conflict resolution.

The transformation of conflicts is inseparable from a previous understanding regarding their causes and the nature of the peace that is to be attained. A strong strand in the Indian literature offers a critical take on the link between conflicts and the way contemporary political communities, and especially states, are organized. Gyanendra Pandey (2006) provides a narrative around and beyond the theme of violence exploring the relationship between the nation, its minorities and the modern state. He explicates how the production and reproduction of majorities and minorities is embedded in the anatomy and sustenance of contemporary political arrangements fraught with the routine violence around the issue of citizenship and community. In a similar manner, Amartya Sen (2006) locates the roots of violence in the reduction of multiple identities to a single identity in current political arrangements. Sen argues that sectarian violence often occurs when both sides are led by an illusion regarding what constitutes the ‘other’. Interrogating the stereotypes in discourses of multiculturalism, fundamentalism, terrorism and globalization, he underlines the imperatives of human freedom and a constructive global civil society. Having thus problematised the role of the contemporary state in conflict situations, it naturally follows that the desired conditions of peace should also be conceptualized beyond rebuilding the state or recreating a single national identity, and definitely cannot be equated by the simple cessation of physical violence.

One innovative take on conceptualizing peace in a different manner has been inspired by Amartya Sen’s (1999) theory of development as freedom, leading to a theory of ‘peace as freedom’. Jon Barnett (2008) has employed Sen’s theorization, especially his focus on agents and the state, to surmount many problems associated with Galtung’s vision of structural violence. Drawing on Sen’s ideas, Barnett’s theory of
'peace as freedom' focuses on the equitable distribution of economic opportunities, political freedoms, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, protective security and freedom from direct violence. This new theorization highlights the imperatives of pluralist institutions and agencies for providing and sustaining peace as freedom.

The task of critiquing and thus expanding the confines of peace discourse is also carried out by Ranabir Samaddar and his colleagues at Calcutta Research Group (CRG). The contributors in Samaddar and Reifeld (2001) interrogate the received notions about conflict and peace and present a template of a critical peace studies, which is informed by the awareness of human rights and justice. As they argue, it is only by contesting all values of authority through the valorisation of dialogue that peace acquires its own value. Samaddar’s edited series of four books published under the banner of South Asian Peace Studies (SAPS) address the politics of excluding justice and democracy from conflict resolution and peace studies discourses. Most of the essays in the four volumes challenge the narrow understanding of peace as conflict management and underline the need to include the historical and socio-political realities of the colonial and post-colonial world. The essays in the inaugural volume of the series (Samaddar, 2004) introduce the concept, scope and themes of peace studies and lay bare the inadequacies of current western liberal understanding on peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Samaddar offers an alternative vision by making a case for a transformation from conflict management to peace, from national security to human security, from revenge to reconciliation, and from rights to justice. The second volume edited by Samir Das (2005) provides a useful morphology of violence and conflicts in the process. The contributors, while analysing varied aspects of peace, accords raise critical questions about the issues and ideologies embedded in the peace process and suggest that a sustainable peace process must draw on the predicates of rights, justice, and democracy. The third volume, edited by Paula Banerjee (2008) narrates the experiences of women as agents and visionaries of peace in South Asia. The articles in the collection redefine peace as a quest for women to transform their position in society by ending the repression across caste, class, race and gender lines. The fourth volume deals with human rights institutions in this region. This edited volume by Ujjwal Kumar Singh (Singh, 2009) looks at the conceptual and practical transformation of peace, showing how the respect for human rights is innately linked to the concept of peacebuilding. The contributors investigate the lineage of human rights to reveal how people’s struggles against specific forms of institutionalized violence take the form of calls for ‘peace’. In order to identify possible new pathways to conflict management, it is argued to be necessary to highlight the perspective of justice instead of a predominant perspective of national security. Instead, the issue of displacement, humanitarian problems, human security and human rights should be at the core of peacebuilding. In this connection, there is also a need to study the phenomenon of state violence (Banerjee, Chaudhury and Das, 2005; Das, 2008; Hazarika, 2000; Hazarika, 1994).

