Challenging the more conventional approaches to dislocation and resettlement that are the usual focus of discussion on the topic, this book offers a unique theory of dislocation in the form of primitive accumulation.

Interrogating the ‘reformist–managerial’ and ‘radical–movementist’ approaches, it historicizes and politicizes the event of dislocation as a moment to usher in capitalism through the medium of development. Such a framework offers alternative avenues to rethinking dislocation and resettlement, and indeed the very idea of development. Arguing that dislocation should not be seen as a necessary step towards achieving progress – as it is claimed in the development discourse – the authors show that dislocation emerges as a socio-political constituent of constructing capitalism.

This book will be of interest to academics working on development studies, especially on issues relating to the political economy of development and globalization.

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**Preface**

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To increase the accuracy of planetary theory, Ptolemy’s successors added epicycles to epicycles and eccentrics to eccentrics, exploiting the immense versatility of the fundamental Ptolemaic technique. But, paraphrasing Thomas Kuhn, *they seldom or never sought fundamental modifications of that technique*. The problem of the planets had simply become a problem of design, a problem to be attacked principally by the rearrangement of existing elements. In adding more and more circles, Ptolemy’s successors had simply been ‘patching and stretching’ the Ptolemaic system to force its conformity with observations; the very necessity of such patching and stretching was showing that a radically new approach was imperatively required. Even a single observation incompatible with theory demonstrates that one has perhaps been employing the wrong theory all along. The existing conceptual scheme must therefore be abandoned and replaced. Hence, to Copernicus, the behaviour of the planets was incompatible with the two-sphere universe. However, what to us is now ‘patching and stretching’ was to Ptolemy’s successors a ‘natural process of adaptation and extension’. Such is the mental groove; such is the anatomy of (scientific) belief; such is the cognitive enslavement.

To attend to and address the injustice of gross physical displacement and subtle dislocations of forms of life as a consequence of development projects, the mainstream has added to the given of ‘development + displacement/dislocation’ compensation packages and resettlement measures. To increase the accuracy of structures of compensation and resettlement, they have added epicycles to epicycles and eccentrics to eccentrics; *seldom have they sought fundamental modifications of their technique*. To them, the problem of displacement/dislocation has simply become a problem of design, a problem to be attacked principally by the endless rearrangement of existing structures of compensation and resettlement. In perfecting the given structure of compensation and resettlement, the mainstream has simply been ‘patching and stretching’ our conformity with the given of ‘development + displacement/dislocation’. The point, however, is to think of a radically new approach to development + displacement/dislocation.

*Perhaps we have been employing the wrong theory all along!*
The existing conceptual scheme that accepts development + displacement/dislocation as given and tries to temper it by compensation and resettlement must be abandoned and replaced. However, what is now ‘patching and stretching’ to us is a ‘natural process of adaptation and extension’ to the mainstream. Such is the cognitive enslavement. The point therefore is to question the very given of development + displacement/dislocation; to question the very logic of development that produces dislocation, and that is inalienably tied to dislocation; to question the very logic of capitalist development that has its origin in primitive accumulation, which is constitutively constituted by the violence of expropriation and appropriation.

Both authors would like take this opportunity to acknowledge their students who have attended courses premised around questions of capital, development, community and subjectivity and who have contributed to the thinking in this book. Some students in the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS, Bangalore) and the Department of Economics, University of Calcutta – Zainab Baawa, Meera Moorkoth, Nisha Mary Mathew, Bitasta Das, Ranjini Krishnan, Rakhi Ghoshal, Girija K.P., Krishna Haresh, Ganesh Kodoth, Elizabeth Thomas, Diptarup Chaudhury, Shashikala Sreenivasan, Richa Shukla, Nivedita Mondal and Pratiksha Banerjee – especially need to be acknowledged. Special thanks are due to Byasdeb Dasgupta of Kalyani University, Rajesh Bhattacharyaa of Jogamaya College, Calcutta University, and Vivek Dhareshwar, Ashish Rajadhyaksha and S.V. Srinivas of CSCS. Thanks are due to the two anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments. We are grateful to Dorathea Schaefter and Suzanne Chilestone of Routledge for their constant help on all matters of writing and compilation. Anirban Chattopadhyay of Anandabazaar Patrika deserves more than mere acknowledgement.

Asha Achuthan of the Centre for Contemporary Studies, Indian Institute of Science and Ranjita Biswas of the School of Women’s Studies, Jadavpur University have incessantly stressed the need for critical awareness of violence – from its complex lamellas in everyday life to a version that is subtle and surreptitious; they have also emphasized the need to feminize both Development and Marxism; we thank them both for offering insights into the ethico-political and ‘standpoint theory’. The authors would also like to acknowledge Tejaswini Niranjana of the Higher Education Cell, CSCS for drawing our attention to the need for critical inter-disciplinarity; in this sense this is a work in ‘interdisciplinary economics’, where economics meets psychoanalysis and political philosophy; in another sense, this work has humbly attempted the inauguration of a new field or theme of research: Dislocation Studies and possible politics around this field or theme.
1 Debates on dislocation, compensation and resettlement

What does our approach contribute?

Conflicts and wars among humans and also natural calamities have been the cause of dislocation since time immemorial. However, the advent of ‘development-connected dislocation’ as a global phenomenon is relatively new, having gathered particular force since the advent of the industrial revolution. What is stunning about these forms of dislocation, economic or otherwise, is the momentous scale on which they appear. Because of its disturbing forms and its momentous scale, dislocation had come to occupy a central position in policy debates and in politics by the end of the twentieth century, and threatens to remain so in this century. However, it is also true that ‘while people pushed out of their homes by an earthquake or war may be favorably viewed by the media or international aid agencies, the victims of development-induced dislocation frequently win no such sympathy. This is so despite the fact that the negative effects of development-induced dislocation may be every bit as grave as those faced by people displaced by other forces’ (Robinson 2004).

Why? The answer seems to reside in the positive value that is attached to development-connected dislocation. While the term development started to be deployed in the 1940s, its genealogy can be traced to colonialism/the civilizing mission’ (Escobar 1995). From the colonial period to the post-colonial period, a belief has gathered strength that dislocation in the present era is paradoxically contributing to growth and to the ultimate development of society. This understanding of development-as-growth emanating out of initial moments of dislocation has reached the proportion of a consensus among the mainstream community of development thinkers including policy makers. At times, even activists structure their language of resistance over dislocation in terms of this consensus. Against this consensus, there have also been sceptics, who have argued against the positive value attributed to development-connected dislocation; they have also portrayed dislocation and, by default, development that causes dislocation as unethical and unjust. It is to this myriad, contested and divided space of development-connected dislocation that the book is dedicated.

While the book focuses on the sources, forms, policies and solutions of development-connected dislocation, it is worthwhile gauging its importance by briefly recognizing its scale. As is evident from the huge empirical literature that has surfaced, the scale of development-connected dislocation, in both
absolute and relative terms, is simply staggering (Fernandes and Ganguly-Thukral 1989; Oliver-Smith 1991; Ganguly-Thukral 1992; McCully 1996; Stein 1998; Dwivedi 1999; Cernea 1999; Parusuraman 1999; Asif 2000). In the era of liberalization and globalization, the expansion of the private sector in a big way has not only increased demand for land, but has also changed somewhat the manner of its expropriation; there has been a further turn towards privatization of property – privatization of land, water bodies, forests, hills and mountains, and minerals deep inside ‘mother earth’. This means more dislocation in the livelihoods of those displaced and also a tectonic shift in the social landscape of affected societies.

Here is a rough estimate. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has shown that, due to large dams alone:

nearly 40–80 million people have been displaced worldwide. In China alone by the late 1980s some 10.2 million people were officially recognized as ‘reservoir resettlers’. Unofficial estimates by Chinese scholars suggest that the actual number is much higher (China Report 1999). All these figures are at best only careful estimations and include mostly those whose homes and/or lands were flooded by water reservoirs; millions more are likely to have been displaced due to other aspects of dam projects such as canals, powerhouses, and associated compensatory measures such as nature reserves.

WCD (2000: 1)

Taking off from a number of reports and works, an ActionAid paper suggests that planned development in India immediately after independence, especially the growth of core sectors such as power, mining, heavy industry and irrigation, displaced at least 30 to 50 million people; only about 25 per cent of this number was resettled and the rest either died or took the road to poverty. If urban dislocation is included, the figure would increase further (Fernandes and Paranjpye 1997: 6); and all this took place in the name of the national interest and ‘for the ultimate good of all’ –

If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country …
Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking to villagers who were to be displaced by the Hirakud dam, 1948, in Roy (2001: 47, 263)

Moreover, enough evidence exists to suggest that government figures across countries greatly underestimate the number of dislocated people (Ganguly-Thukral 1992; Cernea 1996; McCully 1996). Whether due to the setting up of dams, industrial platforms or industrial enterprises, the main losers in development projects are those existing far away from the urban hub with forms of life that are quite different. To highlight the relative effects of dislocation, Arundhuti Roy shows that, following dam-related development projects, a:

huge percentage of the displaced are Adivasis (57.6 per cent in the case of the Sardar Sarovar dam). Include Dalits and the figure becomes obscene.
According to the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, it’s about sixty per cent. If you consider that Adivasis account for only eight per cent and Dalits another fifteen per cent of India’s population, it [is as if] India’s poorest people are subsidizing the lifestyle of the richest.

Roy (2001: 62); see also Fernandes and Paranjpye (1997: 18–19)

Other than affecting the disadvantaged in the ethno-racial and caste hierarchy, effects of dislocation have affected gender relations too, resulting in the ‘relative deprivation of women’. Following dislocation, women more often than not lose informal or customary rights and control over resources. They are also subjected to male bias in the design and implementation of any rehabilitation package and that includes differential treatment in the determination of compensation packages (compensation packages tend to favour male losers and landowners who are usually male) (Colson 1999; Mehta and Srinivasan 1999; Mehta and Gupte 2003). Consequently, resulting from dislocation and the andro-centric bias associated with the compensation/rehabilitation package, the disempowerment and subordination of women tends to deepen; also resulting from the andro-centric bias, the qualitative specificity of the loss that women suffer due to dislocation is usually missed by policy makers. Thus, the importance of development-connected dislocation can be gauged not simply from the absolute scale of its staggering effect (epitomizing violence, disempowerment and marginalization). One must also account for the differential impacts within the groups of dislocated (keeping differentials of gender, caste, etc. in mind) and also between the dislocated as a whole (the losers) and the developers (the gainers).

Across the globe, from Asia to Africa to Latin America and at times even in the heartland of the so-called North, the absolute and relative scale and effects of development-connected dislocation have catapulted dislocation to a vexed contemporary issue. It has forced a debate on its causal origin (whether development should be held responsible for dislocation or not) and the remedy/solution (whether overcoming the effects of dislocation require a socio-political movement or is a policy-based solution enough).

In order to understand the approach of nation-states to development-connected dislocation, it would be revealing to peruse the response of the Indian state. Two features stand out in this response: (i) the domain of policy remains bureaucratized in a top-down manner that works by, comprehensively or partially, excluding the targeted populace from the varied instances of policy making; and (ii) (capitalist) development is accepted as inevitable and, hence, by default, dislocation as a side-effect of that particular form of development is considered inevitable; dislocation is to be tolerated; at most, its ill-effects are to beTempered through compensation–resettlement, but the pursuit of the calendar of development must continue unabated.

While there is no national resettlement policy, land acquisition in India is covered by a national law, the 1894 Land Acquisition Act (LAA) and its subsequent amendments.³ The LAA allows land acquisition in the national
interest for water reservoirs, canals, plants, fly-ash ponds, transmission lines and highways to be carried out by the individual states, in accordance with its provisions. In post-independence India, it was also used by the state to deliver land to developers and enterprises (state and private) to set up industrial enterprises. Under the LAA, compensation is in cash for the loss of land, and also for other productive assets (such as standing crops, fruit and fodder trees), house plots and residences. Thus, within the ambit of the LAA, development (and by default dislocation) remains unquestioned. In the meantime, many organizations in India have lobbied for a national rehabilitation policy. Through these movements against dislocation, various issues such as the right to livelihood, the right to housing, the right to education as well as customary rights of communities have resurfaced. The Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment formulated the National Policy for the Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons and drafted the Land Acquisition Bill in 1998. The policy recognized the need to rehabilitate people. Unfortunately, the bill locates rehabilitation in the statute book by mentioning that, where a law exists, those eligible for rehabilitation should make a claim for it. In the process, no fully fledged law came into existence. The National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, 2003, was gazetted on 17 February 2004. The Union Cabinet gave its approval for the National Policy on Rehabilitation and Resettlement, 2007, to replace the National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, 2003. Only three states, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab, had state-wide resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) policies. Other states have issued government orders or resolutions, sometimes sector-wide but more often for specific projects. Two national companies, the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Coal India Limited (CIL), have also completed and issued R&R policies consistent with World Bank recommendations. In all these sketchily drawn policy turns, two aspects stand out: (i) (capitalist) development remains legitimate and, by default, development-connected dislocation remains unquestioned; (ii) the targeted populace remains outside the domain of policy making.

The context, objective and framework of this book

There has been an explosion of empirical literature on dislocation, almost akin to an ‘incitement to discourse’ (Foucault 1990). Without cutting in any way into their importance, we want to state clearly that it is not our area of concern in this book. Of course, we do remain informed by such studies. However, in this book, we look more into the conceptual framework that underlines such studies. In fact, as we understand, many of these empirical studies operate with(in) a particular framework, a framework that serves as the background of such studies; each study is coloured by a perspective. As of now, the dominant framework remains that of ‘economics of compensation’ and the World Bank-led discourse on dislocation pioneered primarily by Michael Cernea. Nevertheless, such discourses seem to be so much in fashion that it
threatens to fix beforehand the way we learn to talk about dislocation and to seek remedies. Overwhelmingly, these studies take either of these two approaches as the point of reference and departure in their empirical expedition. Our critical engagement in this book is thus with underlying frameworks: the frameworks of such studies; it is with frameworks concerning dislocation, particularly the World Bank’s à la Cernea’s approach; it is also with hidden perspectives. Such an engagement also has practical significance as dislocation has come to occupy one of the crucial nodes of development policy. With policy framing ultimately based on a particular understanding of dislocation, the perspective and framework adopted for viewing dislocation matters; it matters regarding the manner in which the policy makers will seek remedies. For us, certain perspectives and frameworks make certain things apparent; certain other frameworks make certain things obvious; certain frameworks miss certain things; and most importantly, certain frameworks tend to occult—occlude certain other things. Hence, the question of perspective and framework is crucial, even more crucial because new-fangled perspectives – perspectives ‘that could help describe the dominant in terms different than its own’ – can make room for radically different standpoints (Achuthan 2005).

For us, critical reflection on the framework of dislocation stems from a Marxian perspective. From the adopted Marxian perspective, we try to rethink dislocation and resettlement in the context of development and offer an alternative route to contemplate the somewhat vexed issues concerning these. Because our Marxian perspective tries to think of the relation of dislocation with the logic of development and rethink resettlement in that context, it ends up queering (‘making strange the familiar’) the concept of development itself. Far from detaching the logic of development from the logic of dislocation, as is the case with the dominant approaches, we make their inalienable association the focus and locus of our discussion. More specifically, our Marxian critique of development-connected dislocation takes off ‘from the perspective of the excluded as resource’, where ‘class understood as surplus labour’ and ‘world of the third’ are the excluded resources. In the process, it helps ‘describe the dominant in terms different than its own, and also point to other possibilities’. Such a Marxian perspective is, for us, an ‘act of interpretation’ that puts to work a radically different standpoint (Achuthan et al. 2007: vii).

The Marxian perspective on development-connected dislocation builds on four sources: (i) the class-focused Marxian theory of economy, transition, development and hegemony that, unlike and in opposition to the determinism and historicism of the modes of production approach (an approach that is paradigmatic of historical materialism or of classical Marx-ism), inaugurates a non-determinist and non-historicist discursive terrain; (ii) Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation which, in our view, put forward the first methodical theory of dislocation even though it has since remained remarkably absent from the mainstream discussion on dislocation; (iii) the post-developmentalist approach that helped turn our attention to the ‘cognitive enslavement’ that is peculiar to colonialism, an enslavement marked by ‘orientalism’, an
enslavement that is not only a feature of the ‘civilizing mission’ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but of the development discourse of post-independence societies such as India as well; and (iv) the empirical literature on dislocation, mentioned earlier, that has offered us valuable insights into what emerges as the ‘observable phenomenon’ in a study of dislocation, what is internalized into any explanation of causes and forms of dislocation, and also what is missed and what is occulted—occluded within any proposed theory of dislocation and resettlement. While none of these sources is sufficient for explaining dislocation, they are combined in our work through their expansions and their displacements, and also through the introduction of new concepts; such a move helps to shape an altogether different theory of development-connected dislocation and of resettlement.

From third world to world of the third

One concept that plays a particularly crucial role in our examination of development-connected dislocation is that of world of the third. World of the third as conceptually different and distinct from the given of third world; world of the third as invoked to differentiate the ‘space of dislocation’ from the space marked by the category ‘third world’. World of the third as produced out of a Marxian theorization of (global) capitalism, where world of the third is that which is outside the ‘circuits of (global) capital’; whereas third world as produced out of an orientalist understanding of the South is that which is the lacking underside of Western modern industrial capitalism. One is the outside; the other is the lacking underside. What is this space, this form of life that is getting dislocated? Is it the outside of (global) capitalism? Or is it the lacking underside? If it is the outside, perhaps it needs to be valued; why not—even taken care of. If it is the lacking underside—retrograde, backward and definitionally poverty ridden—it is perhaps not too unfair to displace—dislocate it, and also dispense of it for the larger cause of development—progress.

In the hegemonic discourse of development, third world comes to stand in for the category of the retrograde Southern ‘local’; and the hegemonic can then define development in terms of a certain transition of third world, a transition bordering on its ultimate dissolution. Once hemmed in by the category third world, once incarcerated within its infinite reiteration, one loses sight of an outside; one loses sight of the world of the third. Enslaved cognitively within the category third world, one does not get to appreciate the possibility of an outside to the circuits of global capital, where the world of the third is such an outside. Instead, what awaits us as third world is a devalued space, a lacking underside that needs to be transgressed—transformed—mutilated in the name of development. Contained cognitively by the category third world, there is no escape from the ‘truth’ perpetuated by the hegemonic that development-induced dislocation is inevitable. Tragically, even those who oppose the hegemonic discourse of development remain incarcerated by the category of third world; the only difference is that they would want to hold onto it in a
somewhat sympathetic mould rather than see it wither away as part of a developmentalist imperative.

Building on our earlier work (Chakrabarti et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Chakrabarti and Dhar 2008b, 2008c), we seek to contest this ‘truth’ and do so through the invocation of the concept ‘world of the third’, which is, in turn, irreducible to the experience-occluding concept ‘third world’. Third world is that category through which the worldview of the world of the third is occluded—occulted from the discursive terrain so that the development logic can function unabated. The secret ing out, the repudiation, the foreclosure of world of the third is achieved through the paradoxical foregrounding of the third world, such that world of the third is talked about as the third world.

For us, the phenomenon of dislocation visualized from the perspective of the world of the third appears very different from that visualized from the perspective of the third world. From the perspective of the world of the third, from the perspective of this resilient, this conceptually immutable space, this ‘state of exception’, this exception to the ‘camp of global capital’,5 dislocation is evil; dislocation is a problem; it is a process of dismantling and eroding forms of life and possibilities of living that thrive outside and beyond the circuits of global capital, that throw up principles different from capitalism’s internal principles and its associated bio-political social life. While from the perspective of the third world, dislocation is a necessity, at most a necessary evil.

In tandem with the four sources mentioned earlier, distinguishing the world of the third from the third world is crucial for de-familiarizing the given ideal of development and also for taking the imagination of development–dislocation–resettlement to an altogether different terrain, an alternative terrain. While even the non-determinist and the non-historicist Marxian methodology does not allow a claim to a theory of dislocation as being singularly ‘true’, nevertheless, its quite unique perspective sensitizes us to effects and possibilities that remain purloined in the existing literature on dislocation, and which hopefully would help to further enrich the already growing understanding of the topic, both epistemologically and ethico-politically.

Before putting down the contour and the crux of the rethinking of development–dislocation to be discussed in the book, it would be pertinent to clarify the reason for choosing the term ‘dislocation’ and not ‘displacement’ as is usually referred to in the current literature.

From displacement to dislocation

Dwivedi (2002) argues that the naming of the ‘phenomenon of expropriating space’ flows from the discursive framework that informs such naming and is deployed to position the moment of expropriation of space in a certain way. ‘The prevalence of certain concepts signifies not just a desire to communicate meanings but also to frame a problem in a particular manner’ (2002: 715); and such framing determines thereafter how the phenomenon would be looked at and made sense of. In this context, the term ‘displacement’ has a
particular ‘history’, a history of the evolution of the term and its deployment; the term also has an embedded-ness within a particular ‘structure of terms’, where the structure of terms in turn determines what sense the term makes and how it makes sense. The inescapable historicity and structurality of the term ‘displacement’ is tied to the manner in which the phenomenon of expropriating space has evolved in the context of the hegemonic discourse of development, one in which the World Bank has played a leading role. Let us explain why we remain wary of the category displacement.

Dwivedi argues that the category of displacement in development discourse is addressed in relation to its associated category ‘involuntary resettlement’.

On the face of it, it simply conveys that the movement of people in displacement is not voluntary. But what the concept achieves is perhaps nothing short of a political objective. It engulfs the act of displacement and all questions on it. Displacement is cast as an operation of physically relocating people.

Dwivedi (2002: 715–16)

In contrast to the mainstream understanding of displacement, where displacement is about ‘involuntary resettlement’ or about ‘physically relocating people’, we want to look for a naming that will represent the act and the phenomenon in all its complexities. Away from the managerial–technocratic positioning that seeks to displace the problem to exclusively relocating people, this act for us underlies the socio-historical basis of the formation of capitalist development, of the origin-moment of capitalist development. It represents for us the phenomenon of expropriating space so as to usher in capitalism, usher it in through the discourse of development. Development is the masquerade for ushering in capitalism in the South. Thus for us, in sharp contrast to displacement, the term ‘dislocation’ helps to represent the phenomenon we want to highlight. For us, the phenomenon of expropriation is more than the expropriation of space or land; it is for us expropriation of forms of life; and hence, it is more than just about physically relocating people. Recounting the experience of displacement and resettlement of the people of Korba in Chhattisgarh, Dhagamwar et al. (2003: 282) observe:

The establishment’s vision is static and blinkered. … Unfortunately, not even the activists are thinking. If one thinks of modern development as creating more fundamental changes in land use than before, one will not just ask questions about individual or discrete displacement. It becomes meaningless to ask who has lost land, or whose livelihood is affected by the change. To be meaningful, rehabilitation must not consider only individuals or the family losing assets. It has to look at the whole social structure that is being demolished. It is a question of lifestyle in the truest sense of the world. This change in land use is a civilizational change, a millennial change. It must be treated as such.
Dislocation, rather than displacement, helps us get at the more subtle understanding of expropriation we want to forward in this book, an understanding that tries to highlight the polymorphous forms in which the phenomenon of expropriation is activated as part of the development logic of securing the centricity and expansion of capitalism. Let us focus a bit more on the differentiated forms of expropriation to defend further the expediency of the category dislocation as against displacement. It also unveils something that the category displacement tends to purloin.

The World Bank considers multi-dimensional forms of displacement, more specifically that of physical displacement and economic displacement. Physical displacement, at times referred to as involuntary displacement, is a scenario in which ‘affected people are required to relocate’ physically. Such displacements are due to the creation of infrastructure, industrial platforms, cities and townships, roads and highways, irrigation systems and so on. This could occur due to development projects that require land acquisitions from those who legally own the land or from ‘encroachers’ and ‘squatters’ who may not have any legal title over land. Such displacements are typically involuntary. People who are displaced by development projects are called project-affected persons (PAPs).

Economic displacement refers to the case where, according to the World Bank, ‘the impact of loss of income forces the affected persons to move or to initiate alternative strategies of income restoration’. An example could be the setting up of new industrial enterprises that produce adverse effects on the agricultural livelihood of people, say, by changing the ground water levels in the area surrounding the enterprises. While this does not lead to physical displacement in the sense of evicting people as part of the project plan itself, the second-order effects are deadly in terms of disrupting the livelihood of people; such disruptions may force many or even all in that society to leave. Such examples would not be involuntary in the classical sense because it involves no conscious ploy to displace people. These are, if we may say so, ‘voluntary resettlement’ and would not resemble a direct form of physical displacement. The other way of representing it would be ‘forced migration’ – migration, but forced nevertheless. Practically, however, in dealing with the aspects of dislocation and resettlement, the emphasis of the World Bank is on involuntary resettlement, that is, on physical displacement, and more specifically on the PAPs. The use of the category displacement occludes–occults the polymorphous nature of expropriation and turns the focus inordinately on the physical form making invisible multifaceted forms of expropriation. Even though deeply problematical, it is not very unusual to find debates on expropriation focused primarily on physical displacement at the cost of other forms of expropriation.

We believe dislocation is a more appropriate category than displacement; the deployment of dislocation as a category intends to capture even subtle and surreptitious forms of expropriation. In our understanding, dislocation takes the form of physical displacement when there is a certain dislodging of inhabitants from a particular space of living. However, dislocation also captures
the sense of disruption and loss people face when they may not have had to physically leave a particular space. This disruption could be due to effects flowing from either development projects or, say, closure of enterprise or the creation or expansion of an enterprise that has negative effects on their present source of livelihood. Further, our focus on polymorphous forms of dislocation also sensitizes us to the fact that the issue is not merely that of the expropriation of space; space as both material and mental is to be understood in an expanded sense. The issue is fundamentally about the everyday existence of the very forms of life upon which the effects of these varied forms of dislocation are felt, which sometimes takes a more totalizing form of the expropriation of the space of living and, at other times, appears to surreptitiously disrupt and dismantle the space of living. The term dislocation helps us to remain vigilant and keep in abeyance the World Bank’s and, in general, development literature’s epistemic violence, whereby it tends to reduce diverse forms of dislocation to only physical displacement and, thus, by default, turns the attention of the analytic of dislocation towards only one effect of development. As a consequence, the understanding of compensation and resettlement remains tied to that one effect – physical displacement.

‘Dislocation’ as an embodiment of various forms of ‘disruption of everyday life’ and ‘brute physical displacement’ helps to keep the level of analysis strictly at the connection between development logic and dislocation. It turns the focus on the subtle yet incontrovertible connection the logic of development has with dislocation. In that case, no matter what the form of dislocation, one can see dislocation as tied to the logic of development. In this way, the term dislocation remains sensitive to the moments of hegemonic re-articulation of everyday life, subtle and surreptitious moments that amount to the ‘disruption’ of everyday life (in an economic, political and cultural sense) and moments of coercive overhaul of physical space in terms of massive physical displacement. The category of dislocation is thus both broad and malleable, and yet stays intimately connected to the underlying imperative of capitalist development that in turn marks varied moments of expropriation.

With this clarification, let us now delve into the literature on dislocation in order to help shore up our initial point of departure from the varied approaches within such literature.

Reformist–managerial versus radical–movementist: two schools of thought

Referring to the myriad and divided literature on dislocation, Dwivedi (2002) splits the field into two broad approaches, namely the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach and the ‘radical movementist’ approach. International agencies such as the World Bank operate within the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach. As the champion of a top-down approach, the ‘reformist–managerial’ school represents a web of power-knowledge that identifies a domain for policy making and allows the policy makers to articulate an array of discursive practices
with reference to that domain (Escobar 1995). The ‘reformist–managerial’ approach of all hues remains united in their allegiance to the development logic that such a discourse has helped to fashion.

Our Marxian perspective produces a particular understanding of this development logic that we argue is shared by the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach. As we shall explain in the coming chapters, such a development logic flows from a particular and a partisan view of the economy, a view marked by:

i. *Capitalocentrism* (premised on a particular conception of the economy in which capital is the pre-given centre; such that it is in terms of capital that the rest of the economy and class formations are measured, evaluated and given a name); and

ii. *Orientalism* (premised on a particular conception of the Southern ‘local’ as devalued third world against an overvalued modern/West/first world, where the modern/West is the pre-given centre; it is in terms of the West that the *rest* are measured, imagined and named).

Working in their overdetermined imbrications, these two centrisms help instil a certain logic into the transition of society. Transition becomes the ‘progressive’ journey of ‘third world’ pre-capitalist agrarian societies from their pre-assigned backward state towards a modern capitalist industrial economy. This understanding of development or, more precisely, capitalist development, encompassing the possibility of a glorious life in the future, is what gives force and legitimacy to dislocation. The discursive practices that are weaved in around development position and produce the ‘subjects of development’. Subjects of development remain interpellated to the hegemonic discourse of development and the necessary *act* that accompanies development – dislocation. As and when that happens, the subjects become both the targets and the carriers of development logic.

In line with the above worldview, within which the ‘progressive’ logic is encapsulated, the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach cannot but embrace the inevitability of the law of the unencumbered march of development even if it invariably produces dislocation. The logic of development is such that development by virtue of being development cannot be halted, whatever its ill-effects. One cannot but have development; one cannot but have dislocation arising out of development. This means that dislocation, seen as a consequence of development, must be solved independent of the logic of development. Notwithstanding major internal differences, this is the ground zero position of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach.

How then would the problem of dislocation be solved?

While sociologists and anthropologists have contributed immensely to the development of the literature, it is also a misplaced opinion held by many in those disciplines (e.g. Cernea 1999; Dwivedi 2002) that the field of economics has ignored the issue of dislocation and restitution. Classical political economists earlier and mainstream economics over the last sixty years have been
struggling to deal with this phenomenon (Kanbur 2003). Their struggle can be broadly put under the rubric ‘economics of compensation’, which tries to legitimize and justify development projects that give rise to dislocation, and offers a policy framework for compensating the dislocated in monetary form.

Following the pioneering work of Michael Cernea, there has been pressure on the policy paradigm, including that of the World Bank, to depart from the economistic position inherent in ‘economics of compensation’, which reduces the problem of dislocation and also rehabilitation to a few economic considerations, principally income related. Instead, the focus has started shifting towards a more ‘social approach’. This shift, by no means conclusive and uncontested, seeks a replacement of the ‘economics of compensation’ with a newer approach termed ‘resettlement with development’, which helps to posit resettlement as a ‘need’. In the conventional development discourse, we are correspondingly witnessing a conceptual shift from ‘compensation’ towards ‘resettlement need’ as a possible answer to the problem of dislocation. Exciting as it may seem at first glance, we consider it a little misplaced to identify this shift from compensation to resettlement as signalling a sound enough methodological or epistemological break. Because, notwithstanding the shift, their differences thaw into an abiding unity when it comes to the received understanding of the economy (economy understood in terms of a dualistic frame – the frame of a privileged centre such as capital/West and a lacking other such as ‘pre-capital’/‘third world’). Both positions see development as progressive. In both, dislocation is seen as inevitable; the only difference is that one attends to the inevitable in terms of compensation, the other in terms of resettlement. And that too within a framework that leaves intact the supreme and uncontested position of the policy makers. The criticism of economic determinism levelled against ‘economics of compensation’ does not translate into a contestation of determinism that functions at a much deeper level in the case of social approaches towards resettlement. One thus needs not just a critique of economic determinism but of determinism as such. While the ‘voice of conscience’ implicitly implied in the shift within the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach is to be noted and appreciated, one must also be careful to grasp that the differences are basically regarding how the dislocated are to be recompensed.

In contrast, the approach that Dwivedi referred to as ‘radical movementist’ has gathered particular force in recent times through the resistance movements against development-induced dislocation. It views dislocation itself as a problem that must be accessed through a rejection of the top-down approach that development symbolizes (Patkar 1998). Invoking ‘fundamental political issues of rights, governance and negotiation’, it attacks ‘development structures and the political processes that sustain such structures’ (Dwivedi 2002: 712). In the ‘radical movementist’ approach, ‘development is the central problematic and displacement–resettlement failures are symptoms of developmental failures’. Against this, the ‘radical movementist’ approach espouses an alternative vision of development that is people-centric and is based on a different set of
ethico-political values such as rights, participation, harmony, care and responsibility. While these social movements focusing on ‘Sangharsh and Nirman’ (resistance and re-construction) have been at the forefront of articulating an alternative standpoint to the hegemonic rendition of development, increasingly, albeit tentatively, social thinkers too have been lending voice to these movements by intervening at the level of the production of knowledge of development (Roy 2001; Basu 2008). Insofar as theoretical process (say production of the ‘science of development’) too is one component of the overdetermined processes that comprise social reality (Resnick and Wolff 1987: Ch. 1), this growing intellectual voice on the ‘philosophy/economics/sociology of development’ must be seen as adding force to the radical–movementist approach (Dwivedi 2002). While our work may be construed as part of the ‘radical–movementist’ approach because of its trenchant opposition to the ‘reformist–managerial’ school, we remain wary and critical of numerous undertheorized strands and positions within the ‘radical–movementist’ approach. Consequently, if our framework and analysis are at all seen as part of the broader structure of the radical–movementist school, then one has to contend simultaneously with the fact that there is in our framework and analysis a somewhat parallel displacement of the theoretical tenets of the radical–movementist approach. We seek to provoke within the intellectual space and also the space of activism issues that would be challenging (in a positive and friendly way) to the latter school.

As we understand, these social movements in the South draw inspiration from a particular lineage. They can be seen as a continuation of post-colonial struggles (‘post-colonial’ not in a temporal sense but in the sense of the attitude–mindset that drives such struggles), which have been offered intellectual backing by activist thinkers such as, to name a few, Franz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Che Guevara, Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. For most of them, the purpose of social struggles, including the struggle for freedom, was never just to win political independence. For example, Tagore was particular in marking a sharp distinction between (spiritual) freedom and (political) independence (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2008b, 2008c). Instead, fundamentally, the point was to free the structure–subject from the scourge of third world-ism, that is to be free of the orientalist grip that has merged with a capital-centred worldview to prescribe a certain path of ‘development’ for non-Western civilizations. Accordingly, it was also to be, for them, a struggle over mindset, over what would emerge as the worldview of the hitherto colonized subjects. That is why language6 (whether in representation, resistance, ethics or aesthetics) was so important for all these thinkers, and consequently their struggles also became a struggle over the subject’s relation to the ‘battery of signifiers’ (Lacan 2007: 13). This current of intellectual and social opposition to discourses of colonialism and then modernization à la development has been a recurrent theme and is continuing in our times too, notably in the form of the ‘radical–movementist’ approach. In many ways, these intellectual and social movements talk not simply to and of their own people, but to modernity and to the West, as well
pointing out that what seemed obvious to the latter was and remains only a particular construction of the other by the West.

There has been an unnecessary side-effect to this debate within and between the two schools of dislocation. A wedge seems to have appeared between sociologists and anthropologists on the one side and the economists on the other, leading to a gap in their respective understandings, strengths and weaknesses. While mainstream economics have focused primarily on the economy, sociologists and anthropologists tended to be drawn chiefly towards aspects of culture, politics and nature. This wedge and this division is uncalled for because, while development-connected dislocation may be propelled by an attempted change in economic processes and economic considerations, the causes and effects encompass cultural, political, natural and also economic processes other than the policy-targeted processes. In this respect, the relevant methodology to analyse dislocation and restitution must be a terrain constitutive of relationships between economic, political, cultural and natural processes. Rather than the oft-mentioned, albeit problematical, division between the economic versus the social approach that marks debates on dislocation, the challenge is to produce a conception of the economy that emerges out of the overdetermined effects of economic, cultural, political and natural processes, so that it is possible to circumvent at one and the same time: (i) the economism of mainstream economics that tends to reduce existences and explanations of phenomenon and also subjectivities to exclusively economic processes; and (ii) the under-theorization of the economy in the purportedly non-economic/social approaches that tend to reduce explanations pertaining to the economy to either culturalist or historicist renditions. One needs a theory of the economic; a mere historicizing of the economy or a marking of difference through culturalist notations would not do. One needs a theory of capital (and also of labour); a mere historicizing of capital (and of labour-ing practices) or a marking of difference through indigenizing would not be enough.

The methodology of overdetermination that we deploy to study development-dislocation takes us beyond this economy/non-economy division (Resnick and Wolff 1987, 1992; Amariglio et al. 1990; Gibson-Graham 1996). If one works within the milieu of overdetermination, even if the economy is the focus, no explanation can be reduced exclusively to economic effects. Focusing on the economy is not tantamount to economic determinism per se (just as focusing on culture or nature is not determinism either). Notwithstanding its focus on the economic or the non-economic, what makes a theory deterministic is whether relationships, practices, and particularly explanations, are reduced to the effects of a few processes or to one process in particular. To ensure that a non-determinist methodology remains active and does not become mere lip service, the theory that will provide the ground for formulating explanations and meanings of relationships must be based on an operating methodology (in our case, overdetermination) that guarantees the active nature of non-determinism. It is to such a methodology that we remain committed in this book.
Our story and our position

Taking overdetermination as the methodology and class understood in terms of processes pertaining to surplus labour as the entry point, we question the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to development-induced dislocation; we also question their proposed solution measures – in terms of both compensation and resettlement. In the background of this critique, we deliver a Marxian theory of dislocation à la primitive accumulation and in the process end up revisiting the question of resettlement from a different angle altogether.

Taking off from a Marxian perspective, from processes pertaining to surplus labour, we first lay down an alternative economic cartography; in this labour-focused cartography, the economy emerges as de-centred and disaggregated (Chapters 2 and 4). The production of this alternative economic cartography is crucial to a radically different rendition of (economic) reality and also of development. Building further on such an alternative economic cartography, we then go on to analyse the conventional debates on dislocation and unveil the problematic nature of the solutions offered (Chapters 2, 3 and 5). In particular, we demonstrate how the phenomenon of dislocation is inalienably tied to the mainstream/hegemonic logic of development that embodies expropriation (of space/land), alienation, exploitation, overt and subtle violence, and marginalization/othering not only within what we have called the camp of global capital, but also within and over the world of the third (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). The point is to show how this logic of development sidesteps the issue of gross injustices and unethical moments in order to facilitate the growth march of capitalism; a growth march seen in developmentalist discourse as natural, as necessary. It is important in this regard to demonstrate how the Capitalocentric–Orientalist logic of development reconfigures the otherwise decentred and disaggregated economy into the homogeneous wholes of modern industrial capitalist economy and third world agrarian pre-capitalist economy. This dualistic conception of economy opens the route towards a teleological approach to transition, in which the movement of economy appears naturally destined to end in modern capitalism. Accordingly, policies are undertaken to facilitate the transition of the ‘dual’ economy in this proposed direction, which invariably brings about dislocation within and of the world of the third. Because dislocation thus emerges in this discourse as the side-effect of a progressive movement, it legitimizes the ground for separating and treating dislocation as distinct from development logic.

We intervene at this point to enquire into the progressive nature of the couplet development–dislocation (where development-connected dislocation of the present is seen as eventually contributing to progress) and ask whether the logic of progress can serve as a legitimate trope to demarcate development logic from dislocation; instead, is not expropriation–appropriation–violence the conduit that connects (capitalist) development and dislocation. First, the adopted Marxian approach allows us to proceed through a relentless questioning of the existing theories of dislocation, notably that of ‘economics of
compensation’ and that of the social theory of resettlement. Second, even if one takes as given, for the sake of analysis, the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach’s self-proclaimed position on dislocation as de-linked from development, the Marxian approach still provides us with an alternative ground to confront the category ‘progress’ in order to illustrate the following: what appears as progressive in the context of a third world perspective is actually hopelessly regressive in relation to the world of the third. This alternative ground opened by Marxian theory is operationalized through the category primitive accumulation, which Marx pioneered to represent the socio-historical origin moment of capitalism. Taking off from Marx, we put forward an alternative conceptualization of primitive accumulation that in turn embodies the Marxian theory of dislocation (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).

Rather than simply refer to violence as an effect of capitalism, as does the ‘radical–movementist’ approach, the point is to show how capitalism is instituted through violence (the moment of primitive/original accumulation) and constituted through violence (the moment of capital accumulation); instituted and constituted through violence in the same turn, although the moment of institution–constitution is rendered progressive in the hegemonic rendition of development. The interrogation of the concept of primitive accumulation and the critique of the idea of ‘progress’ destabilizes the defence of dislocation that the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach forwards; to do that, however, the concept of primitive accumulation has to be displaced from its original location, context and meaning. Expanding particularly on the work of late Marx (Dhar 2003), we embark on a re-reading of the category primitive accumulation; we throw up an alternative rendition of primitive accumulation from the perspective of the world of the third; we call it the \textit{ab-original} rendition of primitive accumulation; it is something \textit{other than the original} rendition of primitive accumulation – hence it is \textit{ab}-original; it is also a rendition that attends to aboriginality, here the world of the third. The category of primitive accumulation captures the mechanism of dislocating the livelihood and forms of life of a mass of people residing in the world of the third in order to forward the expansion of the circuits and the camp of global capital. Notably, through this re-theorization viewed from the perspective of the world of the third, the manner of looking at dislocation is also altered and so is its meaning. We show in this book how the ‘progressive’ tinge imputed to violence in the context of third world-ism turns into a ‘regressive,’ unethical and grotesque monstrosity if seen from the perspective of the world of the third. Trapped into the language of third world-ism, whether in criticality, as in the case of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, or in sympathy, as with the ‘radical movementist’ approach, the literature on development-connected dislocation has generally failed to interrogate the validity of the category ‘progress’; it is either acclaimed or condemned, but rarely theoretically examined.

From a world of the third Marxian perspective, we finally look at the issue of subjectivity, hegemony and resistance in order to offer alternative routes to rethinking resettlement (Chapter 9). From such a perspective, we are able to offer
a narrative of the subjectivity of individuals and groups interpellated to the hegemonic logic of development. We are also able to suggest why and how alternative subject positions could be formed. Marxian theory explains within the same framework what other theories are often not able to: dislocation is a contested terrain of clashing subject positions rather than being the domain of one single type of subject position. Other theories, to our knowledge, are able to account for only one or the other position rather than explain the contested nature of the terrain of dislocation as it really is. Finally, we would take off from a counter-hegemonic Marxian standpoint to render an alternative conceptualization of the ‘policy’ of resettlement. We name this alternative resettlement right, a right that telescopes ‘zero tolerance’ towards any form of dislocation and involves a rejection of the logic of development-connected dislocation. Resettlement right is about addressing the ethic of dislocation that is inalienably tied to development logic. As such, resettlement right turns against the logic of capitalism-induced industrialization that, at a conceptual level, first sanctions and justifies dislocation only then to consider compensation and resettlement. While not being against migration or against industry per se, Marxian theory of resettlement right questions the above-mentioned development logic and the process of capitalist industrialization embedded within it. Moving beyond the given dualism of agriculture/industry, moving beyond the false either/or of agriculture and industry, our intervention tries to displace the very discursive terrain marked by positions such as obstinately ‘holding on to agriculture’ or mindlessly ‘moving over to processes of industrialization’. We contend that the choice is not between agriculture/stasis and industry/progress; the choice is between what form of agriculture and what form of industry is being given shape. The choice is between having or not having a relation of harmony between the two.

This brings us finally to the question of subjectivity. For us, the question of subjectivity is crucial because of the anti-democratic nature of the top-down approach to development. If democracy is to be valued against totalitarianism, development must be considered as bottom up. It has to be founded on self-governance and self-determination in the sense of allowing the people to participate in the institution of policies and in bringing about changes in their social life rather than being subjected to top-down governance models that look down on people as ‘things’ to be governed. Development discourse with its associated policy paradigm encapsulates top-down governance and consequently demands and indeed seeks a kind of subjectivity that justifies and welcomes dislocation. This precludes other kinds of subject dispositions seen in various resistance movements that seek to displace governance from the top-down register of control, bondage and submission to that of cooperation, bonding and even contestation. The subject after all is not ‘passive’ (waiting to be assimilated under the gaze of development discourse) but active and creative. She is active and creative not in the sense of responding to interpellating calls of development (which she does at times and, hence, the aspect of hegemonized subjectivity) but in the sense of managing her own visibility, thinking,
experiencing and attending to acts and events in relation to the world she encounters and that too ‘empowered with various repertoires and skills of self-presentation’ not reducible to the ones forwarded by the hegemonic (Yar 2003). Hence the questions of subjectivity and particularly the painstaking production of alternative subjectivity are fundamental. And this is the other turn we give to debates on development-induced dislocation, the turn to the question of subject–subjectivity.

The question of subject–subjectivity is important because, apart from the knowledge of our selves given, promoted, propounded, reiterated by and through a developmentalist regime, apart from the objective knowledge of our selves (say statistical knowledge pertaining to per capita income or human development indices) put forward by developmentalist regimes, one also has a subjective understanding of one’s fundamental, or perhaps not so fundamental, mode of being-in-the-world, being in a development-driven world. What is our mode of being (étant) in a development–dislocation-driven world? This mode of being-in-the-world is important because in ‘our everyday lives we grasp entities in terms of a tacit [subjective] understanding [as distinguished from naturalistic–objectivistic knowledge] of what it is to be’ (Guignon 1983); in other words, understanding is fundamental to our mode-of-being in the world. Would the imagination of development attend to this (subjective) understanding? Or would it remain a top-down approach that does not take into consideration the subjective; that continues to project subjects in terms of pre-given objective criterion; that reduces subject–subjectivity to mere statistical data, to diagnostic markers? How would development attend to subjects? How would development attend to those (subjective) reasonings and emotions that one cares about; one has ‘connections to others’ and ‘senses of self, self-esteem, and gender’, and also class, caste, race, nationality. Nearly everywhere, one forms ‘a psyche, self, and identity’ (Chodorow 1989: 4). How would development attend to these? One also disavows given selves, disavows identities that one has herself donned. Nearly everywhere, ‘people’ relate to one another; people relate to structures; people take positions; they are for or against an event; at times, they are ambivalent; they experience pleasure and pain, at times both. How would development relate to these? Because to think of the subject in the context of development, one needs to understand how we experience and cling on to unconscious fantasies pertaining to development and how we construct and reconstruct our felt past in the given present of development (Chodorow 1989: 4). The notion of the hegemonized subject could thus be put forward as an explanation of why stereotypical developmentalist programmes persist; why the developmentalist programme persists tenaciously even when one clearly sees that development is the cause of dislocation, when one clearly sees that development breeds exploitation, inequity, marginalization and plunder, when one sees that dislocation brings with it impoverishment. Perhaps one needed a more well-entrenched theory of subjectivity to explain why the rule of capital could not be done away with; why, instead, it ushered in a more profound and pervasive rule of global capital (which goes by the name
‘globalization’), and also the rule of capitalocentric idea(1)s; why one remains imprisoned within and by an unconscious attachment, a rather passionate attachment to forms of capitalist development imbued with a streak of orientalism, a form premised on a certain third world-ism. How is the hegemony of capitalocentric–orientalist development secured? Why does the subject answer its interpellating call? How is the subject hegemonized by a certain imagination of development – the capitalocentric–orientalist imagination of development? Thus to think of the subject in the context of development, one needs to think of the ‘subject-in-interpellation’; to think of a theory of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subjection–subjectivation’ beyond the objectifying process of being spoken and produced by discourse (by the discourse of, say, development), beyond discursively constituted subject positions (Graham and Amariglio 2006: 201–2).

Even amid the constitutive restlessness, contradictoriness and motivated irrationality of minds (Lear, 1998: 80–122), one needs a theory of the hegemonized psyche that is marked at the same time by the unconscious; one needs to ground the ‘myriad substances of [hegemonized] subjectivity as a supplement to identity’. To think of the hegemonized subject (and the counter-hegemonic subject), we examine in this book the subject’s relation to the master/nodal signifier (point de capiton as ‘button tie’ in Lacan 2006: 681) and also to the repudiated signifier (Verwerfung as the ‘foreclosure’ of the signifier in Lacan 2006: 465). We work on the relation so as to think of the ethico-political, to think of what stands in the way and also what would possibly inaugurate the subjective process of (communitarian) becoming, in order to think of the possibility of radically displacing our relation to the interpellating call, to the hold of hegemonic ideology, and also to a traversing of the hegemonic fantasy or the fantasy of the hegemonic.

In relation to the above discussion, the question of the subject in the context of development can be approached from at least five (if not more) angles:

1. the Subject of development as the hegemonic subject that remains unseen; that remains hidden, hidden behind a discourse of progress or of technological growth, or of an unfolding of the forces of production;
2. the subject of underdevelopment as the poor ‘third world’ subject – who is languishing in a pathetic state – who needs development;
3. the subject of development as the hegemonized subject who is foregrounded – as if the subjects want development – whose need–demand–desire is foregrounded as autonomous;
4. the subject of dislocation who is projected as ‘an unfortunate victim at present but who would be a beneficiary in the long run’; in the process, the need–demand–desire of the subject of dislocation and also the pain–suffering of the subject of dislocation is put aside (purloined) if not put outside (foreclosed);
5. the resisting subject or the counter-hegemonic subject who, through a traversing of the fundamental fantasy of development, sets up another relation to the signifier development, a relation not in terms of capitalism–orientalism but in terms of class–need in their constitutive imbrications.
Our world of the third Marxian perspective, attentive as it is to all the above-mentioned subject positions, launches a challenge to the more conventional approaches to dislocation and resettlement that have hitherto monopolized the discussion on these. What makes this possible is the world of the third Marxian perspective, which offers alternative avenues to rethink dislocation and resettlement and, through this rethinking, to interrogate and queer the very idea(l) of development.
2 Development and dislocation

Why one cannot be addressed without the other?

We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness, and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariot-drive was progress, and that progress was civilisation. If we ventured to ask, ‘Progress towards what, and progress for whom?’ it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such doubts about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us bidding us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying across its path.

Rabindranath Tagore in “Civilisation and Progress” (2004: 271)

Our goal in this chapter is to (de)-familiarize1 the given/received conception of development; and also to tease out the intimate connection between development and dislocation and defend why any discussion of dislocation independent of development is constitutive of a modernist project of reconstructing ‘third world’ societies. The act of de-familiarizing involves intervention at two levels which remain connected in our analysis.

In the first, rather than taking the relation between development and dislocation as given or imputing any normative connotation to development, we evaluate the process through which development appears as a concept; how that concept remaps horizontal differences and existing hierarchies–discriminations in the social on to a complex ‘temporality–verticality’ – where existing temporalities are reduced to a ‘step ladder verticality of space’ and existing verticalities are reduced to ‘historical and evolutionist temporality’. Development thus embodies a peculiar conception of time-space (not reducible to ecological time or cosmological space) that conjoins history with economy: history is made economistic and economic is made historicist. Conceptualizing and then splitting co-existing and coeval spaces/differences into chronological time and non-linear experiences of time into top-down spatialities, the complex ‘temporality–verticality’ informs a unique ‘logic’ that in turn implies ‘normalised models of stages of development’ with ‘homogenizing and regulatory features’ (Burman 2008: 262); the effects of dislocation are also resolved and dealt with through the logic of ‘temporality–verticality’, which, not surprisingly,
encapsulates the faith in and anticipation of salvation named, in secular lan-
guage, ‘progress’; needless to say, progress appears through a teleological
scheme in this set up. Normativity and normativization exercises are neither
externally produced nor a fanciful projection of theorists. Rather, they appear
and function through the very evolution of the concept and logic of develop-
ment (in and through the complex temporality–verticality); they emerge in the
process of development, in turn giving further shape and twist to the latter’s
movement (that is, its appearance, mutation, shift and march – forward and
backward). No matter how curvy its path, no matter how many are the
breaks and turns, the theological system of thought (notwithstanding its
secular connotation) founded on temporality–verticality abandoned neither
the ‘logic’ of development nor the faith in salvation/progress. Indeed, as we
shall evaluate, the history of development is a tale of innovations within such
a system of thought.2 And, it is not that the system of thought determined the
practice of development; rather, the system of thought reflected a way of
contemplation and practice that came to be known as development; it is con-
stitutive of development. The concept temporality-verticality and its relevance
will be unpacked further as we go along.

Second, we show how development is tied to a certain image and repre-
sentation of the ‘third world’; third world, as it comes into the foreground,
relegates the world of the third into the background; third world is the ration-
ale that does not abandon difference–discrimination, but rather resituates
them in a temporal–vertical plane; third world is the rationale that marks the
momentous shift of discursive terrain from the relation of horizontality between
the world of the third and the camp of global capital into a temporal–vertical
plane; third world as pre-capitalist – as lower in step ladder verticality is what
enables the precipitation–sedimentation of the normativity of development. All
these features dovetail in an interconnected way into the category ‘third world’.

We show how an image and representation of lack qua third world facilitates the
growth and expansion of the modern industrializing capitalist economy, a
rationalization that in turn is taken as the deus ex machina of dislocation. This
analysis then makes clear the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach’s stake in trying
to keep and address dislocation as distinct from and independent of develop-
ment. This is the representative politics of development – keep development
separate from dislocation; don’t let one doubt that development must not be
questioned for producing dislocation; don’t let one get the idea that there can be
development without dislocation; don’t let one think of any possibility of
development other than ‘capitalist development arrived at through dislocation’.

Our discussion on the relation between development and dislocation ties
together three components. We start with a worldview in which difference
exists in a relation of horizontality; hierarchies–verticalities are also there, but
have not been reduced to a historicist evolutionist temporality. Specifically,
the de-centred and heterogeneous everyday of economic life is represented in
this book in terms of a class-focused Marxian theory. Yet, the basic structure
of the economy underlying the development discourse is founded on a
dualistic frame – a frame that divides the economic into two homogeneous wholes – and out of which one is fundamental/central and the other a lacking replica of the fundamental/central. How is it possible for the conception of an economy to be transformed from its otherwise de-centred, disaggregated and heterogeneous setting into a dualistic setting given by, on one side, capitalism/ modernity and, on the other side, pre-capitalism/third world? How does such difference get shifted to a complex of temporality–verticality in the conceptualization of the economy? To explore this series of questions, in which lies the mystery and also the force of the ‘logic’ of development, we present a short review of the class-focused Marxian framework and its conception of the economy. Here, we only posit the groundwork of such an economy as that is sufficient for us to locate the moment of transmutation of an otherwise de-centred economy into the normative logic of the stages of development. Critique of the received debates on dislocation and alternative theories of dislocation and resettlement right demands further elaboration of the Marxian theory that is to be taken up in Chapter 4.

Next, we precisely locate the logic of development and, in that context, posit the idea of ‘progress’ as telescoped in this logic of development. We shall demonstrate that the ideas of both logic and progress in development discourse arise from an overdetermination of two centrisms – capitalocentrism (the centrism of capital in the viewing and assessment of the economy) and orientalism (the centrism of the modern industrial West in the viewing and assessment of the rest of the world, especially the Orient and the Southern social). This capitalocentric–orientalist perspective and its associated development discourse produce a conception of the Southern economy as fundamentally fixed into the domain of ‘third world’ and of its conceivable transition towards capitalism.

Finally, we need to spell out clearly the connection of development logic with the poverty management exercise as, in the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, dislocation is seen in its intimate relation with poverty. That is, the process of dislocation is positioned as a moment of poverty creation, and compensation/resettlement as a solution to dislocation is conceived as integral to the process of poverty alleviation. Thus, the relation of development logic with dislocation is subsumed under the overall connection of the development logic with the poverty management exercise. Having explicated the logic of development and its connection with the poverty management exercise, we defend our claim of the specified connection between the logic of development and dislocation in the ‘reformist–managerial’ discourse. That in turn will constitute our point of reference and departure for the rest of the book.

**Class-focused Marxian framework and the economy**

To begin with, for the sake of convenience, the processes within a society are grouped into economic processes (consisting of all processes concerned with the production and distribution of goods and services that are in turn destined
either to become means of production or to be consumed), political processes (processes relating to the intricate organization and regulation of power and authority), cultural processes (processes involving ways in which meanings are produced and disseminated) and natural processes (pertaining to the transformation – biological, chemical, etc. – of the physical properties of matter). Of the number of such processes, Marxian theory focuses on the economic process of class; not exclusively, but in relation to other processes. In the Marxian theory pioneered by Resnick and Wolff (1987), if ‘class process’ is the entry point of analysis then ‘overdetermination’ is the epistemology and also the logic.

Unlike the more conventional approaches that define class as a noun or a group of people, and that too in terms of property or power, Resnick and Wolff (1987, Ch. 3) re-reads and expands on Marx (1967, 1969) to forward a distinct and radically different understanding of class – class in terms of the process of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus labour. The economic process of class thus refers to the organizations of surplus labour.

Class processes do not exist all by themselves, but in a relation of mutual constitutivity with one another and with non-class processes. The particular logical structure driving the relation between class and non-class processes is a component of a general logical structure under which each process is mutually constituted by other processes – constituted in such a way that one process is literally brought into being by all other processes and vice versa. Following Althusser (1965[1969]), this relation of mutual constitutivity between and among processes is termed ‘overdetermination’.

Every site and even every moment in society and therefore the whole of social reality as a complex and contradictory configuration of these sites and moments comprise a web of mutually constituting or overdetermined processes, of which class process is one among other constituting processes. In such an overdetermined milieu, Marxian theory turns–tunes its focus on class and looks to explain a facet of social reality formed by the constituting effects of class and non-class processes. As class is primarily an economic process, the overdetermined reality of class processes (economy) and non-class processes (non-economy) makes any claim to a closed and self-constituted economy moot. Because of its distinct and specific entry point of class process and the non-determinist, non-reductionist (as also non-economistic) methodology, the class-focused Marxian representation of the economy is radically different from the perception of the economy in both neo-classical economics and the orthodox understanding of Marxism, where both are based on other entry points and a determinist–reductionist methodology.

Taking off from such a non-determinist and non-reductionist approach, our particular version of Marxism arrives at a unique representation of the economy; we hit upon an alternative economic cartography – class-focused cartography to be more precise – but cartography altogether different from that generated in and by neo-classical economics and orthodox Marxism moored to historical materialism. As we explain in Chapter 4, the class-focused economy is de-centred and heterogeneous in terms of polymorphous
class processes – capitalist, feudal, communist, communitic, independent and slave class processes. This makes any centrism and any centring of the economy, say on to the capitalist, problematic; thus, any representation of the economy from the perspective of only the capitalist class process remains hopelessly reductionist. The class-focused economy is intrinsically heterogeneous because even similar types of class processes (say the capitalist class process) would differ from site to site as they have varied relations with non-class processes. The question that therefore haunts us: given this decentred and heterogeneous rendition of the economy, how did we arrive at a dualistic representation of the economy? How did we arrive at a meaning of development grounded on the transition of one arm of the dualistic frame into the image of the other arm?

The logic of development discourse: capitalocentric–orientalism

‘Development discourse’ maintains that growth through a process of industrialization symbolizes the coming of modernity. This transition process, often denoted as the modernization process, relates to the idea of development in a specific manner: development is the transition of ‘third world’ qua the traditional under-developed economy into the developed modern, where the traditional and the modern are represented respectively by the two homogeneous wholes: pre-capitalist and capitalist. Consequently, development came to symbolize a particular notion of progress that telescoped in turn the transition of third world to modernity and also a transition of the third world from pre-capitalism to capitalism. Two aspects in this development discourse help to flesh out the logic of development. These are orientalism and capitalocentrism whose over-determination produces a conceptual couple capitalocentric–orientalism. The capitalocentric–orientalist worldview has hegemonized the representation of the Southern economies, producing in turn the notion of development that inhabits much of our understanding of the transition of these economies and drives the policies formed around that understanding. As we shall explain later, the policies concerning dislocation are no exception to this trend.

1. Orientalism and the presumed inferiority of the third world

Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’.

Orientalism is … a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans against all ‘those’ non-Europeans … the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the [backwardness of] non-European peoples and cultures.

Orientalism … as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient … Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.

Edward W. Said (1978 [1985])
For Said, Orientalism is a ‘style of thought’ and also a ‘corporate institution’ that, on the one hand, has to claim **universal**ity for the occident, that is to say, the occident cannot be restricted by time, space or other cultures or traditions (in other words, one has to de-occidentalize the occident and hypothesize the universal – a universal that in turn occidentalizes the orient – occidentalizes the orient in terms of a ‘shared telos’ and a ‘shared worldview’). On the other hand, orientalism has to, at the same time, retain the **exclusivity** and **particularity** of the occident – an exclusivity and particularity retained through a positing of the occident as an **advanced order of things** in the shared telos, as a step or two higher in the ladder of linear history (see Dhareshwar 1996: 119–35). Taking off from such a posited universal, the occident first transforms the orient into an image (albeit lacking) of itself and then shows that the orient is the **same** as the occident, but not quite. Thus, orientalism is that which at the same time produces sameness and also a certain difference and distinction between the occident and the orient; on the one hand, it homogenizes and, on the other, it hierarchizes the occident and the orient. Based on the ‘Orient’s special place in European Western experience’ (Said 1978 [1985]: 1), orientalism is ‘a way of coming to terms with the orient,’ coming to terms with the orient in terms of occidental categories, where the ‘orient’ is also one of the ‘deepest and most recurring’ images of the ‘other’. The orient as a European invention – invention in terms of extant European categories; the orient that has thus helped to define Europe (and the West) as its **same but contrasting** image; the orient as an integral part of European material civilization, culture and self-description/definition.

At a more mundane level, orientalism is a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists and anthropologists ‘have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborating theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, “mind”, destiny, and so on’ (Said 1978[1985]). Of course, the account of the economic is missing in Said, which we inaugurate and explore in the context of dislocation.

Historically, orientalism is a process of producing both the West and its **other**. It followed the newfound confidence that Europe started gaining with the coming of renaissance, reformation and also modernity. Europe, until then a sad little promontory of Asia, until then a composite of disparate geographical spaces, was rediscovering itself as a ‘modern unified being’; its trading requirement, desire to export Christian values (in a word to ‘Christianize the pagan’) and penchant for discovery led it to explore other geographical spaces, and also the (conceptual) space of the other. Thus began a long journey of constructing the West as an **idea**, an **ideal**, and as a concept, a hegemonic concept, a near transcendental concept. The West is thus a **historical**, not a geographical, construct. Taken in its historical dimension, the globe is a sphere in rotation – there is no West and no East to the globe. West and East
are historical constructions imputed, imparted to a geo-sphere in uninterrupted rotation. The concept or idea[l] of the West can be seen to function in the following ways:

First, it allows us to characterize and classify societies into different categories – i.e. ‘western’, ‘non-western’. It is a tool to think with. It sets a certain structure of thought and knowledge in motion.

Secondly, it is an image, or set of images. It condenses a number of different characteristics into one picture. It calls up in our mind’s eye – it represents in verbal and visual language – a composite picture of what different societies, cultures, peoples and places are like. It functions as part of a language, a ‘system of representation’.

… [for example, ‘western’ = urban = developed = rational-progressive-ordered; or ‘non-western’ = non-industrial = rural = agriculture = under-developed = irrational = antiquated = womanly = native-like/savage = infantile.] …

Thirdly, it provides a standard or model of comparison. It allows us to compare to what extent different societies resemble, or differ from, one another. Non-western societies can accordingly be said to be ‘close to’ or ‘far away from’ or ‘catching up with’ the West. It helps to explain difference [and also to set up a hierarchy].

Fourthly, it provides [a universal] criteria of evaluation against which all other societies are ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster. (For example, the ‘West’ = developed = good = desirable; or the ‘non-West’ = under-developed = bad = undesirable).

Hall (1992: 277)

Through such a discourse, a space came to be constituted as the other of the Western/modern. The formation of the other is fundamentally not what the space of the other was all about, but what the other was all about to the Western/modern. The other thereafter came to be defined as fundamentally–foundationally lacking; the set of images that colonized the produced knowledge of the other evacuated the otherwise concrete differences and also the contradictory moments within that space. The construction of West as normal and the other as ab-normal went on concomitantly and, following Said (1978 [1985]) and Chaudhury (1994), we understand this dualism à la the process of orientalism as an impulse not necessarily rooted to white Western Europe; the brown/black/yellow could be orientalist too. Beyond the boundary of continents and nations, beyond boundaries of identity–colour, orientalism has evolved into a dualistic perspective in which one aspect of the whole is presented as inferior in order to posit the superiority of the other aspect; and such a move entails epistemic violence of the worst order. It would not be inappropriate to end this section with a quote from Foucault – a quote that represents the culpability and remorse of a ‘European pagan thinker’ (Dhareshwar 1996: 119):
Among all the societies in history, ours – I mean those that came into being at the end of Antiquity on the Western side of the European continent – have perhaps been the most aggressive and the most conquering; they have been capable of the most stupefying violence, against themselves as well as against others. ... It must be kept in mind that they alone evolved a strange technology of power treating the vast majority of men as a flock with a few as shepherds.

Foucault (1988)

Indeed, one of the important insights we want to bring to light is how a difference bordering on discrimination between the ‘flock’ and the ‘shepherds of development’ emerged to incarcerate the contours of discussing dislocation (see Chapter 9). This ‘technology of power’ becomes particularly pronounced in the role played by orientalism in the formation of the development discourse (Escobar 1995). Development presupposes a particular conception of the economy in which the de-centred and heterogeneous economy is homogenized into two wholes, the superior modern sector and the devalued traditional sector. The rather diverse existence of (‘modern–West’) and (‘traditional–orient’) is collapsed into their respective reductive characterizations by assigning a set of stereotyped images to both. Through this process of stereotyping and also homogenization, the ‘traditional–orient’ is not only made independent and autonomous of the ‘modern–West,’ but also produced as the lacking underside of the latter. The ‘traditional–orient’ is consequently seen, accounted for and acted upon from a presumed centricity of the ‘modern–West’. In the discourse of economic development, the devalued space of tradition or the orient has come to be known as ‘third world’; where third world-ism is equivalent to backwardness and backwardness is equivalent to being third world-ish. Like West/modernity, third world too (notwithstanding its relatively recent post-Second World War naming) emerges as an orientalist concept – a concept and conceptualization that has its roots in the civilizing mission of colonialism but which burgeons under the discourse of development.

2. Capitalocentrism: the centricity of capital

If orientalism is more of a cultural–political construction of the Southern economy as viewed from the perspective of the modern–West, capitalocentrism is a specific representation of the economy viewed from the perspective of capital. Capitalocentrism posits the economy in terms of the dual template (‘capitalist’ versus ‘non-capitalist’) that is in turn premised on the assumed centricity of capitalism (Gibson-Graham 1996). Thus, like orientalism, capitalocentrism too telescopes the monist logic of one, here of capitalism. In terms of our analysis, what are not capitalist modes-of-being (which we shall explore in detail in Chapter 4), no matter how diverse these are, are clubbed into a homogeneous category ‘non-capitalist,’ and then the non-capitalist economy is defined in relation to another homogenized whole, capitalism or its
representative form capital. Capitalism becomes a centre, an essence or a nodal reference point in terms of which non-capitalism is conceived, discussed and policed (by a set of policies). What gets erased in the process are the multi-faceted, non-capitalist modes-of-being and the diverse possibilities they may reveal.

Gibson-Graham (1996: 36) sums up the generic problem with such representations of capitalism as:

Its (capitalism [emphasis ours]) definitions and operations are independent of articulatory practices and discursive fixings; it can therefore be seen as ‘an abstraction with concrete effects’ rather than as a discursive moment that is relationally defined … it exists outside overdetermination.

Once such a capitalocentric definition of the economy is put in place, it is commonplace to find mainstream economists using terms such as accumulation, efficiency, productivity, competition, profit, market, individualism, private property, security, welfare, etc. that relate fundamentally to the representation of capitalist economy in mainstream economics in order then to discuss the non-capitalist or that which is not capitalist. We shall see that capitalocentrism along with orientalism remains the hallmark of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to dislocation.

While the capitalocentrism of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach becomes conspicuous in the course of this book, what is crucial to fathom is that capitalocentrism continues to be operative even within the new Left and within post-developmentalist approaches with equally troubling effects (see Gibson-Graham 1996; Chakrabarti 2001; Gibson-Graham and Ruccio 2001; Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003). This is significant because the ‘radical–movementist’ approach is often seen as coming under the broad rubric of post-developmentalism or New Left-ism. We want to sharply distinguish our position vis-à-vis this strand of the ‘radical–movementist’ approach.

Post-developmentalists have produced criticisms of the big bang logic of transition and development by focusing on: (i) the orientalist construction–denigration of Southern economies; (ii) the essentialism driving the received notion of Southern or third world economies; and (iii) the destructive power and the havoc wreaked in non-Western and non-modern economies by the modern Western idea(l) of progress grounded on historicism (Escobar 1995). They thus question the ethical ground of both progress and development as desirable pursuits. While this is commendable and has offered important insights regarding the operative and universal power of Eurocentrism–modernism, such critical analysis has paradoxically taken the economic monism inherent in received theories of economic development as untested, as practically the only possible economic representation. While our critique of the post-developmental position on the third world, more specifically Escobar’s, is taken up in Chapter 4, we concentrate here on its stance on capitalism.
Oddly enough, one axis of similarity that links modernization theory, left theories of dependency and underdevelopment, and postdevelopment approaches to questions of development is the positioning of the economy within a realist epistemology. By this we mean the presumption that economic knowledge reflects the true state of a real entity called the ‘economy’ (generally understood as a locus of capitalist dominance). … this presumption contradicts the general epistemological position of the post-developmentalist theorists, who see knowledge as constitutive rather than reflective of reality.

Gibson-Graham and Ruccio (2001: 162)

… For postdevelopmentalist theory the global capitalist economy is … positioned as somehow extra-discursive – something that contains and captures heterogeneous local practices and operates outside and beyond the forces of deconstruction. Since capitalism exists as the ‘real’, it is not subject to destabilization in the play of intertextuality like other terms in the development discourse. It appears in post-development theory as an ontological given, disproportionately powerful by virtue of its indiscernable reality in a world of multivalent concepts, shifting discursive practices and unstable meanings.

While the theorists of postdevelopment successfully shift our attention to local differences, movements, and forms of resistance, these turn out to be the weaker ‘other’ to the dominant structure and larger force of capitalist development. The effect is to maintain capitalism as the central referent of development and indeed of what comes ‘after’ development. This narrows the gap that separates the postdevelopmentalist approach from the other two. Rather than representing the economy as a radically heterogeneous social space, postdevelopment critics reinforce the discursive hegemony of capitalism and thereby tend to marginalize the very alternative economic practices they seek to promote.


Gibson-Graham and Ruccio’s critique of economic determinism and also capitalocentrism would demand a re-theorizing of capitalism. In this re-theorizing, capitalist class process would just be one of the polymorphous class processes; and the capitalist class process would be one constitutive moment in an otherwise de-centred and disaggregated economy. On the other hand, post-developmentalist acceptance of the received economic representation (with its inherent economic monism) forecloses the possibility of viewing the economy as de-centred and disaggregated; it actually forecloses a possible language of the economy along with possible social practices such a language could open up. Moreover, absence of such an understanding of the economy means that the post-developmentalists would not be in a position to appreciate the emergence of the dual(istic) model of the economy from within a de-centred and disaggregated space. They would also in the process not be able to appreciate the logic inherent within dualism that drives the discourse of development. Instead, post-developmentalist positions often
accept the given structure of the economy (as in the dualistic model) divided between a modern capitalist economy and a traditional pre-capitalist one.

Given their focus on development and the third world, the post-developmentalistists pit the Leviathan of capitalism (often reduced to capital accumulation; see Shiva 1991, 1994) against an equally homogeneous albeit defenceless and dilapidated ‘third world’ signified by terms such as traditional/subsistence/local; with the difference that the pre-assigned ‘weak’ traditional/subsistence/local is (somewhat unquestioningly) valued in their framework as against the powerful capitalist in the framework of the mainstream. Their theorization would seem to suggest that a subsistence economy is rooted in nature; it is also assumed that such a mooring to nature is part and parcel of the culture of such subsistence economies; the truth is, as if, there in the culture of the subsistence economy. Once this capitalocentric representation is taken for granted, post-developmentalistists work with the assumption that capitalism produces, controls and plunders the traditional/subsistence/local economy as part of an orientalist thematic, imparting a quite different cultural rendition of these economies from what these actually are. With the economy pre-fixed into the two arms of a potent capitalist economy and a feeble traditional/subsistence/local economy, post-developmentalistists tend to see development as harbouring a clash over cultures, in which the culture of industrial capitalism is trying to erase the culture of local economies. Against the economic gains/progress of local societies highlighted by the hegemonic development discourse, post-developmentalistists would flash the red card of cultural losses of local societies that in turn would seriously compromise their existing economic livelihoods. While the hegemonic would comment on the recalcitrant ‘values’ of these local forms of life as regressive, the post-developmentalistists would instead find positive value in them.Caught within this impasse produced fundamentally from an inability to attend to the stifling grip of capitalocentrism, post-developmentalistists are unable to offer alternative ways of reconstructing the economy or rethinking development even as they criticize capitalist development. In their ascribed weaker position, the local is always already in a defensive mould; the local becomes constitutionally marginalized. This is what Gibson-Graham and Ruccio meant by ‘postdevelopment critics reinforce the discursive hegemony of capitalism and thereby tend to marginalize the very alternative economic practices they seek to promote’ (2001: 166). Post-developmentalistists fail to grasp that there is no natural state of marginalization; the state of marginalization is instead produced from a terrain that holds the possibility of some other social, that is non-marginalized, states as well. That in turn demands, to begin with, an anti-capitalocentric conception of a de-centred and disaggregated economy in which the local cannot be taken as constitutionally marginalized. Moreover, not only is there not a constitutionally given marginalized space destined to be forever encased as marginalized, there is also nothing ethical or valuable about such ‘local’ society per se, and it has to be seen as a space harbouring a variety of economic organizations and subjects, and open to possible economic restructuring amid
clashing ethico-political considerations thriving in that space. Taking a position for the ‘devalued other’ in a dualistic economy, and that too without questioning capitalocentrism, is tantamount to subscribing a permanent status of ‘victim’ to that other; as and when they appear, we remain wary of such kinds of victimhood-based imputations or positions. With this clarification regarding capitalocentrism even within the New Left critique, let us revert back to the impact of capitalocentrism and orientalism on the formation of development discourse and the legitimization of dislocation in such discourse.

3. Capitalocentric–orientalist representation of the Southern economy and development

Through the inalienable constitutivity of capitalocentrism and orientalism, and the resultant displacement of the meaning of economy into a dualistic frame, something dramatic happens. Resulting from a capitalocentric gaze, the non-capitalist structures are immediately subordinated in relation to capitalist structures. The orientalist gaze works in tandem with the capitalocentric gaze to produce the de-valued space ‘third world’, as against the overvalued space Western modernity. Through the overdetermination of capitalocentrism and orientalism, the space of non-capitalism is displaced into the derogatory other pre-capitalist where pre-capitalist is not simply a subordinate space in relation to the capitalist space. It is also constitutionally pathological and in reflective of the pathology of the space named ‘third world’. Thus, the category non-capitalism emerges in third world contexts as pre-capitalism. The lacking underside ‘traditional–pre-capitalist–Orient’ comes to symbolize a signpost of economic backwardness; agriculture and informal sectors emerge as traditional sites of backwardness; peasant families, Adivasis, Dalits, informal sector workers, poor women and poor children emerge as harbingers of pathology, as figures of backwardness; as ‘third worldliness’ as a whole. Such verticalities or hierarchical arrangements in the population are not necessarily reducible to development discourse per se; many of these groups differentiated into political–cultural categories of discriminatory hue may have been conjured up since colonial times and some even before that. Thus all ‘evils’ are not gifts of modernity. Rather, this points to the importance of something else: how (economic) development, far from creating all these population arrangements, partly embedded its logic within already existing political–cultural arrangements (capturing differences, discriminations, etc.) that transpired through other kinds of discourses (colonialism, casteism and so on). While these categories, their deployment and effective presence do undergo a change as a result of their integration within development discourse, whether and how this process fundamentally ruffles their previous political–cultural position in the overall arrangement of population is a matter of debate. At the least though, we can point to a reinvention of these groups in a new setting, marking a categorical shift. The momentous change is this: the change and reinvention following development shifts these
groups into the complex temporality–verticality, a transformation operationalized through capitalocentric–orientalism. As an example of the overdetermined and contradictory relations between development and the above-mentioned hierarchies, one can bring up two apparently opposing moments in India’s history of development. One, the chief targets of the 1894 Land Acquisition Act (LAA) formulated in colonial India became the Adivasis and lower castes in the subsequent century; two, the same Adivasis and lower castes were also the objects of benevolence in the poverty management exercise. Given that these groups were already positioned as a hierarchized–inferiorized other in the political–cultural matrix of Indian society, the logic of capitalist development taking the forms of dislocation and poverty management worked over and through these categories of people to not only reinforce their subservient nature but more fundamentally reallocate their experience and existence in the complex temporality–verticality. Although at the other end is the struggle of these groups not only against the assigned categories imposed over them, but against the whole of the political–cultural apparatuses and arrangements and the discourses, such as development, that enable these to come into being and that too in tune with the complex temporality–verticality.

A few further words on the complex temporal–verticality.

For us, the homogenized representation of the space designated pre-capitalism begs the question of its de-centred and heterogeneous existence into independent, feudal, slave, capitalist, communist and communitic forms. With the centricity of the capitalist form taken for granted, the rest of economic existences, no matter how de-centred and heterogeneous, becomes relevant only in their relation, opposition and subordination to the capitalist existence, such that no rethinking of the social in terms of a non-capitalist ethic is possible.

Thus orientalism and capitalocentrism, in overdetermined imbrications, help to define the dualistic framework of a modern capitalist economy and a traditional pre-capitalist economy. This dualistic framework in turn gives the discourse of development a turn towards historicism represented by the category ‘progress’. The developmentalist idea of ‘progress’ can be understood in terms of the metaphor of a ladder. In this metaphor of the ladder, there are ascending steps; the topmost step is symbolized by capitalism. Once reached, there is nowhere else to go. The topmost step of capitalism is taken as the bliss point of civilization. In the development discourse, the pre-constituted ‘modern’ Western economies are presumed to be always already sitting at the top. With capitalism already achieved and no more steps to climb, the modern Western countries only compete with one another, as equals. On the other hand, the economies of the South, presumably pervaded by pre-capitalist structures, are inhabitants of the lower steps of the ladder. The steps below the top are visualized as traditional pre-capitalist structures that are a hurdle and hindrance to the rise of these economies to the next step and the step after that. These economies then need to shed their traditional ways of life and pre-capitalist ways of doing things in order to begin the civilizing journey
up the ladder. Depending upon their historical position, economies are assigned different names – take off, maturing, emerging and so on. Each step in the upward direction represents progress and a certain abandonment of an archaic past. Moulded through the overdetermined logic of Darwinian scientism and Hegelian historicism, the capitalocentric–orientalist view is instrumental in producing a specific logic of transition that defines progress as a transition of society from its pre-capitalist state towards full-blown capitalism. Capitalism unfolds itself in the Southern hemisphere through the logic of development. Correspondingly, development telescopes a political project of reconstructing the social in terms of capitalism.

The evolution of development discourse in post-colonial countries

As the physical colonizers left, the capitalocentric–orientalist perception that drove the civilizing mission of colonialism soon occupied the imagination of the post-colonial rulers and policy makers, and the concrete form through which it was most effectively practised came to be known as the ‘development discourse’. The modernization project of post-colonial societies was based on a firm belief that it was possible to transform traditional pre-capitalist spaces into modern Western capitalism. Development so conceived was not simply about building roads, adopting technologies, feeding hungry people and so on which, in any society and under any rule, is always on the agenda and, hence there is nothing special about such a meaning of development. Development as part of a modernist project emerged as a discourse, that is a system of knowledge about the third world produced in turn through an array of transformative practices (Escobar 1995). Third world became the object and also the site of knowledge production and implementation. An array of practices (involving individual and social actors such as the state, academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media, international agencies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), etc.), apparently dispersed in nature, nevertheless coalesced into a rather systematic and structured chain of signification that fixed, in turn, the image of the third world. The produced knowledge constructed the third world as a lacking space, a space harbouring the pathological. Once the perception of economy is so fixed in terms of a pathological qua third world space and normal qua modern space, development comes to be defined as a progressive transition of the third world from its present pre-capitalist state into the capitalist state. Through a constitutive relation between knowledge and practice, not only the concept of third world but also those of the third world structure and the third world subject became part of the development discourse. Such a development discourse formed and determined the perception, the attitude and the fate of the so-called Southern countries. Whether as a policy maker or as a citizen subject, to remain a prisoner to development discourse that presupposes the above-mentioned dualism is to be entrapped into the capitalocentric–orientalist mindset, a mindset that could be conveniently termed ‘colonized’. Seen in
this way, development can also be viewed as the production and reiteration of the colonial mindset.

The agenda in the above-described development paradigm and the moral impetus underlying the transition process of the Southern countries could be exemplified by the following quote from the United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, as it set out the basic path of transition that was there for the underdeveloped countries to follow:

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.

UN (1951)

What is the meaning of such economic progress and how can it be made a reality? President Truman of the United States summed it up:

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people … I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for better life … What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing … Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

Truman (1949 [1964])

Alongside the powerful men of his time, Truman firmly believed that, as a system, capitalism embodied all these aspects of technological growth, industrialization and wealth creation. It was sold as a virtuous system to countries emerging from colonialism.4

This conceptualization of the economy and its transition soon engulfed the imagination of the ‘elite’ in the previously colonized space and had a particularly deep impact on those who were to take up powerful positions as leaders, policy makers and policy enforcers in the post-colonial nation-state. The following quote from Nehru captures this aspect well:

We are trying to catch up, as far as we can, with the Industrial Revolution that occurred long ago in Western countries.

Nehru (1954: Vol. 2, 93)
The dictum set up by the United Nations and trumpeted by Truman and Nehru became the future agenda for a large number of post-colonial nations. Needless to say, the World Bank adopted and integrated this model within its policy ambit, and helped to give shape to it through the discourse of development. It also helped shape and drive the goal of such ‘third world’/‘underdeveloped’/‘emerging’ countries – a transition towards modern industrialized capitalism. Notwithstanding whether the nation-states evolved on their own or under the aegis of the World Bank and no matter the long-term historical changes such countries have undergone (colonialism to independence, state allocation of resources to market allocation, import substitution industrialization to export promotion industrialization, domestic market to global market, state-sponsored appropriation of surplus to private appropriation), neither the capitalocentric–orientalist perception of dualism nor the teleology of progress it generates has undergone significant changes, at least in the development rationale propounded by the state and global agencies.

Having related the logic of development to a capitalocentric–orientalist perception grounded on the centrisms of capitalism and modernity–West that in turn produces the {capitalism, third world} complex and whose evolution too is set out in terms of arriving at modern capitalism, we now want to explore the connection of this logic to dislocation. However, our analysis of the relation between development logic and dislocation runs into a myriad space that is not our choice. The problem is that the connection of development with dislocation is subsumed under the connection of development to poverty. This is not surprising as the conventional approaches to development, whether espoused by the World Bank and/or mainstream economics, now acknowledge that the process of dislocation contains the germ of poverty. Consequently, encountering and solving the problem of dislocation is broadly seen as coming under the poverty management exercise.

Poverty in the development discourse

In the mainstream discourse on poverty as pioneered by classical political economists, the traditional economy associated with agriculture was perceived as dependent on organic raw materials for food, clothing, housing and fuel. These economies are constrained by land, and growth depends on the productivity of land. The dependence of traditional economies on land, however, means that their growth is constrained and likely to lose sting in the long run. As Lal (1999) pointed out, the same will hold for other traditional activities such as traditional industry (in our terms, the vast segment of the informal sector) and transportation, which because of their structural constraints are not considered as growth oriented.

Taking off from the classical political economists, mainstream economics considers two types of growth – extensive and intensive growth. Extensive growth refers to a scenario whereby the per capita income remains stagnant as an increase in output growth is matched by an increase in population
growth. Intensive growth, on the other hand, takes a scenario in which output growth outweighs population growth such that per capita income increases. Importance is attached to these two forms of growth for their close linkage with meanings of poverty. Intensive growth is preferred because, with rising per capita income, the fruits of increased wealth are supposed to trickle down to the poverty-stricken population. In contrast, with per capita income stagnating, such a trickle down is not possible in cases of the extensive form of growth and hence, in such a growth model, the poor will continue to remain poor. This remains the intuitive logic as to why, in the ‘discourse of poverty’, growth or more precisely intensive growth is considered the primary way to reduce mass poverty in the long run.

The ‘discourse of poverty’ avers that the traditional pre-capitalist sector is embedded within the extensive form of growth and the modern capitalist sector within the intensive form of growth. The former type of economy is said to have far-reaching consequences for the kind of poverty that arises. Because growth is limited by the fixed space of land in the traditional pre-capitalist economy, the law of diminishing marginal productivity constrains the process of growth. This coupled with the Malthusian principle of population growth means that such economies run in the end into a stationary state in which people end up living at the subsistence level signified by the constant per capita income. In this discourse of poverty, people are just about producing their ‘need’ in the traditional pre-capitalist economy. Such a low-level subsistence qua ‘poor’ existence resulting from the pre-capitalist structure of such economies is defined as mass structural poverty.

Poverty attached inalienably to the pre-capitalist traditional economy emerges as another sign of its lack or ab-normality. The heterogeneous reality of the so-called pre-capitalist economy is substituted in turn by a poverty-ridden space and, consequently, its many gradients and shades are subsumed under one overriding expression, ‘third world’, as the lacking other à la a poverty-ridden space. Poverty, pre-capitalism and traditionality are thus rolled into one, into a homogeneous whole – into the image of the ‘third world’. In this discourse on poverty, for such mass poverty to be eradicated, the structures of pre-capitalist economy that produce this poverty must be encountered, entered into and superseded by a modern capitalist economy. It is utopia to think of liberation of the poor from within the pre-capitalist third world-ist structure. As initially visualized by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, one cannot eliminate poverty by reforming (say through the introduction of market or technological progress) the traditional or third world economy. The poor in traditional societies are thus looked at with anxiety and compassion because they are not to blame for their predicament. In the discourse of poverty, if the people in the traditional economy come out as the victims, then the structures of the traditional society along with those people who defend these structures represent the evil. The representation of the third world thus swings between the representation of the so-called traditional societies and its people as symbolic of evil-ness and of victimhood in a coherent and divided
manner (for details, see Chakrabarti et al. 2009: Ch. 1, 3 and 4). Development is an integral component of the modernist impulse that intervenes to save the ‘victim other’ (for example, the oppressed brown woman or the poor brown peasant or the hapless child labourer) from the clutches of the evil other (for example, the oppressive brown man or the rich moneylender or the owner of the ‘informal sector’ enterprise representing the pre-capitalist structure). The terror of the non-capitalist is thus turned into pity for the pre-capitalist. It is the World Bank’s pity for the third world that makes the non-capitalist language of world of the third safe for human consumption. It is through pity that the discourse of development attempts to domesticate surprise. Dread of world of the third is turned into sympathy for third world (Lear 1998: 186).

The converse proposition was that industrial capitalism that combines the institutional settings of private property and free market with capital accumulation will exhibit intensive forms of growth and therefore map the road out of the poverty trap. A journey towards the industrial capitalist sector through rapid growth of that sector was seen as the best recipe for poverty reduction. Along with the institutions of market and private property, of performance markers of efficiency, productivity and capital accumulation, and of subject-hood rooted in self-centred individualism, over time, many other signifiers such as competition, human capital, etc., have been invoked to legitimate the trope of industrialization, growth and modern capitalist economy (Lucas 2002).

The World Bank’s approach to poverty (the overwhelmingly dominant discourse of poverty) reiterates once again the mainstream discourse of poverty, albeit with a rejoinder. In this regard, the World Bank-led development paradigm encompasses a host of players.

... our partnership must be inclusive – involving bilaterals and multilaterals, the United Nations, the European Union, regional organizations, the World Trade Organization, labor organizations, the NGOs, foundations, and the private sector. With each of us playing to our respective strengths, we can leverage up the entire development effort.

World Bank (2000: 13)

Under such a collective effort, growth through capitalist industrialization under market conditions (extended to free trade) is considered the long-run solution to the problem of (mass structural) poverty (see also Bhagwati 2002; Shaikh 2004). In its Handbook on Poverty, the World Bank’s position on growth and poverty is spelled out in the following manner:

Numerous statistical studies confirm that rapid economic growth is the engine of poverty reduction, using both income and non-income measures of poverty ... Removing barriers to access to new goods, technology, and investment opportunities (through trade, investment, and financial liberalization) has generally been associated with economic growth. Structural
policies to improve the functioning of markets are thus critical … Prudent macroeconomic management is a precondition for growth. Macroeconomic stability, and the avoidance or removal of significant distortions in the economy and costs in terms of foregone growth and adverse distribution, are needed to underpin sustained improvements in poverty.

Klugman (2002: 8–16)

Or, as Wolfensohn, the former World Bank chief, says,

A balanced and holistic understanding of the causes and effects of poverty can lead to reforms that promote inclusion, economic growth that reaches the poor, and social development – these are key to sustainable peace … Our job will be to help countries harness the trends … to promote growth, poverty reduction and social harmony.

Wolfensohn (2000: 7–8)

Both quotes stress the point that (the intensive form of) growth (through a transition towards the industrialized capitalist economy) remains central to the eradication of poverty. It is presumed that the question of poverty will be addressed in the course of this growth. That is why, in the context of confronting the issue of poverty, importance is given to conditions conducive to capitalist growth. These include an open market economy with a macroeconomic regime that controls inflation (strict monetary policy), prudent fiscal management (tight fiscal policy with even poverty eradication investment subjected to strict cost–benefit criteria), flexible foreign exchange regime without trade barriers, capital and current account convertibility, privatization, corporate governance reform along the Anglo-American model of shareholding maximization, and so on. Such changes demanded of Southern countries are often known as the Structural Adjustment Programme or SAP (under the purview of the IMF and World Bank), which works to produce and provide ‘suitable’ conditions of existence for the expansion of a capitalism-induced industrialization process. It is believed that such an economic transition will facilitate industrialization, generate high growth and eradicate poverty, principally its most enduring form – mass structural poverty.

If the best recipe for the eradication of poverty is growth through capitalist industrialization, then we should be worried over managing high growth only. We need not address poverty exclusively in order to cure the ‘poor’ of the scourge of poverty as the magic curative potion lies somewhere else – growth. This is what the World Bank and many post-colonial states subscribed to for quite a long period and continue to do so presently. The unilateral focus on growth, however, has started to shift since the late 1960s and, by the 1990s, poverty management has come to occupy a permanent place in the development discourse. What do we mean by poverty management? Why do we need it? What is its relation, if any, to growth?

We begin by noting that, over time, along with mass structural poverty, the conventional development discourse led by the World Bank came to recognize
explicitly the existence of destitution poverty and conjunctural poverty. Destitution is ‘the poverty of able bodied who lacked land, work or wages adequate to support the dependents who were partly responsible for their poverty’ (Iliffe 1987: 5 in Lal 1999: 237). It includes the poverty of those (dependents) who are economically inactive (children, aged, disabled and mentally handicapped) (Klugman 2002: 13). Such irruptions of poverty could take shape in any type of society but, according to the discourse of poverty, they would most likely transpire in the so-called traditional societies. Conjunctural poverty refers to shocks to the system especially in traditional societies, shocks that produce (what can be described as) ‘entitlement’ failures. This could result from political turmoil to climatic crises and end up with outcomes such as famine. It is argued that the organic or traditional societies are more vulnerable to the possibility of conjunctural poverty as these people are assumed to be living at subsistence level. If an adversity or shock strikes such societies, entitlement failures are considered most likely. The cause of entitlement failure is again principally located in the backward economic structures of traditional societies.

For cases of conjunctural poverty and destitution, survival is at issue and poverty management pertains to ensuring that people survive. Thus, while growth through transition towards the modern capitalist sector is considered the means to eradicate mass structural poverty, countering conjunctural poverty and destitution requires working within the traditional sector in order to manage poverty. That is, to face up to conjunctural poverty and destitution, we must take the traditional sector as it is in order to ‘think’, ‘work upon’ and reset the conditions of existence that constitute the forms of life for people in these societies.

Pertinent to our current discussion is the recognition that such situations of poverty, especially destitution poverty, may arise as a result of various kinds of development projects and also expansion of capitalist enterprises. These help to lay down new conditions of existence for capitalist development. Combined with this is SAP (encompassing the aspects of reduced budget deficits, facilitating privatization, open market economy, reformed corporate governance, and so on) that seeks to reform and change the existing conditions of existence in favour of capitalist enterprises so as to facilitate the expansion of the capitalist economy. As an integral part of development logic seeking growth through capitalism-induced industrialization, both the development projects and the adjustment demanded by SAP may give rise to dislocation, which would at times produce physical displacement and at other times a certain disruption of existing forms of life including loss of economic livelihood even as the space of living is retained.

Like becoming a refugee, being forcibly ousted from one’s land and habitat by a dam, reservoir or highway is not only immediately disruptive and painful, it is also fraught with serious long-term risks of becoming poorer than before displacement, more vulnerable economically and disintegrated socially.

Cernea (1994: 18)
The Fund approach to adjustment has had severe economic costs for many of these countries in terms of declines in the levels of output and growth rates, reductions in employment and adverse effects on income distribution. A typical aid program prescribes measures that require excessive compression of domestic demand, cuts in real wages, and reductions in government expenditures; these are frequently accompanied by sharp exchange rate depreciation and import liberalization measures, without due regard to their potentially disruptive effects on the domestic economy.


Market reforms can indeed boost growth and help poor people, but they can also be a source of dislocation. …

World Bank (1991: 32)

We thus come across an important proposition. Growth through capitalism-induced industrialization procreates poverty even as it is at the same time credited with alleviating poverty, especially its most enduring form, mass structural poverty. In the ‘reformist–managerial’ frame, situations of destitution and even possibly conjunctural poverty can arise from crisis in third world societies themselves or on account of the process of modernization à la development projects and SAP (many studies mentioned in Chapter 1 show that dislocation has often taken the form of entitlement failure of the dislocated due to such projects). This means that ‘… development must address human needs’ (World Bank 2000: 57) as part of its management of poverty that are seen to arise from possible poverty scenarios including that opened up by dislocation. This intervention is not to challenge capitalism-induced industrial growth, but to control and manage the ‘poor’ societies.

By intervening within the so-called traditional societies through its proposed menu of needs (that includes resettlement need), development discourse strives to include and integrate such people into its discursive orbit. It intervenes within the forms of life of so-called traditional societies and attempts to seek a change in such societies by trying to put into effect its own support systems. Such moves put these societies into a relation of dependence with the centre – the development paradigm and its organs of international agencies, state, NGOs and so on. This is the moment of inclusion that Wolfensohn was referring to earlier, an inclusion that would guarantee ‘sustainable peace’ and ‘social harmony’.

To summarize, development discourse encapsulates two somewhat opposing yet related theses: growth through capitalism-induced industrialization that is aggressive and ruthless and poverty management that is, as if, benevolent. In development discourse, poverty alleviation then becomes the result of management of poverty through control of and surveillance over so-called traditional societies through the language of ‘third world-ism’, which in turn enables the unhindered transition of the traditional economy to a modern capitalist economy.

Thus, along with a rethinking of the economy, any counter-hegemonic imagination must begin with a questioning of the notion, ‘third world’. Often,
in their effort to get away from a rather problematical third world-ism, post-developmentalist and the ‘radical–movementists’ propose the category ‘local’ as a substitute for third world. There is, however, a problem in this move that generally remains unaddressed. As part of the orientalist worldview, the discourse of third world-ism has already produced an extensive genealogy of the Southern local, and this knowledge has largely colonized our understanding of the local, particularly in the context of the development paradigm. To put it telegraphically, the Southern local is still the third world-ist local.

The question is simple: how do we distinguish ‘local’ from the ‘third world local’, and also from the ‘third world as the Southern local’, without interrogating the category of third world? In the context of the South, third world is as if local and the local is as if third world-ish. Hence the question: if the category third world is put to interrogation, what happens then to the category ‘local’ vis-à-vis the ‘third world’? The problem is that any invocation of the local without an interrogation and a displacing of the given of third world will not be able to extricate the local from third world-ism. Both third world-ism and the question of the local need to be addressed in tandem; both pose a theoretical problem for us; hence, it is not just a question of arriving at the authentic historico-empirical explication of the local and the third world; it is a question of questioning the categories local and third world. Without theoretically extricating the local from third world-ism, the local will remain un(der)theorized and indeed open to appropriation within the discourse of third world-ism. There is a therefore a need to recognize the difference between one local and another local. The question is ‘which local’. Would we invoke a notion of the local that is tied to third world-ism? Would we invoke a notion of the local that is tied to victimhood; tied to evil-ness? Why invoke at all a notion of the local that is third world-ish, that is just the lacking underside of the global and is the representative figure of what has gone awry in the South in terms of capitalism/modernization–industrialization? In this rendition, the local lacks self-definition. It is just a dependent other of the global, such that it is hardly local. For the local to be local, the local needs to be conceptually different from the global and needs to be distinguished from the global. Hence, we need a notion of the local that is speaking an other language – a language other than that of both (global) capital and third world-ism.

We propose a re-theorization of the local; we do this by interrogating and displacing the given notion ‘third world’. For us, the invocation of the category third world is a process of foregrounding a certain notion of the local by development discourse (this rendition of the local is complicit with the text of the hegemonic) and the attendant foreclosure of world of the third (this is the local that cannot be accommodated by the hegemonic; that speaks an other language, language of the outside of the circuits of global capital, language outside of the circuits of global capital) (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2005, 2008c; Chakrabarti et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2009). The crux of development logic lies in a process of repositioning world of the third into the devalued category third world. As a result, it creates the ground for legitimizing the mainstream
discourse of dislocation independently of the development logic. Let us explore the relationship between third world and world of the third in the making of development and the positioning of dislocation in the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach. Not only do we utilize this in the subsequent explication of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach on dislocation and compensation/resettlement, but it will provide crucial clues to critique these as well as to rethink the concepts of dislocation and resettlement along alternative, here Marxian, lines.

**Development as relationality of enslavement: from world of the third to third world**

Let us briefly recapitulate the basic development model. In the development model, capital and the West/modernity form the centre or the nodal/anchoring point and pre-capital/third world’ represents the lacking other. Consequently, in the same model, in the given division of industry versus agriculture, formal versus informal, modern versus traditional and so on, the former of the opposed two is essentially viewed as representing the capitalist economy and the latter as symbolizing a third world-ist pre-capitalist economy. Once it is presumed that the latter is backward, which the capitalocentric–orientalist worldview enables, reiterates and helps to sediment, colonialism first and then development is presented as a process of the ‘progressive’ transformation of the third world agrarian (informal) pre-capitalist economy into a modern industrialized (formal) capitalist economy. An intricate nexus between modernity, capitalism and development with its teleological notion of progress grips the discursive terrain, including the policy paradigm.

Thus, on the one hand, third world-ism flowing from a capitalocentric–orientalist worldview occludes the experience of world of the third; it gives rise to a form of cognitive enslavement. On the other hand, the above framework also telescopes a series of relationships of enslavement grounded on outright bondage (and not bonding) and moral ownership (and not ethicality) of one over the other. This relation of enslavement/bondage takes the form of at times open and at other times surreptitious violence of modernism over traditionality, of capital over pre-capital, of industry over agriculture, of the formal over the informal and so on. The seeds of violence are ingrained in the very structure of these relationships of enslavements and their underlying claims of moral ownership. Through its effects on knowledge, ethics, subject, policy and politics, the relationality of enslavement and claims of moral ownership get further entrenched. Let us explore.

The imputed and assigned connotation ‘third world’ is an attempt to reconfigure the otherwise de-centred and disaggregated ‘local’ societies into a homogeneous figure of backwardness in comparison and opposition to an equally pre-constituted site deemed as advanced/modern. The argument for backwardness has many grounds and approach routes; although one of the more powerful (pioneered by classical political economists) remains to this day that the structures of such societies are responsible for mass poverty and no reform within such structures (including introducing
markets) can change this situation. By virtue of being poor by definition, such societies are backward and hence ready to be intruded. Once ‘world of (local) societies’ are substituted by third world, the homogeneous societal figure qua third world gets represented in various forms such as ‘community’ and ‘social capital’ that, once posed, closes off the possibilities of ‘viewing’ local societies in any other manner. Notwithstanding its representative forms, and there are many that have circulated hitherto, the world of the third ‘local’ is deformed–displaced into the terrain of third world-ism. Any further reference to the ‘local’ or ‘community’ is always already subsumed into third world-ism and the development register that third world-ism gives rise to. The ‘Adivasis’ find their name everywhere in the development register, in the thousand models propped up in their name, but they are only present as a lacking other, as lifeless figures of pathology out of sync with the modern capitalist economy that the discourse of development has set as the norm(al). The ‘local’ is included and talked about and talked to, that is foregrounded, but only as the lacking other. By the very manner of their inclusion, the world of the Adivasis is repudiated and thus secreted out, that is foreclosed. In this context, we designate the foreclosed world of the ‘local’ as world of the third.

World of the third thus pertains to what is foreclosed in the process of foregrounding the third world. By the very terms in which the world of the third is included–foregrounded as third world, the knowledge–language system informing the practices within world of the third is foreclosed. Here, the foreclosure of world of the third takes place concomitantly with the foregrounding of the third world. What is remarkable about the foreclosure of world of the third is that world of the third is actually talked about, interrogated, but it is through this very incitement to discourse that foreclosure takes shape, where the world of third is not talked about as world of the third but as third world. In so far as third world-ism is fundamental in founding the logic of capitalist development, one can surmise that capitalist hegemony is constituted through the foreclosure of world of the third. This ‘local’ à la world of the third is put outside the development register. Instead, what remains of the local is a devalued and displaced reformulation of world of the third. In this book, we pose world of the third as the Marxian counter to that of the given of third world. This helps to resituate the local in a terrain that not only marks it as distinct from third world but also contests it.

We are opposed to both moments telescoped in the category third world: the economico-cultural inferiorization of world of the third and also the reduction of world of the third to a process of homo-hegemonization. Once world of the third is conceptually displaced to third world, that is its structures are represented as harbouring deformity–abnormality (for one because they are said to be producing poverty on a mass scale) and its subjects are seen as lacking other or victims of their own structures, dislocation of this devalued space becomes a legitimate exercise; an exercise that can be carried out in the name of development. Even though the capitalocentric–orientalist construction of third world is a deterministic representation of what world of the third is, it is instrumental in defining, constructing and instituting the logic of development.
Once the devalued representation of world of the third as third world is universalized, one cannot but accept the development logic. As a result, dislocation must be accepted no matter how painful or violent it is. In this context, dislocation is as if it is not a violence over world of the third. Rather, world of the third, by virtue of being backward, invites dislocation. This violence is internalized within the very relation of temporality–verticality between capital/West/modernism and pre-capital/third world/tradition. This relation flowing from the capitalocentric–orientalist worldview absolves capitalism-motored development through industrialization of any responsibility for the violence it institutes.

Towards a modernist ethic of dislocation

At this point, our interest turns towards the World Bank’s admission that, along with reducing poverty, development produces poverty as well. If we agree with the World Bank that dislocation, as a moment of poverty creation, is a consequence of development, then our analysis has revealed that the consequence is inalienably tied to the logic of development. In the mainstream discourse of development, dislocation is an inevitability that contributes to the ultimate good of ‘third world’ people. Consideration of dislocation independent of the development logic is tantamount to a process of masking not only the logical connection between the two, but also the moments of enslavement, violence, marginalization and disempowerment symbolized in the moment of dislocation that is in turn tied to the conception of development.

This signals a certain dissonance in the mainstream development agenda, including that concerning the specific case of dislocation. At one end, the World Bank-led development discourse extols prosperity, harmony and empowerment as virtues of its development agenda and, in the same turn, its development agenda contains a logic that produces violence, instability and disempowerment. As the progressive journey of the development agenda is conceived in relation to capitalism, this dissonance can be seen as a strategy to mask the march of capitalism in the Southern countries. The poverty management system that has emerged in the Southern countries under the aegis of the World Bank uses the interpellating call of ‘poverty’ as a powerful ideological tool to foreground the concept of a devalued ‘third world’ so as to control and manage an alien space that in turn allows the logic of growth through capitalism-induced industrialization to proceed undeterred.

The projection of the apolitical and technical face of development institutions such as the World Bank turns out, in effect, to be the politics of securing capitalist hegemony in the South that materializes through the development discourse. The rather muted reaction to dislocation and the arbitrariness of compensation measures bring to the surface its clear preference for capitalist industrialization as against a demoted place for the realm of ‘poverty’ that it produces. This complicity seems to follow from the conjecture that modern industrialization will get rid of poverty once and for all. It builds into the development institution and also the development(ist) subject the belief that the arm
of growth through capitalist industrialization is primary while that of ‘poverty management’ is secondary. ‘Growth with a human face’ literally places growth first and the human face of poverty eradication as an add-on that needs to be dealt with in order to carry out and smooth the growth exercise in actuality. In this regard, the ‘reformist–managerial’ school is united in its effort to demote the logical link between development and dislocation, even to sidestep the inalienable relation between the two. We, on the other hand, see in the questioning of the ethic of dislocation independent of the question of development an (uninformed) complicity in the very reproduction of capitalist hegemony.

From the question of dislocation to that of compensation: an illusory journey from ethics to justice

As seen from a capitalocentric–orientalist perspective, third world qua ‘traditional’ structures are supposed to harbour poverty and, consequently, ‘progress’ requires a transformation towards modernist structures. This would demand creating, refining and expanding conditions of capitalist markets, private property, cut-throat competition, etc. and also the setting up of infrastructures, industrial platforms, cities and townships, roads and highways, irrigation systems for water supply, etc. These changing conditions will constitute and facilitate the expansion of capitalist enterprises, thus de facto expanding the reach and also the idea of a ‘modern’ economy. However, processes let loose by the developmental logic produce their own set of contradictory effects. Specifically, development projects focused on creating conditions of existence for the expansion of the capitalist economy require people to give up their land and livelihood. Such dislocations with the associated deprivations are recognized as telescoping a process of ‘taking without giving’ and hence demand correction. From our vantage point, the ‘economics of compensation’ arises as a medium of recognizing this ‘wrong’ or ‘harm’ done by development logic and explains why institutions such as the World Bank or states find it important to raise the issue of compensation. By virtue of dislocation being part of the logic of development, one cannot but address the issue of compensation even as the manner of raising the issue of compensation involves an epistemic violence that displaces the issue of dislocation to fundamentally a poverty management exercise.

Recent anthropological work has reconfirmed the presence of community-based controls on such resources. This work has also recorded a growing erosion of such controls and support systems in the face of technological change, population growth and migration, and the opening of new markets. Modernization benefits many. In the long run it can benefit all. But in the process of modernization a great many get trampled upon, the vast majority of whom are women, children, the old, and the infirm. This suggests a central role for government action. But at the level of economic policy, the duties of government cannot be identified unless we know
something about the nature and extent of household, or kinship or religious, or community support system.

We will find it necessary to offer an account of the analytical economics of commodity deprivation. This will allow us to identify resource allocation mechanisms in which fundamental needs can go unfulfilled for an entire class of people. We will wish to identify those categories of people in a society who are particularly vulnerable to chronic destitution … This is essential if we are to understand the phenomenon; but it is also necessary if we are to identify prescriptions.

Dasgupta (1995: 9–10)

‘Problems’ of destitution in a third world economy are seen as emanating from the workings of modernization *qua* growth but that, we are told, is going to benefit all in the end. Thus, in the end, the problems flowing from the devastation wrought on ‘third world’ societies are going to disappear with the disappearance of third world ‘structures’. Therefore, one cannot and must not stop capitalism-induced growth. In the meantime, it is acknowledged that the process of modernization, by breaking down ‘community-based controls’, is going to give rise to poverty *qua* destitution; such poverty *qua* destitution must be controlled and managed as a problem outside the space of modernization. Managing the poor thus becomes an issue as, in tandem with growth, dislocation in its diverse forms continues to materialize endlessly. The issue then is to bring the ‘problems’ under the analytical framework of modernization in order to have the ‘proper’ policy prescription that would manage dislocation and deprivation arising from the ongoing process of growth through capitalist industrialization until the final goal of full-fledged ‘benefits to all’ is achieved. This testifies to the importance of addressing the issue of dislocation and, in that context, the value of viewing ‘compensation’ or ‘resettlement’ as a connecting bridge to control the contradictions arising from the logic of development – growth through capitalist industrialization and the poverty that results from it.

The ‘reformist–managerial’ discourse on dislocation and compensation/resettlement has seen a sudden surge of concern for the dislocated, and this has started percolating into the policy making paradigm of nation-states. This is in sharp contrast to the situation during much of the twentieth century when, despite the debate on compensation, the issue of dislocation remained a side issue for the planning community. This reaction is typified by the World Bank, which can be called the nodal agency of the ‘reformist–managerial’ community. The World Bank’s analysis of the feasibility of development projects did not show any serious concern regarding the dislocated and its associated issues such as whether compensation was paid or not and, if paid, how much and in what form. Between 1947 and 1994, the Executive Board of the World Bank accepted all the 6000 projects that were submitted by the World Bank management (Roy 2001: 76). Across the development community, it was believed that such development projects would facilitate industrial growth and, through a process of trickle down, reduce poverty in the long run.
Due fundamentally to the ‘radical–movementist’ counter-attack typified by the social movement against dislocation, there is now in the ‘reformist–managerial’ community a growing acknowledgement of the ‘truth’ of ‘growth-induced dislocation–destitution’ and the importance of addressing it. In many cases, the World Bank nowadays refuses to fund development projects that in its assessment do not adequately deal with the issue of rehabilitation. However, its position does not transpire into a taking to task of the authorities of development projects, be they state or local authorities or private enterprises who benefit directly or indirectly from such projects. And in cases where the World Bank is not the financier and the state takes the role of promoting, financing and even, at times, implementing the project, the World Bank at best murmurs and more often than not retains a stony silence on the question of dislocation and rehabilitation. In other words, not only does the World Bank not have a policy of zero tolerance towards dislocation (which it takes as a normal after-effect of development), but it retains a similar policy strategy towards recompensing the dislocated. While policy makers in the nation-states and in the World Bank may differ over the need for and composition of rehabilitation, they hardly ever disagree regarding the sanctity of the development logic and the need to keep dislocation distinct from development. It is evident though that the World Bank remains the nodal agency for rethinking the theory and practice of dislocation and rehabilitation, and the community of policy makers globally, including those tied to nation-states, draws heavily on its understanding, explanation and recommendation.