Throughout these abovementioned contributions, two major points are stressed. On the one hand, there is a perceived need for widening the concept of peace, including the questions of freedom (as capacities and opportunities), justice and rights as well as democracy, class, race and gender. At the same time many point to the inadequacy of
any direct application of Western concepts and practices of peace. The latter point has
been stressed in a wider context by others, including Ganguli (1996), who, drawing on
his research on Asian security, contends that the liberal peace may not be relevant, or at
least must be heavily qualified outside of the West.

This, of course, casts shadows on any external intervention into conflict
transformation processes. Dasgupta and Gopinath (2001), for example, focus on the
feasibility and risks of external intervention and argue that innovative and sustainable
techniques for conflict resolution must be explored before seeking military intervention
within the framework of conventional realpolitik. One aspect of such realpolitik is that it
favours states, or at least those aspiring to a role in the state, as the main actors in
conflict resolution. The Indian literature on conflict transformation, however, prefers to
shift some emphasis to non-state actors.

Foremost of these is civil society. Ashutosh Varshney (2002), in his pioneering
study on India, has shown that the prior existence of social networks of civic
engagement across communal lines is the key to prevent violence. In his subsequent
writing he further explores the possible links between civil society and ethnic conflict on
a global template (Varshney, 2003). This contests the instrumentalist emphasis on
political agency, ideology and pressures for explaining the acts of ethnic violence as
explicated by Paul Brass (2003) in his earlier work. In a similar vein Priyankar Upadhyaya
(2010) has traced the imperceptible ways in which cultural dimensions and multi-
religious interaction may contribute to the peace building process in urban centres
where the episodes of communal /ethnic violence have occurred with greater frequency
in recent times. Within civil society, NGOs also receive special attention, their role in
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction portrayed rather positively by Raghavan
(2008). Yet another innovative area around which we find emerging peace perspectives
is the contribution of diaspora actors in peacebuilding and resolving conflicts in their
homeland, a phenomenon that has been explored by Ashok Swain (2009).

Civil society is, thus, often seen in a rather positive light, as an important factor
both in democratization and conflict resolution. This is understandably in tune with the
current emphasis on civil society by global multilateral agencies. The literature in this
regard continues to be dominated by a patently modernist understanding of civil society
according to which civil society is supposed to be (i) an ‘inclusive space’ cutting across
identities and ethnic boundaries (Mishra, 2010) and (ii) a space that also sets democratic
‘deliberation’ in motion (Biswas and Thomas, 2006). Such an understanding refuses to
trace the roots of civil society in the existing society, even though it is there where civil
society is linked to its sources of power and interests, and to the continuing ethnic, class
and other divisions in society.

Moreover, most of the arguments about the role of civil society are more
normative than descriptive/evaluative, and do not squarely tackle the question of how
such a civil society could come into existence in a conflict-torn region. To that end, the
sort of micro-histories of peacebuilding that Das (2007) draws attention to might
provide a useful analytical tool, as well as the works of Banerjee (2008), Dutta and
Vernal (2009). Designating this phenomenon as the ‘unofficial’ peace process, the
monograph on Civil Society, Conflict and Peace (Das, 2007) raises the question of why
this unofficial process is never brought to bear on the official process. The answer provided stresses that very often the so-called civil society that appears in the (post-)conflict setting is unable to make much headway because of its separation from the actual society whose fate it tries to influence. In other words, it is not representative of the wishes, aspiration and interests of the affected societies, but exists as an additional layer over the conflict, operating often with legitimacy only in the eyes of the circles external to the exact conflict environment.