Notwithstanding this vacillating and often ambiguous position on compensation, new questions on dislocation are being raised within and outside the ‘reformist–managerial’ community, at conceptual, policy and practical levels. As a result, a set of hitherto dormant questions on compensation have surfaced and blown themselves up in the face of mainstream economics, the development institutions and planners. Is the old/classical way of conceiving compensation sufficient? Is compensation, to begin with, the right answer to dislocation and deprivation? If not, what then? Is resettlement the answer? Or do we need to think even beyond mere resettlement? Do we need to focus on and question the very logic of development, rather than merely deal with its adverse effects? These are the questions that are now being debated in the ‘reformist–managerial’ community including the World Bank and beyond, and to which we turn next.
3 From ‘compensation’ to ‘resettlement need’

The reformist–managerial approach

In the South, capitalism presents itself under the garb of development whose primary arm is ‘growth through industrialisation’. Industrial development is not simply about securing the expansion of capitalist enterprises, but also involves procuring the required conditions of existence consisting of infrastructure, industrial platforms, cities and townships, roads and highways, irrigation systems and so on. Such an aggressive kind of industrial development requires a claim over space. Hence, people are made to give up their claim over space that had hitherto enabled them to reproduce forms of life quite different from those in industrial hubs. In lieu of giving up their claim over space, displaced people are to be compensated as part of the larger canvas of the poverty management exercise; which, as we have explored, is the secondary arm of development. How would they be compensated?

Following the Hicks–Kaldor compensation criteria, the overwhelmingly dominant and popular answer, at least among economists and policy makers, has been ‘monetary compensation’ or some variant of it. For more than half a century, mainstream economics has been grappling with the meaning of compensation as a legitimate ‘answer’ to dislocation. Taking a cue from this approach, policy makers have tried to devise ‘efficient’ methods to conceive of and implement policies on compensation. We refer to the terrain of thinking of ‘compensation’ from the vantage point of mainstream economics and policy making as the ‘economics of compensation’.

It is also notable that alternative economic approaches have since appeared that supplement the concept of compensation by broadly accounting for the inequity effects of dislocation. These include the social cost–benefit approach using egalitarian weight to internalize distributional aspects as pioneered by, to name a few, Ian Little, James Mirrlees, Amartya Sen and Partha Dasgupta in the late 1960s. In recent times, the safety net approach of Ravi Kanbur stands out.

On the other hand, sociologists and anthropologists have been raising questions regarding the ‘economics of compensation’. They have argued that the ‘economics of compensation’ as a solution to displacement is beset with internal inconsistencies and cannot make good its self-proclaimed assertion of ‘improving or at least restoring re-settlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’.
However, the approach that has found wide currency is the sociological approach of Michael Cernea’s *Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR)* approach, which forwards the need to move from the domain of monetary compensation to resettlement. Cernea’s thrust in turn has been assimilated in the World Bank policy framework.

Notwithstanding legitimate questions regarding the authenticity of the alternative approaches, which have their own quota of problems and criticisms, the pertinent point to note is the common recognition by these experts that none of their proposed alternatives has come close to overcoming the popularity of ‘economics of compensation’ among mainstream economists or policy makers. The frustration among many of the discussants of these alternative approaches becomes clear from these quotes.

Un fortunately, mainstream economic theorists do not revisit the thinking upon which loss evaluation and compensation are based and impoverishment effects are allowed to continue. … I brought up the economic inconsistencies in dealing with resettlement explicitly to the attention of my colleague economists. … There has been little response from economic quarters so far. The same methodologies continue to reign by inertia and cognitive dissonance, despite the [contrary] feedback from practice.

Cernea (2003: 27)

In the late 1960s there was considerable development of methods for applying social cost–benefit analysis to investment in developing countries. In the 1970s, these methods began to be applied. … A battle raged in the World Bank during the 1970s about whether social prices should be used. Formally the ‘social price brigade’ won if we note that guidelines on the use of distributional weights were actually incorporated in the Operational Manual in 1980. In practice, we believe, they were hardly ever used except in an experimental manner in a few cases … Social pricing, using distributional weights, has been abandoned … When the pressure is on to get money out, it is not surprising that demands for more complex analysis are unwelcome. Worse than this, project analysis would never get promoted if they were honestly compelled to report unfavourably on several projects.

Little and Mirrless quoted in Kanbur (2003: 12–13)

No less a person than Sir John Hicks, one of the pioneers of ‘economics of compensation’, ended up questioning not just the compensation principle, but also the underlying cost–benefit approach from which the principle is derived. Hicks (1983: 365–66) wrote, ‘It is a besetting vice of economists to over-play their hands, to claim more for their subject that they should … to estimate, so far as he can, the gains and losses that are likely to accrue, to various classes, or sections of the population, from the proposed action. … It is not his business’. 
As a whole, policy making bodies, national and international, remained hooked to the ‘economics of compensation’ and saw little value in taking a more social approach and/or addressing inequity. While ‘economics of compensation’ is still popular in policy making circles, it is also true that, in recent times, Cernea’s IRR approach has emerged as a serious challenger and, at the minimum, has catapulted resettlement to the centre stage of discussing the costs and remedies of dislocation.

Despite sharp differences, the varied theories, for and against compensation, share two stunning, albeit troublesome, similarities. Almost the whole of the debate has centred on only one form of dislocation – physical displacement. Purloining for the moment the other more delicate and mundane forms of dislocation (whereby people may retain their living space), our critical exegesis of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach in this chapter would ignore these subtle dislocations, an issue we take up later. Moreover, none of the sides question the received logic of development and as such they remain implicated in a capitalocentric–orientalist worldview. Because their discussion on dislocation never turns into an interrogation of either the logic or the ethics of development, at the level of policy, development and dislocation remain two distant and distinct issues. Taking the former as granted, these approaches essentially attempt to understand and solve the latter independently of the former. Insofar as these varied approaches share this attribute of theoretically de-linking dislocation from development, they are, for us, all part of the ‘reformist–managerial’ school of dislocation. In this chapter, taking off from the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle that forms the theoretical bedrock of ‘economics of compensation’, we unpack the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach towards dislocation and compensation, culminating in Cernea’s resettlement need.

**The Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle**

The discussion on compensation in mainstream economics can be traced back to the pioneering intervention by Lionel Robbins in the 1930s. He could be seen as crossing swords with the method of aggregation in the utilitarian approach. The utilitarian approach sought to aggregate the utility gains of the beneficiaries and the utility losses of the losers in the context of providing more favourable weights to the gains and losses of the poor than the rich where the different weights are embedded in the respective utility functions. Robbins raised the problem of comparing an individual's utilities and providing weights that could objectively identify interpersonal differences and compare their welfare. To explain his objection, Robbins used a story by Henry Maine in which a Brahmin says to a Benthamite utilitarian:

I am ten times as capable of happiness as that untouchable over there.

Robbins (1938: 636) added,
I could not escape the conviction that, if I chose to regard as equally capable of satisfaction and he to regard them as differing according to a hierarchical schedule, the difference between us was not one which could be resolved by the same methods of demonstration as were available in other fields of social judgment.

Robbins was pointing to the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons, which is further exemplified in the following quote from Jevons used by Robbins (1938: 637):

I see no means whereby such comparison can be accomplished. Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feeling is possible.

Owing to the epistemological arbitrariness of utility comparisons following the absence of any common denominator, Robbins concluded that interpersonal comparison lacked a ‘scientific’ basis. Robbins argued that, because of the absence of a common denominator, such an interpersonal comparison of gains and losses is problematic. This implies that no welfare prediction regarding a development project in terms of aggregate gains and losses was possible. Robbins’ conclusion meant that policy makers qua economists are not in a position to recommend scientifically about the feasibility of development projects on the basis of aggregate gains and losses.

Such a recommendation could be made only if it would satisfy the efficiency condition of ‘Pareto improvement’. ‘Pareto improvement’ is achieved when, in moving from State A (say with no development project) to State B (say when a development project is undertaken), at least one agent is better off and nobody else is worse off. However, it is virtually inconceivable that a development project will not make any individual worse off, which in turn would violate the Pareto improvement criterion. With this violation of the Pareto improvement criterion, no development project can be ‘scientifically’ legitimized by policy makers on the grounds of sound economic logic.

Following Robbins, mainstream economists were confronted with two questions: (i) how do we aggregate the overall gains and losses of those affected? and (ii) how do we account for the disproportionate suffering of the poor as against the rich that results from displacement? (Kanbur 2003) The second question would require giving greater weight to the gains and losses of the poor than the rich and then using this egalitarian scale to sum up the individual gains and losses to arrive at an aggregate measure of gain and loss. Robbins’ argument was that no comparison regarding the relative merits of individuals is possible for the reasons we have discussed. Consequently, the first issue of aggregation of gains and losses lacks scientificity. For the right or the wrong reasons, we now know that Robbins’ criticism was taken seriously by mainstream economists and, for many, it signalled not just the death knell of classical utilitarianism, but also the justification of new welfare economics,
in which distribution judgement was at best considered troublesome and at worst faulty. Instead, the criterion of Pareto efficiency came to occupy the centre stage. Because it could sidestep equity concerns, the dominant strand of mainstream economics has come to see Pareto efficiency as a scientifically objective and epistemologically neutral concept. As we shall see, the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle assimilated this impulse.

With the impasse instituted following Robbins, Nicolas Kaldor (1939) came up with his famous ‘compensation principle’, which was further substantiated by John Hicks (1939, 1941). The Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle formed the point of reference and departure for subsequent analysis of compensation and provided the ‘scientific’ à la economic justification for undertaking development projects. We basically follow Kaldor in our presentation below.

In answer to Robbins’ objection regarding the problem of specifying value judgements concerning the relative merits of individuals in two sets of situations, Kaldor replied that no such interpersonal value judgement is needed to compare two situations. What was required instead was a cost–benefit approach that would focus on the amount of compensation so as to ensure that those who gained from the project compensate – at least hypothetically – in terms of income those who lost out so as to make the losers no worse off. Whether payment is actually made or not, the old income distribution would, in principle at least, remain intact even as the project would pass the Pareto improvement test. From another angle, Hicks came to a similar conclusion. The relevant issue for Kaldor–Hicks is whether the project gives a positive net benefit, which would imply the fulfilment of the Pareto efficiency principle. As a result, following the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, the emphasis turned towards efficiency and away from distributional or equity concerns.

How does Kaldor measure the benefit to individuals of a change in a state or situation, say following the adoption of a development project? One can imagine that individuals assess their own monetary valuation resulting from the change. Because each individual is assessing his or her benefit in terms of money, in principle, money emerges as the common measure with whose help we can add up the aggregate net benefits of all the individuals from the project in question. The use of money as a unit also implied that only effects with market valuation (actual or contingent) would be considered for cost–benefit calculation. However, using the common unit of money to aggregate the benefit and cost entails an implicit value judgement that in effect takes out distributional concerns from consideration. This value judgement is premised on the presumption that the extra one rupee of benefit holds the same significance for all individuals (rich and poor) to whom it is credited, which means that one rupee of benefit to one individual can offset one rupee of loss to another. This is controversial because it erases the difference between the extents of the loss suffered by the poor as against the loss suffered by the rich. Following this, there is no need now to give weights to distributional changes; interpersonal comparison is thus made redundant and so is the distributional
concern. Once Robbins’ problem is thus accounted at the cost of excluding distributional concerns, Kaldor makes free use of the cost–benefit approach to fashion his famous compensation test.

The crux of the Kaldor–Hicks compensation test is simple: if the gainers from the move from State A to State B can compensate the losers and are still better off without anybody else being worse off, the movement is efficient and hence can justifiably be made. The compensation test does not require us to find out who among the community of people has suffered and to what relative degree. Consequently, individual or groupwise distribution considerations are irrelevant for checking whether the development project has economic validity or not.

There are three notable aspects to this compensation test. First, the gains and losses as conceived by Kaldor–Hicks are in terms of income, which means that individual forms of life are reduced to income considerations, and accordingly ‘benefit’ and ‘cost’ and also the derived compensation are conceptualized as an income measure. This is in line with a methodology that mainstream economics adopts under which: (i) one or a few processes are positioned as relatively important or solely determining the whole (here, livelihood or forms of life); and (ii) those processes are captured within income accounting, which can have possible market valuation (with existing price or through contingent valuation). Second, the transfer of income capturing Kaldor–Hicks compensation could be deemed as a hypothetical gesture as the gainers need only be, in principle, willing to hand over the requisite income to the losers without necessarily parting with it in reality. Cost–benefit analysis is based on a value assumption that the policy makers should pursue projects that result in potential Pareto improvements even though no practical initiative or institution need exist to make the transfers that would result in an actual Pareto improvement (Trumbull 1990: 203). In effect, this allowed for the justification of the project at hand without quite the requirement to recompense the losers. Third, the justification of the project is grounded on the category of ‘efficiency’, which gives validity to the development projects on economic grounds. No further considerations (distributional or otherwise) are needed in seeking justification for the project. In this sense, efficiency as a concept is projected to be an objective criterion and is deemed as ethically neutral. In this type of reasoning, efficiency emerges as the necessary condition for further reasoning; but where efficiency is a concept that could not be opened up to critique; where the efficiency criterion affects all others but is itself not affected by the others. No matter whether compensation from the gainers to the losers is paid or not, it does not change the argument: if the benefits outweigh the costs (inclusive of the amount of compensation), the development project has satisfied the efficiency criteria and hence has been validated. That is, if it is possible to potentially distribute part of the gains to the losers (and hence make them no worse off) and yet retain net gain (implying that at least one person is better off), it means that, whether the distribution actually takes place or not, the project itself is economically beneficial and, on that ground
alone, the project stands as justified. Dislocation, equity and other such aspects then become at best a marginal issue; at worst, they are altogether purloined.

Economic efficiency serves as the ‘scientific’ basis for analysing and justifying the project. Income determinism fixes the nature of payments to be made while the feature of hypothetical payment entails that, even if compensation is not forthcoming, the project can still go through. Together, these three features combine to play a role in motoring the economics of compensation and inform the process of policy making and implementation concerning development projects. The Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle gave a certain (economic) legitimization to and for the development projects and decisively determined the meaning and type of compensation actually to be delivered, if at all. In fact, it gave a scientific à la ‘economic’ justification for carrying out development projects irrespective of whether compensation is actually forthcoming. From our viewpoint, it can be argued that the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle was one of the factors instrumental in instituting a wedge between development and the vexed issue of dislocation and its effects; development can now be discussed independently of dislocation and vice versa. Wittingly or unwittingly, this premise of ‘economic of compensation’ has thus far served as the guiding template for policy makers in viewing development projects and the problem of dislocation.

The logical and policy deficiencies of the compensation principle

Having laid down the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle, let us now turn our attention to a number of criticisms levelled against the compensation principle. These criticisms point to various logical inconsistencies inherent in the principle and also undermine any claim to compensation as an appropriate policy means for meeting the policy goal of recompensing the dislocated.

Criticism I: the compensation principle is unconvincing and redundant

We owe this critique to Amartya Sen (2003: 553–57). Sen argues, in our opinion quite cogently, that the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle is both unconvincing and redundant. Consider a change resulting from a development project, following which the rich are better off and the poor worse off. In this case, if the compensation is actually paid, there is Pareto improvement and the project goes through. If the compensated amount is actually paid out and the end result is a case of Pareto improvement, then we wonder why the compensation test is needed in the first place. The Pareto improvement outcome already includes the paid compensation as part of its cost (along with other costs), which is a sufficient argument for the development project to go through. The compensation test is redundant in this case. On the other hand, the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle does not require actual compensation to be paid. For the project to go through, the compensation principle entails
that the previous income distribution be maintained in *principle*, which is fulfilled here by a *hypothetical* redistribution of income from the gainers to the losers. If the income redistribution from the rich to the poor does not actually occur, then, presuming that the hypothetical distribution is granted and the compensation test passed, in reality, no cash has actually transferred hands entailing that the rich end up being better off and the poor worse off. This is definitely no social improvement, which makes the compensation test unconvincing.

**Criticism II: the compensation principle is unconcerned about distribution**

Other than being redundant and unconvincing, the aspect of distribution turns out to be a thorny issue for the compensation test. In the Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle, because some individuals’ utilities have increased while others’ have decreased, it is not possible to compare the previous state with the changed state without considering the relative merits of individuals and the distribution of income, before and after. Yet, the compensation principle is sustained by adopting two implicit assumptions: (i) rupee value is the same for everybody – rich and the poor; and (ii) that everybody – the poor and the rich – must be given equal weight of one rupee in the calculation of aggregate benefit and aggregate cost. As Kanbur (2003) pointed out, many economists are wary of this shoddy treatment to distributional aspects and would like to see relative *qua* normative weights applied depending upon the income status of the agents. Joseph Stiglitz (1999: 114) summed up the dilemma as:

What happens if the total willingness to pay exceeds the total costs, but the costs borne by some individuals exceed their willingness to pay? Should the project be undertaken? The compensation principle says that if the aggregate willingness to pay exceeds the costs, the project should be undertaken. Most economists criticize this principle, for it ignores distributional concerns.

Disturbed by the absence of distributional concerns, the *social cost–benefit approach* using egalitarian weight was developed during the late 1960s and 1970s. Little and Mirrlees (1969) came up with an operational manual for a social cost–benefit approach in the case of development projects that integrates distribution-sensitive weights and aimed to formulate a technique of finding out whether present social value is positive or not (also see Little 2003). In the case that the present social value is positive, the project goes ahead. Present social value like the traditional value is the total discounted monetary value of all revenues minus expenditure except that the former harbours two additional features. First, as actual prices do not reflect social values, prices have to be so modified to make it equal to social values and, second, there are externality effects (mostly negative) against which appropriate values have to be attached. Little and Mirrlees, however, also point out
that a positive present social value does not mean that there is Pareto improvement, that is, the aggregate positive social value would not capture the fact that certain individuals may be worse off as a result of the project. To account for the losers, we must bring in distributional considerations, that is, provide differential normative weights, such as providing more weights to the gains and losses of the poor compared with the rich. In doing so, if the benefits outweigh the losses, then the project goes through.

While popular in academic circles in the 1970s and 1980s, the social cost–benefit policy frame for recompensing the dislocated lost out to the compensation approach. Other than the time that would be lost on account of distributional considerations, the usual defence put forward for ignoring questions of distribution is the convenient law of average that speaks of a trickle-down system that works as if on its own, through which the benefits of growth following a development project would somehow percolate in the end to everybody including the immediate losers. The anxiety of project delay and the passion for fast paced industrialization meant that approval of projects became the priority and not dislocation of, or resettlement for, the displaced.

In this context, it is important to fathom that, while partly true, it is not exclusively a question of planners being insensitive to the sufferings of the dislocated. Instead, the point is that courtesy the economic logic of ‘efficiency’ as an objective and hence a scientific criteria, it is accepted that any collateral damage in the form of short-term suffering of the dislocated will be ameliorated through future income increase (and a superior quality of life) once the efficiency gains from development projects start to trickle down. Consequently, other conditions such as distribution/equity and, by default, dislocation are secondary to the issue of whether development projects bring economic gains or not. Even today, in deciding upon the allocation of resources, the dominant cluster of economists within the ‘reformist–managerial’ community remains committed to this privileged status of efficiency that the cost–benefit approach teases out.

This comes against the background of criticisms of cost–benefit (for reforming or abandoning it) from numerous social scientists (including some within the ‘reformist–managerial school) on the grounds that the framework cannot account for all the costs. However, they fail to see that the issue is fundamentally not that of the cost–benefit approach, but rather regarding how efficiency is being deployed here to legitimize the undertaking of development projects. As efficiency is the basic foundation of sound economic logic, one cannot do without the cost–benefit approach no matter how under-theorized it is; there exists no better way of finding out the efficiency gain or loss from development projects. One can of course attempt to reform the cost–benefit approach, as did Little and Mirrlees through their social cost–benefit approach. In that case, the difference is not over cost–benefit or calculating efficiency (both Kaldor–Hicks and social cost–benefit calculate net gain). Instead, the debate concerns which effects are to be counted and which left out in the cost–benefit calculations, and also the procedure of going about
it (using normative weights or not). In this context, the Kaldor–Hicks type of monetary compensation is not inclined to include distributional/equity concerns (distribution-insensitive Pareto efficiency), which is on the other hand crucial for the social cost–benefit approach (distribution-sensitive Pareto efficiency).1 From our vantage point, the difference is more substantive than fundamental and, in this context, we have not, to our knowledge, come across any intervention from either the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach or the ‘radical–movementist’ approach to confront at a methodological level the logic and ideology of economic efficiency and its underlying cost–benefit framework. In fact, non-economic strands of the ‘reformist–managerial’ school such as Cernea and also the ‘radical–movementist’ approach generally miss the core strength of ‘economics of compensation’. The criticism of dislocation that the latter delivers does not amount to a criticism of efficiency that justifies the project on purely economic grounds and then backs it up with an argument that the net benefit will be beneficial to the masses in the long run, including ultimately the dislocated who seem to lose out momentarily. Cernea (2007: 1042) criticizes the trickle-down theory by pointing out that such an argument misses the fact ‘that the displaced groups suffer dispossession, dislocation, impoverishment that the general population do not. …’ Defenders of the trickle-down theory, Cernea contends, fail to account for the fact that ‘those displaced have to go through years of enormous effort to reconstruct their economic and social situation, and their communities face an ordeal and a set of risks not imposed on the general population’ (Cernea 2007: 1042).2 While this criticism is well taken, the notable point in Cernea’s criticism is regarding the need to redistribute a certain quantum of benefit from the project to the losers. It is not regarding whether the underlying principle of efficiency that determines the justification of the project is valid or not and whether it can be used as the sole measure of determining the fate of development projects. The absence of interrogation of the core concept of efficiency used for validating development projects means that one still has not answered the question regarding why a particular project is to be opposed, at least on economic grounds. It also points to a situation of being trapped in and torn between accepting the project, which implies de facto accepting efficiency as the measure and also its underlying cost–benefit approach and, at the same time, rejecting the inequity effects of dislocation following the project by trying to question the cost–benefit criteria. Overall, we remain somewhat uneasy with Cernea’s and the other critiques of ‘economics of compensation’ (including those coming from the ‘radical–movementist’ school) as they seem to avoid addressing or critiquing the core of ‘economics of compensation’. In Chapter 5, we use the concept of overdetermination to interrogate efficiency.

**Criticism III: policy irrelevance of the compensation principle**

Tibor Scitovszky (1941–42) has highlighted the policy irrelevance of the Kaldor–Hicks criterion. Scitovszky demonstrated that it is possible to
construct situations where it is perfectly advisable to move from State A to State B and also from State B to State A. This lands us in a policy loop where movement from one situation to another is as good as another, thereby trivializing the compensation test.

**Criticism IV: the compensation principle is an unsuitable instrument to solve the problem of displacement**

Ravi Kanbur (2003) sees in compensation the inability to internalize egalitarian distributive weights. However, he does not deny the importance of either and stands by the need to incorporate both in order to reform the ‘economics of compensation’. He also views compensation as an important component of the ideological exercise to sell the development projects to the dislocated and the people at large.

There is no question that in terms of its own history of debate and dissent on the evaluation of projects, economic analysis should embrace specific compensation mechanisms for every project that is being considered. This is not only because of the ethical imperative, and the illogicality of the compensation principle, but also because of political economy considerations—without compensation to those who are displaced and other losers, the project may get delayed or not go ahead at all, thereby foregoing an increase in aggregate benefits.

Kanbur (2003)

Kanbur also argues for the need to move beyond compensation by pointing out that, even after considering distributive weights, compensation cannot account for all the losses. To account for this gap, in addition to compensation, he calls for the adoption of a structure of safety nets that would automatically redistribute resources such that nobody remains destitute after the project. While Kanbur recognizes that a safety net is not perfect and would invite some major problems at the levels of design and implementation, he also contends that an automatic safety net is the best measure to get over the deficiencies of a theory of compensation. Interestingly, in the course of his analysis, he seems to be identifying ‘dislocation’ as a ‘social’ problem that needs to be tackled in a better way than is offered by simple compensation in order to create a political environment for the legitimization of development projects. This in turn would facilitate and smoothen the functioning of the logic of growth through capitalism-induced industrialization as a motor of ‘third world’ development. In Kanbur’s view, ‘a joint theory of project-specific compensation and generalized automatic safety nets now awaits development’.

One of the telling features of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to dislocation that economists offer (including that of Kanbur’s safety net) is its inability to address the domain of ‘community’ in the context of dislocation. After all, it can be argued that it is the community as a whole that is essentially
the object of dislocation and, hence, the effects of dislocation are better captured at the level of community than individuals *per se* (of course, this is not to deny the importance of the individual or of individual subjectivity but to see the individual as placed within a community as well). However, given the entrenched economism of mainstream economics and the hold of the over-privileged efficiency criteria, any attempt to incorporate community in order to make it central to discussing the effects of dislocation would demand a more social approach that would take us beyond the standard domain of mainstream economics. The stage was thus set for Cernea to enter the debate and for the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to take another turn.

Cernea (1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2007), a sociologist, once a World Bank employee and considered the leading expert on dislocation and compensation, comes out with a fundamental critique of the theory of compensation as discussed in mainstream economics. He applauds Kanbur for having recognized the problem in the received idea of compensation and for suggesting the safety net as a measure to somewhat resolve the issue. Cernea points out though that his critique is of a different logical order, something which not only mainstream economics but even Kanbur’s intervention is incapable of addressing. Cernea’s critique was taken seriously by the World Bank, which went through a decade-long process of rethinking its position on resettlement and compensation (World Bank 1990, 1994–96), finally to come up with an Operational Manual on involuntary resettlement in 2001 that bore the imprint of the issues raised by Cernea.

Let us begin our discussion by reemphasizing the point that neither Cernea nor the World Bank questions the logic of development. For Cernea and the World Bank, the phenomenon of development-connected dislocation is not going to pass over soon.

... the need for such projects is not passing with time. This need is a regularity of development. In my estimate, it is more likely that the frequency of displacements may increase, even if their magnitude will be kept in check better. Demographic growth, urbanization, and the inelasticity of land will continue to require changes in the current use-patterns of lands and waters. This guarantees that the displacement problems will remain a permanent issue on the development agenda.

Cernea (2003: 25)

Notwithstanding the limitation of his approach that could not incorporate a critique of the logic of development, Cernea’s foray into issues of dislocation and resettlement is nevertheless fundamental, and there is much to admire and learn from it. After agreeing with Kanbur on the need for compensation and safety nets, Cernea (2003: 30) retorts:

Yet besides our essential agreement with Kanbur’s analysis, on several issues our argument diverges from his, not disagreeing but rather following a different logical path.
Regarding involuntary resettlement, Cernea makes a distinction between *policy goals*, which, following the World Bank, is to ‘improve or at least restore resettlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’, and *policy means*, which has hitherto been understood as the payment of compensation for lost assets, at replacement costs. Cernea argues that, if the means are deficient, then not even the best implementation of the deficient means can fulfil the policy goal. This is exactly the case with compensation. He argues that, ‘compensation is structurally unable to resolve the task of restoring incomes and livelihoods to where they would be in the absence of forced displacement’ (Cernea 2003: 30) Why?

Cernea proposes the *Improvement Risks and Reconstruction* (IRR) model as an alternative approach for analysing dislocation and its remedy. In the IRR model, he first identifies the number of risks people faced in encountering the possibility of dislocation and, then, on the basis of the accounted risks, tries to find a method of reconstructing the forms of life that have been dislocated. It is notable that Cernea uses the term ‘risk’ in the sociological sense of ‘danger’ rather than the economic sense of ‘uncertainty’ (Cernea 1997; Dwivedi 1999). Using this model, Cernea moves from compensation to *resettlement need*, which is then attempted to be taken care of through an alternative policy goal – *resettlement with development*. To put his position in the proper context, Cernea calls for a movement from ‘economics of compensation’ to ‘socio-economics of resettlement’ (Cernea 2003: 36). The IRR model proposed by Cernea is supposed to form the theoretical bedrock for analysing the ‘socio-economics of resettlement’. It was posited to serve a dual purpose. It can be deployed to argue why compensation is logically untenable as a solution to forced dislocation and also answer what is then going to be the solution. Let us start with the first.

Cernea begins by asking: what are the possible sources of impoverishment following dislocation *à la* forced displacement? Through extensive worldwide research carried on over two decades, Cernea (1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2003) identifies some of the risks frequently faced by the dislocated as: (i) landlessness; (ii) joblessness; (iii) homelessness; (iv) marginalization; (v) increased morbidity and mortality; (vi) educational losses; (vii) food security; (viii) loss of common property; and (ix) social disarticulation or community breakdowns. In the case of dislocation, these defined risks combine together in specific concrete sites to produce distinct sets of effects on the concerned. Despite these differences, Cernea’s research discerns an overall pattern in the effects, and he comments on the extent to which compensation could deal with these effects.

The cumulative effect of these processes is the decapitalization of resettlers, the rapid onset of multidimensional impoverishment or the aggravation of poverty for those already poor … Resettlers’ losses in income, assets, rights, are multi-sided – economic, social, cultural, in cash and in kind, in opportunities, in power. The income lost is not only cash income, but also wealth that is psychological in nature, including culture, status, and identity … forced displacement becomes the … equivalent of an earthquake that
shatters production systems and social networks, undermines identity and plunges those affected on a downward poverty spiral. ... the magnitude and span of the material and non-material impoverishment of displacees exceed by far the redeeming powers of compensation-centred solutions ... empirical research found chronic impoverishment well entrenched even long after, and despite, the payment of compensation. This tells us that – in case after case after case – compensation came up short and was unable to prevent impoverishment.

Cernea (2003: 37–38)

For Cernea, because compensation only deals with monetized losses (and that too reducible to a few essential effects of dislocation that are unable to take care of social costs), it logically cannot be the correct means to account for the actual costs of the dislocated as the incurred costs are both material and non-material. Dislocation reflects the fact that ‘displaced people lose natural capital, man-made capital, human capital and social capital’ (Cernea 1995: 251). It is not a question of whether compensation can be modified and corrected as an extension of economic modelling. Rather, in principle, compensation is incapable of fulfilling the assigned policy goal of resettling the people’s lives by either improving them or at least restoring them to their previous level. The empirical findings reflecting a constant pattern of impoverishment of dislocated people are not simply because compensation is not paid adequately (which most often it is not). More importantly, compensation, even if paid, cannot logically deliver its promised goal. Consequently, ‘economics of compensation’ is at best an *ad hoc* measure intended for the displaced (a kind of solace) and fails to ‘capture the full costs of dislocation and reestablishment and therefore fails to legitimize in technical–economic terms full restitution to the project losers’ (Cernea 2003: 39). If one additionally counts (what the empirical surveys capture in abundance) the time delay, administrative disruption, diverting practices and subtractions involved in the determination and payment of compensation, the utility of compensation as a policy instrument worsens (Cernea 1997, 2003, 2007).

The essential difference between Cernea and ‘the economics of compensation’ is methodological. As explained by us, in the deterministic framework adopted by mainstream economics, policy regarding development projects and policy regarding compensation are reduced to one or a few elements measured in monetary terms. In contrast, ‘... Cernea advances the notion of “cumulative deprivation” that can only be understood from a combination of economic, social, cultural and indeed psychological perspectives’ (Downing 2002). Through a methodological displacement of the analysis of dislocation from economic to the socio-economic domain, Cernea produces a shift in the discursive terrain of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to dislocation.

One essential implication of this approach must be spelled out clearly: the cost of re-establishing a family and a community is generally bound to
exceed the strict market value of the physical losses imposed on that family or community. Compensation alone, by definition, is therefore never sufficient for re-establishing a sustainable socioeconomic basis for resettlers.

Cernea (1997: 1579)

Once the importance of this methodological break is accounted for, it comes as no surprise to find that Cernea’s approach to compensation is as far from the mainstream approach to compensation as the concept of overdetermination is from the deterministic structure of causality. But a question remains: if not monetary compensation, what then?

From the economics of compensation to the socio-economics of resettlement

Taking development as sacrosanct and admitting that some kind of compensation should still be compulsory in cases of dislocation, Cernea moves the solution to the problem of dislocation on to new ground. Cernea’s IRR model seeks this new solution beyond the ‘economics of compensation’. Using the identified ‘risks’ of impoverishment, Cernea puts forward a model of what he proclaims as the ‘self-destroying prophecy’ (Cernea 1997: 1577). ‘The risk prediction model becomes maximally useful not when it is confirmed by adverse events, but, rather, when as a result of its warnings being taken seriously and acted upon, the risks are prevented from being a reality, or are minimised, and the consequences predicted by the model do not occur’ (Cernea 2000a). The key is to identify and predict risks in development projects in order to ensure that they are minimized or averted through resettlement. Even as sharp differences persist on other fronts, this aspect of accounting for effects before dislocation is now accepted, at least in principle, in all theories of resettlement including the World Commission on Dams (2000). In Cernea, ‘the reversal of the risk model – countering landlessness through land based resettlement or homelessness through sound shelter programmes – helps in identifying exactly what needs to be done to avoid the risk of impoverishment’ (Dwivedi 2002: 717).

For the self-destroying prophecy to succeed, two conditions have to be secured at the policy level. First, there is a need to change and build the institutional cushions – legislation, bureaucracy, resettlers’ mode of participating in decision making, etc. – to facilitate the process of resettlers’ reconstruction of social life.

Laws need to be changed to recognize the rights of the groups of resettlers and the marginalized section within the resettlers, to fix the manner in which compensation and other financial benefits would flow to the resettlers. The state bureaucracy must be restructured to act as an effective conduit between development projects and the resettlers. This is essential to stop structural dysfunctionalities, delays, diverting practices, etc., which cause severe disruption
to resettlement projects and make the dislocated populace poorer. Of particular importance is Cernea’s call to include the resettlers within the decision making process (Cernea 1997: 1577–78). A better structure of communication is needed so that, in his words, ‘telling to resettlers’ about dislocation is communicated in a transparent manner. As a result, the ‘to be dislocated’ would be in a better position to plan, pursue and preserve their rights and entitlements in a manner conducive to the prevention of their pauperization. Moreover, there must be consultation between the planners and resettlers on how to proceed with the process of resettlement. Arguing that feedbacks between the two groups are crucial for the successful planning and implementation of the resettlement programme, Cernea contends that ‘dysfunctional relationships between planners and groups affected by displacement are one of the roots of resettlement failure’ (Cernea 1997: 1577). In the absence of participation of resettlers, there is also the possibility of ‘radical–movementist’ groups taking over and preventing the project from going ahead in the first place. Other than providing an indispensable condition to ensure the success of the ‘self-destroying prophecy’, Cernea, like Kanbur, sees in participation an additional utility in preventing resistance or delays to the development projects.

Dwivedi (2002) observes that Cernea’s framework (and also that of the World Bank) is a top-down model designed for the planners to manage the displaced populace so that the project can go through without too many hitches or too much resistance. Paraphrasing Dwivedi in our terms, we may say that the participation of the resettlers remains fixed in terms of ‘telling the resettlers’, no matter how much feedback transpires between the policy makers and resettlers. The resettlers have no right to say no to the development project itself or the right to be a participant in the conceptualization of the project. Such are the terms of participation that they exclude resettlers from the possibility of questioning the development logic. Importantly, the participation of resettlers is at times a ‘talking to’ and at other times a ‘talking with’ that does not dislodge the centricity of the policy makers in the whole process; nor does it disturb the epistemological and ontological distance between the planners and the resettlers. ‘…Notwithstanding its multiple functions, the IRR model’s usefulness is mainly in providing a tool to sensitize planners to the different forms of losses confronting a displaced population … The primacy of this function makes the IRR model a planner’s tool, reflecting the managerial standpoint that “proper” resettlement is the main problem field’ (Dwivedi 2002: 717). Insofar as Cernea’s IRR approach is a component of the ‘reformist–managerial’ community, which takes dislocation as de-linked from development, his suggested way of restructuring the institutions, including that of the mode of communication between the planners and the dislocated populace, paradoxically facilitates the development logic.

The second condition for the successful implementation of the IRR approach is that of ensuring investment financing of resettlement projects that would satisfy the ‘self-destroying prophecy’ and hence prevent the pauperization of the dislocated. To motivate this discussion, we start off with the problem of
compensation in internalizing the time dimension involved in the process of dislocation.

Cernea states that not only is compensation structurally incapable of restoring people’s livelihoods but, furthermore, the compensation principle leaves the aspect of the time dimension of recovery un-addressed. The time factor has important ramifications regarding the survival of the community that is set for dislocation or is already dislocated. Not only is the community dislocated following the development projects but, because of the time that is lost on the route to resettlement, there is a loss of growth as well, which the community would have enjoyed had it stayed in its old settlement. Compensation is unable to deal with this loss as its function is ‘replacement cost’ or ‘damage substitution’, that is replacing what was taken away from the dislocated. It is not equipped as a policy means to internalize the cost of the lost growth of the community, during and after dislocation.

To catch up with the lost growth of communities due to dislocation and allow for accelerated growth to be activated in newly resettled communities, what is needed is investment to ‘lift the displaced people over their pre-project livelihoods levels’. Cernea gives a call for the adoption of a principle of investment that will finance resettlers’ development. That is, in drawing up the development projects, the aspect of investment finance geared towards the improvement of resettlers’ lives must be integrated into the project planning itself. Investment is a different development tool from compensation, and resettlement with development is a different policy goal from compensation designed for the accounting of specific damages.

How will ‘resettlement with development’ be financed? Cernea (2007) puts forward two channels for financing resettlement programmes – economic rent and benefit sharing. Let us start with economic rent. Inaugurated by classical political economists such as David Ricardo and developed by mainstream economics in the context of a market economy, economic rent is defined as income to a factor of production that is greater than its economic or opportunity cost. Taking the value of the opportunity cost of goods or services as their economic/normal value, economic rent is income that is earned above that value. As such, in this approach, economic rent represents a surplus return over and above the opportunity cost equivalent value of factors of production – capital, raw material and labour. This surplus return stems from some kind of monopoly exclusivity over the resources. The extent of the surplus will depend upon various elements including, importantly for our purpose here, the scarcity and quality of the factors in question. The elements of scarcity and quality of the factors that tend to persist over time will ensure that economic rents will accrue to the owners of the factors for a long period. In this context, Cernea makes the argument that forced dislocation gives the developers control over land which effectively turns into a control over all the resources connected with that space – minerals, forest timber, water, etc. in addition to the land. For the owners of an enterprise, economic rent represents a profit over and above the normal return they would have earned if the
factors (the natural resources in our example) were paid their opportunity cost. Whether it is state sponsored or private developers, the point is that having such a control represents a “windfall” significantly in excess of the normal rate of return to capital and results from exploiting the bounty of nature. Therefore, ownership over the resource becomes most important as ownership gives entitlement over returns and determines how these are allocated and used (Cernea 2007: 1036). Cernea uses the justice criteria to argue that displaced people who previously had ownership over these resources should have the right to a portion of these surplus funds that accrue to the state or private owners. Redistribution to the dislocated from economic rent earned by the state and private developers should become a financial instrument to fund the resettlement projects of the displaced.

In addition to compensation and financing through redistribution of economic rent, Cernea argues that part of the finance should also come from the ‘project’s normal and long-term expected stream of benefits’ (Cernea 2007: 1036). Asserting that development projects bring benefit to the project owners, be they private or state, Cernea calls for a sharing of benefits with the dislocated.

The investment needed for resettlers’ reconstruction can be increased not only from the upfront budget allocations to a project, but also on account of the project’s future benefit streams. Regardless of the sector, each successful project has its expected stream of benefits, even if it does not capture an economic rent from natural resources extraction. ... While the upfront budgetary resources are available in the initial stages of relocation, a share of project benefits can start flowing into the resettlement areas during the reconstruction period, and continue. This will sustain the post-displacement reconstruction effort long beyond the completion of the given project.

Cernea (2007: 1036)

Using the instance of dislocation from hydroelectric projects, Cernea (2007) identifies some of the mechanisms of ‘benefit sharing’ as: (i) direct transfer of a share of revenue streams for the financing of post-relocation development schemes; (ii) establishment of a development fund through fixed allocation, whose interest is used for post-resettlement development; (iii) equity sharing through co-ownership; (iv) special taxes to region and local governments to supplement local development programmes; (v) allocation of electrical power; and (vi) granting of various subsidies such as preferential electricity rate, lower water fees, etc. While the mode of sharing would vary from area to area, they must be institutionalized within the framework of investment finance to secure the improvement of resettlers. Cernea goes on to list some of the benefit-sharing mechanisms followed in certain instances in countries such as Japan, Canada, Norway, Brazil, Columbia and China.

In the context of resettlement, Cernea (1997, 2000) asserts the importance of community in any resettlement plan. He writes, ‘enabling the rebirth of
community institutions is paramount for successful resettlement and livelihood reconstruction’ (Cernea 1997: 41). Cernea understands community as disaggregated and de-centred, fractured by inequalities of various kinds, including power. The cost–benefit approach and its associated economics of compensation have glossed over the aspect of social constitution of the community. Consequently, such analysis ignored the process of deepening inequality and marginalization pertaining to gender, caste, race, age, etc. within resettled communities following the development projects that in turn helped stall and, more often than not, reverse the livelihood re-establishment processes (see also Dwivedi 1999; Downing 2002). On the other hand, Cernea wants the institution of community to be at the centre of any plan for rehabilitation, although it is unclear from his analysis as to how the social differences within the community and the probable impacts on the differences that occur following the development projects are to be integrated in any resettlement plan (Dwivedi 1999, 2002). Elsewhere, Cernea suggested that community is important as it allows for a steady reproduction of economic livelihood and growth. Cernea seems to be suggesting that, in the movement from State A (prior to the development project) to State B (after the development project), one cannot deny the importance of community because community provides and preserves social cohesion, stability and security which mitigate risks. In doing so, it would allow the growth potential of the community to be realized and for the community to sustain its ‘natural’ course of improvement that it would otherwise have achieved had there been no dislocation. Community could be seen as the anchor that will allow a relatively smooth passage from the pre- to the post-development phases of a project.

To sharply bring out his point regarding the importance of investment for the policy goal of resettlement along with development, Cernea highlights the difference between voluntary resettlement and involuntary resettlement following dislocations. He sites empirical findings to explain how, as part of its development project, the state finances new settlements to improve the sustainable livelihood levels of resettlers that in turn are geared towards growth-enhancing activities. He argues that, if the state can take this policy with respect to voluntary resettlements, why can’t it do the same with those resettlements that are involuntary. Cernea’s approach has found support from the World Bank Operational Policy which says:

i. Involuntary resettlement should be avoided.

ii. If it cannot be avoided, resettlement activities should be executed as part of sustainable development programs in which the displaced share in the benefits of the projects.

iii. Involuntary resettlement should improve the standards of living of the displaced or at least replace them in real terms (World Bank 2001).

The World Bank also shares Cernea’s point regarding the importance of investment finance in the policy of resettlement:
Resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, providing sufficient investment resources to give the persons displaced by the project the opportunity to share in project benefits.

World Bank (2001)

However, it is also true that Cernea himself remains doubtful about the true extent of IRR’s influence over the planners at ground level. While appreciating the change in the World Bank approach on resettlement following development projects, Cernea also observes, ‘there is, however, still very little in this rewritten policy document about the procedures and norms by which such investments and participation in project benefits are to be allocated and implemented’ (Cernea 2003: 45). Additionally, he contends that, while there has been an advance in our understanding of policy, the re-examination of the economics underpinning this policy advance has not transpired. Dwivedi (2002), however, argues that top-down models like the IRR model are of limited use.

The model adopts a mechanical strategy for problem resolution: land for land, jobs for jobs, homes for homes. This may make the model look neat, but in the process it distances itself from what really happens at ground level. There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that people losing land prefer to be compensated with jobs, those losing livelihoods prefer land … IRR model is insensitive to people’s voices and opinions. Given the diversity of circumstances, options and opinions, modelling a reconstruction strategy may actually be of very limited use. The same seems to apply to the problem-resolution function of the IRR model.

Dwivedi (2002: 720)

Whether from problems of inertia or applicability, it remains true that, for all Cernea’s observations and the shifts in the World Bank’s understanding of involuntary resettlement, the politics of restitution proceed as usual with compensation continuing as the most acceptable means of funding dislocation (if at all) and that too in its characteristically ad hoc manner. Moreover, at times, even if resettlement is the target, its formulation and execution do not tally with the type of resettlement measures that Cernea is proposing and fall hopelessly short of the funding or support it demands. Consequently, even in such instances, the goal to ‘lift the displaced people over their pre-project livelihoods levels’ may not be getting the priority Cernea seeks or may not be getting it in the manner his IRR approach demands. It is nevertheless also true that Cernea’s IRR approach is increasingly gaining acceptance within the ‘reformist–managerial’ community and is destined to put up a major challenge to the existing dominance of ‘economics of compensation’ in the years to come.

Conclusion

Is there any way to both appreciate what lets Cernea see the problems of ‘economics of compensation’ and yet consider why the practices of development and
resettlement don’t generate the results he wants? To answer this question, we take recourse to the class-focused Marxian approach that moves beyond the received imaginations of economy and development in order to situate the problem of dislocation in its intimate linkage with the logic of development. Our Marxian intervention brings into contention a few important queries for the existing literature to contend with.

i. It helps highlight what is special about Cernea that led him to see what others could not. In this context, we show how the Marxian methodology of overdetermination better encapsulates Cernea’s anti-economic stance that allows him to break away from the received economic discourse of dislocation and compensation. It will also reveal how and why Cernea’s anti-economic stance tends to falter at times, especially when it comes to theorizing his concept of resettlement and exhibits open complicity with centrisms inherent in the category of development. That is, Cernea’s anti-determinism qua anti-economics does not always stay active in his analysis and tends to wither away upon careful scrutiny. This encourages us to move the methodology of the study of dislocation into the domain of overdetermination in order to take Cernea’s impulse to its logical conclusion.

ii. While the above-mentioned dissenters within the ‘reformist–managerial’ community including Cernea doubt the veracity of monetary compensation as a policy means, they do not confront the ‘scientific’ justification of efficiency given in its defence. Deploying the Marxian methodology of overdetermination, we shall examine the concept of efficiency and show its limitation. Consequently, any justification forwarded for development projects on the grounds of efficiency alone stand nullified. Moreover, while the dissenters accept the dominance of monetary compensation, they do not explain how it emerges at the social level as the governing mode of recompensing the dislocated. For all the above-mentioned problems including its complicity in producing dislocation that are now well documented, how is it that compensation has emerged as an ideological tool of social reconstruction, in turn shaping capitalist industrialization. Our Marxist theory will try to throw light on this important phenomenon that generally remains ignored by Cernea and the ‘reformist–managerial’ school.

iii. If investment finance in resettlement is the key policy instrument to reduce dislocation-induced poverty, then Cernea and the World Bank must also answer why it is so difficult to have this principle embedded within the policy paradigm. Can we integrate this non-compliance within a theoretical framework? Starting from a Marxian approach, we shall explain how the overdetermined class and non-class processes could lead to a multiplicity of contradictory effects that would in turn explain this non-compliance. This will help us to identify the problems at hand in integrating investment finance as and into a component of resettlement policy.
iv. We argue that the inability of Cernea to link development and dislocation in proposing his theory of dislocation means that his framework remains trapped in the given development discourse that privileges capitalist industrialization with its entrenched capitalocentric–orientalism. This show up in two ways: (i) as a top-down ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to shaping capitalist development; and (ii) as a certain complicity of Cernea’s approach with third world-ism despite his effort to switch to the domain of community; even in Cernea’s approach, community is a given space, and that too a space of victimhood. As already mentioned and to be further explored through the Marxian approach, the use of the category community is problematic within a capitalocentric–orientalist framework as it tends to be positioned as a substitute signifier for third world.

v. Finally, and crucially, de-linking dislocation from development means that the element of violence embedded in development logic is glossed over. To their credit, the ‘radical–movementist’ approach had highlighted this aspect to great effect. However, this violence has been put forward against the idea of ‘progress’ and, in that context, more often than not, the latter has tended to triumph. The rhetoric of ‘loss of the few against the benefit of the whole’ is always a powerful ideological tool to face and overcome. Our particular rendition of Marxian theory brings a new dimension to this debate. We start off with the realization that, if capitalist development embodies violence which takes the form of dislocation, then any theory of dislocation (such as ours) must incorporate violence (as endogenously derived). Despite at times an acknowledgement of violence, critiques of dislocation, including the ‘radical–movementist,’ seem unable to explain and explicate upon capitalism-motored violence from within their framework. Rather than referring to violence as an effect of capitalism, the point is to show how capitalism is instituted (primitive accumulation or original accumulation or primeval accumulation [ursprüngliche Akkumulation] being the moment of institution) and constituted (capital accumulation through exploitation being the moment of constitution) through violence; however, in the mainstream rendition, this moment of violence is rendered progressive. How does capitalism embody violence and progress in one coherent and divided manner? In a situation where capitalism appears through development, our Marxian intervention defamiliarizes the question of violence and progress and asks: is it violence over the third world or over the world of the third. As we shall explain, coming face to face with this question radically displaces the ethically and content of violence; such a displacement is made possible through a re-theorization of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation in the context of development logic. We show that the ‘progressive’ nature of violence that is true in the context of the third world turns into a ‘regressive’ or unethical ‘event’ if seen in the background of the world of the third; what appears necessary and inevitable from a third world-ist perspective appears utterly violent and unnecessary and dispensable from a world of
the third perspective. That is, the developmentalist idea of ‘progress’ stands deconstructed. In the process, the meaning of dislocation is dramatically altered from those forwarded by the ‘reformist–managerial’ and the ‘radical–movementist’ approach and opens up new counter-hegemonic possibilities especially for the latter to contend with.

By breaking open the dualistic paradigm that motored the capitalocentric–orientalist model of development, Marxian theory essentially gives us a framework that allows us to: (i) produce a theoretical linkage of development and dislocation which would throw light on the vexed questions of dislocation arising from the current discussions; and (ii) rethink dislocation and resettlement right in an alternative ethico-political domain that is derived from the adopted Marxian epistemology. Eschewing the mainstream logic of developmentalism with its third world-ism as also any romanticizing of the community/local that is often the hallmark of the ‘radical–movementist’ approach, the rest of the book focuses on delivering a Marxian theory of dislocation and resettlement right. This in turn highlights the importance and urgency of first laying down the proposed Marxian theory on which the rest of the discussion will proceed. That is where we move to next.
4 De-familiarizing the economy and development

We have already mentioned in Chapter 2 that our version of Marxian theory conjoins the methodology of overdetermination and the entry point of class (understood as processes pertaining to surplus labour) in order to define a unique economic cartography. In this chapter, we explicate further on this alternative economic cartography in a manner that suits our subsequent intervention with respect to development and dislocation. In the process of developing such a Marxian theory, we will be highlighting the contribution of each concept in the subsequent discussion on development-connected dislocation and resettlement.

Class: the Marxian entry point

Given the labour process that underlies the production of goods and services, Marxian theory begins with a fundamental distinction between necessary labour and surplus labour. The total labour time exerted by the direct producers in the process of the production of goods and services can be divided into necessary labour and surplus labour. Necessary labour comprises of the performance or ‘doing’ that pays off (in money or kind) for the socially determined basket of goods and services needed to sustain the worker or the direct producer. The necessary labour equivalent of labour time is remunerated. Performance of labour beyond necessary labour is called surplus labour. No payment is made to the direct producers for this surplus labour. Consequently, the labour process involving the production of goods and services embodies three components of labour time: (i) labour time that is embodied within the purchased means of production for which payment (in money or kind) has already been made; (ii) necessary labour time for which the direct producers are remunerated; and (iii) surplus labour time which remains unre-munerated. The concept of class, following Marx, flows from the component of surplus labour (Resnick and Wolff 1987: Ch. 3).

Surplus labour can take the form of surplus produce if the goods and services (use values) are consumed without being monetarily exchanged. For example, in the household, the surplus labour performed by, say, a woman takes the form of surplus produce, which could be consumed by the men and children of the household. Here, surplus produce is that which is beyond the necessary
labour equivalent set aside for the woman (Fraad et al. 1994). Alternatively, surplus labour can take a value form expressed in money if the use value is exchanged for a price (exchange value). In the case of the latter, the value equivalent of surplus labour that is contained in the commodity is defined as surplus value. Together, surplus value (expressed as money) and surplus produce (expressed as use value) constitute the discretionary funds waiting to be distributed to the rest of society.

Whether materializing as surplus produce or surplus value, surplus labour is appropriated by some entity and distributed by the same entity (the appropriator). This distribution of surplus is necessitated because numerous individuals and groups activate various processes that provide conditions of existence to the processes of performance and appropriation of surplus labour. For securing these conditions of existence, the condition providers must be paid from the appropriated surplus. Thus, additionally, there are processes of distribution and receipt of surplus labour. The four processes of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus labour are together denoted by the concept class which, for analytical convenience, is often subdivided into fundamental class process or FCP (performance and appropriation of surplus labour) and subsumed class process or SCP (distribution and receipt of surplus labour) (Resnick and Wolff 1987: Ch. 3).

We define class struggle as struggles over class processes in which contingently formed individual and social actors participate (Resnick and Wolff 1987: Ch. 3; Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003: Ch. 1 and 3). Class struggles take shape over the existence, size, manner and form of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus labour. The critical point in Marxian theory is that the struggle is over an entity in society – here, class as processes of surplus labour. This understanding of class struggle is sharply distinguished from the traditional conception of class struggle as struggles between conscious, action-oriented people divided into groups named as classes. Class is a process and not a pre-given group of action-oriented people; the object of class struggle pertains to the process of surplus labour and not power, property or income. The agents of such struggles could come from various backgrounds and not necessary and exclusively belong to those personifying the site of the process over which the struggle is taking place. This implies that class struggle does not follow automatically from structurally given class positions; the agents and also the actual form of any class struggle materialize from a creative social practise that is contingent, open-ended and whose result cannot be predicted; not only are class actors (those who struggle over class processes) contingent, but even the result of class struggle cannot be predicted. In contrast, struggles over non-class processes (race, gender, caste, etc.) are non-class struggles.

Overdetermination: the Marxian methodology

Seen from the perspective of overdetermination, any site or setting is an ensemble of a ‘thousand threads one treadle throws’, where ‘fly the shuttles …
hither and thither’; and unseen ‘the threads are knit together’, and out of such weaving ‘an infinite combination grows’. Such that a process within the infinite combination of processes (where some processes are known, some remain unknown and some are kept out of the orbit of knowledge) exists in a constitutive and conflicting configuration with other processes. In such an understanding, each process is ‘contingently constituted’ or ‘literally brought into existence’ by the combined effects of other processes. The verb effect here captures the meaning of ‘to constitute’ and ‘be constituted’. In this regard, the different effects serve as the ‘conditions of existence’ of the constituted processes. Every process then exists as a site of effects of those constituting processes, which in turn provide its conditions of existence. Each process also contributes in part to the existence of the constituting processes. As a result, class processes are as much a result of the effects of non-class processes as non-class processes are caused by class processes.

The moment of contradiction is embedded within the very logic of over-determination. Contradiction signifies the differences (distinct qualities, influences, etc.) in terms of effects of processes that mould and, hence, constitute a particular process. That is why each process is literally a bundle of contradictory, even unseen effects – ‘unseen the threads are knit together’. Change in any one process imparts a new contradictory effect on the processes it constitutes, thereby leading to a change in them; and not all are known at a time. That is to say, as one process changes, so too do all the other related processes and, therefore, any one process including class process is in a constant state of flux; and it is such a state of flux that is not altogether known; hence, one cannot have a deterministic knowledge of the flux. This produces a situation of ceaseless change, with cause and effect flowing back and forth such that neither is just the cause nor just the effect. Given this structure of causality and also logic, any site nor setting is understood and said to be an ensemble of over-determined processes; consequently, all theories, relationships, activities and practices are said to be bundles of overdetermined processes.

Marxian theory as non-determinist and as a partial perspective

Our Marxian approach differs from other discourses (Marxist and non-Marxist) of the economy on two grounds. One, our approach is premised on a particular and specific entry point – the entry point of class understood as processes related to performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus labour and, two, it is marked by overdetermination as methodology – a methodology that is non-determinist and non-reductionist. Within an overdetermined reality comprising an innumerable number of mutually constitutive processes (some known and some beyond us), Marxian theory draws on the entry point of class to produce a specific class-focused description of reality referring to the cluster of class processes in their intimate imbrications with non-class processes.

Moreover, Marxian methodology entails that the causal explanation or the interpretation of an act, event or institution proceeds through the overdetermined
and contradictory relations of class and non-class processes and thus cannot be reduced to exclusively class process. That is, within the frame of overdetermination, class process cannot in general serve as a deterministic measure or calculus of explanation or interpretation; in particular, with respect to dislocation and compensation/resettlement, class is never the ‘last instance’. Further, as economism is a form of determinism, our Marxian reading of dislocation and compensation/resettlement is also premised on a non-economicistic attitude.

Finally, with reality comprising a web of overdetermined processes, depending upon respective entry points, there are only different theories or knowledges of reality representing in turn partial/limited ways of viewing, explaining and interpreting such reality (Amariglio et al. 1990; Haraway 1996; Resnick and Wolff 2006). Consequently, if our version of Marxian theory is only contingently consistent within a heterodox world of knowledge, then it cannot (and indeed it does not make) any claim to absolute truth/objection that can be considered legitimate; what it humbly offers is just about a partial perspective and, taking off from such a partial perspective, it suggests an ethico-political standpoint. Marxian theory is also one among many theoretical positions, and it is one among an infinite number of processes that constitute social reality (Resnick and Wolff 1987: Ch. 1). The world of knowledge and social reality are conceptually different, but not independent of one another; effects emanating from theory help to constitute social reality; effects from changing social reality too affect theory. Each world of knowledge makes possible a particular version of reality. We thus have realities and not one reality. Its consequences for Marxian and other theories are far-reaching: neither can social reality be reduced to Marxian theory nor can Marxian theory be seen as the singular truth for explaining reality. What is true for Marxian theory is true for all theories. This means that there is no reality out there that can be posed independently of theory; theory must not be seen as mirroring only the truth that lies within reality (empiricism); reality must not be seen as conforming to theory – theory as a rational kernel of reality (rationalism).

Marxian theory thus debunks both determinism within theory (no process can be reduced to another) and determinism of theory (no absolute truth, whether through empiricist or rationalist methods). For example, overdetermination will reject not empirical analysis per se, but those empirical analyses that ground their underlying logic on determinism (say the hypothesis of finding out whether X and X alone definitely determines Y) or those empirical results that point to truth in an absolute sense irrespective of the fact of, and thus ignoring, the specificity of the discursive frame in terms of which the empirical analysis is conducted and the results interpreted. As and when such a method is propounded and claims made, it reflects determinism within and of theory, something that cannot be sustained within the methodological leash that overdetermination institutes. Instead, overdetermination would vouch for those empirical analyses that are posed in a non-determinist
frame and that refuse to attribute any absolute finality to results from the analysis. This is because not all the effects from constituting processes can be deciphered and hence accounted for at any one time, and also because an approach marked by overdetermination would need to be humble enough to accept that an empirical analysis, result and interpretation is specific to a discursive frame and is thus partial in its scope. This also takes Marxian theory further away from realism.

Because of its deterministic methodology, mainstream economics has serious consequences for class analysis and development policy. Because the category of class does not figure in the register of mainstream economics, its claim of mirroring the real economy in an absolutist sense implies that there can be no place for class process *qua* surplus labour not only within its theoretical domain but the economy as a whole. As part of a claim of its theory as mirroring concrete reality, mainstream economics in effect *forecloses* class processes (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). Its world of knowledge in which class is conspicuous by its absence turns into a claim of the absence (or at best the irrelevancy) of class in the real world. Moreover, in its empirical analysis enunciated from such a discursive domain, the effects of class process remain *purloined* from hypotheses, results and their interpretations. Insofar as this empirical analysis is seen as reflecting the true reality of society, the absence of class in its discursive frame transmutes into the absence of class from social reality as well.

As the concept of (capitalist) development is connected to mainstream economics, class does not and cannot find any place within it either. It is then not surprising that the mainstream discourse of development (including the World Bank discourse) refuses any place to class process and its effects even as it goes on at length in dealing with non-class aspects such as power, property, income, etc. Its understanding of policy, efficiency, market, competition, profit, distribution and so on is bereft of their linkage to class effects. Consequently, the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to dislocation is driven not just by the epistemic exclusion of class (an exclusion that is not an error of omission but an ‘error of commission’), but also the denial of *real* class effects.

**The de-centred economy and the enterprise within**

Our goal is to arrive at an (alternative) economic cartography drawn through brush strokes representative of class effects. As we represent economy here in terms of the configuration of class enterprises, it is important to define enterprise in general and capitalist enterprise in particular.

**The enterprise**

In our version of Marxian theory, the ensemble of processes can be taken as always taking shape in particular conceptual locations called ‘sites’. In this context, *enterprise* is no longer just an economic entity reducible to class (or,
say, aspects such as capital accumulation or some cavernous rational motif such as profit maximization), but is rather an overdetermined and contradictory site of class process and its constitutive economic, cultural, political and natural processes. In this sense, an enterprise is conceived as a constellation of mutually constitutive processes, none of which could be taken as the centre or origin of all further structuralities; overdetermination precludes such a centre or origin; it precludes ‘fundamental immobility’ and ‘reassuring certitude’ (Derrida 1978: 351–70). Such a de-centred understanding of enterprise gets us away from any economistic definition of enterprise. In this context, class enterprises then can be seen as institutional forms of organizations of surplus labour – how surplus is produced, appropriated, distributed and received, and how various conditions of existence shape its organization and are in turn shaped and implicated by it.

The economy in the Marxian approach comprises a complex configuration of polymorphous sites qua class enterprises which, at a broad level, can take capitalist, feudal, communist, slave, independent and communitic forms. It is important to specify that, following Marx, the adjective we put before a class enterprise – capitalist, feudal, communist and so on – would depend upon the modes of performance and appropriation of surplus labour, that is the FCP (Resnick and Wolff 1987; Chaudhury and Chakrabarti 2000; Chakrabarti and Dhar 2008a).¹ Let us explore.

Regarding who appropriates the surplus, Marxists ask whether the direct producers of surplus, that is those who generate surplus labour, are the ones who appropriate it. One can imagine three possibilities.

i. The mode of appropriation is exploitative if the direct producers are excluded from the process of appropriation. Their produced surplus is instead appropriated by non-performers. Depending upon the specific nature of the exploitative mode of appropriation, the enterprises can be differentiated into capitalist, feudal, slave and CA-type communitic class types.

ii. Non-exploitative modes of appropriation occur if the direct producers are not excluded from the process of appropriation. Instead, through some common decision-making process, they share in the process of appropriation. Non-exploitative class enterprises include the communist class type and the AC-communitic class type.

iii. Finally, the modes of appropriation can be self-appropriative if the same individual does both the performance and the appropriation of surplus labour. Such enterprises are termed ancient/independent enterprises.

Let us now define the possible types of fundamental class process (FCP).² Feudal FCP refers to an exploitative arrangement where the ‘serf’ produces the surplus labour, which is appropriated by the non-performing ‘lord’. At a politico-cultural level, relations of feudality are formed around ties of fealty, loyalty and kinship; and also the serf’s inalienable attachment to land.
Examples of feudal FCP would be (i) an agricultural enterprise in which the lord appropriates the surplus of the serf (Keyatakin 1996–7, 2001) and (ii) a traditional household enterprise marked by patriarchal bonds in which the housewife hands over the produced surplus to the husband out of any one or all of these mentioned ties; and here the woman is tied not to land but to a certain ideal(l) of womanliness and to the family as care-giver (Fraad et al. 1994).

Slave FCP is defined as appropriation of the ‘slave’s’ surplus labour by her non-performing ‘master’, where the slave–master relation is based upon the un-freedom of one set of human beings (here slaves) by virtue of being the property of another set of human beings (here masters). Here, it is not labour power but the labourer as an embodied whole who is traded. A contemporary example of slave FCP is a version of the American baseball league (Weiner 2003); what we designate as ‘bonded labour’ is also an example of slave FCP.

Ancient/independent FCPs are non-exploitative because the individual performer appropriates his or her surplus labour individually (Gabriel 1990). However, in the case of independent class process, while the individual performer cannot be excluded from the process of performance, the questions of collective appropriation and the sharing of the appropriated surplus do not arise.

CA-type communitic FCP signifies a situation where labour is performed collectively (standing for C) in the sense of being shared, but one member (standing for A) within the collective appropriates the performed surplus labour including his own (Chaudhury and Chakrabarti 2000; Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003). CA-type communitic FCP is exploitative as some direct producers are excluded from the process of appropriation. CA-type communitic FCP is different from the other exploitative processes – capitalist, feudal or slave class processes – in that the appropriator in the former is also a direct producer of surplus which, definitionally, is not the case for the capitalist, lord or master. It is not unusual to find associated with communitic FCP aspects of loyalty, fealty and kinship, although that does not call for a reduction of its economic specificity to that of the feudal class process. An example would be a family farm where the entire family (husband, wife, brothers, sisters, children, cousins, etc.) share in the performance of surplus labour, but only one person, say the ‘male head’ of the family, appropriates the surplus labour of all including his own, which he then distributes according to some principles and norms. Such arrangements are common within the informal sector and in agriculture in Southern countries.

AC-type communitic FCP symbolizes a situation where the ‘community’ of direct producers or a bigger group not excluding the direct producers appropriate the ‘fruits’ of surplus labour collectively (standing for C), while production is performed individually by independent producers (standing for A). In the context of informal enterprises, an AC communitic class process would resemble a situation where, even if production is performed individually, the individual producers, say via a marketing cooperative, appropriate the surplus collectively. One can also think of such an arrangement in the informal sector and agriculture (Chaudhury and Chakrabarti 2000; Chakrabarti and Cullenberg
2003). Like CA communitic FCP, aspects of loyalty, fealty and kinship relations could inflect the AC-type communitic FCP as well.

**Communist FCP** epitomizes a scenario where not only is surplus labour performed collectively, but the direct producers are also not excluded from the process of appropriation (Resnick and Wolff 1987, 1988). Rather, they share in the process of appropriation. When we talk about sharing in performance or appropriation, we do not necessarily mean that all are part of every labouring activity and every decision with respect to appropriation must be taken together in absolute agreement. What is being suggested is that all must, at least, be participating in the process of production of surplus labour by some common and collective agreement that everybody accepts and that they must, at least, be part of the process of any decision (in agreement or disagreement) pertaining to the appropriation of surplus labour (Cullenberg 1992, 1998).

Resnick and Wolff (1988) have talked of two kinds of communist class process. In one type of communist class process, only the direct producers, and nobody else, appropriates the surplus. In another type of communist class process, there is a community of appropriators greater than but not excluding the direct producers; for example, it could include managers, suppliers and community leaders.

Depending upon the nature of the conditions of existence that constitute the above-mentioned FCPs, each of these distinct FCPs would be in a constitutive relation with subsumed class processes pertaining to distribution and receipt of surplus labour and also non-class processes. Each such cluster of processes would comprise specific types of enterprises that are not capitalist. Depending upon the exact nature of FCP, the class enterprise acquires a name.

Having explicated the class processes ‘that are not capitalist’, let us now move to the capitalist class enterprise. A somewhat detailed treatment is required because of the capitalocentrism (that is the privileging of capital and of the capitalist class process) of development discourse. Moreover, the fact that we shall be exploring the relation of capitalist enterprise with processes of dislocation also makes this exercise unavoidable.

**Capitalist class enterprise**

In a capitalist class process, the total value of a product, also defined as a commodity, here \( W \), is a combination of three values:

\[
W = C + V + SV
\]  

(4.1)

C or constant capital is the value or congealed SNALT\(^3\) (socially necessary abstract labour time) embedded in the means of production, V or variable capital is the value of labour power remunerated as the necessary labour equivalent of SNALT that is exerted by the direct producer, and SV or surplus value is the SNALT equivalent of unpaid surplus labour performed by the
direct producer. Alternatively, V and SV constitute the value added in the production process and are known as living labour. Note that the V component of labour – necessary labour – is compensated through wage payment, while the SV component of labour – surplus labour – remains unpaid. C, on the other hand, is the purchased means of production produced earlier and thus comes into the new production process with embedded or congealed labour time. Because it cannot add any new value other than the value at which it is purchased, C is said to be the repository of dead labour. The value embedded in living labour (V + SV) plus dead labour (C) defines the value of goods or services or what we name as commodity, W. Crucially, while purchased means of production C do not add any new value, labour power contributes fresh value SV in addition to what it burns out for its own reproduction, V.

To define capitalist FCP, we need to connect the value form of commodity to the class process of appropriation of SV. In capitalist FCP, productive labourers are those direct producers who exert living labour, that is perform to the equivalent of V and SV. While the former represents the remunerated portion of labour time, SV as the unpaid portion of labour time is appropriated by an individual or a group of non-performers designated by Marx as ‘productive capitalists’. When productive capitalists appropriate surplus value created by productive labourers, the commodity that embodies the surplus value is defined as capitalist commodity. Capitalist commodity is then a complex of commodity values derived from the three sources of value in their connection with the exploitative mode of appropriation.

The unpaid surplus labour or its value equivalent of SV when expressed in money form is defined as capital. In Marxist theory, capital encapsulates a relationship of exploitation whereby SV pumped out from the productive workers is appropriated by productive capitalists. In this respect, capital encapsulates a relationship of enslavement as well (Marx called it wage slavery) as the workers are positioned in a situation (through the overdetermination of ideological and repressive apparatuses) to perform and hand over surplus to the capitalists (Althusser 1978[2002]).

We are now in a position to define capitalist class process. Capitalist FCP is defined as the appropriation by productive capitalists of surplus value/capital created by productive labourers through a unique combination of three values comprising the value of labour power, value of the means of production and the value of surplus labour.

Given their social position, the productive capitalists occupy the first level of appropriation (a fundamental class position) and distribution (a subsumed class position) of the discretionary funds of SV of an enterprise. Such capitalists could personify the legally defined institutional form of proprietor or owner operator (as in sole proprietorship), partner (as in limited and general partnership) and board of directors (as in a corporation).

In contrast, as receivers of the distributed amount of surplus value, the condition providers to the capitalist FCP are said to be occupying subsumed class positions. Analytically,
\[ SV = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i \] (4.2)

SV represents surplus value, and SC\(_i\) represents the ith subsumed class payment of the ‘n’ distributions of surplus value made by the productive capitalists. In order for the capitalist enterprise to reproduce itself, the productive capitalists must distribute surplus value in such a way as to satisfy a number of conditions of existence.

The condition providers receive a fragment of surplus value for activating, for example, the process of advancing loans (for which the moneylender/bank receives a payment), the process of realization of the sale of product (for which the merchants receive a payment), the process of land credit (for which the landlord or state receives a payment), the process of advancing money capital against ownership (for which the shareholders receive payments), the political process of supervising the workers (against which the managers are paid) or of legalizing the ‘business’ and getting police and administrative protection for running the ‘business’ (against which payments are made to the state), the cultural process of advertisement (for which payments are made to artists or advertisement enterprises) and so on. Those who are receivers of subsumed payment include, to name a few, bankers, merchants, state bureaucracy/ministries, landlords, managers, etc.

Enterprise with capitalist FCP is defined as capitalist enterprise. Capitalist enterprise can take two forms – state and private (Resnick and Wolff 2002). State capitalist enterprise captures the institutional form where surplus value is appropriated by non-performing people who are connected to the state, be they the bureaucrats or the ministries. For example, state capitalist enterprises under the Soviet Union were governed by state-sponsored appropriators and a state-administered system of values, prices and wages, that is state capitalist commodities. One can also have state capitalist enterprises in the context of a market-determined system of values, prices and wages, that is market capitalist commodities, as is evidently the case for many Indian and Chinese enterprises. Private capitalist enterprises, in contrast, consist of private appropriators (disconnected from the state) who could operate with state capitalist commodities or, as is usually the case, with market capitalist commodities. It is noteworthy that, along with private capitalist enterprises, the state capitalist enterprises too have been instrumental in causing dislocation, especially in the twentieth century.

**The economy**

Having laid down the class specificity of enterprises, it is important to understand that such enterprises are also the site of processes related to property and power structure, income distribution and also cultural dimensions. Because class and non-class processes co-exist in overdetermined and contradictory relations, the class enterprises come across as ‘social’ institutions that
are not reducible simply to economic processes including class processes. Moreover, because specific combinations of class and non-class processes affect each enterprise, enterprises are distinct and cannot be aggregated. As such, the specificity and diversity of class enterprises once again reveal the inherent heterogeneity of the economy (Cullenberg 1992). The heterogeneity of class enterprises turns the question of the economy and its transition into the infinite play of differences in a relation of horizontality.

Let us break to spare a few words on heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is ‘never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction or connection’ … [Here, there are] ‘possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate’ (Foucault 2008: 42). As we understand it, Foucault is talking about a methodology that seeks connection between disparate parts, but without reducing one to the other. At this point, it is important to consider the relation of overdetermination and heterogeneity, and the difference between heterogeneity and segmentation, a relationship and distinction that will play a vital role in Chapter 5. As mentioned earlier, overdetermination entails that each part/process is a constitutive effect of other processes, not all of which can be known; each part is then in itself a whole. On the other hand, insofar as it affects other processes, the whole is literally one of the parts among many that constitute other wholes; each whole is then also a part when it affects other processes. This implies that no part, even as a part, can exist exclusively in any capacity; parts cannot have independent and autonomous existence; no part can be segmented from other parts. Heterogeneity connects different parts in the sense of, as Freud would say, weaving them, but is ‘never (driven by) a principle of exclusion’. It is worth noting that the aspect of heterogeneity flowing from overdetermination is very different from the aspect of segmentation flowing from the principle of exclusivity. The former underlies a non-determinist connection between parts bordering on constitutivity without reducing the parts to one another; it is never a matter of selecting this or that process as more or less important; it does not only imply plurality; heterogeneity emphasizes infinitude because not all the parts and their multifarious effects can be accounted for or known at a time. In contrast, segmentation underlies a determinist relation between independent and autonomous parts; it emphasizes a matter of selecting this or that part as more or less important and then seeking their explanation within a determinist structure of causality; it underlies the exclusivity of parts that ends up reducing parts to one another, either absolutely or in order of importance, which in turn tends to shift the analytical register (marked by horizontality and difference) on to the complex temporality–verticality; segmentation emphasizes finitude because, in its typical realist understanding, parts that are known are what constitutes objective reality.

Coming back to our representation, these disparate class enterprises – capitalist, feudal, communist and so on – co-exist across the social terrain spanning sites in industry, agriculture, state, household and even such unacknowledged sites as temple, brothel and university. Insofar as the economy
cannot be reduced to one or a set of class enterprises, the class-focused economy is also de-centred. Evidently, at a conceptual level, it becomes impossible now to specify any economy as capitalist or feudal. It is notable that the aspects of heterogeneity and de-centring are a direct outcome of the methodology of overdetermination, which militates against determinisms, reductionisms and centrisms.

Not only is the class-focused economy not a centred and homogeneous space, the very concept of an economy as such, existing somehow independently from the rest of the society, with its own independent ‘economic logic’, can no longer be sustained in this particular version of Marxian theory. What, when, where and how we produce, distribute and consume are not simply matters of the economic but are constituted by processes related to power (authority–hierarchy), culture (meaning) and nature (matter–bios). In this context, any event including dislocation must be considered a part of the whole of social reality and cannot be reduced solely to economic processes, let alone class processes.

The class-focused, de-centred and disaggregated economic cartography is inhospitable to dualisms such as {modernity/capitalism, third world/pre-capitalism} that have been paradigmatic of the hegemonic discourse of development; as such, the Marxian cartography is counter-hegemonic to the one that drives the development discourse. In our rendition, not only can the economy not be reduced to the centrism of the capitalist sector (which itself is now disaggregated into various kinds of class enterprises, state and private), but even what has come to be known as the so-called ‘non-/pre-capitalist’ is by definition disseminated into polymorphous types with further disaggregation within each such type. An acceptance of the dualistic structure would trigger an unexamined, hence illegitimate, move to further reconfigure the economy through a fixing of a particular class process, namely the capitalist class process, as the centre of the economy and the rest as homogenized into the whole of non-capitalism or pre-capitalism. In that case, the economy in effect is reduced to two axes – (i) ‘capitalist’ captured by the homogenization of diverse forms of capitalist class processes (state and private); and (ii) polymorphous class processes that are not capitalist clubbed into another homogeneous whole, first the non-capitalist and then the pre-capitalist. In the process, what get erased are the complex and multiple meanings of organizations of surplus labour and possible re-articulations that could be opened up by institutions that are not capitalist.

Furthermore, in the context of the so-called South, development discourse with its foregrounding of the third world forecloses the world of the third as part of its attempt to define, control and manage the latter. Such a homogenization of an otherwise de-centred and disaggregated world of the third (de-centred and disaggregated at least in terms of class processes) into the fictional ‘third world’ is what secures the capitalocentric–orientalist worldview – a worldview that drives development in the South. Through this axiomatic centring of capitalism and modernity, the otherwise de-centred
economy is reduced to the two of ‘modern capitalist’/‘traditional pre-capitalist’. The Marxian approach that we put forward not only displaces and problematizes dualisms, but in the process debunks the capitalocentric–orientalist perspective that drives the development logic.

**Transition in Marxian theory**

As class processes are caught up in the interminable flux of overdeterminations and contradictions, resulting in part from class struggles, such flux in turn produces an incessant transition of the class configuration and, subsequently, a further deepening of the de-centring and heterogeneity of economy and society. Similarly, changes in constitutive non-class processes (power, property, gender, race, caste, etc.) impart their unique effects, triggering a change in class processes as well. Not only is society, at any time, a configuration of distinct and heterogeneous class enterprises. Because of the infinity of overdetermined and contradictory effects, the movement of these class enterprises is uneven (and partially unknown) too, thereby making the process of transition of society very much contingent and unpredictable (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2001, 2003: Ch. 6). In our understanding, transition has no inherent inner logic and follows no necessary temporal arrangement of periods – ancient, medieval, modern; it has no inherent, naturalized centre (say capital) around which it revolves; it is not driven by the Hegelian teleology of spirit or by the pre-ordained succession of ‘modes of production’. Transition is a complex and wavering process; part known, part unknown. If we understand historicism as the rational ordered progressive movement of society from a pre-ordained origin to a pre-given end, then our version of Marxian theory, in addition to being non-deterministic, is also non-historicist. This is the effect of situating the explanation of economy and society in a horizontality of differences and not a vertical plane marked by temporal hierarchies of a pre-capitalist past and a modern industrial future.

Does the rejection of historicism mean inaction at the level of the political? Does the rejection of historicism mean a refutation of the ‘political art’ of (un)making history? Our Marxian approach to transition is not agnostic or indifferent to the track of societal change that it favours. It seeks progress, but the meaning of progress is now detached from the complex temporality–verticality in the sense used in development discourse; Marxian rendition of ‘progress’ is about rethinking change in the sense that it seeks to resist the effort to turn the horizontality of difference and the minimal verticality of discrimination into the rigid complex temporality–verticality. Marxism cannot evade the question of progress because, even in the horizontal register, differences do lead to discrimination (a catch-all category here) that could take the forms of exploitation, inequity, oppression, marginalization and so on. Even though the nature of looking at these axes of discrimination is fundamentally different from what would materialize in a theological system of thought that seeks to displace and posit the same in the plane of complex temporality–verticality. Finally, it is not that ‘time’ is not accounted in our understanding; after all, we are forwarding
a theory of transition; only time is not considered in the way development discourse or some such secular theological system of thought would consider it.

There are at least two nodes of progressive struggle in the Marxian horizon. First, Marxians advocate a change that replaces exploitative class processes with non-exploitative class processes so that, at the minimum, those who perform surplus labour also participate in its appropriation. Second, Marxians advocate a transition that leads to a ‘fair’ redistribution of surplus. Consequently, from a Marxian standpoint, one needs to differentiate between practices and policies that address these concerns from ones that do not. Regarding why Marxians consider the couplet ‘non-exploitation and fair distribution’ desirable, we need to explore their consideration of justice.

The considerations of justice in Marxian theory

Marxian standpoint gestures towards three justice criteria – appropriative justice, productive justice and development justice. We begin by positing the two justice criteria – appropriative justice and productive justice (also see Resnick and Wolff 1987; Wolff 2002a; De Martino 2003).

**Appropriative justice**

The moment of appropriative justice is intrinsically linked with the aspect of exploitation. Exploitation – the exclusion of those who produce surplus from the process of its appropriation – is unacceptable because: (i) the direct producers are denied the right to appropriate the surplus they create; and (ii) the direct producers (and even the broader community) are denied the right to decide on the distribution of the surplus.

Regarding the first point, Marxians find the appropriation of surplus by capitalists unjust as this mode of appropriation literally embodies an instance of looting of surplus by non-performers. Undoing the injustice of such loot requires restoring the association of the performer of surplus labour with the process of its appropriation such that the performers are no longer excluded from the process. This is what we, following De Martino (2003), designate as appropriative justice. In this respect, Marxians defend collective appropriation as in the case of, say, communist class enterprise, which represents a scenario where the direct producers are not excluded from the process of appropriation. Rather, the direct producers and maybe even a broader community of people not excluding the direct producers share in the process of appropriation.

Appropriative justice criterion is also satisfied by AC-type communitic class enterprise as, in this case, while the performance of surplus labour is individual, the appropriation (and distribution) of surplus labour is collective and is inclusive of the individual performer.

Regarding the second point, what amount of surplus is to be distributed, how it is to be distributed and who will get what portion of the distributed surplus are questions that have immediate impact on the livelihood of the
broader community (Gibson-Graham 1996; Gibson-Graham and Neill 2001). Because of their rejection of the exploiter’s/capitalist’s exclusive right over the dispatching of surplus, Marxians would have to take a position on distribution depending on their produced understanding of fair distribution. In this context, exploitative modes of appropriation are considered problematic because they institutionalize the process of unfair and undemocratic modes of distribution. For example, in a capitalist enterprise, exploitation entails that the right to distribute the surplus value lies in the hands of a non-performing few. Given their position as appropriators, the association and attachment of appropriators/exploiters with the broader community appears tenuous, and as such their decisions do not necessarily reflect the aspirations of the broader community; detached as they are from the broader community, it usually reflects their selfish personal interests. Exploitation is unjust because it divorces the right of decision making of the broader community (inclusive of the direct producers) from the processes of distribution and subsequently makes distribution with its widespread social impact largely a matter of the choice of a self-centred few.

In contrast, situations of non-exploitation as under communist and AC-type communitic enterprises not only rid society of the loot of surplus, but also place the power of distribution back into the hands of the broader community. Decisions on the procreation of social life become as a result, if we may say so, more accountable or more democratic and, consequently, they provide a wider platform and better chance of addressing what Marxians would refer to as fair distribution. Thus, forms of appropriation – exploitative or non-exploitative – matter with respect to fairness in the mode of distribution. Marxian commitment to justice considerations of sharing/collectivity and equity leads to a preference for the non-exploitative organization of surplus.

**Productive justice**

Productive justice refers to Marx’s principle of ‘from each according to ability’, which principally entails individuals’ obligations to their communities (De Martino 2003). Not only is this obligation to the communities different from what we would have under exploitative organizations of surplus labour (in which surplus value is appropriated by a few exploiters) but, reversibly, the community may in fact have an important role in deciding the manner, target and purpose of distribution. The shared social plane in which the producer functions as well as social pressure helps to create a sense of obligation in the producer to contribute socially desirable surplus; this is achievable according to the principle of ‘from each according to ability’. Insofar as the pressure of distribution of surplus works reversibly on the production of surplus, productive justice could be understood as a justice criterion arising from the pressures of fair distribution.

Until now, our analysis has focused on the space referring to processes of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus labour. However, the class-focused analysis as hitherto exemplified must open itself up to further extensions through the concept of social surplus (Chakrabarti 2001; Chakrabarti
and Cullenberg 2003; Chakrabarti et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2009). This extension of class space in the direction of social surplus opens up the development space further and takes us to our third justice moment – development justice.

Social surplus and the Marxian space of development

Chakrabarti and Cullenberg (2003) argue that one must address questions regarding the ‘marginal’ existence of the poor, the old, the mentally dis-eased, and also preservation of nature and so on which may not necessarily provide conditions of existence to any class process. If we are to follow the class distributions that tie payments to conditions of existence that the agents provide, then these people do not qualify as justifiable recipients of fragments of subsumed payments. This means that distribution of surplus must not pertain singularly to payments for processes providing conditions of existence to class processes, but also towards those who provide no conditions of existence (direct or indirect) for any kind of class process. Surplus by definition cannot be exhausted in the payment against class conditions; it must be more than subsumed class payments.

To differentiate between these two forms of distribution, the concept of surplus is split between production surplus and social surplus. Production surplus consists of subsumed payments required to meet the class conditions of existence of FCP, which is depicted by $[SV = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i]$. Social surplus, SS, represents the socially determined needs of the people (such as relating to poverty, environment, unemployment and even entertainment, to name a few; such as relating to the needs of the children, the old and the mentally dis-eased) who provide nearly no conditions of existence to the class processes. Put in another way, the surplus over and above the production surplus (subsumed class payments/revenues) is social surplus. Social surplus represents the fact that part of the total surplus moves beyond the point of appropriation to another point on the social axis in order to be distributed and received by socially determined criteria (of need) that are different from the ones that guide that of class conditions of existence. Possession, distribution and receipt of social surplus are an altogether different set of processes compared with that of class processes. Consequently, their effects are also dissimilar.

The domain of need and its associated flow of possession, distribution and receipt of social surplus is what, for us, constitutes the development space. The concept of social surplus is critical because it is useful in opening up an alternative terrain of development imagination and contributing to a different kind of politics of transition. This alternative realm helps to shape a radically different meaning of development space from what mainstream economics and institutions such as the World Bank offer. Starting from Chakrabarti et al. (2008a, 2008b), let us explore further.

Recall from $W = C + V + SV$ that the total surplus value is $SV$. Summing up the total surplus value produced by various enterprises – capitalist and non-capitalist – we arrive at the total surplus value ($TSV$). $^5$ TSV, as per our
analysis, is split into two components, production surplus and social surplus. Define \( SV^1 \) as the sum total of surplus value directed towards production surplus (subsumed payments) and \( SV^2 \) as the remaining surplus value directed towards social surplus.

Accordingly,

\[
\begin{align*}
SV^1 &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i \\
SV^2 &= SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k
\end{align*}
\] (4.3)

\( SV^1 \) is the total appropriated surplus value that is then distributed for all kinds of subsumed payments. On the other hand, if social surplus designated as SS is distributed to meet various needs, then

\[
SV^2 = SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k
\] (4.4)

where \( SV^2 \) is the sum total of surplus value distributed as social surplus SS, and \( SS_k \) represents the \( k \)th payment of the ‘\( m \)’ distributions of social surplus.

Total Surplus Value = Production Surplus + Social Surplus

The social surplus could be distributed to meet various kinds of socially determined needs: poverty-related need, entertainment need, environmental need, the needs of the old, the children, the mentally dis-eased and so on. Our understanding of need is not referring to a naturalized or given rendition of need, consisting of some pre-defined objective ends. What emerges as need and in what form is socially determined and remains open to interpretation and change, that is remains open to socio-political articulations; what is necessary is thus ‘socially constructed as necessary’; what is need is indeed a social construction of need. This implies that the need space is a contested terrain, and any idea of universal need or even alternative formulations such as that of Marxian need has to be seen as being produced from within such a social terrain. Putting (4.3) and (4.4) together,

\[
Total Surplus Value = TSV = \left\{ SV^1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i \right\} + \left\{ SV^2 = SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k \right\}
\] (4.5)

Social surplus and the space of development marks a discursive terrain that is able to integrate class and need, creating in the process a unique imbrication of overdetermined and contradictory effects. As is evident from the above equation, surplus directed towards production surplus and that directed
towards social surplus would be in an overdetermined and contradictory relation; for example, given the quantum of SV, increase or decrease in one would have a correspondingly inverse effect on the other.

Insofar as the set of need constitutes the development space, Marxian theory would consider the terrain of need to be flexible, contingent, unstable and open to interventions and articulations rather than being closed off into a universal set of needs handed down from the top (say by the World Bank or the state). One axis of development struggle concerns what should emerge as socially necessary need; it is thus no surprise that what constitutes need, even hegemonic need, has tended to change over time. This means that, from a Marxian perspective, the universalized set of needs should be read as arising from specific political positions that, by repudiating other need-related renditions and prospects, emerge as universal. In this context, need-related development struggles are struggles over meanings of need and also over the manner, mechanism and forms of appropriating and distributing social surplus as well as over who should be considered the rightful recipient of social surplus. The players converging in the need space and also confronting one another over the appropriation, distribution and receipt of social surplus include, to name a few, central governments, local governments, local bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international agencies such as the World Bank, individual class enterprises (such as state class enterprises, private class enterprises, household class enterprises and so on), the political parties and the social movements. If the struggles over the nature of class process and over production surplus are struggles over class-related processes and are consequently class struggles, then the struggles over the nature of need process and over social surplus are need-related development struggles. Our particular version of Marxian theory can be roughly represented by Figure 4.1.

**Development justice**

The Marxian understanding of development connects three distinct nodes of struggles: (a) over class processes (struggle over fundamental and subsumed class processes), (b) over need processes (struggle over processes related to
need and social surplus) and (c) non-class/non-need processes (struggles such as, for example, over gender relations that importantly constitute the performance of surplus, say, for instance, through the sexual division of labor or, say, the social understanding of ‘nutritional needs’ of men and women). Struggles do take place along these axes, and yet due to their mutual constitutivity, each constitutes the other in important ways. Development politics consequently must be attentive to the multiple and complex levels of such struggles. In this regard, Marxian theory too brings into contention its own understanding of developmental progress in line with its ethico-justice considerations. We name this ethico-justice position development justice.

Development justice would call for an intervention within the development space in order to put forward need considerations that would be considered fair. This need will be so construed as to be in opposition to the hegemonic need considerations forwarded by the development discourse that fashions capitalist hegemony with its centrisms of West/modernity and capital. Escobar identifies the problem as:

Social movements necessarily operate within dominant systems of need interpretation and satisfaction, but they tend to politicize interpretations; that is, they refuse to see needs as just ‘economic’ or ‘domestic’… It is a problematic ‘moment,’ since it usually entails the involvement of the state and the mediation by those who have expert knowledge… It is clear that in the third world the process of needs interpretation and satisfaction is inextricably linked to the development apparatus… The challenge for social movements – and the ‘experts’ who work with them – is to come up with new ways of talking about needs and of demanding their satisfaction in ways that bypass the rationality of development with its ‘basic needs’ discourse. The ‘struggle over needs’ must be practiced in a way conducive to redefining development and the nature of the political. (Escobar 1992, 46).

How about extending Escobar’s argument a bit here? In the ‘struggle over needs’ so as to re-define both ‘development’ and the ‘nature of the political’ it is not enough to be anti-Orientalist; one needs to be anti-Capitalocentric as well; because hegemonic need is not just Orientalist, it is also Capitalocentric. Here following Marx, we define such socially necessary need as radical need which, in our understanding, is what constitutes the Marxian terrain of development justice.6 Rather than stemming from a universal human rights provision, radical need is contingently ‘political.’ The ‘radicality’ of need as also its ‘political’ touch arises, first, from the need space itself that connects the posited need to certain ‘ethical’ criteria that is considered valuable-in-itself (for example poverty related need is related to the existence of the poor and there can be no compromise on such a need) and, second, from a contestation of exploitation, including capitalist exploitation, and its associated process of unfair and undemocratic modes of distribution that prevents the need from acquiring the status of ‘right’. Radical need is thus a need transformed into
right (with zero tolerance towards violation of the right) that, by its very manner of being posed, is anti-capitalist (because it contests exploitation) and is anti-third worldlist (because it challenges the conceptualization of hegemonic needs that is tuned to third worldlist representations). These two criteria transform the concerned need into a ‘political right’ that operates under an anti-Capitalocentric anti-Orientalist scanner, which signifies a transmutation from ‘need as technical’ to ‘need as justice.’ Development justice acknowledges that class matters as to whether radical need is to be fulfilled or not; class struggle is important for need struggle (and vice versa) and for the fulfilment of radical need. The invocation of development justice displaces an otherwise depoliticized need space (a need space produced, legitimized by the hegemonic and that is positively inclined in favour of capitalism) towards a political consideration of need – a consideration that is firmly anti-Capitalocentric and anti-Orientalist. Struggles over radical needs through need struggles and struggles for appropriative justice and productive justice through class struggles must complement and converge if we are to contemplate a transition of society from its present Capitalocentric-Orientalist moorings to another setting in which both the centricities of capital and modernity/west wither away.

As and when the three justice criteria – appropriative, productive and development – are met independently or in tandem, Marxists would call it ‘progress.’ Accordingly, struggles to achieve these justice criteria are progressive struggles. Evidently, because of the non-teleological understanding of transition that is adopted, the Marxian concept of progress or of progressive struggle too has no teleological bias. Nothing in Marxist theory says that evolution of society follows a pre-given pattern such that it will move inexorably towards a non-exploitative and a fair society. This is what the rejection of historicism brings into the Marxian horizon. What it says, in contrast, is that it is a desirable solution and one should advocate and fight for it. This means that, from a Marxian perspective, struggle for Marxian ethico-justice criteria and their defence becomes a permanent and an interminable struggle.

In a terrain that is horizontal, there are development stages, not given diachronically but synchronically pulling and pushing development in different directions. In this regard, our analysis does provide some guidance to the political role of Marxists in line with its progressive points of justice.

This matrix indicates that the pair {exploitative classes, unfair distribution} is unacceptable and Marxists should reject a system dominated by such a pair. In this regard, movement to any of the other pairs will be acceptable even though {non-exploitative, fair distribution} will be most preferred. There is no hard and fast rule though as to where one should move. Given a specific context, it may be strategically feasible to be moving to a state of {exploitative, fair distribution (indicating the expansion of the radical need space)} or {non-exploitative (indicating constriction of the exploitative space), unfair distribution}. One may make further distinctions about exploitative classes, preferring one set as against another. The matrix and the possible further
sub-classifications point to the fact that Marxian politics on development could involve a complexity of strategies over time.

To clarify one final point. The above does not offer any scope to infer that attaining the progressive points of justice is some bliss point or that attaining them will erase all other problems or even that they will not open up new kinds of problems; all we say is that some aspects of ‘difference-discrimination’ are better accounted for by achieving these points for reasons already explained; that is why struggles to achieve these points are progressive.

Capitalist hegemony: foreclosure of the world of the third

We have explored thus far how development discourse positions, discusses and makes operational the moment of dislocation and compensation/resettlement through a transmutation of the otherwise de-centred economy into the dualism of \{capitalism, third world\} organized through capitalist hegemony. Capitalist hegemony as activated through development discourse is constituted through three nodal or master signifiers: (i) capitalist surplus value appropriation; (ii) capitalist commodity; and (iii) hegemonic need. The first two refer to the defining signifiers of the capitalist class process, which ensures in turn the centrality of capital. The third is representative of the set of needs inaugurated and applied within the world of the third through a certain third world-ism.

In the process of giving shape to the hegemonic symbolic constitutive of and constituted through the three nodal or master signifiers, the language related to class and world of the third are secreted out; this makes us hospitable to a discourse of development that has its centricities in capital(ism) and modernity/West. In the process, the corporeal form, the materialities of world of the third are included in terms of the language of third world-ism, but the language of world of the third comprising of hitherto unthought semantic possibilities is foreclosed in the process. Hegemonic needs surface in the
interface of this process of foregrounding-foreclosure. third world-ism is essentially structured around the set of ‘needs’ (we have called them hegemonic needs) pertaining to the distribution of social surplus whose operations produce a displacement of world of the third into a platform that is under the hegemonic control and management of institutions including the World Bank and the organs of the state. Such a set of needs enables the hegemonic to encounter, confront, displace, control and subdue the familiar platform of world of the third into a distinctly different domain – that of third world. In this way, third world-ism is essentially produced through the repudiation of a chain of fundamental signifiers that govern the forms of life of world of the third, a repudiation that is secured through the production of another chain of signifiers – substitute signifiers – that anchor the need-related conceptualization of the hegemonic. World of the third is thus controlled, managed and subdued while capitalist development flourishes. Consequently, the three nodal signifiers – capitalist surplus value appropriation, capitalist commodity and hegemonic need – through which capitalist development works in the South are anchored by and in turn provide anchorage to a host of floating signifiers (spanning from capitalocentric ones such as profit, competition, efficiency, individualism, capital accumulation, market, private property to orientalist/third world-ist ones such as social capital, community, informality, agriculture, the poor, the indigenous, the third world woman, the third world child, etc.). The symbolic order that is structured through the three nodal signifiers telescopes two moments: (i) the uncontested centrality of capital; and (ii) the devaluation of third world as the lacking other of a modern Western space pre-occupied by capital. The discussion and debate of dislocation and compensation/resettlement is internalized within such a language of the hegemonic, that is within the symbolic that reproduces itself through the foreclosures of class and world of the third.

While we have explored the philosophical grounding of world of the third in its relation to third world in Chapter 2, what still remains to be explained is how we arrive at a conceptualization of world of the third? How do we find–found the world of the third vis-à-vis the third world? Chakrabarti and Dhar (2005, 2008c) and Chakrabarti et al. (2009) define world of the third as the conceptual-territorial space procreating outside the circuits of global capital. In this regard, ‘circuits of global capital’ comprise all those processes that are directly or indirectly connected with the global capitalist enterprises. These connecting processes are situated in spaces ranging from the banking to the trading enterprise; they are situated in spaces ranging from the state to the local capitalist enterprises. Numerous non-capitalist enterprises in the unorganized sector (through outsourcing and the production chain) are also part of the connecting processes. Together, these processes constitute the circuits of global capital. The circuits of global capital thus span a much wider space than that specified by the physical reach of all the global capitalist enterprises combined. Thus, for example, the growing connection of global capitalist enterprises with the informal enterprises in the Southern countries (say via
outsourcing) refers to an expansion of the circuits of global capital (Chakrabarti et al. 2008, 2009). However, it is also notable that capital is the centre of the circuits of global capital and, in that context, the expansion of the circuits of global capital implies the expansion of capital. Securing and expanding the circuits of capital would mean that the defining signifiers of capitalist surplus value appropriation and capitalist commodity are reiterated and re-inscribed, and capitalist hegemony re-produced.

Given this vastly disaggregated and de-centred space, capitalist enterprises compete with one another through the circuits of global capital in order to create, sustain and expand the processes of the creation and appropriation of surplus value or capital – both productive and circulating. In the current juncture, development policy encapsulating the goal of ‘growth through industrialization’ can be seen as an effort to create and expand conditions favourable to the circuits of global capital in order to allow competitive capitalism to become entrenched in Southern countries such as India.

Moreover, via a series of discursive practices (encompassing economic, cultural, political and natural processes), certain forms of life comprising interrelated sets of relationships and practices are formed in relation to and for the circuits of global capital. Together, they come to constitute the ‘camp of global capital’ (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2005; Chakrabarti et al. 2009: Ch. 5). Quite evidently, the camp of global capital would encompass the various state apparatuses, educational institutions, notions of individual values, entrepreneurship and consumerism, judgement of performance, gender relations, customs and mores, etc.

World of the third, on the other hand, consists of overdetermined and contradictory processes beyond and outside the circuits of global capital. The circuits of world of the third include a wide variety of pre-dominantly non-capitalist class enterprises (although it could even include capitalist enterprises) and also the equally diverse economic, political, cultural and natural conditions of existence. Correspondingly, from a Marxian perspective, world of the third is a reality that is non-reducible to any particular type of enterprise or specific form of economic existence. Circuits of world of the third along with the institutions and agents that shape a set of practices and relationships and inform a form of life around such circuits are referred to as the camp of world of the third. Sometimes, such camps in their complex totality are also referred to as world of the third societies.

World of the third society is constituted by relations to nature, to land; it is constituted by relations among members (not exclusively kinship relations) that it sustains, by varied property relations or the absence of them over resources, by the knowledge/information of the terrain its members have, the labour processes and class relations pertaining to surplus labour, the forms of distribution – market and non-market, caste relations, gender relations, race relations and so on. Such world of the third spaces are punctuated by numerous contradictions and antagonisms related to class, gender, caste, race and so on. The story of a cooperative, concordant and self-contented ‘tradition’ or ‘community’ is a myth produced as part of an emotive/cultural
discourse of the third world and one that, with modifications (e.g. through categories such as ‘social capital’), serves as a condition of existence for the development discourse.

Regarding the subjects procreating within world of the third societies, not surprisingly, it is inhabited by, to a great extent, those identified ‘marginalized’ and ‘indigenous’ groups such as Adivasis, Dalits, etc., who are typical target figures of third world-ism. These ‘identified’ groups have their particular forms of economic practices; and by virtue of such practices being overwhelmingly ‘not capitalist’ and being not industrial in the ‘modern’ Western sense, they are further positioned by mainstream discourse as structurally marginalized or poor, that is, as third world-ist. In Marxian terms, their economic practices are not ‘pre-capitalist’ but ‘are not capitalist’, which must be further divided and disaggregated into varying forms of non-capitalist existences.

World of the third, unmoored from development logic, can be placed as a conceptual–territorial space over which no value judgement (good, bad, useful) can be made. In the event of constructing this conceptual–territorial space, we make no claims regarding the economic status of world of the third society (it could be exploitative or non-exploitative; rich or poor), its cultural ethos (it could be fundamentalist in some axis or more than liberal in others), its political institutions (it could be closed or open-ended with regard to rules of authority) and its relation with nature (it could be friendly or unfriendly towards its surrounding environment). Different ethico-justice considerations would clash in this space even as it could have its own hegemonic articulation in favour of one ethico-justice condition. As an open-ended and conflicting site, Marxian ethico-justice criteria would consider and want to develop world of the third society in directions specified by its attachment to collectivity (non-exploitation), equity (fairness in distribution) and rights (radical need). How these struggles are shaped would vary depending upon the specific kind of world of the third societies.

World of the third can be found(ed) in what has come to be known as the ‘third world’; it can also be found(ed) in what has come to known as the other of the third world – the North, the West, the modern, the industrialized, the urban – where world of the third seems almost an impossibility. It can be found(ed) in the rural and also the urban. Evidently, both the camps of global capital and world of the third would be reproduced side by side making their encounter inevitable, as is evident from the recurrent processes of dislocation.

World of the third space comes face to face with the camp of global capital in two ways. First, they are directly intruded upon by the violent dismantling of their space of living through development projects; they are physically displaced repeatedly by development projects. Furthermore, these people may find their forms of life dismembered at times (even if they do not have to leave their living space) due to the entry or expansion of capitalist enterprises in their spaces, which eliminates one or more of their crucial conditions of existence (say the scarcity of quality water generated in world of the third through the aggressive drawing of groundwater by capitalist enterprises). This intrusion by capitalist enterprise is justified by the development logic; such
intrusion is considered a mark of progress; progress marked in turn through the expansion of the modern economy, that is the camp of global capital.

Second, they are intruded because, on account of being inhabitants of the ‘third world’, they are seen as victims on two counts: (i) victims of their own ‘backward’ structures that produce their poverty, which in turn necessitates a ‘humanist’ intervention in their space; and (ii) victims of development, which dislocates their forms of life through an encounter of their living space with the camp of global capital. Their victim image on these two counts in turn reinforces their third world status.

World of the third is thus affected by violence in two axes: brute violence of the progressive logic of development that dislocates them with impunity; and benevolent violence of the poverty management exercise that reinforces their third world-ist image, the image of a destitute figure waiting to be rescued. This is not to say, as we have already explained, that world of the third societies are necessarily ‘just’ societies, and that exploitation, oppression and even marginalization are absent from such societies. Marxian theory takes us miles away from such a romanticizing of the ‘local’. However, Marxian theory also says that what happens inside world of the third societies, what injustices are perpetuated therein and what the struggles are conducted to overcome these, are arguments of a different logical order; it can in no way serve as a sanction for the intrusion and violence that world of the third societies face by virtue of being branded third world-ist. It is in this context that we feel the need to have an ethical commitment towards world of the third societies and produce a reverse gaze and also an ethic tu(r)ned to the world of the third. To situate this reverse gaze and ethic, one needs a category different from the third world whose existence is the basis for initiating and legitimizing the intrusive logic of capitalist development. In doing so, what becomes evident is the hegemonic’s process of foreclosure of world of the third achieved through the foregrounding of third world and also the meaning of capitalism as the norm in terms of which the transitional logic of development is to be forwarded. Moreover, situating world of the third in this manner means that need is no longer to be seen in the context of the third world-ist development domain. Instead, it is now situated in a world of the third context and is grounded in an intimate relationship with radical need and social surplus, and that too in a manner that deconstructs the hegemonic development discourse and also shores up alternative explanations of existing practices and alternative possibilities of social reconstruction. The terms of discussing the meaning and policy of dislocation and compensation/resettlement are accordingly fundamentally altered.

Escobar and third world: one final encounter with post-developmentalism

We have already highlighted the inadequate theorization of economy in the works of the post-developmentalist school. We have seen how this inattention
to the economy entraps them, quite inadvertently, into a certain capitalocentrism. In fact, this inability to theorize the economy shows itself in the otherwise commendable work of Escobar (1995), who criticizes the denigration and subjugation of the third world without quite explaining why and how it emanates from a capitalocentric–orientalist discourse of the economy – a discourse that transmutes an otherwise de-centred and heterogeneous economy into a dualistic representation and that too in terms of the complex temporality–verticality. His inability to initiate a different rendition of the economy leads to a failure to displace third world from its received meaning even though that remained the goal in his work. This is representative of a rather entrenched problem within the post-developmental approach – an approach that is critical of the orientalism imbued in development discourse (especially the prefabricated cultural aspects) but misses out on a similar kind of critique of the capitalocentrism embedded within development discourse. In the process, post-developmentalists (and even one of the best among them, Escobar) miss the worldview that telescopes the two into one and how the two together in representing the other as (i) backward and as (ii) pre-capitalist (the projection of the other as pre-capitalist is crucial – it is a condition of third world-ism – something Escobar misses) produce the ‘third world’-ism that Escobar wishes to resist. The failure to critically assess this worldview produced through an entwining of orientalism and capitalocentrism leads to the inability to see how ‘third world’-ism emerges as what we have called the ‘constitutive inside’ of capitalist development (the adjective ‘capitalist’ is crucial); and how the insided-ness of the third world concomitantly relegates world of the third to the realm of the ‘constitutive outside’ of, once again, capitalist development. Instead, as we are arguing, third world as the constitutive inside, as the incessantly ‘spoken’, as the condition of capitalist development, as the crucible of an incitement to developmentalist discourse and world of the third as the constitutive outside, as the ‘unspoken’, as the condition of third world-ism, constitute, in tandem, development discourse.

Escobar’s scheme also fails to recognize that the developmentalist agenda’s object of control is not third world, but instead world of the third; world of the third as the harbinger of a non-capitalist ethic and language outside of and beyond the circuits of global capital – an ethic and language that puts under erasure capitalist ethic and language – is displaced into ‘third world’ – third world as pre-capitalist – as a lower step in the ladder of linear time; the difference that world of the third is to capitalism is thus reduced to mere temporality – where third world is the languishing past of the West/modern; world of the third as the critique of the capitalist present is thus reduced to a third world-ist past. There is thus a turntable – the critique of capitalism that world of the third throws up is turned into a critique of world of the third by the capitalist modern West through third world-ism; the subject of critique (here world of the third) is turned to an object of critique (here third world); in the process, the ground/legitimation for intervention in, and displacement and dislocation of, world of the third is prepared.
Escobar’s frame tends to relegate third world to two parallel and contradictory conceptual existences – one, as a category of development discourse and, the other, as a separate reality existing out there. What then is third world? Constructed? Or existing out there? For Escobar, ‘third world’ is a category produced by development discourse – hence, the genealogy of the category in Encountering Development – which in other words, is an encountering of the category ‘third world’. However, at about the same time, third world is also an object of empathy and subject of resistance. Reflecting on the third world, Escobar says, ‘I want to show that this (development) discourse results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the third world is produced’ (Escobar 1995: 11). He also avers that ‘... development discourse ... has successfully deployed a regime of government over the third world, a “space for subject people” that ensures control over it. ... Nevertheless, even today most people in the West (and many parts of the third world) have great difficulty thinking about third world situations and people in terms other than those provided by the development discourse’ (Escobar 1995: 9, 12). Escobar’s analysis of third world is grounded on an underlying methodology that we find problematic. He emphasizes that the third world is produced by development discourse, and yet he is also suggesting that it is a ‘space for subject people’; is it then something that can be explicated historically? Does it exist as a space outside of development discourse? Is he proposing that development discourse does not represent third world accurately and the need of the hour is to arrive at a valid representation of the third world? This signifies that development discourse does not correctly mirror the third world that is somewhere out there, and which can be brought into the open by attending to the cultural processes that post-development approaches highlight. Escobar can be read here as faltering between two recognizable forms of determinism – constructionism and empiricism. Instead, from our Marxian perspective, every theory produces a particular reality within which it is one of the processes; no reality exists outside of theory; different theories highlight different realities; and realities in turn spawn theories. Development discourse constructs an economic/social reality within which third world has a particular place and there is no third world outside of that reality. Escobar is urging us to resist the negative representation of third world without quite realizing that one cannot but have a negative representation of third world; third world is the representation of that which has to be projected as negative. There is no third world except in its denigratred representation; there is nothing to salvage of third world, nothing in third world to hold onto, nothing to defend of third world.