Within the classes of actors that can offer a potentially important contribution to the resolution of conflicts, special emphasis is placed in the Indian literature on women, who have been conspicuously missing in the conventional understanding of war as well as peace. Most traditional narratives would rather confine women’s role as the worst victims of war. In contemporary literature, in contrast, their role is underlined both in terms of the necessity of widening the concept of peace by the inclusion of gender-related forms of (structural) violence, and in terms of the traditional role of women in practices aiming at peace and reconciliation. Most of the recent writings linking gender and peace draw on a holistic vision of peace defying the narrow confines of the statist notion of security and highlighting instead the truth of everyday insecurities in South Asian women. For instance, Satbeer Chhabra (2006) describes how women living along the Indo-Pak border suffer direct/indirect physical and psychological violence of dislocation, fragmentation of family, loss of the men folk, double burden of survival and care of the family. Peace in this wider sense is construed not merely as a derivative of war but as a quest to end all manifestations of oppression cutting across caste, class, race and gender lines. This in turn offers interesting intersections with such related issues as the gendered reconfigurations of the state, power/knowledge systems, sexuality, care, labour and the implications of globalization for people’s security. Anuradha Mitra Chenoy and Achin Vanaik (2001) have interrogated the feminization of perspectives pertaining to matters of national security and whether altering the gender balance in those decision making structures concerned with peace, security and conflict resolution make a significant difference.

Apart from such an enlarged scope of concerns in terms of peace, the literature also highlights the contribution of women across cultures in forging coexistence, peace protests, and creating public constituencies in favour of peace in the neighbourhood, streets, villages and even on international borders. In recent years the role of women in peace process has been highlighted by scholars and peace activists throughout the world. Several Indian writers joined the global stream of scholarship in highlighting gender perspectives in conflict analysis and peacebuilding discourses. While some looked into the impact and transformations on gender relations during and after the conflict, many focused on the role of women in peace-making, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. These feminist perspectives posed fundamental questions to the hitherto dominant concepts of peace and security and offered many alternative visions, many of which were rooted and nurtured in South Asia. Rita Manchanda (2001) in her edited volume presents multiple narratives in which women have coped with conflict situations in South Asia. Showcasing experience ranging from Armed Virgin of the LTTE to Naga Mothers, these essays transcend the victimhood discourse to explore
women's agency in the peace process. These well conceived narratives also show how social conflicts at times inadvertently create favourable public spaces leading to desirable structural transformation for the empowerment of women. Some of the contributors have examined the experiences of women during the post-conflict period, showing the predicament of women activists recruited for instrumental reasons during the conflict and how they are driven back again to their traditionally marginalized role as the peace process begins. The edited volume suggests that mere engagement of women in conflict does not per se offer any transformation from gender perspectives. The edited book is hailed as a path-braking contribution as it opens new entry points for the researcher to use an ongoing conflict to renegotiate oppressive gender, caste and other hierarchies both conceptually and practice. Paula Banerjee (2008) in her edited volume explores peace in experiential terms and draws from the quotidian experience of women in building peace and justice around their community. The volume on the whole traces the generic links both conceptual and material between the transformative feminist politics and the problematising of the gendered binary of war and peace. The role of women in negotiations and peace initiatives is researched in an edited volume by Radhika Coomaraswamy and Dilrukshi Fonseka (2004). Similarly Urvashi Butalia's edited volume (2002) builds on the everyday lives of Kashmiri women in the protracted violent conflict and how it has affected them whether as victims, agents, or perpetrators. The book makes a convincing case that any negotiations for sustainable peace must include women as core participants.

Beside the nature of the peace to be pursued and the actors who should be at the centre of this activity, the methodology of peacebuilding is another contentious area. If there is some agreement in the literature about the need for a broad conception of peace beyond the cessation of physical violence and about the involvement of a similarly wide range of actors, there still remains the question as to how to implement such a comprehensive and inclusive transformation of conflict. The dominant way of trying to achieve this has been through development, which is often regarded in India as a panacea to conflict, a view that can be found in the work of a section of think tanks and policy advocates such as Gulshan Sachdeva (2000), H. N. Das (2002) and others. Baruah (1999, 2005), for instance, points out how the new policy of connecting the region with its transnational neighbours is likely to solve its chronic problems ('durable disorder' as he describes it) of conflict, violence and insurgency. Yet, many others see development as insufficient in itself to address the wide-ranging issues that should be included in conflict resolution. Dutta et al. (2010), for one, advocate that development should be always closely linked to a concern with human security, linking the issue back to the broadening of the concept of peace.