Of course, we laud Escobar for rendering unfamiliar the given picture of third world; as an effect of the discursive practices of development, ‘the third world is a contested reality whose current status is up for scrutiny and negotiation’ (Escobar 1995: 214–15). While there can be no denying the fact that Escobar poses the problem correctly, his otherwise commendable effort to ‘scrutiny’ the third world remains somewhat incapacitated by the inability to
break away from the third world. If different theories produce different realities, then any attempt to forward a different reality of the so-called third world must proceed from a distinctly different theoretical plane, a terrain that would, say, unpack how third world differs from world of the third. Only then can we clearly posit the underlying capitalocentric–orientalist worldview that is motoring the development discourse. In other words, the point is not fundamentally to de-familiarize third world, but also development discourse itself within which third world operates as a category. By so de-familiarizing the development discourse and its integral concept of third world and showing these as operating through the capitalocentric–orientalist worldview, we can explore how the foregrounding of the category third world makes possible the foreclosure of world of the third. Moreover, a ‘third world-ist’ justification (which is now foregrounded in development discourse) of the dislocation of third world would be seen in a different light from the perspective of world of the third; from the perspective of world of the third, one would need to denounce such ‘liberation’ as moments of plunder or ‘primitive accumulation’. Such an alternative framing would make possible a contesting story in which not third world but world of the third becomes the ground for opening in the process a quite different terrain of interpreting development. In contrast to Escobar and the general post-developmental trend, the ground for a counter-hegemonic imagination is not just to scrutinize or negotiate or struggle for third world, but to problematize its presence and foregrounding through a return to what the development discourse has made absent and foreclosed – world of the third. It is this return of the foreclosed of capitalist development that can seriously destabilize third world-ism. One place where this re-turn to world of the third is particularly effective is regarding the question of tracking the clashing subjectivities pertaining to dislocation and compensation/resettlement.

**Marxism and the question of subject**

Keeping in mind the fact that structure and subject constitute one another in their overdetermined imbrications, that one brings into existence the other, we think in this section of the *subject*, the subject in relation to structures and in relation to institutions. We draw upon a specific rendition of subjectivity through Marxian theory that would not only problematize the conventional understandings of subjectivity pertaining to the issue of dislocation and resettlement, but will also throw new light on the phenomenon.

The understanding of the rational agent in neo-classical economics is such that (rational) subjectivity is given beforehand and the sum total of the subjectivities of rational economic agents (the *homo economicus*) determines the ultimate structure of the economy – the economy in general. On the other hand, there could be another understanding of the subject – a rather contrary understanding – where the subject could be understood as basically reflecting the structure (say, the working class subject who is determined by his or her position in the structure). Under both these representations of the subject, the
subject is an entity that is reduced to a certain inner essence or truth, either it is the rationality of the individual or it is the structurality that the mode of production is. Subjectivity reflects this inner essence or truth, that is the pre-constituted consciousness of the subject, and any digression from this given situation is considered abnormal/pathological. In neo-classical economics, the pathological state would be captured by those subjects who are not ‘rational’ in the sense that neo-classical economics understands rationality and who do not respond to the nodal signifiers of the economy. In this context, ‘third world’ subjectivity as reflective of the pre-constituted domain of traditionality represents a state of abnormality. Similarly, in orthodox Marxism, subjects other than those belonging to the working class are rendered redundant for societal and transitional purposes.

Marxism moored to a more post-structuralist concern has, on the other hand, emphasized the de-centred and fragmented nature of the subject; the subject is criss-crossed by considerations of class, caste, race, gender, sexuality and so on; the subject is an overdetermined and contradictory whole of numerous effects relating to economic, political, cultural and natural processes. Because the subject is a complex and fragmented entity constituted by multiple effects, no subject can be reduced to a single disposition. There is no inner essence or truth, no pre-constituted consciousness structured by either a given state of mind, as in case of the rational subject, or a given structure of consciousness, as in case of the working class subject. Not only is the subject a space of difference in terms of class, caste, race and gender effects, but even within a single category such as ‘class’, the subject is nothing but a complex and contradictory whole. Take the case of class. Courtesy our concept of class as a process, it is feasible for a worker (productive labour) to be a shareholder capitalist (unproductive capitalist) or for an exploited worker (productive labour) in a capitalist enterprise to be a feudal lord (non-capitalist exploiter) in the household. With the dispersed nature of class, subjects too get dispersed in terms of their class disposition. The dispersed nature of class processes means that no subject – individual or social – can be based on pre-supposed or pre-formed formulas of subjectivity, interest or consciousness emanating from the subject’s unique location among subjects or in a structure.

As the subject holds many diverging positions – class and non-class positions – that allow him or her to engage in a multi-layered array of activities, practices and relationships, different contradictory effects from these processes constitute the subject. With the subject always already in a state of becoming, the subject cannot be reduced to any one position such as a class fixed one. The non-reducible character of the subject means, for example, that the occupation of a class position (say as an exploited worker) in no way guarantees a conscious disposition towards class-based struggles (say struggling towards ending exploitation).

Whither then the question of the subject and also subjectivity? Does this mean that the class-focused approach then veers towards an erasure of subjectivity or, for that matter, political subjectivity? Does this mean a withering away of subject–subjectivity? To an extent, yes … but not quite. Yes, because it does problematize the given notion of (political) subjectivity; the rather
thick notion of (political) subjectivity. Not quite, because, even in a milieu of
general doubt, uncertainty, scepticism and instability, it thinks a thin notion
of the subject; a rather contingent notion; contingent with respect to nodal
moments of partial–limited suture; contingent with respect to the Moebius
Band that subject–subjectivity always already is. This thin notion of the sub-
ject relates to the third understanding of the subject; third beyond (i) the thick
notion of the subject and (ii) the withering away of the subject; third beyond
the subject as everything and the subject as nothing, not a thing. In fact, the
genealogy of the subject shows that the invocation of the subject has always
been in an atmosphere of doubt, scepticism, uncertainty and instability. It has
always been a form of soft contingent pleading. In terms of the tradition of
thinking of the subject in its bare minimum thinness, we propose five subject
positions (albeit thin and contingent) in the context of development:

i. The ‘Subject of development’: I am already developed; You are under-
developed; You need it as well; You need capitalist development

ii. The ‘subject of underdevelopment’: I lack therefore I need (capitalist)
development (the subject of guilt)

iii. The ‘subject of development’: See, she wants (capitalist) development; Its
her autonomous desire (the subject of choice)

iv. The ‘subject of dislocation’: I need (capitalist) development therefore I
suffer [the pain–suffering of the subject of dislocation is thus put aside
(purloined) if not put outside (foreclosed)]

v. The resisting subject or the counter-hegemonic subject who, through a
traversing of the fundamental fantasy of development, sets up another
relation to the signifier development, a relation not in terms of capitalocentric–
orientalism but in terms of class–need in their constitutive imbrications:
We appropriate surplus labour; We distribute surplus labour; We make a
case for radical need; We work towards non-exploitation, fair distribution
and resettlement right.

Of the five subject positions delineated above, the first four get sympathy
and the fifth is mocked, abused, dismissed and violated; and this happens
somewhat in association with the foregrounding of the third world and the
foreclosure of world of the third. The authors of this work, on the other hand,
wish to foreground the fifth position and, in the process, reveal the hegemonic
constitution of the subject and also theorize the clashes and struggles per-
taining to dislocation and resettlement. It is to highlight that dislocation is a
contested terrain (as it evidently is) not least because of opposite subjective
dispositions – hegemonic and counter-hegemonic – that clash.

The question of the subject is further problematized by the question of the
unconscious; thus the subject is not just disaggregated; it is never enough to
disaggregate or de-centre the subject or any reality; it is important to think
beyond mere disaggregation or de-centring; disaggregation and de-centring
give us the sense of a cosy plurality, of plural causation understood in rather
simple terms, where discrete entities add on to form a plural whole; over-
determination is not a mere add-on of discrete entities. The deployment of the
concept of overdetermination by Freud has in it a hint of the Nachtraglichkeit –
the activated-after-the-event-ness of the provocation, which seems to suggest a
notion of time-space or of language not subordinated to the present, not
subordinated to what is being presently written on the (mystic) writing pad.
For Freud, a trauma may have little or no effect at first; yet a later trauma of
a somewhat similar kind may provoke a symptom by triggering off the pro-
vocation of the earlier trauma, a process that may in turn be continuously
repeated; a process that may in turn effect–affect subsequent processes such
that one does not have an exact clue of the final trajectory or of the end.

Such is the subject. One can think of the subject in terms of an over-
determined ensemble of a thousand threads; the colour of some are known;
some remain unknown; unseen are the processes in which the threads are
knitted; uncertain are the end affects; what we have is an infinite combination
always already in the process of emerging. Overdetermination shows how the
question of the subject is menaced by language not subordinated to the pre-
sent, to the given present, to what is being presently written on the (mystic)
writing pad. Overdetermination shows how the subject is menaced by the
remainder, by unthought-of-remainders, remainders that emerge out of the blue
as reminders. Overdetermination shows how the subject is menaced by the
unconscious: it shows how people are profoundly affected by the unconscious
structured like a language. The question of the unconscious thus complicates the
question of the subject further:

In elaborating his theory of the unconscious, Freud in fact touched on an
extraordinarily sensitive point of philosophical, psychological, and moral
ideology, calling into question, through the discovery of the unconscious
and its effects, a certain ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’ idea of ‘man’ as a
‘singular’ whose unity is ensured or crowned by consciousness.

Althusser (1996: 114)

Further, if Freud ‘broke with physiology and medicine [that is with the
observational sciences], it was because he was educated by his own hysterical
patients, who literally taught him and allowed him to see that there existed a
language of the unconscious inscribed in their bodies’ (Althusser 1996: 119).
For Rose (1987), the unconscious constantly reveals the ‘failure’ of identity;
because there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no stability of identity, no
position that is ever simply achieved. For Spivak, the unconscious is another
name for ‘radical alterity’ (Spivak 1996: 83). The unconscious ‘undermines the
pigeon-holing of meanings and speech acts’. It undermines the conscious ego’s
decision to situate intended meaning in itself and for another conscious ego.

One therefore needs a theory of the hegemonized psyche that is marked at
the same time by the unconscious; one needs to ground the ‘myriad sub-
stances of [hegemonized] subjectivity as a supplement to identity’; hence a
speaking with Freud; with Marx–Freud; hence a beginning of the book with Marx and a turn towards Freud. This turn to Freud is all the more important because, in thinking about the subject’s relation to the signifier, one needs to think of ‘psychoanalytic effects that are decisive for the subject such as foreclosure [Verwerfung], repression [Verdrängung], denial [Verneinung] itself’ (Spivak 1996: 84). In this work, we primarily focus on the psychoanalytical effects of foreclosure as constitutive of the subject in development.

Having problematized the notion of the subject to an extent – having thought through the metaphysical notion of the subject (Subject to be precise) and having thought through the subject-as-put-under-erasure (subject to be precise) – we are now in a position to think the third understanding of the subject – the subject as hegemonic (and as counter-hegemonic) – the subject as hegemonized (and as resisting hegemony) – where hegemony is not pre-given but is contingent upon nodal moments of partial closure – upon anchoring signifiers of fractional–limited suture – a suture that is, in turn, arrived at through fundamental repudiations, through repudiation of fundamental signifiers; hence counter-hegemony is contingent upon the subject being possessed by repudiated signifiers, possessed in the sense of being haunted (Achuthan et al. 2007). It is this third understanding of the subject – hegemonic and counter-hegemonic – that informs our subsequent discussion of subjectivity.

In this context, the (Marxian) counter-hegemonic standpoint that we will explore is intertwined with:

i. a turning away from within (the within being the centre, the hegemonic symbolic) outward (Achuthan 2004, 2005) and

ii. a turn to the foreclosed outside (of class and world of the third) so as to
inaugurate within, the return of the foreclosed outside (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2005).

For us political or counter-hegemonic subjectivity is tied to the two above mentioned moves. First, the subject has to turn away from the hegemonic symbolic; the subject has to turn away from the nodal points or centrism that secure the hegemonic symbolic; the subject who was hithertho within, now turns outward; the subject turns to the hitherto “excluded as resource” (Achuthan et al. 2007); the subject who was hitherto inside, now turns to the foreclosed outside; and the return of the foreclosed outside within the hegemonic symbolic destabilizes and defamiliarizes the hegemonic symbolic. But how would the subject turn away from within outward? Only by traversing the fundamental fantasy of Development. Only by fundamentally traversing the fantasy of Development.
5 A critique of received theories of dislocation, compensation and resettlement

Drawing upon the overdetermination of class and non-class effects, drawing upon the complexity of subject positions, we deliver in this chapter a methodological and a substantive critique of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, encompassing the ‘economics of compensation’ and also Cernea’s Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) approach. In the process, we confront and answer some of the questions raised at the end of Chapters 3 and 4; this in turn moves the discussion on dislocation to a different terrain – the terrain of a Marxian theory of dislocation and resettlement right.

Cost–benefit, efficiency and policy as an ideological tool of social reconstruction

Violence is a subtle force. It is not easy to detect its presence though you may feel it all the same.

Mahatma Gandhi in “Towards Non-Violent Socialism”

The crux of the ‘economics of compensation’ lies in the cost–benefit framework and the objective marker of efficiency. Our analysis reasons that both, at least the way they are deployed in the concerned literature, are irreparably flawed. Our critique expands on Wolff (2002a, 2002b, 2003) who uses the methodology of overdetermination to argue against the mainstream methodology of cost–benefit and the efficiency measure. This critique will evidently encompass the Kaldor–Hicks principle or any other closely related principle (including the one proposed by Little–Mirrlees) that uses the efficiency criteria in the context of the cost–benefit framework.

To recap, in the cost–benefit analysis, when considering any effect concerning an event, act or institution, if it is found that the positives (the benefits) outweigh the negatives (the costs) then the effect is said to be efficient. Otherwise, it is inefficient. Wolff gives two reasons to debunk the idea of an absolutist understanding of efficiency and consequently of any probable cost–benefit calculi based on such a notion of efficiency. First, because any one act, event or institution has an infinite number of overdetermined effects now and into the future, there is no way to identify, let alone measure, all the consequences.
It is simply not possible to have an efficiency measure in any comprehensive, total or absolute sense. Claims that these chosen effects are privileged means that the efficiency measure would consider a few effects, usually the more visible effects, effects that are transparent and effects that are affecting the present. What we have then in effect is relative efficiency that is paraded as if it is an efficiency measure in some total, absolute sense. Any assertion or claim of one or a set of effects as relatively more important than others requires that we need to know all the effects in order to make a comparison. However, if knowing all the effects, which are infinite in number, is impossible, so is the exercise of checking and comparing each one of them to arrive at some absolute measure of efficiency. Second, each of the effects of any particular economic act, event or institution has an infinite number of causative influences. This means that no ‘effects’ of a particular act, event or institution proposed by efficiency analysis are reducible exclusively to its effects. As a result, the efficiency of any particular act, event or institution cannot be measured by the proposed ‘effects’ chosen in efficiency analysis. Each of the criticisms on its own makes the efficiency principle false and, in tandem, doubly false. Whether we apply subjective probability, perform contingent valuation or undertake partial analysis, the logical problem with efficiency sticks. We have thus demonstrated that the basic weapon of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach that forms the basis of the adoption of development projects is fundamentally flawed.

That the absolute efficiency measure of the kind used in the cost–benefit approach is logically faulty means that ‘there is no single standard of efficiency’. As Wolff (2002a) contends, ‘... it follows logically that all efficiency analyses and results are relative, not absolute. They are relative to (dependent upon) a determinist view of the world, a determinist ontology that presumes unique causes and “their” effects’. Any efficiency measure as and when conceived entails a partial or a relative criterion for selecting what is deemed as relevant ‘effects’. At the least, this means that no efficiency measure on its own can legitimately claim for itself absolute ‘scientificity’.

The second criticism furthermore implies that even relative measures cannot pin down certain events, acts or institutions to chosen exclusive effects, no matter how partial these are deemed to be. Even a partial construction of efficiency is open-ended and contingent and is subject to newfound processes whose effects were previously not considered. Because the possibility of unknown and unexpected effects always remains, at no point is it possible to say that there is finality to the exercise or that the current efficiency finding is the true one, even in its relative or partial sense. However, there is more.

Our analysis throws important light on the constitution of policy. Attempts to construe policy in terms of changes in this or that process by claiming the relative importance of the chosen process are in effect an exercise that interpellates subjects to the proposed processes. A process chosen by the policy making body as the relevant or the ‘most important’ represents the prerogative of the framework (with its entry points and object of analysis) in
which the chosen process occupies a central place. In such a frame, certain effects are highlighted, others demoted, still others simply ignored and still many more unaccounted for by the limited scope of the discursive focus. In the very manner in which it is conceived, planned and implemented, policy telescopes a specific worldview, a partisan and also a partial perspective. As and when this ‘partial’ position is turned into ‘absolute truth’ demoting and/or erasing all other positions and effects, policy takes on an ideological hue; policy becomes a tool for projecting a partial–partisan position as the only substantive position. In this regard, the pretence and the projection of absolute objectivity and neutrality associated with efficiency measurement and the cost–benefit framework, paraded often with iron-fist finality by the policy makers or mainstream academicians as a mark of scientificty, are in effect masking the ideological origin and foundation of a specific position, here the centricities of capital and modernism.

Through the exercise of differentiating the more important processes that are fit for inclusion, as against those considered less important and consequently that are not to be counted, policy represents one important arena of brute political bludgeoning (which is far from the world of so-called scientific reasoning). It plays a fundamental role in positioning and relating the subject to a certain understanding of reality at the expense of others and, in the process, creates the politics of consensus. In a more Lacanian vein, the ‘relation between the signifier and the subject’ is tuned and set in a particular manner (Lacan 2006: 449). Capitalist hegemony based on producing, securing and expanding the domain of consensus is constituted by, among others, the particular efficiency calculi that reign supreme in a period. Any breakdown of the supremacy of a particular efficiency calculus would surely be reflected in a challenge to the consensus and hence leave the hegemonic open to questioning. Thus, it is no surprise to find vigorous, scientistic, even absolutist defence of ‘efficiency’. The purpose is to situate the method of checking the feasibility of economic projects in a ‘scientific’ plane; such invocation of scientificty would serve to take the method and its outcome beyond any questioning and interrogation.

In this context, one can say that some processes are demoted in favour of chosen processes. One can also say that not only are some processes ‘put aside’ (purloined) but still other processes/languages could even be fundamentally repudiated (foreclosed – made to be, as if, non-existent) by virtue of the fact that their exclusion is buttressed by the denial–disavowal of their very existence and hence, by default, there is denial–disavowal of their very exclusion. In the process, it is forgotten that some such fundamental process/language has been fundamentally forgotten; it is, as if, a forgetting of the forgotten. In terms of the knowledge that the given framework produces, such processes/languages remain occulted, and their role in the constitution of economy and society remains invisible–indiscernible.

We have already explored how the Marxian category of surplus labour remains foreclosed in the approach of mainstream economics; consequently,
‘effects’ emanating from changes in the processes of surplus labour or class processes (those that are unfolding in numbers even as we speak) find no place in either the development logic or the policy that is fashioned as part of that logic. Their effects in the cost–benefit frame and efficiency calculi go unaccounted. By virtue of the foreclosure of surplus labour, the benefits and costs pertaining to the surplus labour-related effects on and of dislocation remain unrecorded. No amount of rectifying–perfecting of the economics of compensation (or, for that matter, resettlement) with its emphasis on chosen ‘important’ indicators (that of course exclude class process) will ever find a way to count the class-related effects. This also points to the obvious: the efficiency calculi and the cost–benefit analysis emanating from a class-focused approach will be dramatically different with diverse consequences from the one proposed under the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach. This example demonstrates that different efficiency calculi (in line with their respective understandings of reality) with diverse cost–benefit analysis would produce equally varied knowledge of the issue in question and, hence, many contesting understandings of dislocation and rehabilitation.

Such a contested field open for political intervention marks the environmental space as well, despite the best efforts of the ‘reformist–managerial’ community to shrug off such opposition by invoking the ‘scientific’ concept of efficiency (Bromley and Paavola 2002). In this context, our contention is that reality is not just pluralistic; reality is overdetermined;¹ and as overdetermined reality is also marked by the unseen/unspoken, reality is where

... a thousand threads one treadle throws,
Where fly the shuttles hither and thither,
*Unseen* the threads are knit together,
And an *infinite* combination grows.

Of the *infinite* combination that emerges, nature is one such *unseen*. Nature as one axis of the ‘woman–nature–machine’ continuum is one such *unseen* unspoken element. Class understood as surplus labour is another. World of the third is yet another. This book is premised on the understanding that an encounter with the hitherto unseen/unspoken (like class, like world of the third) can throw up contesting contexts that require some rather displaced perspective in order to make sense of them, so as to speak their language. The hegemonic logic of development and the Kanbur–Cernea type of internal critique are therefore both impoverished; impoverished in the sense that they both fail to attend to that which remains *unseen/unspoken* in a fundamental sense.

Thus, in the hegemonic logic of development and in the purported critique of the hegemonic, the same fate awaits world of the third, which, like class, stands foreclosed via the foregrounding of third world. The re-representation of world of the third as a devalued–retrograde–backward third world in the hegemonic register of development means that any subsequent policy regime
regarding that space and the people therein is produced with reference to ‘third world as lacking other’. Resulting from this process of foregrounding of the third world, world of the third as the outside of the circuits of global capital disappears from the discursive terrain. Any policy regime operating in the setting of foregrounding–foreclosure is then, by definition, not an innocent or apolitical exercise of do-goodism. Instead, it comprises a distinct array of practices that enables the positioning of world of the third as devalued third world. Insofar as operating within the hegemonic register of development is concerned, the primacy and centrality of capital and West/modernity that underwrites in turn the foreclosure of class and world of the third is embedded within the policy regime and the underlying efficiency measure it uses.

To make sense of the process of foreclosure of world of the third through the paradoxical foregrounding of third world, we draw attention to recent events pertaining to dislocation in India and China. One aspect, which functions with great force in these unfolding events, is the clashing opinion between different groups regarding what should be counted as the costs and benefits following the proposed dislocation. For one, the nature of clashing opinions can be gauged by the palpable differences in the varied efficiency calculi that different groups are proposing. It is not surprising then that this conflict stretches into the proposed understanding of compensation and resettlement too. Take an example. The ‘reformist–managerial’ approach will account for land in terms of productivity, and any gains and losses will be attributed to private individuals à la its accepted domain of private property. However, for those in so-called ‘third world’ societies, land may not simply be a matter of productivity; land may not just be private property. Additionally or otherwise, land may be part of the cultural repository of the community (community understood as a being-in-common; Luc-Nancy 1991) that emerges in intimate imbrications with land. (The community as being-in-common is born out of its relation with land. The community is attached to land. Hence land is not just a resource.) Land could also be part of political positionings. It could additionally be tied up with unique understandings of nature. Numerous studies point to such a social embracing of land (and water) beyond the measure of productivity or mentality of private property that are so fundamental in the formation of mainstream conceptions of land and now water (Shiva 1991, 1994). In the mainstream accounting, even if a dissenting understanding of land (and water) is recognized, it is immediately associated with a dismissal of such a mindset as symbolizing third world-ism, as being retrograde. This devaluation, which in turn is really a dismissal of other forms of life, reinstates the legitimacy of imposing the conception of land in line with its proposition, as essentially private property whose value must be measured in terms of productivity. Through this foregrounding of the modernist conception of land, a conception moored to legal private ownership of land, the other conceptions of land are sent into the background. This epistemic violence in favour of the mainstream conception of land finds favour in the policy regime of the day, even as the otherwise complex
reality reveals diverse conceptions of land and, accordingly, different efficiency calculi working against one another, in the process creating a conflicting perspective on land and hence on its loss/compensation. Seen from the plane of the horizontality of differences – differences on meanings of land – this is not at all surprising. However, the complex temporality-verticality produces a step-ladder hierarchy out of the different conceptions of land: the conception of the legal and private ownership of land is valorized over other extant conceptions as also over conceptions of land thriving in and shaping world of the third societies.

Further, world of the third as embodying forms of life outside the circuits of global capital has relations fundamentally different from those within the circuits of global capital. It is quite possible that, in world of the third, labour power is not a commodity in the sense that it is commodity within the circuits of global capital. It is quite possible that land is not an object of legal private ownership; water is surely not an object of ownership, at least not in the modernist sense. In fact, in world of the third societies, water is usually shared, grazing land is definitely shared, and even surplus produce may be collectively shared. So are the hills and the mountains, the forests and the resources residing deep inside the land. Most importantly, world of the third has a form of life different from that within the circuits of global capital; and when dislocation hits world of the third, it does not just dispossess them of land (which is the mainstream and also the commonsense understanding). It has to endure a ‘loss of concepts’, a ‘loss of events’, a ‘loss of mental states’ and at least a ‘threatened loss of identity’ (Lear 2007: 295–98).

Instead of accounting for these complexities and divergences that are certainly components of an unfolding heterogeneous ‘reality’, what we often observe is an attempt to pass over, demote or simply deny the existence of other efficiency calculi referring to distinctly different calculations of cost–benefit in favour of that proposed under the warped thesis of the consensus that follows the hegemonic development logic. This is indeed a classic case of relative efficiency trying to project itself as an absolute measure so as to validate the consensus in a socially and ethically neutral sense. History does not unfold as a simple teleology; it is also not driven by any scientific given. It is certainly also the result of a socio-political construction that is, at times, facilitated through explicit violence backed up by an array of ideological exercises to legitimize as universal one set of efficiency, cost–benefit and well-being as against others. Their appearance under the garb of absolutism, scientism and naturalism enable, in combination with other factors, the production of the social in a direction that ensures the victory of some groups over others, ensures the benefits of the victory to some at the cost of losses to others (here world of the third). Such dominance and wealth status of particular groups is certainly reflective of which type of efficiency calculi acquires hegemony at a historical juncture. It has been so during colonization and we do not see why it is any different under the era of capitalist development and in SEZs that is currently unfolding.
Segmentation, determinism and third world-ism in the reformist–managerial approach

How do we make sense of the following frustration of Cernea:

Unfortunately, mainstream economic theorists do not revisit the thinking upon which loss evaluation and compensation are based and impoverishment effects are allowed to continue. … I brought up the economic inconsistencies in dealing with resettlement explicitly to the attention of my colleague economists … There has been little response from economic quarters so far. The same methodologies continue to reign by inertia and cognitive dissonance, despite the feedback from practice.

Cernea (2003: 27)

If Cernea had precisely located and compared the difference at the level of methodology, then he would have reconciled himself to the fact that the cognitive dissonance of mainstream economics is by virtue of its adopted methodology, which works by reducing reality and its explanations (and policy based on such explanations) to the causal influence of one or a few chosen processes. No kind of revisiting as Cernea is suggesting in the above-mentioned problems is possible except by giving up the methodology of the deterministic structure of causality itself. This would mean giving up the mainstream economics framework and indeed the idea of development, founded on that framework. It would mean giving upon the system of thought that works in and through the complex temporality–verticality. Cernea, with his socio-economic approach that seeks to combine economic with non-economic processes, is suggesting a move in favour of a non-determinist methodology. However, instead of taking the methodological journey to its logical conclusion – conclusion of non-determinism – Cernea ends up shifting towards a middle ground. The result is a peculiar brand of determinism that comes to inflect his IRR approach, leading in turn to a fresh set of problems.

To begin with, contrary to his implied non-determinism in the socio-economic approach, a streak of determinism comes to inflect Cernea with respect to his acceptance of the mainstream idea of development. Cernea glosses over the point that, like compensation, development too is a concept that remains bound by a determinist structure of causality. Such an idea of development is as much a product of the determinist methodology of mainstream economics as compensation is. In the mainstream approach, development is reducible to growth; growth is reducible to expanding capitalism; and the form of capitalist class enterprises is reducible to industrialization. In this approach, the growth of Southern societies is measured in terms of monetized activities. Such a measure is put in place in a scenario of the moralistic (d)evaluation of the South, South as a repository of the pathological ‘third world’, ‘third world’ as the repository of backwardness; where such evaluation is done in terms of a ‘modern’ ‘capitalist economy’, with ‘modern’ and ‘capitalist’ as
essentialized in terms of a telos of ‘progress’ that the ‘third world’ is supposed to follow. As we have explored in Chapter 2, the deterministic structure of causality is deeply ingrained in the manner in which development is defined and practised. Moreover, as we have explained, the concept of efficiency is marred by absolutism that is nevertheless the driving force of accepting or rejecting development projects, a determinist evaluation that Cernea, by virtue of his commitment to development logic, does not question. His critique of the cost–benefit approach with respect to the treatment of restitution in ‘economics of compensation’ falters and flies against his quite unwitting but nevertheless unquestioned acceptance of the so-called scientific measure motoring the choice of development projects.

It can be claimed that, even if Cernea finds economic inconsistencies in the methodology of mainstream economics for its treatment of dislocation, there is actually no inconsistency in mainstream economics’ treatment of development and that of compensation as a mode of restitution. It follows economic determinism in both. What Cernea observes as the cognitive dissonance of mainstream economics can be turned against Cernea, as his refusal to question the underlying determinism of development cannot but be identified as an equally strong case of dissonance. Questioning the methodology of mainstream economics in terms of an alternative non-determinist methodology that sees each process and relationship as effects of overdetermined and contradictory processes must logically extend the ambit of questioning into the capitalocentric–orientalist idea of development, from where dislocation and compensation is seen as a side-effect, in a manner whereby dislocation is to be seen as de-linked from development. In other words, Cernea refuses to question the source of dislocation, a source that remains grounded on the determinisms of modernity and capital.

Furthermore, Cernea’s IRR approach and his contribution in terms of forwarding a conception of resettlement remains unabashedly locked within a deterministic methodology. The significance of this determinism that we tease out is simple but profound. First, the IRR approach cannot satisfy the self-proclaimed policy goal of ‘improving or at least restoring re-settlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’. Second, the mentioned policy goal itself is moot. That is, Cernea’s criticism against the broken and incapacitated policy means of ‘economics of compensation’ applies to his IRR approach as well, and his framework is fatally flawed because the goal that he sets is misplaced. Let us explore.

‘Improvement’ or ‘at least restoring’ means that the two situations – before and after dislocation – must be identified and compared, which in turn would require reducing the overdetermined and contradictory reality into a few major indicators in order to make this comparison. As explained in Chapter 3, in the IRR approach, the indicators are set in terms of identified risks. These risks appear as segmented from one another and reconstruction involves replacement – land for land, job for job and so on (Dwivedi 2002). The point is to ensure replacements, piece for piece, before the event occurs.
One then has a way of comparing whether improvement or restoration has taken place at all or not.

Now recall, the policy claim as set by Cernea stands for ‘improving or at least restoring re-settlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’. Doesn’t the set goal smack of economism? Indeed, an argument can be made on that front. One may ponder as to whether income and livelihoods are seen simply in economic terms. If income improvement or restoration is the goal, then why take this detour through the IRR approach or through the World Bank’s elaborate testament. We would do better here to expand on the ‘economics of compensation’ along the lines suggested by Kanbur and ensure that people are not worse off. In fact, alongside IRR, Cernea does emphasize the need for compensation and that is probably flowing from the mentioned income concern. But, given his attempt to move away from economism including income centristm, an exclusive focus on income cannot be and is not the crux of his method or argument. His focus is on livelihood or, its reduced form, economic livelihood.

They (the dislocated) surrender not just any non-essential, indifferent good. They surrender the economic foundation of their existence. It is this economic foundation that must be reconstructed.

Cernea (2007: 1038)

Is the foundation of livelihood reducible to the economic? Is reconstruction of livelihood only an economic affair? Isn’t livelihood overdetermined by numerous processes, economic and non-economic? Should the issue of livelihood be reduced to a few risk indicators or should it be seen in the context of the production of social life? If the former, how then are we to make sense of Cernea’s claims that ‘displaced people lose natural capital, man-made capital, human capital and social capital’, which suggests a move towards the socio-economic reconstruction of livelihood rather than its reduction to economic reconstruction? Indeed, it is not clear whether this emphasis on economic reconstruction is in sync with ‘re-establishing a sustainable socioeconomic basis for resettlers’ that Cernea (1997) had referred to earlier.

In the context of an overdetermined reality, far from being seen through a segmented lens, livelihood is constituted by economic and non-economic processes clustered into various relationships and practices, and as such cannot be located outside of social life. The reduction of reconstruction of forms of life to economic reconstruction and that too in terms of certain identified risks presents a methodological problem for Cernea, as his view of community as a social entity and his solution to dislocation in the form of recompensing economic livelihood seems contradictory. Is the risk of ‘social disarticulation or community breakdowns’ identified by Cernea real and, if so, why is it not part of livelihood reconstruction? If the risk of marginalization within different groups of resettlers following dislocation is important, how is it to be included within livelihood reconstruction? The reduction of reconstruction to economic reconstruction begs the question of why then
do we need a social approach in the first place to produce a theory of loss following dislocation.

Cernea may resist this slippage into economic determinism by saying that economic livelihood is constituted by non-economic factors. Reconstruction of economic livelihood would entail re-setting the needed non-economic conditions of existence to ‘improve or restore’ livelihood. After all, he also says, ‘enabling the rebirth of community institutions is paramount for successful resettlement and livelihood reconstruction’. Let us give Cernea the benefit of the doubt regarding the methodological dissonance (his somewhat divergent understanding of social life and that of recompensing loss) and his solution (which reduces loss to economic elements with a somewhat ambiguous position on social reality) with the kind of defence we have just suggested (we cannot find any other way to correct this dissonance). That is, taking economic livelihood as an overdetermined site of an infinite number of constitutive processes, let us ask whether the claims of ‘improvement’ or ‘restoration’ can be satisfactorily met by the IRR approach.

Dwivedi (2002) suggests that the problem with Cernea’s reconstruction thesis lies in the very worldview that looks at risks as segmented. He argues that compartmentalizing effects whereby the ‘risk variables are isolated from each other’ pose serious problems for reconstruction including its inability to account for the irreparable losses of communities, institutions, identities or practices. It fails to ‘distinguish risks that can be prevented from risks that require curative responses’ (Dwivedi 2002: 720). While, to his credit, Dwivedi reveals the existence of segmentation in the IRR approach that is indeed the hallmark of the ‘reformist–managerial’ community, he cannot explain its source, which as we are arguing here is a methodological issue. Its implication too needs to be stressed.

Segmented risks, by producing a representation of the socio-economic, are supposed to better capture the forms of life of dislocated people. It is precisely here that the problem can be located. Segmentation sidesteps the issue of the overdetermined reality of world of the third by, wittingly or unwittingly, reducing such reality to a few chosen disparate sources—the identified risks—taken as independent and autonomous of one another; segmentation implies the principle of exclusion. Moreover, the latter are chosen in terms of indicators that are teased out from within the given centralities of capital and modernity/West. In other words, the determinism of the segmented approach follows a capitalocentric–orientalist worldview.

For example, we have already seen that the segmented approach works with a certain meaning of land flowing from understandings of private property and productivity (which in turn is derived from the modern capitalist economy in which ownership, value and performance are understood in the above-mentioned sense). This foregrounding of a narrow economistic and ownership-driven meaning of land segmented from its other constituting effects and meanings in turn ‘puts aside’ (purloins) the cultural, political and nature-driven understandings that give shape to the connotation and significance of
land in world of the third societies. Even the idea of economic rent as an estimation of the value of resources in general and land in particular is based on the market principle, which is derived in the context of a modern capitalist economy. However, from world of the third perspective, loss of land may not just be loss of the means of production, but also a loss of shared environment; it could be the loss of a relation one had with the purportedly inanimate—here land. World of the third societies are not made up of disparate and segmented dwellings, lands, trees, lakes and people. It is instead the confluence or weaving of their effects that produces experiences, activities, practices, relationships, spiritualities, attitudes, customs, mores, habits and so on, which in turn provide content to that space. Accordingly, the principle of estimation and its subsequent valuation of land or resources in world of the third societies would need to be radically different.

The fundamental unity of creation was not simply a philosophical speculation for India; it was her life-object to realise this great harmony in feeling and in action … The water does not merely cleanse his limbs, but it purifies his heart; for it touches his soul. The earth does not merely hold his body, but it gladdens his mind; for its contact is more than a physical contact—it is a living presence. When a man does not realise his kinship with the world, he lives in a prison-house whose walls are alien to him. When he meets the external spirit in all objects, then is he emancipated for then he discovers the fullest significance of the world into which he is born; then he finds himself in perfect truth, and his harmony with the all is established. In India men are enjoined to be fully awake to the fact that they are in the closest relation to things around them, body and soul, and that they are to hail the morning sun, the flowing water, the fruitful earth, as the manifestation of the same living truth which hold them in its embrace.

Tagore (2004: 100–1)

The overdetermined reality of world of the third and the reality as conceptualized by the segmented approach are fundamentally different. If the segmented reality conjured up by IRR is far from the overdetermined reality of social life, how, if at all, can we make sense of the self-imposed policy goal of ‘improving or at least restoring re-settlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’? A weaker argument would say that we don’t have any one way to find out about ‘improvement’ (or ‘at least restoring’) as the two realities would indicate two different reference points with different markers for assessing ‘improvement’. Because meanings of improvement would fundamentally differ, the ‘improvement’ claimed by the IRR approach is always open to questioning. A stronger argument would state that, as far as reality is seen as overdetermined, it deeply problematizes the claim of ‘improvement’ or ‘restoration’. This is because, if placed within the overdetermined field, the segmented risks approach can in no way be seen as representative of social life. The identified risks (land, job, etc.) are within the overdetermined reality, and the latter comprises not only
the risks, but other processes as well. Moreover, rather than being segmented, these risks are in a state of mutual relationship with one another and other processes. To talk about getting rid of segmented risks in resettlement as indicative of improvement and restoration in no way translates into improvement and restoration of livelihood as such, if livelihood, existing and reconstructed, is to be seen as derived from the overdetermined reality. Consequently, the goal of ‘improvement’ or ‘restoration’ of livelihood in terms of the determinist methodology of segmentation is misplaced.

A similar criticism could be directed at the World Bank’s methodology of reconstruction, which builds on Cernea. While discussing the importance of the World Bank’s Operational Policy, Thomas (2002: 347) points out:

> That does not mean that the (World Bank) directive as an instrument is not without its inadequacies. The directive cannot address some of the more intangible issues of development. It cannot, for example, address what Downing refers to as the sense of relief resettled people get by visiting the shores of a lake that covers their former homes … However the directive would be a better instrument if it would address other important issues such as the mechanics of dispensing compensation to the resettlers with speed to ensure that no time vacuum exists from the time of movement, as delays would lead to their further impoverishment.

If we abide by the understanding of reality as overdetermined, any projected division between the material and non-material to account for the meaning of community and the forms of livelihood procreating within it is misplaced. Quite paradoxically, the inability to account for the non-material was one of the highlights of Cernea’s critique of ‘economics of compensation’. The relief that people get in visiting a waterfront or even the shores of an old dried-out lake is part of the meaning that the community, albeit disaggregated and decentralised, derives for itself. The meaning of ‘relief’ is importantly constituted by (and in turn constitutes) how and where people work, what they understand by leisure and pleasure, how they use water and conserve (or do not conserve) the lake, who is allowed or disallowed to draw water, etc. To talk of development of the community in any theory of resettlement would require accounting for all the effects in their constitutive relationship that together define and sustain the shared environment of world of the third, which clearly cannot possibly be counted, let alone used to compare pre- and post-dislocation periods. It is not a question of the lake being filled up, but that of the dislocation of forms of life, of structural dispositions, of subjectivities–relationships, of ethical standards and even of aesthetic experiences, all of which a waterfront, in numerous ways and in conjunction with equally numerous processes, helps to shape.

The World Bank’s, Thomas’ and Cernea’s segmented approach reveals the paucity of their understanding of world of the third (or of any reality) that they are trying to reconstruct. How to seek a comparison of the livelihoods in two different situations if the overdetermined reality of world of the third and
of what the ‘reformist–managerial’ community understands as reality differs? Here, the question is not whether dislocation should or should not happen or whether persons are happier or not before and after dislocation. Our claim is that not only is the policy means of Cernea’s IRR approach flawed, even the policy goal of ‘improving or at least restoring re-settlers’ prior livelihoods and incomes’ remains moot. The first point referring to policy implies that ‘livelihood’ may well have to be reconstructed following dislocation, but the question is still left hanging as to whether the issue is one of economic reconstruction or social reconstruction. The IRR approach is problematical not because the reconstruction index is an approximation. The deeper problem is that its segmented understanding of what is to be reconstructed (economic reconstruction) stands in contradiction to its self-proclaimed definition of reality as consisting of mutually constitutive social processes. The second point captures the inability of policy measures to say with any authority whether the reconstructed livelihood is better or worse. That is, even when contemplating reconstruction of the dislocated, the goals of comparing the pre- and post-dislocation situations need to be attended to carefully. If reality is overdetermined, then the two states, I and II, would present two non-reducible realities. That is what adopting a non-deterministic approach entails.

To summarize, we identify three problems in both the ‘economics of compensation’ and in the so-called Kanbur–Cerneea critique of it. First, none of the approaches questions the logic of development; none questions the capitalocentric–orientalism that drives the imagination of development. Second, both approaches are determinist in methodology; both approaches are steeped in a certain economism, one openly and the other somewhat surreptitiously. We suggest overdetermination as methodology instead. However, overdetermination is not a cosy plurality of the economic, the political, the cultural and the natural. Overdetermination is not just disaggregation and decentring either. Methodologically, overdetermination is also tied to an awareness of the unseen/unspoken within the infinite – ‘unseen the threads are knit together’, and ‘an infinite combination grows’. This is important because the hegemonic rendition of reality does not offer a transparent ‘menu’, however infinite the range, from which one could pick and choose one’s preferred ‘starter’. The hegemonic rendition sees to it that there are some hidden/unseen menus, such that the menu is in actuality always already finite. Possibly such hidden/unseen menus are more nutritious; perhaps such hidden/unseen menus are actually good for the overall health of world of the third. The choice of entry point is therefore never simple or innocent. It is not that one is simply choosing ‘efficiency’ as a marker, while the other is choosing ‘exploitation’. Missing out on hidden/unseen menus could mark choice; just as it marks it in the case of Kanbur–Cerneea. Choice could also be marked by an attention to hidden menus, to the hidden/unseen among infinite possibilities. Hence the notion of a touchy entry point as against a simple entry point. A simple entry point is an entry point chosen from among given menus. A touchy entry point is an entry point marked through attention to
hidden/unseen menus. Resnick and Wolff (1987), by rethinking the economy from the entry point of class understood as surplus labour, have drawn attention to a touchy entry point; an entry point the hegemonic tries to hide; and consequently masks a rethinking of the economy; such a masking ends up transmuting the partial perspective of efficiency into the absolute measure. The third problem is the rendition of community that informs the Kanbur–Cernea centric critique. While one is sympathetic to Cernea’s attempt to think of development in relation to community participation, we remain weary of his rendition of community. For us, community is not a given abstract ideal or a will to essence; for us, community is always already in a process of becoming such that the community is a contingent being-in-common subjectively produced; and as community as an emergent being-in-common is subjectively produced, the question of subjectivity is also important in our work. The question of subjectivity is crucial in our work because we situate the subject between the top-down approach of development and ‘the contingent picture of development’ to be creatively imagined by subjects in their respective solitude and also in the solidarity of ‘subjects being-in-common’ or perhaps in their ‘being subjects-in-common’.

Perhaps it is not simply the question of subjectivity that is important to us; it is a particular notion of subjectivity that is important to us for a rethinking of development–dislocation. Our particular notion of subjectivity is crucial because the ‘reformist–managerial’ adherents comfortably speak (of) subjectivity these days. However, the language of subjectivity they speak is fundamentally different from the language of subjectivity we speak. The situation is somewhat similar to the question we face in the context of the economy. The ‘reformist–managerial’ approach also speaks of the economy; but the language of the economy they speak is fundamentally different from the language of the economy we speak. Ours is marked by the touchy entry point of class (and radical need); theirs is stripped of any allusion to class. The situation is similar in the context of subjectivity. Our understanding of subjectivity is marked by Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) rendition of overdetermination (and also by Quinian underdetermination and the Freudian unconscious), whereas their understanding is marked by a ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’ idea of the ‘[hu]man’, the human as a transparent and rational ‘subject’ whose unity is ensured or crowned by consciousness (Althusser 1996: 114). Hence, the question of subjectivity is crucial to us in two senses – one, the concept of subjectivity that we think needs to inform development thought and, two, the empirical particular of subjectivity need to be contested. For example, for us, world of the third subjectivity is not ‘victim subjectivity’; instead, it is subjectivity outside the circuits of global capital; where outsided-ness is a crucial resource for re-imagining development.

**Third world-izing the subject in the name of resettlement**

In his segmented approach, Cernea’s view of land is typical of a capitalocentric–orientalist worldview that regards land in terms of property, productivity and
market. As we have already explored, land like water may be very much part of cultural formations, of political positionings and with ties to unique understandings of nature. It is not surprising then that the type of subjectivity that flourishes in world of the third may be fundamentally different from the one that flourishes within the circuits of global capital, a difference that is not particularly accounted for by Cernea and the World Bank.

Cernea and the World Bank would refer to a largely modernist type of subjectivity harbouring a Baconian mindset; they refer to a type of subjectivity that has with land and water a relation of possession–ownership–productivity; in such a type of subjectivity, land and water are resources that are to be (ab)used, that are either extracted or ploughed. In world of the third societies, land and water may not be external to the subject; they could well be part of the life-world of the subject; the subject is in relation with land and water so as to form the ‘woman–nature–animal–machine’ continuum. Posing nature as closed off and segmented and as distant/detached from the subject, the subject’s relationship with nature becomes one of detachment, control and enslavement. This produces the subject’s rather imperial gaze, which sees nature through principles of penetration, mining, conquest and plunder. Implicit within the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach is then a modernist type of subjectivity harbouring a Baconian mindset that is structurally closed in its formulation and deployment. In the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, there is no place for any other subject position; there is no place for any dissenting subject position; there is no provision of accounting for the tumultuous passages of subjectivity formation; there is no acknowledgement of the possibility of unconscious and passionate attachments to land–water–trees–birds–animals, for structural dispositions that see life as intimately tied to nature. Hence, in the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, there is no provision for a subject to say no to resettlement despite all the provisions of benefit sharing and more. For example, the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach would not be in a position to explain movements that are not based on extracting compensation or resettlement, but one which says no, a straight and simple no to development itself. This was, for example, evident in Nandigram village in left-ruled West Bengal, India. In Nandigram, people rose up in revolt to say no to development; to say no to the state-sponsored attempt at clearing the way for the setting up of a chemical hub by a private capitalist enterprise that it tried to openly profess will take ‘backward’ Nandigram into modernity. This led to a bloody engagement between the camp of world of the third and that of the left-ruled state sponsoring the development policy of capitalist industrialization. Such movements make palpable the political nature of the development logic and how, far from its self-proclaimed scientific logic, it operates with instruments of repression and ideological production.

In contrast to this Baconian mindset, world of the third subjectivity would tend to see nature through ideas of nurture and care. Thus, it is no surprise to find many such societies dealing with land and water generally at the surface level (drawing water from rivers, ponds and ploughing land, keeping in mind
the fact that land is not a dead object or simply a means of production but something that is alive and that lives alongside humans) as against the penetrative attitude that marks subjectivity within the circuits of global capital (where water is extracted through deep bores within earth, where land is dug deep as part of mining exercises). Our case study of Plachimada in Chapter 8 makes amply clear the conflicting subject dispositions. Technologies adopted within the circuits of global capital too are conducive for such kinds of (ab) use of water and land. In contrast, even when varied ethico-political positions within world of the third societies thrive, leading to social struggles over elements of nature concerning land and water (which could at times take problematic proportions), the worldview founded on embracing and protecting the shared environment remains a powerful if not the dominant theme in the procreation of social life.

Suppose, following the refusal of the subject to think of any other economic livelihood outside the current form of life, her position reflected a different ethico-political outlook that refused to substitute her form of life and move. The subject would be willing to change, that is develop her form of life, but not substitute it. Her lived version of well-being and happiness would be different, say much more holistic, balanced, caring and responsible, from the simple measures and pleasures of more, especially of income, that the modern capitalist mindset would embrace. Say she finds comfort in the philosophical faith espoused by Tagore,

... the mere process of addition did not create fulfilment; that mere size of acquisition did not produce happiness; that greater velocity of movement did not necessarily constitute progress, and that change could only have meaning in relation to some clear ideal of completeness.

Tagore (2006: 36–37)

This subject embraces development of a different kind that is grounded on an ethico-political attitude emanating from her overdetermined and contradictory space of world of the third. What then about the counter-hegemonic subject who refuses to be drawn into the logic of development and wants to have nothing to do with it? What about the logic of development that refuses to concede a place for such a subject and would rather see her resistance through the lens of a top-down approach? Is it then surprising to find the hegemonic dub the subject as ‘evil’? For such counter-hegemonic subjects, dislocation is not about compensation or resettlement, but instead concerns the development logic that in turn is interrogated with a possibility of its rejection. This means that any proposed theory of resettlement must internalize the moment of critical interrogation and rejection within its formulation. Kanbur–Cernea’s approach with their third world-ist moorings attempts to evacuate any prospect of opposition to development logic by trying to keep at bay the possible ‘irruption’ of the evil; instead, their method enables the hegemonic to control and manage world of the third through third world-
ism – where third world-ism is the reduction of a *horizontality* and a relation of *difference* (the horizontality of the camp of global capital and the camp of world of the third, with world of third as the *difference* of the camp of global capital) to a *verticality* (the *verticality* of capital and *pre*-capital, with third world as *pre*-capital). Their approach can thus be seen as part of the hegemonic effort to foreclose world of the third by disallowing world of the third subjectivity ever to hit the discursive terrain. While need-based discourse may very well be liberating in the hegemonic account, the buzzwords the eavesdropper hears and sees in the corridors and texts of development institutions such as the World Bank are security, control and social harmony, and the unending fear and anxiety of the marching footsteps of Gandhi’s world of the third.

**Community as a substitute signifier**

Community is a contentious category that has been debated intensely over the years. One can identify three received positions with respect to community. First, there are those including many post-developmentalist adhering to the ‘radical–movementist’ approach who have treated community as pristine, wholesome, moored to nature and, in the process, have imputed positive value to community. Second, there are the hardliners within the ‘reformist–managerial community’ who not only question the existence of such a pristine community, but also contest any reference to community as valuable. Third, exponents such as Cernea within the ‘reformist–managerial’ community have sidestepped the viewing of community as either good or evil. Despite its declared diversity, the third approach still treats community as positive because of its perceived ability through social networking to provide risk coverage of various kinds against unpredictability and contingencies securing along the way a stable environment to sustain the development process. Notwithstanding their differences, we can identify two similarities among these positions. They tend to treat community as: (i) a congealed mass in a society with low income and elementary livelihood; and (ii) an ethical instantiation of the good, the harmful or the valuable. While these positions on community have their respective strengths and weaknesses, we do not subscribe to them. Our focus, however, remains the ‘managerial–reformist’ approach in the context of dislocation.

In the ‘managerial–reformist’ approach, ‘community’ is treated more as a social organization that is outside the realm of capitalist economy; as if the community does not harbour economic processes of any real value; as if the community is a repository of hierarchies (that is of political processes, processes pertaining to the command-based organization of power) and of superstitions (that is of cultural processes, processes pertaining to the conservative organization of meaning). Reiterating thus the centrism of the modern capitalist economy, the projected devaluation helps to situate community, once again, into the language and domain of third world-ism. Rather than being
theorized as a possibility outside the grip of third world-ism, the category of community is created, positioned and deployed as part of an instrumentalist rationality to facilitate the working of the development logic.

Not surprisingly, community remains a metaphor of extreme poverty and vulnerability. Thus, in the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, community symbolizes a local space that has the characteristics of low income, poverty, risk proneness and at times backward structures that is vulnerable and with given valuation. It is projected as a lacking underside of the mainstream real economy qua capitalism. As a surviving economy, the community is seen, at best, as a weak, defenceless, fledgling but nevertheless useful entity that needs protection from outside in order to survive. Such an idea of community is sponsored, supported and worked upon by the World Bank and other international agencies, state agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The community is positioned as facing threat from internal and external forces. Internal threats are, as if, constitutive of community. It is believed that the crisis within community, such as that epitomized through ‘tragedy of the commons’, is internally produced, a situation in which the community subjects through their own actions (such as overuse/misuse of the commons) produce its structural breakdown. Paradoxically, such an understanding of crisis within community presumes a certain kind of ‘rational’ mindset (moored to a modernist understanding of the subject) that is self-seeking and is maximizing self-interest at the expense of others. Another internal threat, as explored in Chapter 2, is the obdurate presence of mass structural poverty stemming from the backward structures of such communities. The production of such threats is of course again conceptualized from the perspective of the modern capitalist economy. These and many other kinds of threats seen as arising from irrational subject behaviour and backward structures are positioned as further markers of third world-ism.

The second set of threats is seen as externally produced, arising principally from the development agenda (dislocation, environmental degradation and so on). This should have demanded a turn towards an enquiry of the development agenda itself which, of course, the World Bank and Cernea diligently avoid.

But then this is the point.

Positioning on ‘third world’ as vulnerable and susceptible communities (internally and externally) makes it conducive for the poverty management exercise to proceed undeterred. The reiteration of the image of communities lacking in resources–energy–imagination (where the ‘lacking community’ is yet another expression of third world-ism) generates the belief (sometimes even among members of such societies) that they are third world-ish, that they are the ‘third world poor’; whereby the people there and elsewhere learn to see and do things in terms of this artificially procured space called ‘third world’. The goal is to enable a passage from the existing state of world of the third – world of the third as the outside of the circuits of global capital – to third world – third world as dependent on the development paradigm for redemption and rescue. Through an array of discursive practices founded on the coupling of the
categories ‘community and poverty’ which foregrounds the hegemonic set of needs, development institutions try to instil themselves as the benevolent outsider, and in turn make development a discourse of benevolence for the ‘victim’.

From a world of the third Marxian perspective, the idea of community as a substitute signifier of third world-liness is problematical. Far from getting us away from the capitalocentric–orientalist paradigm, the category of community moves us yet again into that terrain. It was the category of world of the third that drew a sharp epistemological break from third world-ism and in the process instituted a departure from that paradigm. In addition, as explicated, world of the third is neither definitionally a signboard of backwardness measured by income nor does it have any inherent positive ‘value’. As an open-ended space, world of the third refers to the lived reality outside the circuits of (global) capital that is marked by clusters of overdetermined and contradictory class and non-class processes and also by varied ethico-political positions.

But then what do we mean by the term community? We would like to stress that community is not there; it is not out there; it is not some thing that is always already out there; something that can be protected or preserved. Following Jean Luc-Nancy (1991),

... provided we remain open to all the re-elaborations and all the theoretical and practical rethinking that might be necessary, the political is indissociable from something that the word ‘communism’ has expressed all too poorly, even as it remains the only word to point towards it, albeit very obscurely, very confusedly ... the political is the place where community as such is brought into play ... the political [is] the place of community ... the place of a specific existence ... the existence of being-in-common, which gives rise to the existence of being-self ... we are brought into the world ... according to a dimension of ‘in-common’ that is no way ‘added onto’ the dimension of ‘being-self’ but that is rather co-originary and coextensive with it. But this does not mean that the ‘common’ is a substance uniformly laid out ‘under’ supposed ‘individuals,’ nor is it uniformly shared out among everyone like a particular ingredient. No: this means that the mode of existence of existence and appropriation of a ‘self’ is the mode of an exposition in common and to the in-common, and that this exposes the self even in its ‘in itself,’ in its ‘ipseity,’ and in its own distinctiveness, in its isolation or in its solitude.

Rather than a given entity, community as the being-in-common is in process; being-in-common is a process of work; it is a work of ethical–aesthetic creation. In this sense, the political is also the place where community as such is brought into play; the political is the place of the community, of the emergent being-in-common; or to put it differently, the community or being-in-common is the place of the political. Community as the political of working towards a being-in-common is what our world of the third Marxist ethico-justice standpoint would embrace.
In other approaches, community has been viewed as a pre-given thing (nation, party, working class, family, etc.). Community as a representation of third world is another such thing. In whatever form it is imagined, it remains the case that people are assigned to belong to communities; people belong to this community or that by virtue of being members; they are grouped into populations of communities. The imagined community is more of a formal and an abstract association, which can however acquire the status of reality in the minds of the subjects. To produce this transmutation of the formal and abstract into a real entity in the minds of individuals – which is to hook up subjects in a relation with certain kinds of signifiers – is precisely the task of the hegemonic. As and when such kinds of interpellation fail, the relationship of subjects to the particular community snaps and what was the imagined community goes into a state of crisis as often happens.

In a community where the association of the subject to it is pre-assigned and taken as given, there is no process, no work in relation to the creation of the ‘common’ in the community. In the event, it necessarily loses the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it. Here, community never becomes the site for subjects to sit face to face in an open-ended engagement, for relationships to be creatively formed and for collective decision and action to emerge with reference to social life. Instead, in its passive existence where the subjects of community are objectified into this or that, the decisions or actions concerning social life are estranged from the people and transferred to the whole – the community – and by default the experts or vanguards who are positioned as most equipped to deal with the problems of the community. Such a concept of community guarantees, as is the case with Cernea and the World Bank, the reduction of the political to the management of power and to the power of management.

**Investment finance for resettlement: why does class matter?**

The World Bank has been announcing for over a decade now that those affected by the development project should share the benefit of the project. Why doesn’t it happen? Why, as Cernea (2007) argues, is investment finance for resettlement in general not included as yet in the development agenda?

One thing needs to be stated clearly. Whether the matter is monetary compensation or investment finance for development through economic rent or benefit-sharing, the question of redistribution of existing wealth (from the supposed beneficiaries of the project to the losers) persists and, in that context, the problem seems to reside in the impediment to such kinds of redistribution. We are not simply referring here to the probable problems emanating from implementation of the process of redistribution but, also fundamentally, whether such redistribution is at all justified and feasible. As Cernea points out, ‘the counter argument to making investments in addition to compensation for resettlers’ benefits typically invokes the scarcity of
resources and competing demands’ (Cernea 2003: 41). While it is partly true that the nature of funds disbursement will depend a lot on the available resources (that is why resettlement remains a more difficult issue for ‘developing’ countries), Cernea argues that such redistribution is justified on grounds of economic rent and net benefits derived from the project itself (as explained in Chapter 3). It is then a matter of how the existing wealth and future wealth flow is prioritized and how far its use is justified. This is reflective of an ethico-political question in terms of which the issue of distribution in general and development justice in particular needs to be addressed, a point touched on but not seriously analysed by Cernea. That is, Cernea’s IRR framework would consider ‘investment finance for development’ as a means for poverty alleviation of the dislocated without internalizing within that frame the effects of distributional struggles that are almost always likely to affect the outcome of investment finance.

Our Marxian analysis would stress that the problem of the non-inclusion of the principle of investment is due to distributional considerations that can be explained through effects stemming from the overdetermined and contradictory relationships between class and non-class processes. Moreover, as we shall explain, the distributional processes form important relations with processes in production, specifically the modes of appropriation, which is prised open in the following analysis. This will highlight once again the importance of treating the issue of dislocation and its remedy in the intersecting space of class and need.

Let the total surplus produced in an economy prior to dislocation be:

$$\text{Surplus before resettlement need} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} SV^1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i \\
+ \left\{ SV^2 = SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k \right\} \right. \tag{5.1}$$

Part of the surplus value $SV^1$ is used to make subsumed payments $SC$, which exhausts in production surplus, while the other part $SV^2$ is disbursed for various needs, which exhausts in social surplus. Let this be the situation prior to dislocation.

Now, consider a society ‘A’ positioned to be dislocated due to a development project, say to build an industrial platform. And, let us accept that, as part of Cernea’s goal of resettlement with development, some of the existing surplus funds need to be ‘invested’ for resettlement purposes, which have to be introduced in the planning of the development project itself. As this payment is on account of resettlement due to dislocation, it fulfils no conditions of existence for any class enterprise and thus qualifies as social surplus. Let $SS_R$ be the component of social surplus needed to satisfy the proposed resettlement need, $R$. This $SS_R$ constitutes need payment following dislocation and comprises the portion of social surplus distribution over assigned distributions for other need purposes including that for monetary compensation.
To keep the analysis simple, suppose that (i) total surplus remains constant and (ii) social surplus (SS_k) directed towards other needs does not change. That is, we abstract away from the hypothetical economic rent or future benefit from projects (which will make the total surplus variable), and concentrate on the current distributional aspects to highlight the issue. Later on, we will even drop these assumptions and allow the revenue stream to vary. This is to demonstrate that, no matter how the revenue–expenditure situation is presented, class processes play an important role.

**Situation 1: total surplus constant and social surplus towards other needs as unchanged**

Given SS and resulting from the required SSR, the required post-dislocation social surplus becomes:

\[ SV^{2R} = SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k + SSR \quad (5.2) \]

Clearly, after the extra investment funds needed for resettlement are made available, the post-dislocation social surplus (SV^{2R}) must be more than the pre-dislocation social surplus (SV^2):

\[ SV^{2R} > SV^2 \]

Given that the total appropriated surplus value remains the same and payment towards other needs is unchanged, this reconfiguration of surplus is possible through a reduction in the surplus value intended for subsumed class payments (SC) so that more funds could be released for social surplus. That is, with investment funds directed at resettlement, post-dislocation subsumed payment (SV^{1R}) must be less than pre-dislocation subsumed payment (SV^1).

\[ Given, \; SV^{1R} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i, \; SV^{1R} < SV^1 \; and \; SC_i < SC. \quad (5.3) \]

With (5.2) and (5.3), (5.1) gets modified into:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Surplus after resettlement need} &= \left\{ SV^{1R} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} SC_i \right\} < \left\{ SV^1 = SC \right\} \\
&+ \left\{ SV^{2R} = SS \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k + SSR \right\} > \left\{ SV^2 = SS = \sum_{k=1}^{m} SS_k \right\} \\
&\quad (5.4)
\end{align*}
\]

The distributive logic now becomes clear. Investment funds needed for resettlement must be part of the surplus value that was previously intended as subsumed class payments. This affects two groups of people.
First, if they are asked to part with the required investment fund needed for resettlement, the appropriators of surplus value would have to forgo an additional portion of the appropriated surplus value leaving less under their control to distribute as subsumed payments. That is, they would be left with less of the discretionary funds that they can distribute from their point of appropriation to agents who participate in processes that provide various conditions of existence to the enterprise. Because they will have less leverage over funds to be distributed as subsumed payments and hence less control over the enterprise and also over the current and future contradictory effects that may originate within it, the appropriators may resist such redistribution. This is especially the case with exploitative forms of appropriation (such as the case with capitalist enterprises) involving a small exclusive group lording over the discretionary wealth. By virtue of being largely disconnected from the broader community of people and also their needs, these exploiters would be resistant to giving away funds for the purpose of community-based development which resettlement attempts to seek. With the right of appropriation secured through and within the frame of ‘property rights’ legitimized in turn by the hegemonic discourse of capitalism and guaranteed by laws, no structural mechanism exists that can pressurize and channelize the funds from the point of appropriation towards purposes considered socially desirable. In this case, one would require the intervention of outside agencies such as the state (through taxation), which immediately places these exploitative enterprises and state agencies into, at best, a suspicious relationship and, at worst, a potential situation of conflict. Because the state is seen as encroaching and violating the socially acceptable right of appropriators to exploit, which is in principle acceptable even to the state, it makes the intervention of the state in this regard that much more difficult, at the level of both legitimization and practice. Moreover, in a scenario where capital uses its mobility as a threat, the state remains under constant pressure. This is so partly by virtue of the fact that, if taxed, capital can threaten to move away from the region and because this state intervention would be seen as a violation of the principle of ‘private property’ which sanctifies and sanctions the appropriation of wealth.

From the perspective of the capitalists, such states would face negative ratings concerning investment decisions.

The second group of people who would be disturbed by this redistribution comprises the subsumed class agents. The subsumed class holders would include the merchants, banks, managers, shareholders and so on. Even workers who receive perks and bonuses above their necessary labour equivalent could find their existing benefits under threat. If the state takes responsibility for investment finance for resettlement (which could be delegated to NGOs as well), then, in addition to the existing surplus component received as tax, it will now have to generate the additional revenue through a redistribution of surplus from the other subsumed agents towards itself. On the other hand, if the responsibility falls on corporations (or generally on class enterprises), then the existing subsumed revenues received by the agents (internal agents such as managers or
external agents such as shareholders or bankers) attached to the corporations will come under threat as a part of the surplus leaks out for resettlement purposes (on account of a movement from subsumed revenue to social surplus).

Interestingly, a particular component of investment finance could disrupt existing class processes and even open up an axis of class struggle between the dislocated people on one side and the appropriators and other subsumed class groups on the other side. Cernea’s recommendation of ‘equity sharing through co-ownership’ means that the dislocated people would take up subsumed class positions as direct receivers of surplus value on grounds of ownership. This immediately implies that the appropriators would have to contend with another node of surplus distribution. Other subsumed receivers of surplus value including existing shareholders would find their received surplus constrained by the outflow towards the dislocated. While some corporations have indeed taken the route of ‘equity sharing through co-ownership’, it has in general not found many takers for the reasons we have discussed.

Collecting our findings, the process of generating funds for investment finance could open up its own overdetermined and contradictory effects on class and non-class processes and potentially set off various types of struggles: between existing subsumed class agents as they see their revenues come under attack; between subsumed agents and the fundamental class appropriators of surplus value as the appropriated funds available for distribution to these agents fall; between the appropriators and the workers if the workers see their existing subsumed benefits fall; between the appropriators, subsumed agents, the workers on the one hand and the development agencies or social movements on the other. It is not altogether surprising to come across one or a combination of such struggles transpiring in connection with dislocation.

**Situation II: total surplus constant and social surplus towards other needs as variable**

To catch a glimpse of effects and struggles other than the above-mentioned ones, drop the assumption of a constant $SS_k$ (social surplus for other need purposes) and allow it to vary. This in turn would trigger further overdetermined and contradictory effects that may bring hitherto unaccounted effects into the scene of investment finance for resettlement. We may take a case where social surplus intended for resettlement need is planned through a reduction in social surplus currently intended for other need purposes such as for unemployment programmes, pension funds and so on, which might set off need-related struggles between various need claimants.

In addition, we should point out that a redistribution of wealth might open up need-based struggles within the dislocated community of people itself if they, individually or in groups, struggle to claim for themselves part of the social surplus in the event of funds being diverted for the purpose of resettlement need. Such struggles may potentially occur within the dislocated community.
of people whose need demands may diverge between groups cutting across caste, income, gender, race, etc.

**Situation III: total surplus variable and social surplus towards other needs as variable**

Let us now drop the assumption that total surplus will remain constant. After deducting for payments to workers and means of production, let its total volume increase. Suppose that this follows from gains in economic rents and profits that accrue to the project developers. In class accounting terms, this will show up as increased surplus value. Does this increase in discretionary wealth mean a healthier possibility of ensuring resettlement?

There is no doubt that higher surplus would be favourable for resettlement if certain conditions are met. First, it has to be ensured that the additional surplus is not exhausted into subsumed class payments, that is, it is not further distributed to agents associated with the class enterprises, say as increased dividend payments to the shareholders. In such a scenario, it could very well happen that the shareholders of the concerned enterprise may strike by using their financial power of selling the shares, thereby bringing down the value of the enterprise. Second, even if some part of the additional surplus leaks out as social surplus for need purposes, it has to be guaranteed that a component must be extracted towards the purpose of resettlement and not for other need expenditures. Thus, whether and how much of the additional surplus is made available for resettlement is a matter of intense distributional struggles – class struggle (over subsumed class payments) and need struggle (over the flow of social surplus to various need purposes). Trying to ensure the flow of additional surplus towards resettlement might even invite a class struggle over the modes of appropriation. Under exploitative modes of appropriation, particularly the private capitalist type, the appropriators remain disengaged from the community at large in terms of affective attachment (that is why they could exclude others with impunity to secure for themselves the entire wealth) and also in terms of physical proximity (they might be residing in some far away corporate headquarters, distant from the site of production). As a result, there is no inherent mechanism to divert a flow of surplus from the control of appropriators towards the pool of social surplus, specifically for the purpose of resettlement. If fulfilling the aspect of resettlement need or any other such need aspect is the immediate goal of policy and if the given modes of appropriation stand in opposition to its fulfilment, then they would very well have to be transformed towards, say, the communist or even the state capitalist types. For example, the attack on the private corporatist and even oligarchic production units that is evidently taking place in much of Latin America through a spate of nationalization and the rise of private cooperatives (with communist forms of appropriation) could be defended on the grounds that the state and larger community of people must control surplus for various distributional concerns targeted towards needs deemed as socially desirable. Funding
resettlement is therefore not just a question of ‘scarcity’, but also concerns who has possession of the surplus and its flows, and who receives them.

Indeed, if investment finance for resettlement is going to be the policy rule for conceiving any development project and if, as Cernea pointed out, the number and intensity of dislocations are only going to increase over time, then ensuring resettlement need can only be part of intense need-related conflicts taking place over the flow of social surplus. It would also be associated with diverse class struggles over the fundamental class process of appropriation of surplus and also its distribution and receipt as different agents find themselves reacting to overdetermined and contradictory effects stemming from the possibility of dislocation and resettlement.

Our Marxian analysis reveals that, following dislocations due to development projects, a substantial quantum of social surplus would be needed for resettlement and if applied will seriously affect those who had hitherto garnered the major share of the nation’s (and indeed the globe’s) wealth. With concentration of wealth qua surplus value principally in the hands of capitalist appropriators and subsumed players such as banks, merchants, shareholders and managers, resistance–reluctance to this investment finance scheme for need purposes such as resettlement is not at all surprising. These agents might part with their surplus out of altruism and at times they do so following their so-called corporate social responsibility. However, such voluntary disbursement can hardly be a rule (Stiglitz 2006), and such gifts cannot be counted upon as investment finance for resettlement. This is especially true in a modern capitalist economy that is supposed to function on the assumption of self-seeking ‘rationality’ of agents driven by utility maximization in an overwhelmingly competitive milieu. If investment finance requires a redistribution of surplus from fundamental and subsumed class agents, and if no mechanism or rule exists to guarantee it, then how the distribution is actually going to transpire for the purpose of investment finance will remain unanswered, as is evidently the case for Cernea and the World Bank. We have answered why it will continue to remain an unresolved issue unless it is seen as a political economy question that requires explicitly addressing the overdetermined and contradictory field of class- and need-related struggles.
Western Marxism and its theory of primitive accumulation

Limits and limitations

This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race.

Marx (1867 [1954])

In the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, dislocation is a mere technical issue that is de-linked from development logic; this in turn secures the de-politicization of the issue of dislocation. Such a demotion at times and sheer indifference at other times to the moment of violence is not something peculiar to development logic or its precursor in colonialism. Its root is roughly traceable to how the classical political economists tackled the issue of dislocation during the formative period of industrial capitalism in Europe.

In an extensive study, Perelman (2000, 2001) reveals how and why classical political economy foreclosed the ‘origin’ moment or the ‘pre-history’ of capitalism and foregrounded instead an ahistorical and a naturalized façade of capitalism. In such renditions, the brute force of history that brought into being capitalism was deemed necessary and inevitable. It was defended through a displacement of the issue of force into the domain of morality encapsulated in a war against the sloth, indolence and leisure of the peasants and artisans. The elements of force included separation of direct producers from means of production through enclosure and then enacting the privatization of commons. At other times, it took the form of colonialism or the institutionalization of a disciplinary matrix to set up conceptions of wage labour, shop floor discipline, etc. Marx (1970, 1973, 1990) presented a systematic analysis and critique of this phenomenon by invoking what has since come to be known as ‘primitive accumulation’. Marx’s point was simple. This dislocation is neither accidental nor inevitable. Marx formulated the category primitive accumulation to represent the socio-political dimension of dislocation in the context of the origin and formation of capitalism.

From a Marxian perspective, the erasure or the defence of violence telescoped in the constitution of capitalism continued from classical political economy to its modern incarnation in neo-classical economics. There is complete silence on this issue as far as hardcore mainstream economics is concerned and, in
the case of development discourse, the moment of violence in dislocation is displaced to and subsumed under a progressive logic of history. This turns the moment of dislocation into the liberating ground of some future gain. Not surprisingly, the current ‘reformist–managerial’ agenda of compensation and resettlement evacuates from the discursive terrain the decisive moment of force that initiates the act of ‘separation’. It gets lost in the cacophony of developmental progress that such a ‘separation’ is supposed to usher in. The evolution of capitalism, of its aleatory formation, disappears into the march towards what the mainstream development discourse beckons as a ‘paradise’ in waiting. The ethic of dislocation in mainstream discourses is analysed in terms of failures or inadequacies of compensation and resettlement. It hardly pertains to a question concerning the event and issue of dislocation per se, that is, the point of separation itself. In this way, the issue of dislocation is subordinated to the rather ubiquitous consensus on development. By displacing the central moment of force involved in dislocation, the discourses of compensation and resettlement end up erasing or, at best, subordinating the socio-political history of dislocation. In the process, the intimate association of the socio-political history of dislocation with the origin and formation of capitalism is erased. In this rendition, force is, as if, the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one; it is itself an economic power.

Marxian theory deploys the category primitive accumulation to highlight the close connection between dislocation and capitalism by showing how and why the socio-political history of dislocation fundamentally constitutes the origin of capitalism. Capitalism materializes within the overdetermination of structures-subjects pertaining to economy, authority, meaning and nature. One of the fundamental concepts used by Marx to trace the violent materiality of the origin of capitalism was primitive accumulation. It represents the role of violence in the social formation of varied conditions of existence of capital (e.g. commodity, private property, shop floor discipline, etc.), such that the direct producers are separated from their objective conditions of existence, including their means of production. This guarantees a face off between two groups – the capitalists with capital and the workers with no possession and nothing to sell except their labour power. Primitive accumulation ensures the origin of the capitalist organization of exploitation.

Unlike in the North, primitive accumulation has appeared in the South through the colonial and the development discourses within which the category third world has played a crucial role in legitimizing the logic of violence associated with primitive accumulation. A debate has erupted within Marxism regarding whether primitive accumulation should be seen as a determinist and a necessary moment of history or whether it should be read in a non-teleological way. While we sympathize with the latter for reasons we will explain, we are somewhat at unease with the terms of debate. Our disquiet stems from the fact that the original idea of primitive accumulation, even when displaced to a non-teleological terrain, remains somewhat Euro-centric. This reflects the inability of the literature to ground primitive accumulation in
the context of development generally and more specifically in the context of a (foregrounded) third world-ism and a (foreclosed) world of the third. The challenge then is to confront and reveal the specificity of primitive accumulation in the South, that is, in the form dislocation takes via the development logic.

Through our conceptualization of primitive accumulation, we demonstrate how modes of violence _qua_ dislocation are inalienably tied to the logic of development and how this development logic masks the adverse effects of the growth march of capitalism. Consequently, far from being a de-politicized moment, the event of dislocation telescoped under development logic is a part of the hegemonic move to foreclose the world of the third through the foregrounding of third world in order to allow the transition towards capitalism to proceed undeterred in the South; it is also to institute a ‘diachronic relegation of the other’ (here world of the third) to third world – third world as the ‘survived pre-history’ of a Western industrialized urban present; such diachronic relegation is premised on a ‘denial of coevalness’ – coevalness of the capitalist ethic-language and world of the third as a non-capitalist ethic-language (see Bunzl 2002: x).

One salutary characteristic of our Marxian theorization of primitive accumulation lies in its ability to capture within its framework the clashing opinions unfolding over the current forms of dislocation in India and elsewhere. Our theorization, on the one hand, explains the ‘reformist–managerial’ consideration of dislocation as a teleological movement of history that materializes by chopping, block by block, the devalued third world (and hence is progressive in the hegemonic development register). On the other hand, it also captures the ‘radical–movementist’ approach as situating dislocation in terms of an explicit mode of violence enacted over the world of the third (and hence is unethical and unjust).

We start by exploring the movement from the orthodox rendition of primitive accumulation to the current debate on primitive accumulation in which efforts are made, albeit in a somewhat Euro-centric orientation, to move the category beyond its determinist moorings. Incorporating the advances made in this debate, the next chapter will seek to posit a new reading in which class and world of the third are incorporated in the theorization of primitive accumulation. In the process, we shall explore how the varied insights emerging through this journey enrich our understanding regarding the questions and also the forms of dislocation.

**The current setting of primitive accumulation**

In recent times, primitive accumulation as a category has staged a comeback. It has been claimed in some quarters that the classical form of primitive accumulation transpiring in the West has been somewhat blunted by ‘passive revolution’ in the South, whereby capital has tended to operate by accommodating and not annihilating pre-capital (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003: Ch. 5; Moore 2004). It is argued that this was particularly true during the
Cold War when a host of factors such as Keynesianism and the welfare state, the deep-rooted strength of pre-capitalist elements, working class resistance following the rise of the Soviet Union and the independent course of the nationalist struggles contributed to creating this gridlock. Now, with the Soviet spectre gone, the welfare state under attack (although the effects of financial meltdown may freeze, reverse or even displace the process) and the Southern nation-states getting rapidly locked into the transnational project of ushering in capitalism, the fast unfolding neo-liberal project is once again opening the floodgate to decisively chart the course of primitive accumulation (Harvey 2004, 2006).

Following the evidence gathered from the dislocation literature, we are, however, far from convinced about any proposed break in the process of primitive accumulation. While the forms of primitive accumulation may have changed somewhat towards privatization of the commons under the neo-liberal regime, it was quite pervasive earlier as well with the state playing a central role (as it still does). Whether through domination of private capitalism or state capitalism, primitive accumulation remained operative all through. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in recent times the category of primitive accumulation has resurfaced quite strongly as a mode of explaining the operations of capitalism in the era of globalization. The theoretical renewal has exposed the phenomenon to a scrutiny not comparable since the time of Lenin and Luxemburg. As such, the basic question is not really the return of primitive accumulation to explain capitalism-induced dislocation, but of how it is made to return. In initiating this debate, the point of departure remains Marx’s rendition of primitive accumulation in Capital and Grundrisse. Let us start our discussion by situating Marx’s definition of primitive accumulation and how it was hitherto presented in a version of the orthodox Marxian framework.

Original accumulation and its incorporation as ‘primitive’ into historical materialism

Is capitalist production with its mode of appropriation a historical process with a discernible origin? Answering in the affirmative by pointing to what must precede capitalist production and capital accumulation, Marx stated:

... money is changed into capital; ... through capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital pre-supposes surplus-value; surplus-value pre-supposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour-power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point.

Marx (1867 [1954]: 667)
But, what is the starting point of capitalist production, of the production of surplus value and capital, of its appropriation and part investment for the further accumulation of capital?

... two very different kinds of commodity-possessors must come face to face and into contact: on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying other people’s labour-power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers of their own labour-power, and therefore the sellers of labour. Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. With this polarisation of the market for commodities, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are given.

Marx (1867 [1954]: 668)

Primitive accumulation is the process enabling the creation of a ‘free’ mass of labourers at the disposal of the capitalists. Using the case of England as his site of analysis, Marx defined primitive accumulation as:

... the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive because it forms the pre-history of capital and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.

Marx (1990: 875)

This process involves two transformations. First, it transforms the social means of subsistence and production into the service of creating capital and, second, it proletarizes, i.e. it transforms the immediate producers (attached principally to land–agriculture) to (free) wage-labourers (Marx 1990: 873–74). The end result of the two is the creation of a labour market where labour power can be freely exchanged, thereby acquiring the status of a commodity. For a worker to be ‘free’ under capitalism means that she must not own or possess any means of subsistence and production, and she must be detached from the shared environment that previously sustained her forms of life. Primitive accumulation forwards a theory of how a condition of existence for the origin and expansion of capitalist production – labour power – is created as commodity:

The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means of production by which they can realise their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale.

Marx (1867 [1954]: 668)
How could such a massive change in the conditions of human existence be achieved and who would take the lead to enact it? Here, Marx referred to multiple sources, including colonial plunder, which can be held responsible for producing the desired effect of ‘separation’.

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalled the … dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. … The different moments of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In England at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g. the colonial system. But, they all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and organised force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation …

Marx (1867 [1954]: 703)

Marx clearly saw primitive accumulation as occurring as a result of multiple factors that could take place even in a global context and in which the role of the state in initiating the process is vital. While the forms of primitive accumulation may have changed and even expanded in scope with the ongoing transition of capitalism, these insights more or less hold firm. Through his analysis, Marx was insisting on the importance of the conditions of existence, economic and non-economic, required to secure the processes of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus value in a capitalist form. Far from being pre-given or being a naturalized setting, these varied conditions of existence would have to be socially constructed. These will have to have a historical passage to occupy their present forms; sedimentation of a construction would require reiteration. Henceforth, the present state of the conditions of existence or of its operations cannot be discerned without tracing the trajectory of their formations. Not surprisingly, then, Marx was as much interested in analysing the analytical form of the commodity as he was in tracing the historical formation of the commodity (a process which included the conquest of colonies).

Similarly, one cannot understand the capitalist form of private property as encapsulating ‘freedom of exchange’ without locating the history of the formation of private property achieved through the destruction of other kinds of property structures that prevailed in varied forms in world of the third societies. Marx (1973: 471–514) himself described the Asiatic, Slavonic, ancient, classical, Germanic forms of property. This transformation of extant property structures
towards bourgeoisie private property is based on the alienation, that is the separation, of direct producers from objective conditions, which Marx called *earth*, within which world of the third societies are inscribed. This way, the violence of ‘exclusion’, of separateness, becomes embedded in the very constitution of private property. The freedom to exchange private property instead of challenging this embedded violence of exclusion helps to reproduce it – it continues to reproduce the very alienation on which the exchange came to be based to begin with. Overall, the formations of commodity, private property, shop floor hierarchy, etc. are structured through a network of political and cultural processes. All these conditions of existence, including the appearance of commodified labour power, come together to secure and expand the organization of capitalist exploitation.

The starting point of the development that gave rise both to the wage-labourer and to the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker. The advance made consisted in a change in the form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation.

Marx (1990: 875).

Should we then see primitive accumulation as a necessary sub-moment of history that is bound to happen? In his analysis of the English case, Marx left enough ammunition for many to believe that this is so:

The economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.

Marx (1990: 875)

Orthodox Marxist theory has used this impulse of Marx to theorize primitive accumulation as a necessary component of the process of transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial capitalism. As such, the concept of primitive accumulation got hooked to the teleological movement towards an industrial capitalist economy. In orthodox Marxism, the aspect of the creation of free wage labour came to the forefront and the moment of dislocation went into the background. This was defended as part of a teleological understanding of transition in which the inevitability of capitalism as a stage in history meant that the creation of free wage labour was the issue at hand. As the arrival of industrial capitalism was considered *fait accompli*, the moment of dislocation was deemed as a side issue and its outcome seen as inexorable as the unfolding of capitalism. Quite paradoxically, this orthodox Marxist theory then joins hands with development discourse in which world of the third re-inscribed as third world must inevitably give way to a modern industrial space as part of a ‘progressive’ logic of history. As in the hegemonic discourse of development, here too, the moment of dislocation, of ‘separation,’ is sidelined by other considerations tied to the teleological. The difference is that the orthodox Marxian approach will highlight the violence and portray what
emerges out of it in negative terms so as to produce the ground for the subsequent succession of a new historical stage, which will be denied or demoted in the hegemonic development discourse.

If one is hemmed on to orthodox Marxism, then primitive accumulation emerges as a sub-moment of the historical evolution towards capitalism and, thus, by the logic of history, facilitates, from thereon, a movement towards socialism/communism. One could even telescope the stage of capitalism within socialism in order to define a movement from feudalism to socialism as the Soviet case of socialist primitive accumulation showed.

How far did Marx himself accept the logic of historical inevitability attributed to him? As we shall see in the next chapter, he was thinking in far more complex terms and came out clearly against any defence of historical inevitability and hence of primitive accumulation as a necessary step towards ‘progress’ (Dhar 2003). Starting from late Marx, our critique of the teleological rendition of primitive accumulation in orthodox Marxism rests on its adopted premise of a devalued third world conceptualized as an inferior mode of production, which in turn justifies its dissolution as part of a ‘progressive’ logic to create the mass of wage labour proletariats needed for the expansion of industrial capitalism or industrial socialism.

Consistent with the dominance of the frame of historical materialism within Marxism, for a long time, the orthodox Marxian rendition of primitive accumulation remained the influential understanding of dislocation within Marxism. It was from the 1990s onwards that new thinking, especially on the question of ‘historicism’, started to emerge. While numerous writings have by now accumulated, a good place to review the emerging thoughts is the debate in *The Commoners*. It also captures well some of the directions in which the Marxist theory of dislocation à la primitive accumulation is tending to go.

**The debate in *The Commoners***

Particularly interesting is the position of De Angelis (2001), who seeks to rescue the concept of primitive accumulation from ‘revolutionaries’ who welcome primitive accumulation as a necessary stage towards capitalism (De Angelis 2001: 19). Instead of viewing primitive accumulation simply as a historical sub-moment, he seeks to resituate the concept as a recurrent strategy of countering opposition to capitalist expansion. The basic argument of De Angelis goes like this.

The process of primitive accumulation involves the dimension of force and epitomizes the separation of direct producers from the means of production. The classical understanding has been that this is an essential sub-moment of history encapsulating the passage from a feudal mode of production to a capitalist mode of production. Moreover, the ‘revolutionaries’ would attest that this sub-moment is a necessary step in propelling the march towards socialism. No matter how brutal the ‘separation’, there is no escape from it. Departing from such a reading, the discussants in *The Commoners* see
primitive accumulation as a strategy that facilitates the accumulation of capital and not simply as a ‘rupture between modes of production in an epochal period of transition’.

The relationship between primitive accumulation and capital accumulation is particularly exploited in this approach. It is claimed that, while both types of accumulation share the feature of ‘separation’, the conditions of existence of the two separations differ. Capital accumulation captures the aspect of reproduction on a grander scale of separation between the direct producers and the means of production, such that the social relation between the owners of the means of production and the alienated labour personified respectively by the capitalist class and the working class is reproduced. In this sense, De Angelis sees capital accumulation ‘as accumulation of social relations’. Primitive accumulation, on the other hand, refers to ex novo production of separation that is ‘aimed at people who have some form of direct access to the means of production’ (De Angelis 2001: 9). Primitive accumulation in that sense is an original production of the separation that stresses direct extra-economic force, while capital accumulation is sustained through networks of command that ensure the dominance of the capitalists over the workers and thus captures the ‘silent compulsion of the economic relations’ between the capitalists and the workers. The two are however tied in a relation of mutual constitutivity as capital accumulation pre-supposes primitive accumulation as its basic precondition; primitive accumulation ushers in capital accumulation. Primitive accumulation captures a set of strategies or social processes that help to remove any barrier to market expansion, which is a condition of existence for the process of capital accumulation. The ‘endless drive for accumulation’ must thus be constituted by primitive accumulation, and this association enables the production of the separation between capitalists and workers on a grander scale. Moreover, De Angelis also emphasizes that capital accumulation needs the workers to adhere to the ‘ordinary run of things’, by which he meant an acceptance of the capitalist mode of production as the norm. There is, however, no guarantee of this acceptance, which means that there must be ‘ideological use of political economy’ to produce a submissive subject through ‘education, tradition and habit’. ‘To the extent we identify ideology as a form of social power … this ideological use of political economy at this juncture is in itself an extra-economic means to re-impose the ordinary run of things’ (De Angelis 2001: 16).

Capital’s struggle against any resistance to primitive accumulation defines the context of not only the forms of primitive accumulation, but also those of capital accumulation. This is particularly true for commons, which are now under attack from the neo-liberal project. The way to take over the commons with undefined property rights is to enclose it by privatizing the property. Resistance to takeover of commons will determine how, if at all, the event of enclosures will transpire.

The definition of a social barrier evokes the idea of a social limit beyond which capital cannot go in furthering the opposition of dead to living labor. In this sense, this social barrier is a form of ‘social common’ because
it sets a limit to the extension, the scale of the separation between producers and means of production.

De Angelis 2001: 18)

In this sense, primitive accumulation, far from being simply a moment capturing a historical epoch, is also contingent and would necessarily take various forms, depending upon the nature of social barriers and the strategy to overcome these. Following Marx, De Angelis emphasizes not only the varied forms of the enclosure of commons, but also other means such as national debt and inflation, trade, etc., through which primitive accumulation could be carried out. The numerous forms of primitive accumulation include those materializing through colonial or global relations in which,

\[
\ldots \text{accumulation in one place may correspond to primitive accumulation in another place, in which the ex novo production of the separation can be the condition for the reproduction of the same separation in another interlinked place.}
\]

De Angelis (2001: 11)

Bonefield (2001, 2002) extends and reiterates De Angelis’ thesis by arguing that primitive accumulation is not simply a historical epoch, but also a ‘logic’ of separation that inherently constitutes capital accumulation.

It posits the principle constitution of capital, a principle which capital has to reproduce on an expanding scale and to which capital has always to return in order to posit itself as capital.

Bonefield (2002: 5)

That is, primitive accumulation is a constitutive concept of capital and of its process of accumulation. Once it is produced through separation, it continues to appear through the process of capital accumulation. Primitive accumulation is the aufgehoben\(^3\) that transforms the historical pre-supposition of capital into the constitutive conceptual pre-supposition of capital. Bonefield's is very much a Hegelian reading of primitive accumulation where:

the essence of primitive accumulation is suspended (aufgehoben) in accumulation proper means that the principle of primitive accumulation, that is separation, is raised to a new level, rendering primitive accumulation as a specific epoch historically redundant. At the same time its essential character is maintained as the constitutive presupposition of capital: separation … The historical presupposition of primitive accumulation inverts thus into the premise and precondition of capitalist accumulation.

Bonefield (2002: 4)

Zarembeka (2002) criticizes the above readings of primitive accumulation and reiterates the historical context of primitive accumulation. He argues that
Marx clearly posited primitive accumulation as a historical epoch capturing the moment of transition from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode of production. He castigates the above authors for not dealing with the texts of Marx, which clearly state this. Primitive accumulation should be reserved to characterize the ‘original rise of the capitalist mode of production’. Second, while Zarembeka commends the authors for highlighting the aspect of separation in capital accumulation, he expresses discontent at the reduction of primitive accumulation to capital accumulation. He argues that the existence of separation in both does not call for the reduction of one to the other; the context and the meaning of separation under primitive accumulation and capital accumulation are different and they should be treated as such. On this point, he is particularly critical of Bonefield and Perelman (2000), who admonishes Marx for theoretical ambiguity arising from a demotion of the importance of ongoing separation from the means of production that ends up undermining the present brutality of the market forces. Zarembeka argues that, as Marx saw primitive accumulation as a historical epoch and no more than that, this charge against Marx is misplaced. He finds the usage of primitive accumulation for ‘separation’ in modern times confusing and wonders why ‘separation’ should be synonymous with primitive accumulation. ‘If we should accept that accumulation of capital is indeed separation of new laborers from the means of production, then, why bother with the concept of “primitive accumulation”’ (Zarembeka 2002: 4). In his opinion, this expansive reading of primitive accumulation beyond its mere historicity imparts vagueness in both the concepts of accumulation. Given that the historical epoch that materialized through primitive accumulation has passed, Zarembeka would contend that capital accumulation itself would telescope force or violence and, as such, the current enclosure of commons with its associated dispossession should be seen as an integral component in the process of capital accumulation. This of course mandates that we stay away from positing primitive accumulation as if ‘the concept is applicable for all times of capitalist development rather than just the process of initial transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production’ (Zarembeka 2002: 1).

While we agree with Zarembeka on the importance of keeping primitive accumulation and capital accumulation distinct (although an exploration of the relation between them could be important), we disagree on the treatment of primitive accumulation as a mere historical epoch that has passed its time and is no longer operational or relevant. We argue that primitive accumulation continues to be epoch making insofar as its effects on the constitution of capitalism are concerned. Our position, however, crucially hinges on an understanding of capitalism that is different from the more conventional renditions of capitalism with their moorings in modes of production. What if we produce an understanding of capitalism outside of the given of the mode of production?

Our particular version of Marxian theory would pose the conception of capitalism from within a non-determinist and non-teleological understanding
of the economy and its transition. In this context, there has been a move to construct a meaning of social totality as contingently hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Chaudhury 1994). As explained in Chapters 2 and 4, from a Marxian perspective, capitalism as a hegemonic construct is another description of an otherwise open-ended reality arrived at through a transmutation of the overdetermined reality into an, as if, contingently closed reality, in which class process is repudiated or foreclosed. Capitalism as a hegemonic construct involves the complexity of economic, political, cultural and natural processes, and is, as if, a symbolic order produced out of such complexity. The otherwise de-centred and disaggregated overdetermined reality is thus epistemologically closed (and this is the vital moment of hegemonic construction) through the materialization of nodal points that help to anchor and structure an otherwise heterogeneous and disaggregated field. Through this re-articulation, overdetermined reality is turned into a symbolic order anchored to nodal points. Capitalism is one such symbolic order structured around the nodal points, capitalist surplus value appropriation and capitalist commodity, which are the defining signifiers of capitalist class process or capital (see Chapter 4).

Capitalist hegemony encapsulates a situation in which the encounter of capitalist class process with the multitude of non-capitalist class processes is situated on the basis of the normativity of capital, which in turn skews the encounter into a favourable one for capital. In the context of the South, as we have argued, this capitalocentric worldview in its intimate imbrications with orientalism translates the encounter into a field of symbolization and a chain of signification constituted by the foregrounding of ‘third world’ and the foreclosure of world of the third. Following the hegemonic reconstruction of the social out of an otherwise overdetermined existence through the foreclosure of class (the effect of capitalocentrism) and world of the third (the effect of orientalism), the social is turned into the dualism of capitalism (the domain of the modern) and pre-capitalism (the domain of the traditional) that helps to pose and map out the logic and path of ‘development’. The overdetermined reality then dissolves into: (i) a transmutation of the de-centred and disaggregated field involving slave, feudal, independent, communist and communitic class processes into the homogeneous whole of non-capitalism; and (ii) a turning of non-capitalism into the devalued other of capitalism, that is into pre-capitalism. This implies that, in the context of capitalism à la hegemonic, capital cannot but be in a permanent state of engagement with non-/pre-capital, or what from the Marxist perspective is the differentiated field of ‘what are not capitalist’.

If we displace Zarembeka’s argument to the terrain of hegemony, we are then referring to the ‘historical epoch’ as reflective of the transition of feudalism as one hegemonic formation (or it could be a structure of some other centrisms) to capitalism as another hegemonic formation. Capitalism as a hegemonic formation is, however, not a closed structure; it is only contingently closed; closed through nodal points of partial fixation; the lack of closure is related to the infinite number of overdetermined processes discharging contradictory effects that perpetually
defer the possibility of full closure; thus cracks remain even within a seemingly ubiquitous ordering of the symbolic. Even as policies are undertaken to secure and expand the reach of the hegemonic as part of some specified social engineering or otherwise, policy outcome becomes unforeseen and the transitional path of society non-deterministic. This is because the overdetermined heterogeneity of the social field over which the policy effect materializes produces discord, successful or failed adjustment, tension, mutual incongruity, unevenness and contingency and so on, a result in no small part due to simultaneous changes in other social processes as well. The hegemonic is thus already always cracked, with gaps and fissures, and is open to the possibility of unbecoming. Holding on to the hegemonic must then be a continual process, with reiteration and reinvention of what is to be included and excluded – excluded in terms of both simple exclusion and foreclosure.

This re-theorization of the hegemonic makes the idea of the ‘historical epoch’ as a transition towards capitalism a never-ending and continuous process; a process that has to be perpetually secured because it is, as if, under threat of falling apart. In this context, we can view primitive accumulation as a constitutive and an inalienable moment of capitalism, as it strives to alter the conditions of existence of ‘what are not capitalist organizations’ into those favourable to capitalist organization. This is not necessarily the eating up of non-capitalist by the capitalist, but more of a change in the former’s forms of existence. The securing of the capitalist hegemonic would then involve an unrelenting intervention into the constitutive relation between non-capitalist class organizations and the conditions of existence that shape it. As and when that encounter acquires the form of ‘separation’ involving the enclosure of commons, we do have primitive accumulation. It is notable (and we would agree with Zarembeka on this) that such an event is conceptually not the same as expansion of the scale of production as in capital accumulation. However, despite Zarembeka’s insistence to the contrary, primitive accumulation is actually a moment of the present, occurring continuously and in continuum with other moments including the process of capitalist accumulation that helps to secure capitalist hegemony. It is simultaneously a historical epoch that seeks expansion of the frontier and depth of capitalist hegemony and an event of the present that continually disturbs the boundary between capitalist and non-capitalist organizations. The concept of primitive accumulation allows Marxian theory to present a theory of the transition of the hegemonic à la capitalism, a transition that is diachronic and also synchronic, in which both the diachronic and the synchronic moments are tied in complex knots.

We can conclude that the phenomenal character of primitive accumulation is hardly changed whether it is posed within an overdetermined reality or within hegemonic reality. What is altered is the perspective of viewing primitive accumulation. From our Marxian perspective tied to overdetermination, we intend to show in the next chapter that primitive accumulation as perceived within hegemonic reality is in effect a reiteration of the centricities of capital and the West. It captures an imperial moment in the form of devastating and
demolishing world of the third with its predominantly non-capitalist forms of life. Insofar as the centricities of capital and the West inform capitalist hegemony, primitive accumulation remains its constitutive basis.

Finally, De Angelis correctly points to a need for the displacement of the concept of primitive accumulation to a non-teleological frame in order to guard it from the ‘revolutionaries’ who see virtue in its brutality. However, such a displacement fundamentally demands a re-look at the concept of primitive accumulation and not just its description. This requires resituating the discursive terrain onto a non-deterministic and non-teleological plane such that categories like capitalism, capitalist class process, capital, capital accumulation and primitive accumulation could be constantly rethought along that plane. A historicist and a determinist method is inconsistent with such a rethinking. The question therefore is: how do we move away from economism (or any kind of determinism) even as our object of analysis is an economic category? How do we move away from teleology even as we locate primitive accumulation as an integral component of the history of capitalism? Challenging as these theoretical dilemmas may appear in any endeavour to rethink primitive accumulation, they must be addressed.

A post-structuralist rendition of primitive accumulation

Moving away from the above-mentioned discussion on primitive accumulation in The Commoners, a very provocative and, for our purpose particularly useful, exposition of primitive accumulation is provided by Read (2002). He takes off from Louis Althusser and Antonio Negri to produce a non-determinist reading of primitive accumulation. Read sees continuity as also a relation of constitutivity between primitive accumulation and capital accumulation, but his evaluation of the relationship is distinguished by its non-Hegelian reading. Let us explicate Read’s position.

In tune with our understanding of capitalism as a hegemonic formation, Read sees it as a mode of production albeit displaced from the centrality of the forces and relations of production (the epistemology of economism) to that of the overdetermination of economic, political and cultural processes. In this reading, he does not reduce capitalism to the law of capital accumulation as the participants in The Commoners tend to do. Rather, he sees the latter as one of the many components of a capitalist mode of production and that it, like all other aspects, remains overdetermined by economic and non-economic processes.

If capitalism is an ensemble of relations that is not reducible to the anthropology of labour, then the question is what makes possible, in the first place, this overdetermined ensemble of economic, political and cultural conditions that enable the procreation of capital as a mode of production and within it the process of capital accumulation to unfold. If the answer rests on divulging the process of primitive accumulation, then does not the reconfiguration of social relations that primitive accumulation helps bring about continue to impact the process of capital accumulation? Does not the initial ‘separation’ impart
meanings to the process of capital accumulation? Moreover, as the conditions of existence and their changes would produce varying effects, won’t the appearance of capital and of capital accumulation transpire in an uneven and contingent manner across time and space?

Let us first review Read’s conceptualization of primitive accumulation and then its place and role in the definition of capitalist modes of production in general and the process of capital accumulation in particular. Primitive accumulation can be delineated into three moments attached to the element of force. The first is the moment of initial separation that can result from multiple conditions of expropriation leaving the producers without their means of production, most importantly land. Read makes a vital point:

The ‘extinction’ of the feudal mode of production encompasses multiple elements and trajectories. It includes the dissolution of the regime of the guilds, the breakdown of the system of peasant landownership, and the massive disintegration of existing structures of wealth and prestige through merchant and usury. These elements of dissolution are not the effects of a single strategy or aspects of a single process; they are, rather, entirely disparate. … Marx finds the intersection of disparate historical trajectories and itineraries that only come together in the common space that they mutually create. For example, the laws and acts that turned common lands into pasture and forced the peasantry off the land did not have as their goal the creation of the ‘proletariat’ as a propertyless working class; this was rather an unintended effect that was later seized by other agents and actors. ‘The knights of industry, however, only succeeded in supplanting the knights of the sword by making use of the events in which they had played no part whatsoever’ (Marx 1977: 875). … Expropriation in itself does not produce ‘free workers,’ however, only disenfranchised peasants and artisans.

Read (2002: 32–33)

So, ‘separation’ by itself does not imply the creation of free wage labour that is at the disposal of the capitalist. The second moment of primitive accumulation is the period of ‘bloody legislation’ designed to impose strict control over the disenfranchised peasants and artisans.

While such laws are founded on the fantasy that it is possible to go on being a peasant after feudalism, their secondary and perhaps unintended, effect is the control and containment of a ‘working class’ – of those who have only their labor power to sell. Those ‘freed’ from previous forms of labor and existence must be violently coerced and contained into the new structures of labor and existence. … The transition from feudalism to capitalism is neither smooth nor easy, and it requires the necessary intervention of law, the state, and new forms of police to transform disenfranchised peasants and artisans into subjects of labor.

Read (2002: 33–34)
Thus were the agricultural folk first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded and tortured by grotesquely terroristic laws into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage-labour.

Marx (1990: 899)

This, along with the first, constitutes the sovereign moment telescoped in primitive accumulation. The third and final moment of primitive accumulation is the normalization exercise operating through the ideological apparatuses that ‘obliterates the memory of the past modes of production as well as any traces of the violent foundation of the new mode of production’ (Read 2002: 45). Realized at the level of laws or institutions, this normativization exercise also fundamentally constitutes the subject making the social existence associated with the capitalist mode of production the norm.

What primitive accumulation reveals is that there is no mode of production without a corresponding mode of subjection, or a production of subjectivity. The ‘economy’, as something isolated and quantifiable, exists only insofar as it is sustained by its inscription in the state, the law, habits, and desires.

Read (2002: 45)

In emphasizing the role of the disciplining and normativization exercise in the constitution of subjectivity, Read heavily depends on Althusser (and Foucault).

Castigating the rather unexamined reading of Althusser as ‘structuralist’, Read contends that Althusser, in opposition to Sartrean existentialism, was only being disapproving of any reference to an underlying human nature and hence of discourses based on some abstract essence of humanity. Althusser’s reading of primitive accumulation is a critique of classical political economy and its modern incarnations that would assume the formation of capitalism as an accomplished fact and would retroactively defend it through the invocation of an underlying human essence, either the essential moral difference between the capitalist (diligent, intelligent) and the worker (lazy) or the essential desire to save and accumulate capital. In sharp contrast, Althusser reads Marx as trying to focus on and produce the aleatory formation of capital through his concept of primitive accumulation, which situates capitalism not as given, but as the result of a historical construct. Describing the capitalist mode of production as a web of overdetermined relations that have been put in place through the different trajectories marking the long process of primitive accumulation, Althusser situates the subject and the process of subjectivity within this history of the emergence of conditions of capitalism. Rather than flowing from the abstract essence of humanity, the elements of human desires, human intentions or human subjectivity ‘must be considered from the particular relations and the history of those relations’ (Read 2002: 32). Far from demoting subject to structure, Althusser tried to put forward a general theory of the aleatory materialism of capital formed through a journey in which the
structure and subject have no pre-given origin or predestined end, no closure within which the other can be reduced, where each is simultaneously the cause and also the effect within any relationship.

The three above-described moments of force (involving aspects of explicit violence, disciplining and governance) are telescoped in the process of primitive accumulation. Operating through an ensemble of repressive (representing the sovereign) and ideological (representing the bio-political) apparatuses, primitive accumulation is Marx’s response to the classical political economists and their modern incarnation in neo-classical economics, who represented the rise and reproduction of capitalism as simply a matter of thrift and expenditure (a journey from merchant capital to industrial capital) and in which the element of force that made possible the (be)coming of capitalism stands as foreclosed (Perelman 2000, 2001). In contrast to the latter’s ahistorical reading of capitalism, Marx’s analysis is a reminder of the social constitution of capitalism, as in the past and the present. In this history, the dissolution of the feudal mode of production, the violent origin of the capitalist mode of production and the history of colonialism, on their own and in relation to one another, defined capitalism and also its specificity across time and space.

Moreover, the element of force embodied in primitive accumulation brings into contention the aspects of statecraft and legality and refers to a qualitative change in the form of violence that far surpasses the initial moment of ‘separation’. This changing form of violence happens through the second and third moments of primitive accumulation in which: (i) ‘the moment of violence almost disappears in its executions … the violence of primitive accumulation is immediately justified within and by the new order that it constitutes … the violence of primitive accumulation is difficult to locate as an event because it loses itself in the law and the new society that it produces’ (Read 2002: 37–38) and (ii) ‘… violence disappears not into the neutrality of law, but into the quotidian relations that are the effects and cause of the law’ (Read 2002: 38). Concerning the latter, Marx says, ‘The silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in exceptional cases’ (Marx 1990: 899). This ‘silent compulsion’ captures the ‘disciplinary power of the capitalist, as the internalization of the violence within the system itself’ (Read 2002: 40).

The above-mentioned analysis of primitive accumulation has major implications for the concept of capitalist mode of production and capital accumulation. In fact, via this internalization of violence, Read contends that, ‘capital accumulation is nothing other than primitive accumulation continued onto the shop floor, thus nothing other than a continuation of the modification of violence begun with “bloody legislation” and the enclosure acts’ (Read 2002: 38). Similarly, capitalist mode of production cannot be reduced to the force of economic relations. It is instead an overdetermined ensemble of cause and effect stemming from economic and non-economic processes, including state, law and ideology. Moving away from economism (which marks the conventional discourses of mode of production) and capital accumulation (which shaped the orthodox Marxian
rendition of primitive accumulation), Read reads Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation as propelling a non-determinist conceptualization in which the role of non-economic forces in articulating the history of capitalism, past and present, becomes important.

**Post-modern primitive accumulation**

Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the passage from modernity to post-modernity marks a fundamental translation in the idea of primitive accumulation. Notwithstanding the diverse ways in which it unfolded across regions, primitive accumulation, according to Hardt and Negri, can be made to fit into two general models that are governed by the relationship between wealth and command, and between inside and outside. According to them, in the classical model as described by Marx for the case of England, the wealth needed for the primitive accumulation of capital comes from outside (the colonies), while the command is internal (evolution of English and European relations of production). In the second model characterizing primitive accumulation in the erstwhile colonies, the wealth arises internally while command comes from outside (principally European and US capital) (Hardt and Negri 2000: 256–59). To a large extent, the distinctness of the two models of primitive accumulation combined with other local effects helped to fashion the distinct formations of capitalism across regions. However, the passage from modernity to post-modernity has changed the frame of primitive accumulation because now, according to Hardt and Negri, the division between inside and outside is fast disappearing with globalization, and courtesy of the computing and information age, the accumulated social wealth and social labour is becoming *immaterial*. As a result, the command structure too is becoming universal (culminating in the empire). In this changed scenario, primitive accumulation is now post-modern primitive accumulation. It affects any semblance of commons procreating outside and within capitalism, capturing, in the process, the accumulation not simply of wealth and workers, but of subjective potentials, desires, and knowledges, many of which are formed outside capitalism, in the public sector and in the interstices of commodified existence. Moreover, it is increasingly the power of life itself, the capacity to reproduce and live, from the genetic code to the basic necessities of existence that like the feudal commons is increasingly coming under the rule of ‘absolute private property’.

Read (2002: 46); also see Basu (2008)

Primitive accumulation is helping to re-create and re-produce the over-determined reality of social life as ‘networks of activities productive for capital’

(Read 2001: 29).
Having made this journey through readings of primitive accumulation, we now stop and ask: whatever happened to the category of third world in primitive accumulation? What about world of the third? To examine the generic response of Western Marxism, we consider Hardt and Negri as our reference point.