The emphasis on development has come under criticism for it reduces those affected by the conflict to simple receivers without them participating in influencing the direction taken by the post-conflict arrangement (Samaddar and Banerjee, 2010; Das, 2008). A similar argument can be raised against the focus on good governance as long as it is conceived as a technical and institutional solution to the perceived malfunctions in society. As Baruah (2009) puts it: “... except for a rhetorical nod, substantive measures for building and nurturing institutions of good governance scarcely feature in the policy
agenda of Indian counter-insurgency experts or believers in a development fix”. This calls for what Baruah (1999) earlier described as ‘alternative institutional imagination’ and recasting India’s federal relations in a way that provides for ‘institutional accommodation to its subnational communities’. The results of implementing the institutions of good governance, these authors warn, depend largely on how these institutions are imagined in the first place.

With the recent successes of the Indian state in pacifying some of its peripheries, some argue that the democratic agenda becomes the largest casualty. The most important question is how to consolidate the peace constituency and turn it into a form of social power so that the democratic agenda can be brought back and pushed through in public discourses. Dutta et al (2010), Samaddar and Banerjee (2010), and Das (2008) chronicle a number of contemporary people’s movements particularly on such humanitarian issues as displacement, resource crisis, transparency in governance etc., which have been successful in bringing often otherwise conflicting communities together. They contend that the future of today’s peace agenda lies not in pacification but in democracy in its participatory form. In view of the above, there is a need for multi-layered, multiple-level dialogues. Dialogues held with the insurgents only are argued to be insufficient in themselves for a sustainable peace, and instead the process of dialogue should be broadened to include the wider society, incorporating its more general peace-building capacity. The literature also points out however, that in India the government usually views all kinds of initiatives for dialogues as anti-state and therefore suspicious (Samaddar, 2004).

One specific methodology explored in the recent literature is the use of problem solving workshops and ethnographic methods to contribute to both the theoretical and the practical aspects of peacebuilding. Contributions here range from the evaluation of the long-term impact of problem solving workshops on attitudes and behaviours of conflicting parties (Malhotra and Liyanage, 2006) and an exploration of Galtung’s Transcend Method in the Indian context (Gulrez, 2004), to providing ready-made conflict resolution simulations which could be used as a role-play exercises in classroom and practical training for conflict resolution (Kumar: 2009).

As a means of conflict transformation, one can also mention a method that builds more directly on Gandhi’s heritage and more specifically on his vision of Shanti Sena (unarmed peace brigades), which, according to Gandhi, should wage peace much like war is waged. Thomas Weber (Weber, 2006) retracts the lineage of Shanti Sena from its inception to the acrimonious debates between Jai Prakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave where the former favoured peacekeeping against Vinoba’s endorsement of peace-building functions of Shanti Sena. The impulse of Shanti Sena is being carried forward by Radhakrishnan (1997) – a scholar-turned activist who has produced a series of books and training manuals to mobilize youth towards nonviolent activism in different parts of the world.
7. Conclusion

Having reviewed a wide range of literature, ranging from conflict resolution and conflict transformation, peacebuilding and statebuilding, to governance, both in European and North American, as well as in Indian literature, it is important to re-emphasise what the contribution CORE is making to these various strands of literatures is. As noted at the beginning of this review, the foundations of the project are rooted in several fields. CORE’s contribution to these fields and its uniqueness is twofold. First, it explores conflict governance in unconventional ways and aims to bridge the currently existing gap by analysing the dynamics on the ground, bringing in the role of the local actors. Second, and equally important, is the comparative element of the project, which does not solely include case studies both from Europe and India, but also consults and aims to talk to the literature from both sides.
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