The non-place of third world and foreclosure of world of the third: why do we need an ab-original rendition of primitive accumulation?

Let us begin by asking how Hardt and Negri understand globalization, empire and the place of ‘local’ within it.

Globalization … should be understood. … as a regime of production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization. Hardt and Negri (2000: 45)

Through this regime of heterogenization/de-territorialization and homogenization/re-territorialization, globalization produces, reinforces, deepens and widens the grip of the bio-political production of social life conducive to re-producing capitalist organization. Empire is the command structure of a new global order that encompasses both globalization and bio-political production of social life. Regarding the status of the local within such an empire, Hardt and Negri (2000) disagree with the celebration of the local as the axis of either a discursive space of difference or revolutionary resistance.

The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire.

Hardt and Negri (2000: 45)

Local struggles remain ignorant of the fact that ‘the globalization or deterritorialization operated by the imperial machine is not in fact opposed to localization or reterritorialization, but rather sets in play mobile and modulating circuits of differentiation and identification’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 50). The local is then both a result and a component of the globalization process and empire formation. As such, struggles for locality, by remaining unmindful of the real threat or adversary (here empire), become unwittingly complicit in the very re-production of empire. Empire continues to function including, among other things, by producing localities, while those fighting for those localities are, in doing so, hemmed in by the illusion of struggling against empire. Hardt and Negri give a passionate call to abandon the
strategy of local resistance in favour of ‘real alternatives and the potential for liberation that exists within Empire’ (2000: 46). Liberation can only come from within empire because, with no visible outside and the entire globe shaping its domain, empire can only explode from within.

We have seen how, in the capitalocentric–orientalist discourse of development, the ‘local’ of the South has come to be displaced into ‘third world’, a process that guaranteed in turn the foreclosure of world of the third. Hardt and Negri’s discussion on third world is short but decisive, and it would not be an overstatement to say that such discussion remains complicit in the foreclosure of world of the third. In fact, Hardt and Negri see third world as already, or in the process of being, articulated into the chain of a materializing global order. Hardt and Negri critique the notion of third world as (historically) obsolete in the post-colonial setting; by post-colonial, they understand a hybrid space as elaborated by Homi Bhabha (Hardt and Negri 2000: 137–59). For them, third world has lost its autonomous place and has become a hybrid space in which the third and first worlds implode, one into the other, announcing in turn the end of the (pure) third (world) of yesteryear. According to Hardt and Negri, the obliteration of third world with the advent of hybridity as the governing relationship announces the (final) subsumption of the so-called South into empire. Instead of drawing a line of difference between world of the third and third world, they collapse the two into the received rendition of third world (which they designate as a valid category), and then consider third world as being in the historical process of assimilation within what they describe as the new global order.

What is a fact though is that world of the third has long been dead, dead since the later years of modernism–capitalism–development. It was third world-ism that took its place. In the South, this has been the predicament of situating the so-called third world into the discourse of local(ity) – the local qua third world serving as the state of exception – local as both a site capable of being interiorized within the capitalist hegemonic and a site capable of producing resistance. Somewhat related to the foreclosure of world of the third, we are now being told that, with globalization, even this protracted third world as representing the Southern local(ity) is no more. Through this repudiation of third world, we are made to forget the already forgotten world of the third – a case of double forgetting – a double disavowal. We project the absence of world of the third in Hardt and Negri as constituting a discursive amnesia in empire analysis that is as disturbing as the violence perpetrated on world of the third. Torn between the two, world of the third becomes the subject of a twin violence.

Moving towards a re-theorization of primitive accumulation

While discussants have been more inclined to conceptualize primitive accumulation within a non-teleological approach, the inability to address the vexed question of third world has been almost universal. The emphasis has
instead been on either the obliteration of third world from the process of primitive accumulation as in Hardt and Negri or a focus on the commonality of the process of primitive accumulation that by default demotes the specificity of third world. The latter impulse has been highlighted by De Angelis,

... there is a common ground between different phenomenal forms of neo-liberal policies, and that peoples of the North, East and South are facing possibly phenomenally different but substantially similar strategies of separations from the means of existence.

De Angelis (2001: 20)

To his credit, Moore (2004) questions the eradication of the conceptual category of third world in analyses of capitalism in general and primitive accumulation in particular, although he too does not mark the difference between third world and world of the third. It is not simply a matter of primitive accumulation first in the First World, and now in the third world, or even a question of ‘blocked dialectic’ as in passive revolution (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003: Ch. 5). Rather, the fundamental issue concerns the role played by the category third world in substituting world of the third, and how this foregrounding—foreclosure helped to justify the process of primitive accumulation.

This methodological lacuna points to a deeper epistemological problem that Western Marxist schools have burdened themselves with. They stumble and falter before orientalism and its articulation with capitalocentrism that defines the (be)coming of modernity in the South. Notwithstanding its contributions in other axes, ‘classical political economy’ was a Euro-centric discourse addressing the constitution and interest of the Self in the West. Any critical encounter with that Self must account for not simply the constitution of the Self, but also that of the positioning of the other. Moreover, the other was re-created in order to define the Self, and the very manner of their concomitant production helped produce a Self/other relation where the other was a devalued and a lacking image of the Self. Consequently, this positioning of the other as the lacking other must be seen not as a perspective of the other, but that of the Self, which in our case took shape through centricities of capital (capitalocentrism) and West/modernity (orientalism). While appearing first through the logic of colonialism and then through that of development, the invention of the lacking other now named third world must be seen as capturing the constitution of spaces and subjects being positioned for the process of primitive accumulation. It is a reminder that the original moment of primitive accumulation appears under the progressive/civilizing garb of colonialism and now development. While subjecting us to the importance of addressing the history of capitalism, of its social construction, the discussants of primitive accumulation were silent on the history of the idea of third world and the various forms (colonialism and development) through which the category appeared, was transmuted and translated, although never to shed its imagery as the lacking other. Earlier we saw Marx in the context of Europe.
referring to the issue of enslavement of workers that primitive accumulation helps to bring about so as to posit and secure capitalist exploitation. What about the enslavement of world of the third that development logic brings about? What about the connection of the enslavement of workers with the enslavement of world of the third in the formation of capitalism in the South? This is not a matter of reinterpreting primitive accumulation, but one of remapping the discursive terrain to discuss primitive accumulation, an issue that Western Marxism failed to comprehend.

The ‘local’ in the West and the ‘local’ in the erstwhile colonies did not have the same trajectory, not simply because the social conditions of existence differed across regions. It is also no less important due to the trajectory of colonialism and developmentalism with its capitalocentric–orientalist perspective that defined the aleatory formation of capitalism in the South and which cannot be compared or reduced to the evolution of capitalism in the West. The ‘commonality’ that De Angelis refers to is not that concerning the strategy of primitive accumulation. Rather, it belongs to the ubiquitous category of other (orient/third world) that helped not only define primitive accumulation in the South, but also fashioned the strategies to produce it. To ignore the specificity of this historical trajectory (and the numerous processes specific to that trajectory) by ‘making it equivalent of or subsuming it to the North’ or highlighting the ‘blurring of the North–South division’ means that the constitutive specificity of primitive accumulation in the South remains fundamentally unaddressed.

Put bluntly, the theory of primitive accumulation remains starkly underdeveloped and Euro-centric. Notwithstanding the desperate attempts to resituate it in a non-teleological domain, primitive accumulation remains turned to the perspective of capital and the West; in that sense, the theorization of primitive accumulation remains orientalist.
7 Primitive accumulation = world of the third Marxian perspective on dislocation

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it.

Karl Marx in *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845)

Philosophers have interpreted capitalism. Historians have described capitalism. Philosophers have interpreted primitive accumulation as the origin moment of capitalism. Historians have chronicled primitive accumulation. The point, however, is to have a world without primitive accumulation, without dislocation. The point is to have a world without capitalist development.

Starting from a world of the third Marxian perspective, we develop, in this chapter, the *Grundrisse* of another reading of primitive accumulation, which ‘renders unfamiliar’ the given rendition of primitive accumulation. This ‘unfamiliar reading’ of primitive accumulation is in turn facilitated by late Marx’s encounter with the non-Western world in general and the Russian Mir in particular (Marx 1970, 1975, 1983, 1989). Our description of this particular encounter and engagement rests principally on Marx’s correspondence with Vera Zasulich (Marx 1970).

Why is this engagement of Marx (a German, coming from Western Europe) with Zasulich (a Russian, coming from Eastern Europe and also from a landmass that spills largely into Asia) crucial to our work? For one, Marx ponders once again over the question of primitive accumulation; he ponders over it in a non-Western setting, having done it once before in the context of British rule in India. He asks afresh how primitive accumulation will take shape in a non-Western setting in general and how it would take shape in Russia in particular. More importantly for us, he grapples with the question of whether primitive accumulation is inevitable or not? Can we not bypass the process of primitive accumulation?

This encounter of Marx with the non-Western world can be taken as a precursor to a theorization of primitive accumulation in the (developmentalist) context of the South. We use this opportunity to fix points of departure that characterize our understanding of primitive accumulation. It also marks for us a *turning away* from the original Marx, from a Westernized Marx to an *ab*-original Marx, to a Marx that is at the same time *ab*-original – that is other than the
white Western original – and that is also tuned to questions of aboriginality. Our re-reading of primitive accumulation is an explication of why some of the ideas forwarded by Marx some 130 years ago matter in attending to problems of dislocation. It is an engagement that inaugurates an understanding of dislocation that is radically different from other engagements with dislocation.

What does our intervention achieve in terms of debates on dislocation? First, it shifts the terms of reference from third world-ism to world of the third; in the process, it questions development – development understood in terms of the transition of the pre-capitalist third world in the image of the modern capitalist West. By default, it also questions development-induced dislocation of the pre-capitalist third world; it questions that particular imagination of development – capitalist development – that definitionally originates through large-scale dislocation. It thus turns what was hitherto deemed necessary, what was deemed as developmental in the milieu of third world-ism into something that was in actuality extreme violence – violence of primitive accumulation on world of the third. What was dislocation in a third world-ist milieu thus emerges as primitive accumulation in the context and perspective of world of the third.

De Angelis pointed to the importance of ‘social barriers’ not in the form of ‘pre-given’ structures to be dismantled, but those articulated through opposition to the process of primitive accumulation. The presence of resisting ‘social barriers’ shows that the issue of primitive accumulation cannot be located outside of the matrix ‘proposition–opposition’. This, however, demands that the proposition of primitive accumulation and the opposition to it must be telescoped within a theory of primitive accumulation. Which in turn means that one cannot produce a theory of primitive accumulation by staying within the category ‘third world’. Not only does third world-ism produce a one-sided view of primitive accumulation, it also implies that the moment of resistance from within third world-ism is turned to an exercise of the accommodation of opposition within the proposition (and this is exactly what has happened in compensation and resettlement). The disciplinary networks associated with the development paradigm professing third world-ism have served the purpose of institutionalizing resistance within the development logic. If incarcerated within this frame, resistance to primitive accumulation becomes paradoxically a losing battle. The ‘social barriers’ to primitive accumulation often tragically transpire into a losing battle for holding on to ‘backward’ states of existence as against ‘progress’. Given the strategy of the mainstream to reduce resistance to primitive accumulation to the play of two contradictory and opposing forces, one being against ‘progress’ and the other being for it, the whole issue thus gets reduced to positions for or against progress qua industrialization.

To get away from this cycle of hopelessness and surrender that emanates from a defensive position, we need to move towards the category of world of the third which stands in opposition to third world. Resulting from this changed perspective, rather than being seen as a measure of and step to progress, primitive accumulation is revealed for what it is: a process of overt violence
(involving dismantling of livelihood and/or forms of life) enacted over world of the third through the use of repressive development apparatuses (RDAs) and ideological development apparatuses (IDAs) in order to facilitate the expansion of the modern capitalist economy. In the process, what is emphasized in the moment of resistance is the possibility of questioning the logic of capitalist development. It is not enough to produce a non-teleological reading of primitive accumulation. Equally important is to produce a theory of dislocation that will also be reflective of the perspective of the dislocated (here world of the third) and show whether, and if so how, such a reading could possibly open routes to chart out alternative trails, lanes, alleyways and conduits of social transition.

The ab-original Marx and the Asiatic

Marx had an ambivalent position with respect to the idea of community. On the one hand, he seems to be reading community somewhat akin to our concept of world of the third; for example, with respect to the Russian commune, Marx is seen to treat it as not the pre-capitalist past of capitalist Europe; he sees it not as the past-to-be-transcended but as the synchronic other of a capitalist present; as that which marks difference with respect to capitalist presence. On the other hand, he seems to be viewing community as a political being-in-common; for example, the Russian commune is neither good nor evil; beyond good and evil, it is a process of becoming common.

To begin with, insofar as community was seen as a representation of social reality, Marx was particularly seduced by the different concrete social forms such as those in India (and China) that have sometimes been characterized as akin to the Asiatic mode of production or AMP (Bailey and Llobera 1981; Shanin 1983). Bailey and Llobera (1981: 23) succinctly summarize Marx’s struggle over AMP thus:

> Marx’s development of the concept of a specific social totality, the Asiatic mode of production, spanned a period of thirty decades. ... In certain writings, particular elements of this totality – property, the division of labour, surplus appropriation, exchange, and commodity production – are treated in detail. However, Marx never achieved a systematic exposition of his theory of the AMP.

However, despite his inner struggle with respect to a systematic exposition of AMP, Marx was clearly hinting at an understanding of community as the overdetermination of numerous processes and not just that deriving from (communal) property ownership. Some of the economic processes, including the non-capitalist class processes, are mentioned above in the quote from Bailey and Llobera. If one also adds non-economic processes, of which Marx was aware, the overdetermination of processes becomes even more complex. Marx also underscores the layers of relationality that inhere in such
complexity; it is the tuft of relationality that guarantees the endurance of such social formations; it is, as if, despots, rulers and empires come and go, but the web of relationality endures. The social or community endures not because of some metaphysical inner core, but because of the complex web of relationality that constitutes such social formations.

The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clan.

Marx (1973: 84)

This is not to romanticize the ‘greater whole’; it is just to suggest that a dismantling and annihilation of the supports of relationality that mark the greater whole cannot be represented as necessarily good; it is also to suggest that the experience of the greater whole cannot be disavowed.

On the other hand, Marx, from his formative period to late in his life, also saw ‘real community’ as a being-in-common ‘with others’ as against ‘illusory community’ marked by order–normativity–statecraft. Being-in-common with others was for Marx the condition of the abolition of class division and exploitation; it was the groundwork of personal freedom achieved ‘in and through association’. The ‘greater whole’ had to be produced; it was not given; the fact that, in AMP-like situations, it had been produced over centuries was not a problem for late Marx; instead, it was a promise on which non-exploitative forms of being-in-common could be imagined. In that sense, the imagination of the being-in-common was ‘political in its left moorings’ and ‘left in its political moorings’. For Luc-Nancy (1991), ‘left’ means, at the very least, that the political, as such, is receptive to what is at stake in the imagination of the community: while ‘right’ means, at least, that the political is merely in charge of and is circumscribed by order-normativity-statecraft. For Marx and Engels:

Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. … The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.

Marx and Engels in Selsam and Martel (1963: 270; italics ours)

Marx could be seen as arguing against a given and pre-formed community (what he called an illusory community) that stands above and over individuals.
Marx’s ‘real’ community is the condition and ground of a process of active engagement of individuals with others; it is the space of articulating one’s freedom, so as to give shape in the contingent to the collective-becoming of the in-common. In this sense, Marx’s real community is the breathing space and breeding ground of both solitude and solidarity. Late Marx in the context of Russian Mir and the Paris Commune again took up this understanding of the ‘greater whole’ as the product of a process of creative work of and towards the being-in-common; here, Marx engaged further with the idea of the community in its political form through the concept of the commune.

**Ab-original Marx’s account of primitive accumulation**

One of the controversial areas concerning Marx remains his analysis of the Russian commune and his position on the ‘Russian Road’ (Dhar 2003). With mainstream or even non-Marxist left moorings, it is understandable for the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach and even a strand of the ‘radical–movementist’ approach to remain silent on Marx. What is revealing, however, is the silence of Western Marxists who could not reconcile his so-called evolutionist stance taken in the preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* with a strident anti-evolutionist (and anti-eschatological) position on the Russian Commune. Western Marxists had demoted class process (Resnick and Wolff 1987) and had failed to conceptualize the specificity of the South in the context of development; such failure had made their position complicit with the foreclosure of world of the third. From such a Western Marxist position, Marx’s analysis of the Russian Commune appeared uncanny and even inconsistent with his earlier approach, and they thought it best to avoid it. Consequently, for them, Marx’s analysis of primitive accumulation remained at best rooted in his explication in *Capital*.

However, at least insofar as primitive accumulation and its relation to politics and history were concerned, Marx himself saw no inconsistency between his earlier and later works. He saw this movement as analytical that leads to a better theorization of the category of primitive accumulation.

Was Marx arguing for a certain teleology when referring to primitive accumulation in *Capital*? That is how a large section of Marxists have read primitive accumulation. In an ironical move that has befuddled many Marxists, Marx, reacting against an admirer who emphasized the aspect of historicism in his work, retorted:

> It is absolutely necessary for him to metamorphose our historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophical theory of general development, imposed by fate on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they are placed, in order to eventually attain this economic formation which, with a tremendous leap of the productive forces of social labour, assures the most integral development of every industrial producer. But we beg his pardon. This does us too much
honour and yet puts us to shame at the same time. … Thus events strikingly analogous, but occurring in different historical milieu, led to quite disparate results. By *studying each of these evolutions on its own, then comparing them*, one can easily discover the key to the phenomenon, but it will never be arrived at by employing the all-purpose formula of a general historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being *supra-historical*.

Marx (1975: 293–94)

Here, Marx is resisting the metamorphosis of the historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a *historico-philosophical theory of general development, imposed by fate on all people*. In his letter to Vera Zasulich, Marx re-emphasized the turn against the logic of supra-historical inevitability that argues for the dissolution of the ‘primitive’ Russian Commune. Instead, Marx provided a defence of the Russian Commune and the need to preserve and work creatively, patiently and with care on its existing social form. He considered the regeneration of the Russian Commune as crucial for initiating a struggle against capitalism. Referring to his analysis of primitive accumulation in *Capital*, he avers:

… I expressly limited the ‘historical inevitability’ [note: this term is put in quotes as a mark of the problematical nature of this term that many of his so-called followers tried to attribute to him] of this process to the countries of Western Europe. Why so? … we are dealing here with the transformation of one form of private property into another form of private property. The land tilled by the Russian peasants never having been their private property, how is this to be applied in their case?

Marx (1970: 152)

While Marx held a more nuanced understanding of private property than his ‘bourgeois’ counterparts, our attention is drawn to Marx’s suggestion of discounting the ‘historical inevitability’ argument and the need to explore the possibility of different socio-historical outcomes. Not only was any assertion of an inevitable movement from feudalism to capitalism problematical, but even the inevitability of primitive accumulation needs to be questioned. For Marx, primitive accumulation is a socio-political project of ushering in capitalism. Its presence would depend on whether a capitalist route is taken at all or not. Rather than read his work on England as an argument for historical inevitability, Marx’s reading should be taken as a retrospective exposition of what had transpired in England. No way can this be taken as an argument for closing off other routes of imagining history. Marx asks:

… does this mean that the development of the ‘land commune’ must necessarily follow the same lines under all circumstances? Certainly not. Its constitutive form allows the following alternative: either the element
of private property implied in it gains the upper hand over the collective element, or vice versa. Everything depends upon the historical background in which it finds itself … Both these solutions are possible *a priori*, but both obviously require entirely different historical environments.

Marx (1970: 156)

Railing against the proclamation of historical inevitability in general and Russia in particular, he says categorically:

One should be on one’s guard when reading the histories of primitive communities written by bourgeois historians. They do not stop at anything, even outright distortion. Sir Henry Maine, for example, who was an ardent active supporter of the British government in its policy of destroying Indian communes by force, tells us hypocritically that all the noble efforts on the part of the government to support these communes were thwarted by the elemental force of economic laws.

Marx (1970: 154)

If at the time of the abolition of serfdom (in Russia) the village communes had been immediately placed in conditions of normal development. … if all this expenditure had been used for the *future development* of the village commune, nobody would be talking about the ‘historical inevitability’ of the destruction of the commune: everyone would recognize it as a regenerative force in Russian society and as something superior to those countries which are still enslaved by the capitalist regime.

Marx (1970: 153)

It is important to note here that Chernyshevskii’s *Essays on Communal Ownership of Land* had a profound influence on Marx. Chernyshevskii maintained that it was possible for Russia to shift from communal ownership to communism. There was no necessity of going through the process of primitive accumulation; there was no need to break the (existing) backbone of village societies, of greater wholes with existing webs of relationalities that were not always retrograde. Reacting against the logic of ‘historical inevitability’, he warned:

History is like a grandmother; it loves the younger grandchildren. To the latecomers it gives not the bones but the marrow of the bones, while Western Europe has hurt her fingers badly in her attempts to break the bones.

Chernyshevskii quoted in Wada (1984: 48)

Oblivious of Chernyshevskii’s radical observations, the history of capitalist development and dislocation that we have been explicating can be summed up
as attempts to break the bones of world of the third along a logic that sees progress as an inevitable journey of society along Western European lines. The ‘new pillars of society’ comprising the ‘reformist–managerial’ community who see dislocation as inevitable are ‘doing their best to prepare the masses for such a catastrophe’ (Marx 1970: 161), that is, oversee through IDAs the process of breaking the bones of world of the third.

In contrast, both Chernyshevskii and Marx see the possibility of the (non-capitalist) ethical in the regeneration of what the hegemonic dismisses and dispenses as archaic. But how will this regeneration take place? And what did Marx mean by regeneration? Here, Marx takes another uncanny turn. He explains that in Europe the so-called archaic type of commune has found its way into the land commune, which is more of a social configuration in which certain segments are under the influence of private property while other segments are communal in nature.

... a commune in which the arable land has become private property, whereas forests, pasture and waste land, etc., have remained communal property.

Marx (1970: 154)

Elsewhere:

... although arable land remains communal property, it is redivided periodically among members of the land commune in such a way that each person cultivates by himself the fields assigned to him and appropriates the fruits of his own labor, whereas in the archaic communities production was communal and only the products were distributed.

Marx (1970: 155)

In land commune then, Marx is clearly pointing to the presence of independent class enterprise and, for ‘archaic’ communities, communist class enterprise. In fact, we may add the CA communitic class enterprise as possible forms (especially in the case of family farming), wherein even as collectivity may prevail at the level of production, the mode of appropriation could be exploitative. And, other exploitative class organizations such as slave, feudal and even small-scale capitalist enterprises and non-exploitative AC communitic organizations may prevail on their own or in tandem with other class enterprises. We now know from further developments in the Marxian framework that what Marx was referring to as land commune (or even archaic commune) could be theorized in terms of world of the third.

Not only would world of the third be conceptualized as de-centred and disaggregated in terms of economic organizations (although it does rule out in reality the dominance of any one class form), but it could also be constituted by a complex network of property and power webs. Warning against the possibility of ‘more or less centralized despotism over the communes’,
Marx calls for adopting a system of governance ‘by an assembly of peasants elected by the communes themselves, which would serve as an economic and administrative organ to protect their interests’ (Marx 1970: 157). Paraphrasing Marx in our context, we understand land commune as referring to a shared environment in line with world of the third.

Coming back to Western Europe, Marx observed that it is this land commune that was being subjected to privatization resulting from the internal dynamics and also the process of primitive accumulation. Although, as we have seen, Marx also pointed out that there is no a priori inevitability attached to this process. Given diverse routes, what position would Marx take? Forced by his Russian counterparts to confront the debate over the ‘Russian path’, Marx turns political in a manner that militates against the possibility of subscribing to the ‘progressive’ logic of historical inevitability attached to capitalist industrialization. Noting that, in Russia, ‘land commune has been preserved on a national scale to the present day’ (Marx 1970: 156), Marx believed that any development of Russia should be based on ‘the evolution of the commune’ and the immediate step would be to ‘recognize it as a regenerative force’ and place it in conditions of ‘normal development’. Elsewhere, in the preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, he writes:

… present Russian communal land ownership can serve as a point of departure for a communist development.

What then is preventing such an evolution from happening? Marx was categorical that the Russian state had been forwarding policies that had exposed these communes to ‘abnormal economic conditions’. It also supported those ‘branches of the Western capitalist system’ that facilitate and speed up the ‘plundering of agricultural produce by unproductive intermediaries. It has thus helped enrich a new capitalist vermin sucking the blood of the already anemic village commune’ (Marx 1970: 160). Instead of taking policies that would support the ‘normal development’ of the village commune into a ‘real community’ as Marx and Chernyshevskii would have wanted,

… the state has assisted in accelerating the development of technical and economic means most instrumental in facilitating and speeding up the exploitation of the tiller, i.e. the largest productive force in Russia, and in enriching the ‘new pillars of society’.

Marx (1970: 160)

He decries the spokesmen for the ‘new pillars of society’ who ‘denounce the very wounds inflicted on the commune as natural symptoms of its decrepitude’ (Marx 1970: 160).

Is expropriating land from the peasantry a necessary condition for the moment of primitive accumulation? Is expropriating land from the peasantry the same as expropriating the tillers of the land? Marx’s categorical reply was
no. This is a major shift in Marx from his original rendition of primitive accumulation, a shift that marks a decisive departure from a property-centric reading of primitive accumulation (formed around Marx’s exemplification of England) towards emphasizing the importance of the multifaceted conditions shaping forms of life.

In order to expropriate the tillers of the land it is not necessary to drive them from their land as was the case in England and elsewhere; nor is it necessary to abolish communal property by an usake. Just go and deprive the peasants of the product of their labor beyond a certain point and you will not be able to chain them to their fields even with the help of your police and army.

Marx (1970: 159)

Marx was referring to the different policies taken such that world of the third societies become anaemic and decline. Primitive accumulation is not just about a question of land or direct forcible eviction. It also concerns how the conditions of existence governing world of the third societies can be changed in multiple ways (through unfavourable modifications in terms of trade, debt, trade, technology, capital–labour ratio, water, forests, etc.) in order to bring about a major disruption in the forms of life of these societies such that they finally get dismantled, at times, as if, of their own free will. Primitive accumulation is better understood as a choreograph of altered conditions of existence that leads to a gradual and at times quick dismantling of world of the third forms of life. This reveals that there is no one trajectory of primitive accumulation. Rather, depending upon the conditions of existence being altered in such societies, primitive accumulation would take different paths and forms. Not only is there no single route of primitive accumulation between countries, it is very likely that, especially in countries such as India with diverse types of world of the third societies, the forms of primitive accumulation could vary within a country as well.

Taking the specific case of Russia, Marx (1970: 160) asks: what can be done to prevent the destructive influences geared towards dismantling the village commune? It is notable that the posing of this question itself marks his opposition to the oft-mentioned ‘historical inevitability’ attributed to primitive accumulation. He gives two arguments. First, Marx exhorts us to take a position against primitive accumulation (in any form) and crush this external enemy of world of the third by a ‘powerful counteraction’; as if, to hold on to existing AA, AC and CC class processes and resist their transition to AB and CB class processes of the capitalist kind.

At the same time as the commune is being bled and tortured and its land made barren and poor, the literary lackeys of the ‘new pillars of society’ refer ironically to the wounds which have been inflicted on the commune as symptoms of its spontaneous decrepitude. They claim that it is dying a
natural death and the kindest thing would be to put an end to its agony. Here we are no longer dealing with a problem to be solved, but quite simply with an enemy who must be defeated. In order to save the Russian commune [that is, ‘save’ the existing AC and CC class processes from becoming AB and CB type capitalist class processes] there must be a Russian revolution. And the Russian government and the ‘new pillars of society’ are doing their best to prepare the masses for such a catastrophe. If the revolution takes place at the right time, if it concentrates all its forces to ensure the free development of the village commune, the latter will soon emerge as the regenerative force in Russian society and as something superior to those countries which are still enslaved by the capitalist regime.

Marx (1970: 161)

Such reference to the ‘natural decay’ of communes finds resonance in the more contemporary reference to the ‘sorry’ state of agriculture as a so-called consequence of a process in which agriculture is considered passé. In fact, when referring to the supra-historical and the issue of ‘historical inevitability’, Marx was pointing to the danger of the erasure of the political that comes about by reducing the political to the presumption of an inevitable journey of human society, say from agriculture to industry. In the process, he was pointing to the dangers of justifying relationalities of exploitation under the garb of the ‘progressive’ march of civilization that capitalism manifests. In contradistinction to such a stand, the notion of the political that Marx was espousing would involve mounting a challenge to the organization of exploitation and ensuring fair distribution à la radical needs in order to activate the process of being-in-common grounded on the ethicality of bonding and not bondage. Marx thus called for a Russian revolution to develop the Russian Commune and its surrounding agrarian life along communist lines.

This takes us to the second point. Marx did not consider world of the third societies as valuable per se. He saw them as open to multiple possibilities. In this context, he argued for a particular ethico-political stance. Conceding the fact that the Russian Commune cannot survive in its current form, he called for its rejuvenation. This regeneration is to be based on two factors. The first is its movement towards ‘collective production and appropriation’, which in turn would require setting up, and this is the second factor, various conditions of existence that included common ownership of land and also modern implements, fertilizers, farming methods, etc., which the concurrent existence of capitalist production has already made known. The two factors would conjoin into a large-scale agricultural re-organization that would then initiate the ‘normal’ development of agriculture. Notwithstanding the debate of large scale versus small scale (Boyce 2006: 83–104), our analysis reveals that the AC communitic enterprise represents another possible scenario of non-exploitation and the communal form: individual production on individual plots even as the peasants appropriate their individually produced wealth.
collectively (in *Letters from Russia*, Rabindranath Tagore (1960) had suggested ‘collective appropriation’–‘individual production’ as a solution to the contradictions inherent in the couple collectivity/individualism). Typically, under AC communitic enterprise, production units would be small even as wealth stands consolidated. While it has to be mentioned that Marx was referring to the looming crisis in the Russian village commune, which he argued would be overcome by large-scale collective production and appropriation, our development of Marx’s framework along the class-focused frame makes both communist class enterprise and AC-type communitic class enterprise, large and small scale, satisfy the ethico-justice criteria of appropriative justice, productive justice and development justice.

What about the funding? Taking agrarian society along the path of ‘normal’ development with modern techniques and changed organizational forms requires a large input of funds. Put in our terms, we read Marx as clearly proposing that this social surplus fund be given the status of radical need as it not only serves communist organizational forms, but in the process becomes a counterforce against capitalist hegemony. ‘As for the initial organizational costs – both intellectual and material – Russian society owes them to the “village commune” at whose expense it has been living for so long and in which it must seek its “source of regeneration”’ (Marx 1970: 159).

Marx’s analysis throws a further question at us. Should primitive accumulation be seen as a transition from a feudal mode of production to a capitalist mode of production? In our reading, Marx has moved decisively away from such a supposition. In fact, he brings within his analysis independent and communist class enterprises with reference to land organizations and theorizes primitive accumulation as a process of dismantling these existing or possible forms of non-capitalist existences. What this calls for is the need to consider the presence of these different class arrangements within world of the third societies so that both the deployed form of primitive accumulation and resistance to it can be precisely located and analysed. That is, we need to give shape to world of the third by opening a theoretical space that would allow for all these diverse possibilities to exist. This demands a movement from the categorization of the economy in terms of mode of production (more of a macro concept) to that of the de-centred and disaggregated rendition.

Moreover, Marx can be seen to be marking a sharp distinction between modern techniques and what we have referred to as modernization. The discourse of modernism is set through the dualism between agriculture and industry with development conceived as the expansion of the latter at the expense of the former. Marx can clearly be seen as rejecting modernism even as he considers modern techniques indispensable for the development of societies, agriculture or industrial. In fact, the issue for Marx was not industry versus agriculture (or modernism versus traditionalism), but the presence of exploitation, enslavement and plunder within each and in relation to one another. Referring to these dualisms as imaginations invoked to facilitate the journey towards capitalism, Marx sought an ethico-political standpoint that would
move the idea of societal transformation beyond these dualisms (situated in terms of the complex temporality–verticality). For Marx, the struggle for the collective in agrarian societies must be conjoined with the struggle for collectivity in industrial societies such that ‘the return of modern societies to a superior form of the “archaic” type of collective ownership and collective production’ (Marx 1970: 157) is achieved. In this way, Marx reversed what the hegemonic termed as ‘progressive’ into the ‘regressive’ and the purportedly ‘regressive’ into the ‘progressive’.

Marx is not just a historian of capitalism, Marx is not just describing primitive accumulation. The reformist–managerial school prescribes dislocation without naming it as primitive accumulation. Critiques describe primitive accumulation. However, Marx is a critique of primitive accumulation; because, for Marx, the point is ‘not to describe’, ‘never to prescribe’ but to have a world without primitive accumulation. In the process, Marx shows what is wrong with primitive accumulation. In fact, the concept of primitive accumulation is conjured up by Marx to critique capitalism; not to prescribe it or describe it. Through his particular rendition of primitive accumulation in the Russian context – primitive accumulation as violence, as unjust, as unethical – Marx can be understood as deconstructing the idea of inescapable historicity and scientific inevitability tied to the origin and evolution of capitalism. He is also unveiling in the process the ‘masked political character’ of capitalism and primitive accumulation and also the ‘hidden hostility’ of the modern West to world of the third.

In this context, one could also ask: what would a theoretical framework look like that: (i) dissolves the dualistic frame with its underlying capitalo-centric–orientalist mooring; (ii) produces a de-centred and heterogeneous social space in which ‘what are not capitalists’ are disaggregated into numerous modes of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus so that, from within these, collective forms can appear as existing and possible; (iii) enables the positing of a political standpoint based on the ethico-justice considerations of non-exploitation, fairness and right; and (iv) encompasses the different historical trajectories of the process of primitive accumulation and hence of capitalism in a manner that reveals the ‘regressive’ content of the so-called ‘progressive’ logic forwarded by the protagonists of development discourse. Working through all these features, we have tried to produce a Marxist framework that deploys class as processes of surplus labour to open the discursive terrain to an assortment of economic arrangements – capitalist and non-capitalist. It is also to open the discursive terrain to world of the third – world of the third as the outside to the circuits of global capital – as against third world (where third world is what the ‘new pillars of society’ assume as and attest to be in a process of natural decay due to its self-imposed decrepitude and where ‘the kindest thing would be to put an end to its agony’).

It is in this discursive terrain (with the above-mentioned rationalizations for putting an end to agony) that the ‘separation’ of world of the third from its conditions of existence is attempted. Such separation is organized through
RDAs. In such instances, it also becomes imperative to control any possibility of resistance, which is done through IDAs. Working on the overdetermined imbrications of culture and power, of overt and covert violence, of IDA and RDA, we explicate in the next section how the wheels of primitive accumulation operate vis-à-vis world of the third.

**Primitive accumulation: ideological and repressive development apparatus**

In the age of democratization, one would expect the repressive development apparatus (RDA) to be somewhat muted. Indeed, many have pointed to a sea change in the technology of power in the late twentieth century (the age of democracy) that has tended to move away from RDA to the ideological development apparatus (IDA). We contend that any thesis of a total change in the technology of power to IDAs is a gross simplification (at least for the Southern countries) and does not bear testimony to those cases of dislocation in which the RDAs continue to work with intense ferocity. In the context of development in general and dislocation in particular, IDA and RDA work in tandem, as overdetermined.

**Ideological development apparatuses**

Starting from Althusser (1978[2002]), we locate the place of IDAs as a ‘certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions’ (Althusser 1978[2002]: 172). ‘Ilectual’ is the imagination that individuals form about themselves and others, including other subjects and institutions (Wolff 2005). The institutions are literally places where the IDAs materialize and function. In this sense, the ideological apparatus has a definitive material base although its effects are not confined to that base. According to Althusser, an ‘ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material’ (Althusser 1978[2002]: 191). IDAs *interpellate* subjects (they are made to respond to certain calls – say the call of being the ‘subject of development’).

The category of subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.

Althusser (1978 [2002]: 195)

All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects … ideology ‘acts’ or functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing. …

Althusser (1978 [2002]: 197)
The task of IDAs would be to interpellate subjects to the *nodal signifiers* of development – capitalist exploitation, capitalist commodity and hegemonic needs. The IDAs would include the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), development-related research institutes, institutes of development economics, state agencies including central banks, educational institutions and departments, management and finance-related institutes, political parties, trade unions, legal institutions, policy making bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media–communication services (press, radio and television). Through processes of production and dissemination of meanings, subjects are made to set up a relation with certain signifiers – profit, efficiency, competition, consumption, development, industrialization, individualism as signifiers of an unquestioned good – and third world-liness, agriculture, informality as signifiers of backwardness in need of development.

It is indeed a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without appearing to do so, since these are ‘obviousness’) obviousness as obviousness, which we cannot fail to recognize and before which we have the inevitable and natural reaction of crying out: ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!’

Althusser (1978[2002]: 194–95)

It is, as if, the ‘individuals are always already subjects’; subjects see themselves as ‘working by themselves’. The strength of ideological production is such that individuals do not think that they are being duped–deceived into becoming such and such subjects. Rather, ‘the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that she shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that she shall (freely) accept her subjection, in order that she shall make the gestures and actions of her subjection ‘all by herself’. They are *not* subjects except by and for their subjection. That is why they ‘work all by themselves’.

... the vast majority of (good) subjects ... ‘recognize’ the existing state of affairs that ‘it really is true that it is so and not otherwise’, and that they must be obedient to God, to their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt ‘love thy neighbor’ as thyself, etc. Their concrete, material behavior is simply the inscription in life of the admirable words of the prayer: ‘Amen – So be it’.

Althusser (1978[2002]: 203)

Is dissent ruled out by the IDAs? Hardly so! As part of its ideological production, one of the major tasks of the IDA is to circumscribe dissent by fixing the terms of reference through which dissent would manifest. In doing so, it fixes the terrain of asking questions. Some questions *can* be raised within the hegemonic order; some *cannot*. In particular, we have seen how questions regarding compensation and resettlement can be raised, but one can never
turn this into a contestation of the development logic. For some (including many in the new social movements), the very asking of questions came to signify the moment of radical democracy – moments of a radical questioning of the hegemonic – a questioning the hegemonic order had previously repressed. For some others – whose concern we share and with whom we would surely like to join hands – doubts over these moments of ‘radical questioning’ persist. They would interrogate the ‘terms of reference’, which so displace people’s encounter with dislocation that dissenting questions come to us in only dwindled and dwarfed forms of some more serious and radical questions that we would like to throw up at the (capitalist) hegemonic. More particularly, we remain sensitive to foreclosure (here class and world of the third) as the founding moment of the hegemonic symbolic (here capitalist development) such that radical interrogation of the hegemonic symbolic is rendered impossible. However, this is not to deny possibilities of ‘working through’ the hegemonic symbolic in which the imagination is opened up to alternative possibilities hemmed to the foreclosed – the ‘possibility for new possibilities is precisely what it is to face the future creatively’ (Lear 2007: 304). Further, given that both subject (and structure) are fundamentally open-ended, cracked, fissured, fractured (closure is a myth!), given that the space of the political is non-finite no matter how much the hegemonic attempts to suture the unknotted, there exist possibilities that work against the hegemonic IDAs. Consequently, the production of a counter-hegemonic subjectivity that contests both the hegemonic IDAs, mainstream or dissenting, is always already a possibility.

**Repressive development apparatus**

RDAs as an apparatus of overt violence and blatant suppression comprise the police and military, judiciary, court, administration and so on. RDA could be termed as the old right of sovereignty – to take life or let live (Genel 2006: 47). For example, the terrain of development is littered with instances of statesponsored violence. Whether it is the case of forcibly displacing people, crushing resistance of people threatened with displacement or subduing people who are opposed to certain aspects of development policy through juridical and legal recourse, the use of state power has been widespread and lethal. However, in the context of development, the use of RDAs should not be seen as the exclusive forte of the state. Political parties, NGOs or even foreign/colonizing powers (the entire colonial experience is littered with such instances) could be a party to this logic of ‘to take life or let live’, either on their own or working in tandem with state organs.

The initial phase of development, construed in terms of the transformation of ‘third world’ structures into ‘modern’ structures, saw the use of the RDA with impunity and without any concern whatsoever for the fate of ‘third world’ people. The subsequent inclusion of poverty management to accompany the goal of growth motored by capitalist industrialization meant that the hegemonic must also be seen as favourably disposed towards the ‘third world’
in order to be allowed to intrude within it as a benevolent big brother. The ‘third world’ must not simply be seen as an evil other, but also a victim other. This realization brought with it a sea change in the technology of power, whereby a new strategy evolved in the form of intervention within the domain of world of the third so as to persuade the subjects therein to give consent to its own existence as devalued, that is third world-ist, and hence in want of the proposed hegemonic need construed and forwarded by the development paradigm. An array of development practices involving national and international flows of social surplus enabled, in one turn, the ideological production of the subjects as devalued ‘third world’ selves and also allowed them additional space (through various projects) to articulate their ‘liberation’ from their self-proclaimed devalued state. However, what never changed in this somewhat altered strategy was the continuing norm of industrial capitalism as a telos for all of the ‘third world’ to follow. This meant that the participation of the third world (through IDAs) in their own annihilation must go on concomitantly with the use of RDAs. Notwithstanding the effort on the part of the hegemonic to de-politicize the exercise of development through the operations of IDAs, RDAs remain an indispensable component of development logic.

One of the fundamental roles of RDAs is to dislocate people from their existing forms of life, so as to ensure that the conditions of existence for the expansion of the camp of capital can be put in place. The justification of this intervention lies in a violence that has taken place earlier – the foreclosure of world of the third through the foregrounding of a devalued third world as part of an effort to set up capitalism as the norm. Once the justification to ‘cure’ the third world is set (in which the IDAs have a major role to play), the dismantling of world of the third societies so as to extend the camp of capital appears perfectly legitimate.

The target of expropriation of world of the third may not simply be to establish, say, a (global) capitalist enterprise or a zone (such as the free trade zone or special economic zone) where a cluster of (global) capitalist enterprises can function. As part of the self-proclaimed effort to ‘modernize’ the ‘third world’ economy and rid it of poverty once and for all, the process of industrialization is seen as the solution which requires setting up, refining and expanding infrastructures, industrial platforms, cities and townships, roads and highways, irrigation systems for water supply, etc. The above moves are further bolstered by a concomitant desire to create a social cluster with an adequate ‘comfort zone’ telescoping the lifestyle that is appropriate (residential complexes, wide roads, flyovers, hotels, shopping malls, golf courses, artificial green zones or pure pristine wilderness without the presence of humans and so on) to attract (global) capital and fashion its camp. Specifically, development projects focused on creating conditions of existence for the expansion of the camp of capital require people to give up land and livelihood and their known forms of life. As the process of industrialization with its associated urbanization in and around the camp of capital is considered the road map to modernity or progress, it is not the existing cities but world of the third spaces
procreating outside the camp of capital that are typically targets of such interventions. That the history of dislocation has been, in terms of sacrifice, weighed heavily against indigenous and ‘marginalized’ groups should come as no surprise. Such interventions within world of the third signify an explicit form of sovereign intervention which the regime of the RDA helps to symbolize.

Revisiting primitive accumulation

As discussed in the previous chapter, Read (2002) argued that Marxists have claimed and fought with one another over two versions of history in Marx: first, the teleological movement rooted in the logic of economism that is essentially motored through the contradictory relations between the forces and relations of production and, second, the non-teleological movement that operates through the overdetermined complex of natural, economic, political and cultural processes. While a few Marxists such as Althusser had previously argued vigorously in favour of the second approach, it is only in recent decades, especially in the post-Soviet Union era, that one can discern within Marxists an ongoing shift of preference in favour of the second approach. We too have been arguing for a conception of transition along this line. The recent rethinking on primitive accumulation as laid down by us in the previous chapter is an indication of this shift. This changing approach has merged with recent ethico-justice considerations on dislocation in order to somewhat dent the euphoria of ‘progress’ attached to the process of primitive accumulation, which is now seen more as a tool for highlighting and criticizing the moment of ‘separation’. However, we have also argued that the process of rethinking primitive accumulation in the current literature still suffers from the inability to include ‘third world’ and ‘world of the third’ in the context of development discourse. Nor has it succeeded in accounting for Marx’s insights on primitive accumulation as he moved from Western Europe to the East. Internalizing the insights of Marx, we have shifted further to the countries subjected to the gaze of colonial development that, for the ‘new pillars of society’, forms the basic ground for charting the transition route of such societies. As a result, the meaning and form of primitive accumulation changes as well.

Before moving any further, we make two observations related to our conceptualization of primitive accumulation. First, and this is especially common in the context of the Southern countries, there is nothing that prevents a subject from holding polymorphous class and non-class positions. Any theory must incorporate (and not erase as is often the case) such polymorphosity within its frame. For example, a wage labourer (say working in the city) could also be the owner-appropriator of an agricultural farm. Interestingly, he occupies multiple positions: that of an appropriator of surplus value (fundamental class process) in the agricultural farm, distributor of surplus value (subsumed class process) in the same farm and performer of surplus labour (fundamental class process) in an industrial enterprise. There is necessarily nothing antithetical between a property-owning individual and a wage
labourer; being a wage labourer does not inevitably mean also being propertyless (including attachment to land). As more intricate interlinkages between agriculture and rural non-farm employment and also between agriculture and industry develop, the multiplication of such varied positions occupied by a segment of rural individuals should not surprise us. Primitive accumulation that emphasizes the exclusivity of pure wage labour (as against property ownership) would run into trouble in capturing and explaining such phenomena (for details, see Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003).

Second, it is becoming evident that the old thesis promising a breakdown of agriculture resulting from the logic of growth through industrialization has undergone some modifications, at least in countries such as India. The promised transformation from agrarian society towards a full-fledged industrialized capitalist economy has taken quite an unpredictable turn as far as the promised accommodation of a ‘surplus’ rural labour force into the modern capitalist economy is concerned. A remarkable turn in the hegemonic discourse of development has been to clear the growing modern capitalist sector of any responsibility in integrating migrating population from agriculture which, previously, remained one of the central theses of not only the dual economy imagination, but also of the classical form of primitive accumulation. Whether because of the rapid rise in population or the labour-substituting technological changes or simply the inability of industrial capitalist economy to grow quickly enough or the perverse nature of the ongoing breakdown in agriculture, or a combination of all these factors, the point remains that the requirement of a mass of potential workers to be released from agriculture towards industrial growth has declined. Another so-called third world ‘traditional’ sector, the informal sector, has grown in volume and importance in the last fifty years absorbing, by default, a large reservoir of people coming from agriculture who are unable to find work in the capitalist industrial economy; the informal sector can be seen as a safety net that can potentially absorb ‘left-over’ population from agriculture. The informal sector can be split into two where one part has emerged as an economic supplement to (global) capitalist enterprises while another part remains outside the circuits of (global) capital (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). The second part of the informal sector within world of the third exists in urban and also rural areas. This testifies to the further point that primitive accumulation does not simply work with respect to world of the third agriculture, but also the world of the third informal sector where the latter’s conditions of existence are expropriated or re-set to facilitate the control and march of (global) capital (Chakrabarti et al. 2008; Chakrabarti et al. 2009).

We now have in place four interrelated aspects needed to re-conceptualize primitive accumulation: (i) the distinction between third world and world of the third; (ii) the deployment of both IDAs and RDAs; (iii) foregrounding dislocation in relation to the creation of wage labour; and (iv) focusing on dislocation as dismantling of forms of life of world of the third societies containing diverse kinds of economic arrangements rather than as a moment of dismembering feudalism.
From a world of the third perspective, the problem with primitive accumulation lies in its very rationalization. A modernist worldview would see primitive accumulation as part of a teleological journey towards ‘progress’ that is inalienably attached to the presence of ‘third world’ as a devalued space waiting to be overcome. In contrast, a worldview that counts ‘world of the third’ would view primitive accumulation as a process of dislocating its forms of life. From a world of the third perspective, not only is it problematical because it comes violently above and over world of the third. It is equally troublesome for it erases, both at the concrete level and as a possibility, all other forms of economic organizations and social forms. This includes the non-exploitative possibilities and fair arrangements that would have reshaped not only the evolution of world of the third in a new direction, but may have served as an inspiration for the workers in industry to seek non-exploitative arrangements. It is all of that plus the eradication of alternative experiences and forms of life, concrete and imagined. It is not just the violence of primitive accumulation that is our concern. Rather, our issue is also with the content of that violence and the imagination it attacks. Primitive accumulation thus symbolizes the sedimentation of relationships of exploitation, enslavement, plunder and calculation at the expense of possible forms of life grounded on sharing, collectivity, equity and care. The divergent ethicalities grounding the two paths are irreconcilable and conflicting. Indeed, as is evident from numerous cases in India, the remarkable dissonance (taking the form of severe conflict) that is often observed between the defenders of development policy who consider dislocation as an inevitable moment of the modernization of third world (here, the capitalists and communists could converge) and those of world of the third subjects flows from the radically different perspectives from where they view primitive accumulation. Accordingly, their respective understandings and ethico-justice concerns regarding dislocation and the assessment of the deployment of RDAs/IDAs differ dramatically.

With this discussion in the background, let us once again focus on the twin transformations attached to primitive accumulation referred to in the previous chapter: objective and subjective conditions. The first transformation requires that the producers be detached from their objective conditions, that is, be estranged from their means of subsistence and production. We have already seen that, following Marx, this means not just the moment of expropriating land from the peasantry. More fundamentally, it emphasizes the expropriation of the tillers of the land. The same would apply to the informal sector or any such claims in common elsewhere. Along with the direct dismemberment of class organizations, we must attend to the alteration and dismantling of the various conditions of existence that enabled the class organizations to function. The attention is then riveted to the transformation of structures of shared environment which objectively defined the forms of life.

The second transformation requires that the producers be separated from their subjective conditions of existence. In our understanding, an individual’s attachment – cultural–political orientation – to world of the third is what we
call the subjective condition of producers’ existence. It forms their embodied subjectivity no matter how problematical they may be seen in other axes (say gender, caste, race, etc.). The subject’s objective condition cannot be reproduced without this subjective condition and vice versa. They are intrinsically linked to one another and constitute the forms of life in world of the third. 

Primitive accumulation is the process of taking world of the third apart by altering the conditions of existence so as to literally dislocate not just their living space, but their nodes of subjectivity too that inflect their forms of life. Far from being a moment of separation reducible to a de-linking of property per se, primitive accumulation turns out to be, to borrow from De Angelis, an ‘accumulation of social relations’ of world of the third. From a world of the third perspective, primitive accumulation signifies a process of separation from the known and sedimented forms of life.

Further, our displacement of the concept of primitive accumulation from its teleological moorings makes us question the received understanding that the process of primitive accumulation essentially refers only to rural areas. As world of the third is a possibility in any space, the urban–rural divide is illegitimate insofar as materialization of primitive accumulation is concerned (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003: Ch. 6). We have already referred to the possibility of primitive accumulation with respect to the informal sector. To take another example, urban squatters may be dislocated by being separated from the ‘occupied’ public space (who live and work in the same surrounding) through the use of RDAs, thereby finding both their objective and subjective conditions of existence abolished. On the other hand, the dislocation of hawkers from the ‘occupied’ working space could see one condition of primitive accumulation (the transformation of objective condition) being satisfied and not the other. While the subjects of dislocation may retain their living space (the hawkers’ living space remains intact), their objective condition of existence (the public land that the hawkers occupy) could be expropriated. Indeed, there can be other variations as well. In this context, ‘separation’ for us signifies not simply a complete once and for all and for all expropriation of people from world of the third. Rather, we use ‘separation’ as involving numerous kinds of dislocation of the conditions of existence that mark the forms of life of world of the third people, where the once and for all complete estrangement is only one form. As we have been explicating, for all such cases, the deployment of RDAs is backed up by IDAs.

In a Marxian rendition, primitive accumulation is seen as a process of expropriation of the objective and/or subjective conditions of existence of world of the third without the additional criteria of it being supported by the absorption of those dispossessed people as wage labourers. If the dispossessed become or are made to become wage labourers and serve as workers in the capitalist industrial sector, then it is only, among many others, one possible resolution of this ‘separation’ unfolding in distinct socio-historical settings. We may call this the classical form of primitive accumulation. However, primitive accumulation could unfold intermittently in dispersed time and space,
producing varied processes of turning world of the third societies into anaemic and decrepit existences of third world-liness. Rather than direct expropriation of the subjects, this somewhat non-classical form of primitive accumulation would involve changing one or more of the conditions of existence of world of the third such that severe disruptions occur within it. Whether it is over an entire region or taking place intermittently across a region, the process of primitive accumulation symbolizes an assortment of dislocations that are an integral component of development logic.

Primitive accumulation thus captures a facet of development logic that not only helps to bring about capitalist industrialization along with the camp of capital. It also never allows world of the third to settle into what Marx called ‘normal development’ – development experienced, understood, imagined, conceptualized, practised and modelled by world of the third itself.

The role of the developmental state in primitive accumulation

The state, like all entities, is an overdetermined site of economic, cultural, political and natural processes; the state cannot be reduced to class process or bourgeois rule. However, the state does also forge, albeit with contradictions, a constitutive relation with capitalist organization of surplus and also its economic, political and cultural conditions of existence. Further, as part of the hegemonic, the state also institutes a relationship with ‘third world’. These two aspects have had a profound impact on the constitution of the state’s role in primitive accumulation. First, while the relationship between state and capital need not and has not always been friendly, certain kinds of state and capitalist organization of surplus have evolved and found sedimentation in the twentieth century. The welfare state under ‘Keynesianism’ or planning and the market-friendly state under ‘neo-liberalism’ not only give us two kinds of state; each also provides their respective conditions of existence (economic, political, cultural and natural) that, through their constitutive relation, facilitate two different trajectories of capitalist organization of surplus. Second, the ‘third world’ centric component of state – state of the post-colonial countries – has certainly invaded the register of needs and, in fact, remains very attentive to fashioning need discourses. Consequently, the state has emerged as an important site of claiming and distributing social surplus to all corners of society. This is true at a conceptual level (say knowledge and policy making) and a practical level (policy implementation) even though in any situation the two levels are overdetermined. That is, not only has the rationality of the post-colonial state undergone a change with its embrace of need discourse, its apparatuses too have undergone a change (with refinement and addition) in order to deal with the challenges that have arisen as a result of this changed scenario in the form of developmental discourse.

These two aspects – the modernist and the third world-ist – combine to produce what we refer to as the ‘developmental’ state. It reveals that the state can no longer be seen as circumscribed by the horizon of liberal rights. Nor
can it be simply seen as being at the direct service of capital – as being its condition provider. The state is also a ‘third world’ state. Beyond the perimeter of capital and market, it also attends to the ‘third world’. As in the development discourse with its two axes of growth through capitalist industrialization and poverty management, the state too has two souls, two arms, a split existence; it is sundered between a ‘modern capitalist’ existence and a ‘third world’ existence. But, is this division real? Or, as in the development discourse, is its ‘third world-ist’ presence part of a management exercise to ensure the safe preservation and expansion of industrial capitalism? Is the second arm conceived to balance out the excesses of the first arm? Through a mediating role, does the state then facilitate the process of primitive accumulation? The history of the evolution of the state in the context of the capitalism–orientalist discourse of colonialism and then development suggests that this indeed is the case. To explicate this point, we need to once again reactiviate the conceptual division between third world and world of the third.

As a conceptual-spatial site of overdetermined and contradictory processes that procreate outside the circuits of global capital, world of the third comes face to face with the camp of global capital. The state plays a crucial role in this encounter. The state being a component of and a partner in the development discourse tries to foreground an element of ‘universality’ to emerge as the mediator between world of the third and the camp of global capital. Yet, by emerging as the ‘mediator’, in the figure of a neutral universal, the state, at the same time, splits the two camps into a hierarchy wherein the latter – camp of global capital – emerges as prioritized. This is achieved because the state works through and within the structure of the foregrounding of third world and the foreclosure of world of the third; this creates the illusion that world of the third is third world. The ‘developmental’ state de facto produces a rationale for itself: the state faces and deals with world of the third as if it is third world, where the outside of (global) capital is turned into the devalued other of (global) capital. The development state apparatuses deal with the ‘third world’ by subsuming its so-called ‘interest’ within the march of capital; it is as if, the good of all, including that of the third world, lies in the expansion of capital operating through primitive accumulation. The pre-assigned ‘interest’ of third world lies in its withering away in the end or its control in the short run. In this way, even as the state proclaims its neutrality, it operates within the development rationality in which the privileging of a part of the whole – capital – is viewed as a necessary moment for achieving the universal good of all. While the category of state must not be reduced to capital’s rule, it nevertheless remains part and parcel of the hegemony that views the economy through a privileging of capital and modernity.

The ‘mediating’ position flowing from the dual face of the ‘development’ state has practical ramifications for world of the third. First, world of the third societies are intruded because, on account of being inhabitants of the ‘third world’, they are seen as victim. The state’s intervention in the terrain of need as part of its poverty eradication programme is supposed to relate to the
state's benevolent attitude to the victim. But, it also turns out to be a component of discourse of cultivating hegemonic needs. Hegemonic because the needs are so produced and positioned (in which IDAs play a crucial role), and their terms of access so cultivated, that they remain at ease with the expanding arm of capitalism. Some of these hegemonic needs can be seen as exclusively pertaining to world of the third such as the rural employment guarantee scheme, mother and child health scheme and so on; while other needs such as compensation and resettlement pertaining to dislocation should be seen as attempts to displace the linkage of development with dislocation into simply the effects of dislocation.

An effect of invoking these hegemonic needs is related to people's alienation from democracy, that is from participating and deciding on aspects of their social life. People's alienation from democracy is a crucial condition for translating world of the third into a depoliticized third world. In the process, 'third world' intervention becomes more of a technocratic approach. Debates on whether the NGOs or the state organs are more efficient providers of help to the 'third world' abound and, more often than not, the Left too tends to become tied to this incitement. Displacing the set of needs that arises in world of the third arises into the 'third world-ist' terrain of hegemonic needs, the 'developmental' state strives to carve out an effective control over the world of the third. The governance of state turns into a management of world of the third.

Second, world of the third societies are directly intruded through the violent dismantling of their space of living through development projects including those that are state run or state sponsored. It is now common knowledge that, in India, prior to and after the liberalization period, state-run enterprises and state-sponsored development projects have played a pioneering role in fashioning massive dislocation in the name of national interests. Furthermore, in the era of liberalization and globalization, countries such as India are witnessing the entry of the private sector in a big way that is changing the manner of expropriation of space towards privatization of property. Here too, the state is playing a crucial role in creating and organizing necessary changes in conditions (economic, political, cultural and natural) such that this entry of private capital could be facilitated and the desired economic transformations achieved. The use of state RDAs is evident in all such operations, taking in the complex conduit of policy, the policing and bureaucratic instruments of its implementation and the legislating and judicial apparatuses sanctioning the use of violence. This could be done, say, by directly capturing land from the farmers through eviction or buy outs, and then handing it out to private parties. Sometimes, the state helps the private parties by creating and/or changing the conditions of existence, in the process deploying the police, changing the laws, initiating or reforming the rehabilitation policies and so on. Regarding world of the third, the apparatuses of the state operate under the moral pretension of doing 'good' to the lagging 'third world' so that the latter can be made part of the modernizing march. The state's ideological apparatuses
work overtime to produce this illusion of benevolence and salvation in wait-
ing in order to depoliticize the violence over world of the third such that viol-
ence is seen as a necessary sub-moment of history. It is thus not surprising
that, like other constituents of capitalism, the state too sees the violence,
including that which it performs, as an act of liberation of the ‘third world’ from
its own decrepit situation.

To take two steps back. The rationale of third world-ism comes in addition
to the (neo)-liberal rationale that sets in place the march of industrial cap-
italism. The discourse of third world plays the same critical role in the forma-
tion of the developmental state that political economy, as Foucault (2008)
describes, played in the formation of (neo)-liberalism and that of the modern
state in the West; the difference being that, in the former scenario, the devel-
opment state has no qualm in planning and directing the (world of the third)
economy, while in the latter (at least in the ordoliberal German version, but
not so much in the Anglo-American version) the state at best helped to create
and organize the economy (particularly market and competition) but never to
plan or direct its functioning. The ‘development state,’ at least the current
Indian state, incorporates both these rationales into the above-described logic
that informs its mediating role.

To leave the world of the third population on its own is too dangerous,
especially when it is subjected to primitive accumulation from time to time; it
must be surrounded and somewhat incarcerated. How? By bringing world of
the third into a discursive register from where it can be subjected to surveillance,
management and control: hence third world. Such an accounting and regulation
of world of the third comes about through public intervention (development
state) and private intervention (NGOs, World Bank, etc.), albeit in their
overdetermined and contradictory relationships. To successfully engineer the
process of primitive accumulation, the accounting and regulation of compen-
sation and resettlement need arise as pacifying technologies in this displaced
discursive register. However, world of the third has relative autonomy; she has
autonomy insofar as she manages her own visibility, thinking, experiencing
and attending to acts and events in relation to the world she encounters, and
that too empowered with various repertoires and skills of self-presentation not
reducible to third world rationale. That is why world of the third (or a certain
segment) at times says an emphatic no to development-induced dislocation.
Simultaneously, world of the third has no autonomy (at least that is the con-
dition of maintaining the order) when subjected to the third world-ist ratio-
ne. This is not to say that in the latter the subjects have no autonomy per se
(people also pursue activities of their own ‘free will’), but there is no auton-
omy from the third world-ist rationale; that is why at times world of the third
(or at least a segment) is inclined to say yes to her own dislocation. Pulled and
pushed into contradictory directions from these two sides, world of the third
lives dangerously and so does the state which tries to both tame and break it. In
a situation where both are living dangerously, in which the life of world of the
third continues to endure precariously and spill over even as the state tries to
control and destroy it, peaceful co-existence is practically impossible. It is in this dangerous field of co-existence that primitive accumulation transpires, an event that the state (committed as it is to the march of industrial capitalism and its conditions of existence in the market, competition and so on) cannot not only avoid but rather, by virtue of its own self-defined rationality, must make possible. The ‘developmental state’ (or for that matter any modern state) *must* thus be part of the governance of primitive accumulation.
8 Two case studies of primitive accumulation in India

Special Economic Zone and Plachimada

If money, according to Augier, ‘comes into the world with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek’, capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.

Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1

To illustrate our theory of primitive accumulation, we now proceed to present two case studies of primitive accumulation in India. They are chosen to reveal, what we call, the assorted forms of primitive accumulation, from its more classical array to a somewhat non-classical mode – a micro and perhaps mundane mode; from its more explicit, overt and obvious version to its more surreptitious, silent and secret form.

We analyse the more classical form of primitive accumulation through an exemplification of the idea of the special economic zone (SEZ) in India. We show how a wholesome transformation involving expropriation and dispossession of forms of life – forms of life within world of the third – is being processed through SEZ. This is a way of implanting deep into world of the third land the machinations, norms and philosophy of the camp of (global) capital; and all this is done on the pretext of forwarding the development march of India; forwarding it in the image of the capitalist industrial West as also China, in its post-Mao incarnation. The defence of SEZ is that it will open the floodgates for productive capital, ushering in the process an increase in income, quality employment and generally producing a higher standard of living; and those who would not benefit directly would benefit indirectly in the long run through ‘trickle down’ from the creamy top. This, however, is not the full story; this is one story; a story from a particular perspective. SEZ helps bring to the fore a combination of displacement, expropriation–exploitation, inequity and enslavement as a way of constructing a ‘colony’ – a colony within independent nation-states – a colony for capitalist expansion and also for the deepening of the capitalist mode – where the capitalist mode(l) is premised on the nodal signifiers (*point de capiton*) – ‘private capitalist surplus value appropriation’ and the ‘market form of capitalist commodity tuned to the global’ (Chakrabarti et al. 2009). The other pertinent point in this context is that of ‘social barriers’ set up by world of the third resistance to SEZ; such
resistance is affecting the progress and also the form of primitive accumulation. Along with producing the much coveted ‘separation’ of world of the third subjects from their previous objective conditions of existence, the mechanisms to control the disfranchised and indeed the very process of primitive accumulation too are being impacted, not only within the SEZ areas but also beyond. In the course of this description, we highlight the particularity of the trajectory of primitive accumulation in India and show how that particularity is partly due to the uneven trajectory of the transition process, not least because of resistances.

While the trajectory of primitive accumulation in a SEZ-like scenario is recorded and recognized, there are also unrecognized and unrecorded forms of primitive accumulation. Our second study concerns this non-classical form of primitive accumulation. We have already elucidated that forceful dislocation of forms of life initiated through development projects is not the only form of dislocation. The logic of growth through industrialization driven by the setting up and expansion of ‘modern’ capitalist enterprises may create a moment of dislocation in which the economic livelihood is dismantled even as the populace of world of the third retains their living space. Resultantly, the change in the given condition of economic livelihood via its overdetermined and contradictory effects on other processes could produce a severe disruption of life within world of the third. This is an instance of a non-classical form of primitive accumulation stemming from the process of separation from one or many of the objective conditions of existence that re-produce world of the third economy and society. In this case, an alteration in the objective condition of existence of world of the third disrupts and could even dismantle their forms of life without the SEZ kind of explicit use of RDAs.

To exemplify the above phenomenon, we put forward the case study of Plachimada, a village in the Pallakad district of Kerala. Here, Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Private Ltd (HCCBPL), a global capitalist enterprise, has set up a factory that produces coke. The received logic of development would consider the setting up of such a global capitalist enterprise in an otherwise ‘third world’ backwater as progressive as it allows global capital and its circuits to prise open territories hitherto outside the purview of the modern industrial economy. We would like to show how this seemingly ‘progressive’ step could create a situation of dislocation à la separation from one or more objective conditions of existence of world of the third societies, here quality water, producing in the end a severe disruption of the forms of life and even their possible dismemberment. Because in the hegemonic approach to development, dislocation for all practical purposes is reduced to physical displacement, the question of compensation or of resettlement does not arise in this case. This is tantamount to non-recognition of a certain form of dislocation.

Special Economic Zone: the classical form of primitive accumulation

The association of primitive accumulation with coercive violence in the form of RDAs can also be read as a failure of sanctioned violence. Sanctioned
violence is defined as a scenario where the consent of one agent produces a sub-space ‘that brings forth effects in it turning over against him leaving little room for his further consent’ (Chaudhury et al. 2000: 92). The generation of consent concerns the production of the subject of development, which, of course, falls within the realm of IDAs. An example is that of a segment of world of the third who would consent to the setting up of a modern capitalist unit in their vicinity, a contract that sanctions the subsequent extraction of resources by the enterprise that may even destroy the forms of life therein (say by depleting the groundwater level, spreading toxic substances, etc.). Sanctioned violence here takes the form of sanctioned dislocation. The subjects of world of the third may somewhat paradoxically give consent (to dislocation/violence); they might give consent for a number of reasons such as, say, for what they think to be a better standard of living (with better jobs, with better education, with better health, etc.) within the ‘camp of global capital’; such as, say, for what they perceive to be the glitter within the ‘circuits of global capital’; such as, say, for the dazzle of global capital that unfolds along its border – the plush shopping mall, the six-lane highway, the soaring sensex. What happens thereafter, that is the theft and plunder, of course goes well beyond what they asked for and is not contained in the contract. It is evident that, for the consent to be generated in the first place, sanctioned violence must involve the moment of persuasion through IDAs. Indeed, and this is quite common, those who surrender to the persuasion and hence to sanctioned violence may clash with forces who refuse to concede and be persuaded in the first instance (such clashes are becoming a feature in space marked for SEZs in India). This also tells us that world of the third is potentially a fragmented space in which different subject positions are produced, and these could and often do clash with one another.

In the last chapter, we saw that primitive accumulation telescopes the sovereign moment involving the coercive use of the state and of law, and also the moment of normativization. Displaced into the development space through RDAs and IDAs as regimes of coercion and persuasion, respectively, moments of explicit violence and sanctioned violence converge and implode within the process of primitive accumulation. This is particularly the case where the resistance or the ‘social barrier’ to the moment of ‘separation’ is particularly strong and/or the potentially disfranchised people have other means such as voting rights to register their protest. Whether ‘separation’ will be subjected to exclusively RDAs or a combination of RDAs and IDAs depends partly on the historical trajectory of ‘resistance’. Consequently, the histories of primitive accumulation in so-called third world spaces, such as in China, India, Latin America and Africa, while being subjected to the same rhetorical loop of third world-ism, have taken many forms depending on the specific mix of RDAs and IDAs.

Our focus is on India where, in recent times, the magnitude of social resistance to ‘separation’ has gradually made ideological interventions important. While ‘separation’ itself involves a dose of RDAs, this is no longer a sufficient
condition. It has to be backed by IDAs. We bring to bear this linkage between primitive accumulation and RDAs–IDAs in the context of third world–world of the third to understand the logic of SEZs unfolding in India. A somewhat furious debate has surfaced of late following the efforts of the Indian government and the state governments to allow the setting up of SEZs. While the radical side has focused on the angle of primitive accumulation with important insights (Basu 2007; Chandra and Basu 2007), none of the forays is based on the framework developed here.

To begin with, a word on the relation between state and market that follows Foucault (2008). Neo-liberalism takes off from liberalism, which emphasizes the aspect of limited government that will allow the market to function freely. Here, the crucial question is: how far can the state be limited in its governing capacity with respect to the market? Foucault points to two trends in neo-liberalism, Anglo-American and German, both of which are active in India, albeit with Indian particularities. Our attention here is focused on the German *ordoliberal* version. This version points to the importance of the rationality of the market and the presence of competition. These, however, are not taken as given and hence have to be created and organized (not planned or directed) within an institutional and legal framework by the state. Also, market and competition are considered as fundamentally fragile entities. As a result, the state is called upon to structure precisely such fragile economic functions. The state exists, as if, to fulfil the economic potential encapsulated in the creation and organization of market and competition that will ensure not only the free working of economic processes, but also eliminate social distortions and thus enable the highest possible level of economic growth and prosperity. Given the fragility of the market in ordoliberalism, a number of state-sponsored social projects such as pension funds, health care, unemployment benefits and so on are organized as part of governance (which is where the Anglo-American version departs, for it would assume the rationality of the market even in these apparently non-economic arenas). Moreover, the greater the expansion of the market and competition into the global setting, the greater is the economic potential of accomplishing the objectives of economic growth and prosperity. Global markets and global competition require their creation and organization through a globally produced institutional and legal framework. To the point of being somewhat persuasive in our argument, we can say that the series of reforms in India – the new economic policies – could be seen as reflective, at least partly, of a transformation of the Indian developmental state from its previously held political character of allocating resources (the era of directing and planning the economy) to the rationale of establishing and organizing markets and setting rules of competition through a remapping of its institutional and legal framework, achieved sometimes on its own and at other times by inscribing sectors of Indian economy within the globally produced institutional and legal framework. In this background, SEZ can be viewed as an effort sponsored by the Indian state to establish the structures of the market and the rules of competition in a very specific
manner that we will discuss. It is not that the state wants to plan or direct the market and competition through SEZ; it would instead help to create and organize the market and competition in the form of SEZs so that the private agents can operate without state intervention within and through it. In this sense, instead of being minimal, at least on account of setting up the SEZ, the state is active, although it never seeks a political explanation or justification for its policy and action, which it instead professes is an exclusively economic matter.

SEZs were pioneered quite successfully in China and, since then, they have been established in several countries including India, Iran, Jordan, Poland, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Russia and Ukraine. By World Bank estimate, as of 2007, there are more than 3,000 projects taking place in SEZs in 120 countries worldwide that account for $600+ billion in exports and 50 million direct jobs (Sen and Dasgupta 2007). In the case of India, SEZs replaced the Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in 2000, which was followed up by the 2005 SEZ Act that began operations in 2006. Indian SEZs allow for the setting up of SEZs in the public, private, joint sector or by state governments, which really means that both private and state capitalist enterprises are free to operate within the SEZ. By November 2007, 404 SEZs encompassing an area of 52,360.0414 hectares have been cleared and an additional 176 SEZs have been granted in-principle approval (IBON 2008: 2). Given the government’s policy priority, this number is bound to increase rapidly, although it must be said that the mass uprising against SEZ in India seems to have put a spanner to its pace.

The SEZ represents an attempt to create a miniature version of the ‘camp of (global) capital’. Other than the industrial capitalist enterprises that form the hub, the camp would include restaurants and hotels, houses and apartments, gymnasiums, club houses, multiplexes, shopping arcades and retail spaces, schools, swimming pools, etc. (IBON 2008: 4). The state plays a crucial role by providing water, electricity and other services required by the developers.

At a broad level, the SEZ has been controversial for two reasons. For one, its debatable nature stems from the extraordinary rate of exploitation of workers in a setting of near absolute control under productive capitalists, which often evokes the enduring memory of a colonized site; at times, such sites even evoke the memory of slave labour in cotton plantations. The idea of such a kind of control can also be seen as somewhat akin to Bentham’s panopticon or ‘inspection house’, which is less about controlling the body of the worker and more about the surveillance of workers in order to impose a better manner of supervision by authority/management so as to generate greater productivity and profit. Second, the SEZ is set up by dismantling world of the third agrarian societies and hence involves a process of primitive accumulation. These two are linked as we explain later. Let us start with the first aspect.

SEZs are meant to serve as a cluster1 with some special advantages for capital – national as well as global. The developers of SEZs would benefit from numerous tax concessions to develop the land, and the enterprises therein would have the advantage of flexible labour norms with the state governments having the power to relax the labour laws concerning minimum
wages act, contract labour act, etc. (IBON 2008). This allows for the relative surplus value production system (which is technologically driven) to be combined with the absolute surplus value production system (which is driven by longish working hours) such that a rate of exploitation not possible in non-SEZ areas now becomes achievable. This allows for an increased appropriation of surplus value by productive capitalists.

Moreover, a system of tariffs, duties and trade operations puts in place various kinds of subsidies (that would otherwise go towards diverse subsumed payments). These allow the units in a SEZ to retain the maximum possible quantum of profit after having deducted all the other payments from the appropriated surplus value whose sum total, courtesy of the subsidies on subsumed payments, has been considerably lowered. These include, to name some, duty-free import or the domestic procurement of goods, exemptions from central sales tax, service tax, state sales tax, custom/excise duties and dividend distribution tax, relief on reinvested export profits, favourable conditions for external commercial borrowing, low rents with extended lease for factories/plots, removal of electricity taxes and duties. Evidently, the exemptions on subsumed payments provided by the SEZ Act would allow the enterprises to retain a greater portion of surplus value as profit than would otherwise be possible. Such exemptions even raised objections from the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which otherwise embrace the neo-liberal agenda. They are concerned over the loss of tax revenue following the various subsidies and how that will reduce the funds accruing to them as social surplus in order to fund various need-related projects. Their objections have been rejected. In this context, we can read SEZ as another example of how the arm of growth through capitalist industrialization is prioritized compared with the poverty management exercise. This prioritization gives to development a certain hue (and consequently to dislocation a certain legitimation) – a hue marked by the promotion of profit-related considerations and the demotion of need-related considerations.

Recalling historical lessons, the colonial space served as an open-ended field for the capitalist class enterprise to: (i) extract for its appropriators the maximum surplus value from the direct producers; and (ii) subsidise the subsumed payments so as to retain the maximum possible profit. SEZ represents a (capitalist) ‘colony’ deep inside the South propped up now by the national states that try to produce a similar environment for the SEZ enterprises. Economic processes surrounding the conditions of existence to organize the production of surplus, political processes concerning the formal and informal rules of authority and control of human behaviour, cultural processes concerning the production and dissemination of meanings are, through their overdetermined effects, instrumental in producing an environment that will facilitate a particular form of disciplinary network conducive to facilitating extraordinary rates of exploitation. The empirical findings of Sen and Dasgupta (2007) on three different SEZs in Santacruz-Mumbai in Maharashtra, Noida in Uttar Pradesh and Falta in West Bengal during 2004 and 2005 reveal that
the government claim of job openings and better terms of work under the SEZ are debatable as these SEZs show an abysmal state of working conditions (captured in their paper by working hours, union membership, wages, etc.) and security level of workers (employment security, income security, work security, skill security, etc.). We can infer that numerous factors such as considerations of wage, tax, trade along with a distinct (somewhat panoptic) regime of internalized labour control are partial effects that are converging to make SEZ site exploitation friendly and profitable.

Now, let us come to the second controversial aspect of SEZs. In the case of India, the central government, the state governments, capitalists and also the mainstream establishment have wholeheartedly, and at times reluctantly, backed the process of setting up SEZs. This has meant the displacement–dispossession of tens of millions of people from their forms of life, thereby turning this ‘separation’ into a total ‘loss’ or extinction for world of the third. Fragmented debates continue to surface on this ‘loss’ such as, for example, regarding whether employment lost due to this ‘separation’ can be compensated by new employment by SEZ enterprises (of course, ‘new’ employment remains a distant possibility in the context of capital-intensive technology with high labour productivity in SEZs). Important as these issues are, it is the totality of their effects and their significance that are our point of focus here.

In post-independent and pre-liberalized India, notwithstanding the history of resistance, the deployment of RDAs (however uncomfortable their appearance may have been) was somewhat accepted as a necessary step for shaping the progressive march of India’s development journey. In recent times, especially with India’s turn towards private capitalism, the employment of RDAs in fostering primitive accumulation and bringing about the much needed ‘separation’ through the establishment of SEZs has acquired new urgency. However, it has also met with stiff resistance. Which is not surprising as, from the perspective of world of the third, the so-called ‘progressive’ move of displacing the ‘third world’ through the expansion of the camp of (global) capital, and that too in such an organized manner as represented by the SEZ policy, comes to be seen as an act of overt violence that is not so progressive.

For world of the third, the issue is not simply that of recompensing their economic livelihood through compensation or resettlement, as is often mistakenly inferred. It is also a question of their subjectivity rooted to the land and the shared environment that supports their forms of life. The development paradigm comes to world of the third as a top-down model that denies or demotes world of the third subjectivity. It packs within its logic a refusal to be sensitive to the possibility whereby world of the third subjects could say no to that logic, say no to dislocation. The concept of empowerment that finds widespread advertisement in the poverty management exercise (the secondary arm of the development paradigm) abrogates its presence in the process of primitive accumulation designed to expand capitalist economy and its camp (the primary arm of development logic).
The resistance to dislocation, which is de facto a denunciation of the primacy of development logic, has forced the Indian government to rethink the whole issue of SEZs. This has transpired into an exercise to circumvent and thus put aside the moment of denunciation so as to allow the development logic to operate freely. In this context, there is an attempt now to reconfigure, but not dismantle the SEZ. It is being done in two ways, and both involve a greater role of IDAs bent on stabilizing the fluid and volatile situation by modifying the nature of hegemonic ‘control’.

First, the government is rethinking the issue of compensation for the dislocated. Previously, it had sought to compensate the losers (including landowners, agricultural labourers and sharecroppers) in monetary terms. Given the strident opposition, it is now also contemplating resettlement, although it must be said that compensation still remains the first priority. This compensation/resettlement, provided it is implemented in its true spirit (given the past record, a very controversial assumption indeed), constitutes one of the cornerstones in the reform of SEZ policy. Moreover, it is a provision that land acquisition should be done by the developers and not the state (although many state governments have opposed it) and, to protect India’s food security, prime agricultural land (more than single crop land) should be left out of SEZ acquisition. The latter means that single crop farms populated mostly by marginalized groups would be open for SEZ acquisition! Additionally, there is a provision being sought to offer shares in the enterprises to the dislocated. The state, with its various organs and in association with private organizations, is taking recourse to diverse means of selling this policy to the potentially disfranchised populace.

With all the proposed policy changes with respect to SEZs, it is difficult to say whether such a reformed SEZ is acceptable to the developers and capitalists, although the benefits of being within a SEZ would remain attractive as long as the colony is still a colony, even if somewhat reformed. The benefits in terms of fewer subsumed payments, loose labour laws and a more secure land acquisition process should be an attractive proposition for any productive capitalist. The Indian state expects investments to flood into the SEZs, even with these reforms.

Second, the Indian state (and various state governments as well) is trying hard to sell the dream of SEZs that is supposed to usher in a new competitive edge to Indian enterprises. This is part of its concerted effort to produce a subject of development interpellelated to the logic of ‘separation’ as a necessary step towards ‘progress’.

Other than making the broader populace surrender to the development logic, these ‘reforms’ are particularly geared towards quelling or curbing the resistance to state-sponsored industrialization developing in world of the third. It is also meant to introduce a situation conducive to sanctioned violence, which will in turn ensure in the first place that world of the third consents ‘voluntarily’ to giving up land (and mineral and forest resources and also forms of life) to the capitalists. World of the third must be ‘negotiated...
with’ to acknowledge, as if, of their own free will, the worthlessness of their forms of life, their ‘third world-ish’ life forms, and to embrace even if grudgingly the brave (albeit risky) new world of modern industrial capitalism with its glittering camp of (global) capital. At one level, through monetary compensation and resettlement, the objective is plain and simple to sell ‘greed’. At another level, there is an endeavour to legitimize the short-run ‘pain’ of adjustment by selling the long-run dream of wealth and job creation. These are, as if, means designed to achieve the end: the world of the third populace thus concurs in their own dislocation and the rest of the populace does not suffer much guilt. The overt violence of primitive accumulation organized through RDAs is turned into a ‘contract’ of sorts that, if successfully negotiated, displaces the enactment of (state) violence into a somewhat civil necessity. In this way, the work of dislocation à la separation is arrived at through the complex interface of coercive violence and sanctioned violence.

IDAs help to develop and disseminate reasons as to why the erasure of world of the third now turned/termed third world-ish is necessary for the good of all including the subjects of dislocation. In the process of having executed and ensured the process of ‘separation’, through a network of media and political interventions backed up by compensations (and even resettlements), they further legitimize the devastation and annihilation of world of the third. Interestingly, the targeted world of the third form of life may in the process simply disappear into oblivion; but the people within, if not killed by state-sponsored violence, will remain. These are the people who have been rendered irrelevant by the Indian nation-state in its developmental journey. Somewhat paradoxically, the government and capitalist enterprises that have ruined their forms of life as well as the international agencies will now send their rescue missions – of government bureaucrats and NGOs – to put up alternative support systems and to ‘help’ the dispossessed and dislocated people with ‘acts’ of resettlement or compensation. Even as it smashes and shatters life within world of the third, the hegemonic (with its organs) strives hard to emerge as the benevolent outsider. As a result, instead of losing faith in the rule of the hegemonic, the world of the third people – the ‘victims’ of coercion and/or sanctioned violence – could now even be grateful to the regime for receiving benefits (i.e. compensation and/or resettlement) in return. Some of the people hitherto inhabiting the world of the third now splinter out to occupy places around the border of the camp of (global) capital. They end up providing cheap labour/services (domestic help, security guards, etc.) that now help to secure the hub of (global) capital – a hub whose very coming into being has been made possible through the dismantling of their forms of life. Others become part of a new world of the third (formed at the margins of and within the (global) city) with their own household and informal sectors.

For those subjects who refuses to surrender to the logic of the ‘new global consensus’, who retain a near obstinate fidelity to the form of life within world of the third, and who cling on to a different ethico-political standpoint from what is forwarded by the hegemonic discourse of development, their
worldview needs to be *put outside* the realm of the possible; they need to be *prohibited*; their language needs to be foreclosed. Only such foreclosure could preserve the sanctity of the consensus and the hegemonic.

The return of the foreclosed is then the condition of a return to the political. With the return of the foreclosed, the battle over primitive accumulation, over sanctioned violence, over dislocation, over capitalism and, more so, over this discourse of development becomes a different kind of opposition. The discomfort and turbulence in current times even as ‘India is shining’ with its record-breaking growth performance testifies to this growing ground-level challenge to the consensus of development. More light will be shed on the ‘motivated irrationality’ of this near obstinate subject in the next chapter.

**Coca Cola and Plachimada: the non-classical form of primitive accumulation**

Let us begin by theorizing the class enterprise of Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Private Ltd (HCCBPL). For setting up its coke plant and activating the processes of performance and appropriation of surplus labour in the production of coke, the state government as proprietor of land, as ‘landlord’, has provided HCCBPL with land against which it pays the state ‘rent’. This site of production must be in close proximity to clean water; availability of clean water from natural sources is then a critical condition of existence for the process of coke production and, in class terms, for the performance and appropriation of surplus labour in HCCBPL. HCCBPL opted for a site in the ‘rain shadow’ region of Plachimada, which had a large reservoir of underground water; and to get the requisite amount of water to produce its bottled products, HCCBPL dug six bore wells as deep as 750 to 1,000 feet. Now this water had hitherto provided an indispensable condition of existence to innumerable agricultural and household class enterprises in world of the third societies whose village wells go down to about 150 to 200 feet. The water is commonly owned by world of the third society; it forms an integral part of the shared environment of world of the third. Other than clean water, the HCCBPL enterprise would be constituted by numerous other conditions of existence such as land provided by the state, loans provided by banks, money capital provided by the shareholders; conditions provided by supervisions, managerial skills, advertisements and also by the process of capital accumulation set in motion by the managers; conditions provided by merchants selling coke. There may be still other conditions of existence, but these will suffice to convey the crux of our argument. In this enterprise, direct producers perform surplus labour while productive capitalists in the form of the board of directors of HCCBLP appropriate the surplus value and distribute portions of surplus value as subsumed payments to the ‘condition providers’. The subsumed receivers of surplus ensure that all these conditions including the natural conditions of existence sustain the process of capitalist exploitation.

The class analytical equation of the HCCBPL enterprise will look like:
SV = SSCR\textsubscript{STATE} + SSCR\textsubscript{MAN} \{(\text{sup, skills, adv, cap–accu}) + SSCR\textsubscript{BANK}
+ SSCR\textsubscript{SHARE} + SSCR\textsubscript{MER} + SSCR\textsubscript{NP}\}

(8.1)

where $SV = \text{surplus value produced by direct producers and appropriated by productive capitalists}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{STATE} = \text{subsumed class revenue going to the state for ensuring the safe reproduction of the conditions for property ownership and other legal processes}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{MAN} \{(\text{sup, skills, adv, cap–accu})$ = \text{subsumed class revenue of the managers for the purpose of supervision, rendering special entrepreneurial skills and for disbursing funds for the organization of advertisements and capital accumulation}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{BANK} = \text{subsumed class revenue to the bank enterprises for lending money capital}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{MER} = \text{subsumed class revenue accruing to the trading enterprises for enabling the sale of the commodity}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{SHARE} = \text{subsumed class revenue of shareholders for lending ownership capital}$; $SSCR\textsubscript{NP} = \text{subsumed class revenue for natural processes on which we will soon elaborate}$.

In the case of Plachimada, while all ‘conditions of existence’ are paid against their respective roles, no payment is made against the process of drawing clean water ($SSCR\textsubscript{NP}$) which helps to sustain HCCBPL. Water as a natural resource is considered a free good and is consumed freely in the process of production. Evidently, if payment against this subsumed class process were to be made, the subsumed payments for the other processes would fall. This immediately indicates that there are gainers from this unpaid natural process. Who gains from this and how? The key to answering this question lays in disinterring the category of profit.

One of the lessons drawn from Marxian theory is that profit is \textit{not} definitionally equivalent to gross surplus value. With surplus value and not profit as the key measure of wealth, the appropriated gross surplus value gets distributed among managers (including a certain sum for initiating the process of accumulation of capital), merchants, owners, state officials, monopolists and so on. That is, if gross surplus value is exhausted through a distribution of surplus value to each and every constituent entity that provides conditions of existence for the creation and appropriation of surplus value – the moneylenders, managers, banks, landlords, shareholders, state, etc. – then profit can only be the portion of residual subsumed payment accruing to the claimants of profit.

Moreover, this subset, that is the claimants of profit, has varied across the history of capitalism, although typically, in the current and dominant understanding, profit (before tax) is the amount left to be distributed for capital accumulation to the managers, for dividends to the shareholders and for taxes to the state. However, from a Marxian perspective, profit remains a specific social arrangement concerning the distribution of a portion of surplus value.

Maximization of profit thus encapsulates the urge to distribute increasingly greater subsumed payments for the profit claimants (managers for capital accumulation, shareholders and the state) at the expense of other claimants of surplus value (Resnick and Wolff 1987: 155–60). Profit claimants contest
with other contenders of surplus value such as managers, bankers, merchants and so on. For example, more funds to the shareholders can come at the expense of lower taxes to the state or lower interest payments to the bank and so on. The incitement to discourse on the ‘maximization of profit’ in mainstream economics thus masks the very existence of surplus value and the contradictions associated with the processes of appropriation and distribution of surplus value; in fact, profit emerges as a substitute signifier of a portion of surplus value that conceptually has explosive potentials.

Further, Marxian analysis has a distinct rendition of efficiency and of the connection of efficiency to profit. From a class perspective, efficiency would entail that the total amount of labour input (necessary labour plus surplus labour) per unit of commodity declines; or, to put it another way, more commodities could be produced with the same amount of labour input. Everything else remaining the same, Marxian efficiency would imply that increased efficiency leads to a greater amount of surplus value available to the enterprises, which is different from increased profit. This is totally contrary to the neo-classical mainstream approach, which explains higher profit as caused by efficiency and, in that light, sees a positive relation between profit maximization and efficiency. In Marxian theory, profits may remain the same, decline or increase with greater efficiency. For example, suppose that increased surplus value flowing from a more efficient production scenario is associated with a greater demand for surplus value from the bankers (who might demand a higher interest rate), the state (who might demand higher taxes), managers (who might demand higher bonuses) and so on. The demand from these subsumed players could be so high that it might reduce the amount of surplus value available to be distributed as profit. Here, increased efficiency may paradoxically lead to lower profit. Or, higher surplus value, thanks to greater efficiency, may be accompanied by the distribution of higher social surplus to meet, say, poverty need. This redistribution may reduce profit. If we view a process like this through, only, the prism of profit, which shows a decline in this particular case, we may reach a wrong conclusion regarding efficiency. Claims made on a law like association of efficiency with increased profit are rendered problematic in the class-focused Marxian approach.

**The story of profit and theft of HCCBPL**

Having presented a class-focused analysis of profit as a fragmented form of surplus value and of profit maximization as simply a claim for higher distribution of surplus value to some specific claimants, we are now in a position to explicate the distributive effects of the unpaid natural conditions of existence that HCCBPL was enjoying. Evidently, if one condition of existence such as the natural condition remains unpaid, then there is a greater amount of surplus available for appropriation and distribution, including that for profit. Far
from a result of increased productive efficiency, the higher profit of (global) capitalist enterprises is a result of:

i. the exclusive and unquestioned right of productive capitalists to appropriate the surplus value materializing under any circumstances and in any form; and
ii. a certain form of distribution of surplus value, in this case, of non-payment for the natural condition of existence, which shows up in higher profit.\(^2\)

To take a look at the profit equation of HCCBPL, recall from Chapter 4 that:

\[
W = C + V + SV
\]  

(8.2)

where \(C\) is constant capital, \(V\) is the value of labour power, \(SV\) is the surplus value and \(W\) is the value of the commodity.

There are two cases that could come up for consideration, one in which payment for the natural process is made and the other in which the payment is not made.

*When payment is not made*

In case payment is not made, equation (8.2) becomes:

\[
W = C + V + SSCR_{STATE} + SSCR_{MAN(sup, skill, adv, cap-accu)} + SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{SHARE} + SSCR_{MER} 
\]  

(8.3)

Now, in terms of our specific case, the component of profit is that portion of surplus value that is directed towards the shareholders, the state and the managers for accumulating capital. After deducting from surplus value the payment to the moneylender, to the managers for purposes other than capital accumulation and to the merchants:

\[
\text{Reported Profit} = \Pi = W - (C + V + SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{MAN(sup, skill, adv.)} + SSCR_{MER}) \\
= \{W - (C + V)\} - \{SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{MAN(sup, skill, adv.)} + SSCR_{MER}\} 
\]  

(8.4)

As \(W - (C + V) = SV\),

\[
\text{Reported Profit} = \Pi = SV - \{SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{MAN(sup, skill, adv.)} + SSCR_{MER}\} \\
= SSCR_{STATE} + SSCR_{MAN(cap-acc)} + SSCR_{SHARE} 
\]  

(8.5)
This reported or bookkeeping profit, however, masks the process of not paying against the natural condition of existence.

*When payment is made*

Had the natural process of water been accounted for in the payments, the value of the commodity would be:

$$W' = W + SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID} = (C + V + SV) + SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID} \quad (8.7)$$

and

$$\text{Real Profit} = \Pi^{real} = (W') - (C + V + SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{MAN}(\text{sup, skill, adv}) + SSCR_{MER})$$

$$\Pi^{real} = SV - (SSCR_{BANK} + SSCR_{MAN}(\text{sup, skill, adv}) + SSCR_{MER} - SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID})$$

$$= SSCR_{STATE}' + SSCR''_{MAN(\text{cap-accu})} + SSCR''_{SHARE}$$ \quad (8.8)

where the difference between real profit and reported profit is $W - W' = SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID}$ and, if the unpaid amount is accounted, that is paid, then the subsumed class revenues to the state, shareholders and managers for capital accumulation would stand reconfigured as

$$SSCR_{STATE}', SSCR''_{MAN(\text{cap-accu})} \text{ and } SSCR''_{SHARE}.$$

Now, what is true for HCCBPL is true for all capitalist enterprises that thrive under such conditions where they can ‘take something without giving’, without even the recognition of taking. Summing up the globally appropriated surplus values and their distributed amount, the profit flowing from the operations of such enterprises would look like:

$$\sum \Pi^{real} = \sum W' - \left( \sum C + \sum V + \sum SSCR_{MONEY} \right)$$

$$+ \sum SSCR_{MAN(\text{sup, skill, adv})} + \sum SSCR_{MER})$$

$$= \sum SV - \left( \sum SSCR_{MONEY} + \sum SSCR_{MAN(\text{sup, skill, adv})} \right)$$

$$+ \sum SSCR_{MER} - \sum SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID})$$

$$= \sum SSCR_{STATE}' + \sum SSCR''_{MAN(\text{cap-accu})}$$

$$+ \sum SSCR''_{SHARE} \quad (8.9)$$

where
\[
\sum \Pi^{real} - \sum \Pi = \sum W/ - \sum W = \sum SSCR_{NP}^{UNPAID} \\
= \left( \sum SSCR_{STATE}^j - \sum SSCR_{STATE} \right) \\
+ \left( \sum SSCR_{MAN}^\prime - \sum SSCR_{MAN}^{(cap-accu)} \right) \\
+ \left( \sum SSCR_{SHARE}^\prime - \sum SSCR_{SHARE} \right)
\] 

(8.10)

Clearly, the ‘non-paid’ amount is the difference between reported profit and real profit. The importance of non-payment lies in the fact that it leaves a greater amount of appropriated surplus value to the board of directors of an enterprise. However, non-recognition of surplus value (due to the non-recognition of class process) means that one only encounters and counts profit, thereby erasing the moment of the ‘non-paid’ amount of surplus now appearing as profit. The process of making invisible the route of exploitation and of the non-paid distributed quantum of that appropriated surplus value through the foregrounding of profit brings two additional benefits to the capitalist organization of surplus.

First, the hegemonic rendition of the economy that follows from the discourse of mainstream economics situates profit as one of the performance indicators to measure the ‘value’ of an enterprise. Higher profit is considered a market indicator of good performance, which has a positive effect on the share value of the enterprise. It also brings additional benefits to the enterprise such as accessing credit at favourable interest rates, getting favourable prices from suppliers, etc. Second, if higher profit follows from higher than usual appropriated surplus value, it allows the board to better strategize over the contradictions with respect to the multiple claimants of surplus value. The board of directors is not only able to distribute a greater amount for profit claimants, but can also now distribute part of it to satisfy other claimants – the banks, traders, managers and so on. It can even distribute some portion of subsumed payments to the workers in such enterprises (who are otherwise exploited within capitalist enterprises) who often receive a portion of the surplus value as rewards, bonuses and other benefits. All such surplus recipients would be negatively affected in case the natural process of drawing clean water is recognized as providing an indispensable condition of existence and remunerated accordingly.

In what is reported by the enterprise and the market (in the capital market, for instance), there is no recognition of the extraction of clean water as a condition of existence. What is reported and understood is that the profit is a result of the increased efficiency of HCCBPL, which, if looked at from a Marxian angle, turns out to be an illegitimate claim. In class terms, higher profit cannot simply be reduced to efficiency per se and, as exemplified in the case of HCCBPL, higher profit is a result of an unrecognized redistribution of surplus value flowing from unpaid natural conditions of existence to other
claimants of surplus value including those coming under the rubric of profit. Consequently, higher profit is the result of a process of theft, that is a process of taking without the recognition of even doing so. Such forms of taking are rampant in cases of land acquisition; but in Plachimada, it was not land, but water; hence in Plachimada, direct displacement from land was not the issue, but dislocation of extant forms of life even if one held on to one’s own land was the issue.

The effect of extracting unpaid natural resources for the purpose of higher surplus value and profit does not end here. Our further claim is that this process of theft in turn produces important changes in other class and non-class processes materializing in world of the third. These changes turn the event into one of plunder. Let us flesh out this point with respect to the case of Plachimada.

The process of plunder of world of the third

Clean water taken from the natural resources may very well affect the availability and nature of the water itself if, as is usually the case, such expropriation of resources for free – without any subsumed class payments – is conducted by a host of such capitalist enterprises. Given that such (global) capitalist enterprises more often than not have no stake in what happens to the quality of water and its availability for other destinations, the use of natural resources by such enterprises (if left to their discretion) can be indiscriminate. This is in sharp contrast to the use of water by other class enterprises that are geographically rooted in an area, whose reproduction depends critically on the availability of a certain amount and quality of water.

We have already shown that world of the third represents conceptually and also in an embodied corporal sense a de-centred and disaggregated field pro-creating outside the circuits of global capital and that it consists of poly-morphous class processes overdetermined by an equally complex array of non-class processes (cutting across gender–race–caste and so on) (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2005, 2008c). Within world of the third, class enterprises would acquire diverse forms – forms that are exploitative, non-exploitative and also self-appropriating – with a large share comprising various kinds of non-capitalist enterprises. We would resituate Plachimada in such a disaggregated class setting within world of the third and would seek to theorize the relation of these class enterprises to one indispensable condition of existence – water. Importantly, while water or any such condition may help to constitute forms of life within world of the third, the existence of world of the third cannot be reduced to one or a few such processes. Ecological processes (including processes relating to water) are integrated into world of the third along with other constituting processes that together define the forms of life therein.

Predominantly, world of the third societies such as Plachimada must not be reduced exclusively to natural or ecological processes. It is often claimed that societies depend upon natural processes such as water, and that they get access to the natural resources including water as part of a shared right over
the resources. Referring to the *Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology* in New Delhi, Barlow and Clarke aver:

> Based on these traditional spiritual and cultural traditions, says the foundation, local communities in India have developed ‘creative mechanisms of water management and ownership through collective consensual decision making process’ designed to ensure ‘sustainable resource use and equitable distribution’.

Barlow and Clarke (2004: 87)

We do not assume that water or natural resources need be considered as shared in world of the third societies; in such societies, the source of water may be privately owned or shared or could even be some combined form of both. Our focus, however, is on the shared right over the source of water that seems to animate much of the discussion in India, especially with respect to world of the third.

Even if water is shared (as is often suggested), the fact that natural processes (such as processes pertaining to water) are constituted by economic, cultural and political processes has an important bearing on *how* and *among whom* it is shared. It is not enough to say that the members have common access to water. What is also important is *who* (individuals or groups) among such societies has access to water and in what form. *What* and *who* defines the manner of sharing? Certain groups (related to caste, gender, ethnicity or age) could have certain special rights over water even if, in principle, all have access to it within such a society. Marginalized castes, poorer people, women, even children may have a lesser access to water resources than dominant castes, men, adults or the richer segments of society. Natural processes such as water could hold different meanings for different people even when they are sharing it. It is well documented that the politics over water is intense in India. One explanation for its intensity could be the contradictory meanings regarding sharing that are shaped by the intersecting moments of class, caste, gender, race and so on. That there is to be shared access to water produces its own possibilities of inclusion and exclusion at various levels as different groups of people in different ways manoeuvre their respective struggles over the process of sharing. As equations in terms of class, race, caste, gender and age change, so does the meaning of natural process such as water, so does the meaning of ‘sharing’, and this in turn helps to re-shape world of the third societies.4

Despite such contradictions cutting across class, caste, race and gender, it is important to emphasize that contradictions are related to the specific form of articulation of diverse forms of life with nature and not with questions regarding people’s access to natural processes such as water. That the natural process concerning water is largely shared is borne out by figures from the World Bank, which, in 2001, estimates that only 5 per cent of the world’s water amounting to one trillion dollars is *commoditized*.5 It points to a scenario where
the natural process pertaining to water, to date, remains mostly a shared product under the jurisdiction of world of the third societies or distributed as free goods through public enterprises (Barlow and Clarke 2004: 105). It is a different matter that the process of commoditization of water through corporatization is currently unfolding at a rapid pace.

Household class enterprises and agrarian class enterprises depend on a set of natural processes (such as, say, mud and dry leaves to build houses, water and fuel to cook food or, say, water and organic fertilizers to till the land). Distribution of surplus in turn could also be geared towards the maintenance of natural processes, say through means as diverse as extensive gifts and offerings via the religious ceremonies to distributing surplus for financing the maintenance of local irrigation systems, and also for soil and forest preservation. All such means help to preserve the natural ecological process that enables natural resources to be supplied for the economies of world of the third societies. Insofar as livelihood within world of the third is critically constituted by the class enterprises through which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed, any disruption in the natural processes, such as the lack of a sufficient amount and quality of water, would threaten these existing class enterprises.

It is in this context that the above-described process of theft in Plachimada turns into an inferno of plunder. Farmers in Plachimada complained that, with the entry of HCCBPL, the critical condition of existence of water that sustained their agrarian class enterprises had altered drastically, thereby threatening to devastate their livelihood forms. Many more found their household class enterprises under threat from the effects let loose by the process of plunder.

The Coke plant’s alleged indiscriminate extraction of local ground water sharply lowered the water levels where the surrounding communities live and farm. The ground water has become contaminated and undrinkable … poor, farm-labouring Dalits and tribals have had to stop cultivating paddy because of this shortage of water, and migrate elsewhere to look for work.

*The Telegraph* (6 May 2004)

… things have turned against the company after it was found that sludge flushed out by the company had toxic material, which allegedly polluted the wells in the vicinity.

*Financial Express* (31 October 2005)

The process of primitive accumulation following the entry of HCCBPL produced a crisis in the seemingly unconnected agricultural class enterprises (because of the non-availability of quality water for cultivation) and household class enterprises (because of the undrinkable and unusable nature of the water now available). As the unpaid natural process intended for one site (the HCCBPL)
inaugurates the erasure of this condition in other sites, in effect, the class reproduction of the global capitalist enterprise takes place by creating crises in other enterprises. The cost of drawing the water for the process of coke production is not simply the unpaid subsumed payment. It is also the variety of social effects, including the effects captured by the devastating impact on the agricultural and household class enterprises that too depend on water whose availability and quality had been compromised by HCCBPL’s intervention. This reinforces the point that the camp of (global) capital and the camp of world of the third are locked in an overdetermined relation; the glitter within the camp of (global) capital is too often at the expense of abject darkness in the camp of world of the third. As circuits of global capital change, such as through the expansion of a global capitalist enterprise, the world of the third too undergoes a somewhat drastic change.

Even if the (global) capitalist enterprise pays for water by buying it, say, hypothetically, from another local enterprise or the community or the state, it still does not reflect the social cost. Hence any amount (to be) paid for water could always be questioned – especially in terms of the cost such an extraction of water incurs on the world of the third. That is, even if a certain amount is paid for drawing water, the private payment does not account for all the social effects triggered by the (global) capitalist enterprise amounting to the plunder of world of the third societies.

This immediately raises the point that the condition of natural process pertaining to water constitutes expenditure on various accounts that are beyond the private consideration of HCCBPL, but which must be accounted within the cost of drawing water. If one starts to account for the overdetermined and contradictory effects stemming from natural processes pertaining to water, \( \sum_{NP} \text{SSCR}_{\text{UNPAID}} \) would be transformed into something virtually incalculable. The subsumed class revenues that, say, banks, managers and merchants receive, and the share of profit that the state and shareholders receive, are then partly due to the spoils that they would not have received without the theft from and plunder of world of the third. The unpaid part of the subsumed revenue can literally be taken as a transfer of surplus from world of the third to all those agents comprising the camp of capital who share in the spoils of theft and plunder. This means that development not only creates dislocation and the ensuing deprivation of world of the third. It also ensures that the riches within the camp of capital are produced through the very process of dislocation of world of the third.

The above discussion also points to an important relationship between exploitation, capital accumulation and unpaid subsumed revenues accruing to the global capitalist enterprise. As explained earlier, the unpaid subsumed revenue shows up in higher appropriated amounts, a component of which is then distributed to the profit receivers. With such higher profit flowing from unpaid subsumed payments, part of the increase could be directed towards more funds for the purpose of capital accumulation which, in turn, by facilitating the expansion of the scale of production (making possible many more
Plachimada), enables higher rates of exploitation and hence higher surplus value and, if other things are favourable, increased profit. A ‘virtuous’ cycle is created for global capital, and this is done against the background of a vicious cycle of devastation and destitution for world of the third. Enterprises such as HCCBPL would, of course, view this in terms of efficiency and growth and represent higher profit as an increased return on employed capital. In the process, HCCBPL would put aside the fact that its higher profit accrues from dislocation; yet, it is the truth of dislocation that can ‘threaten the entire edifice’ of world of the third. It is in the context of this truth of dislocation that our class analysis has tried to show that growth driven and sustained by (global) capital is built on theft from and plunder of world of the third. The theft of surplus labour inherent in capitalist fundamental class process and the theft following the non-payment for its condition providers (here, the natural process pertaining to water) exist symbiotically with the plunder of world of the third. These mutually constitutive processes affect and shape both the camp of capital and the world of the third in important ways.

Considerations of ethics and justice would call for redressing the harm the process of plunder does on numerous counts and the right of all those affected by the process of plunder to be recompensed on account of all its detrimental effects. We have already noted that such an accounting is simply impossible. The demand to be recompensed by HCCBPL would need to telescope effects not all of which can be accounted for. Still, this claim to HCCBPL must be made in this resituated ethico-justice plane. It has to be seen as an effort to resist the process of ‘dismantling’ world of the third societies that finds no reference in the state organs, in the international agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the modern capitalist enterprises and the stock markets. What should have been recognized as plunder is subsumed and lost in the ‘progressive’ logic of growth driven by a process of capitalist industrialization that comes to see the expansion of global enterprises such as HCCBPL as the materialization of a ‘modern’ economy enacting a positive transformation of ‘third world’ societies.

**Conclusion**

The seemingly lingering form of primitive accumulation in Plachimada reveals how certain kinds of dislocation remain un-addressed because, strictly speaking, these dislocations cannot be represented in terms of crude physical displacement. While the element of ‘non-recognition’ is to be expected of the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach, unfortunately it at times becomes true for the ‘radical–movementist’ approach as well. The latter’s critical look remains inordinately circumscribed by the classical form of primitive accumulation such as that in SEZs, which arises from a wholesome ‘separation’ that is gross in magnitude and in which the nexus of state–capital–elite is palpable. What gets purloined in the process are the more mundane but pervasive and ubiquitous forms of primitive accumulation, albeit modified and ab-original,
involving indirect and heterogeneous impacts, impacts that are adverse to conditions of existence in world of the third (we only came to know of Plachimada because of strong resistance by the locals, activists and the involvement of a known multinational). It is important to realize that the non-classical form, the mundane and the surreptitious form (but the deadly form) of primitive accumulation have been unfolding and continue to unfold rapidly in India following the proposed policy of rapid growth through capitalist industrialization. Because of the purportedly ‘normal’ process of capitalist development, these forms of primitive accumulation are helping to break down world of the third, block by block. Such a breaking down contributes to making world of the third societies look ‘anaemic’; and such a look helps to ‘denounce the very wounds inflicted … as natural symptoms of its decrepitudes’, so that there would be no mourning for the demise of world of the third. Reversing Mao’s strategy of enveloping the urban with the rural, this strategy of primitive accumulation epitomizes the encasing and the enfolding of the rural by the urban.

Such non-classical moments of plunder underscore four aspects. First, they highlight the impossibility of any claim of ‘recompensing’ as total, fair and justified; compensation remains haunted by insurmountable limits. Second, they bring to light the process of plunder materializing through the relation between the circuits of (global) capital and world of the third and, in this context, make explicit the detrimental effect on world of the third. This in turn makes the workings of (global) capital coasting the process of plunder a matter of ethics and justice. Third, they bring into the open the aspect of redistribution of wealth from world of the third to the camp of global capital as an ‘unpaid’ amount is distributed as the ‘legitimate’ wealth of productive capitalists, bank capitalists, merchant capitalists, state and managers (and even some workers in certain cases). Fourth, the demand to be recompensed against the process of plunder becomes a powerful strategic move against (global) capital. It is open to imagination that, given the impact of the process of plunder on the natural and ecological processes with its subsequent detrimental effects on the economy of world of the third and its forms of life, the claim for recompense must include the subsumed payment against drawing upon the natural condition such as water. It must also be tuned against all the harmful effects (not all of which can be countered at a time or are even visible at one particular moment) that such primitive accumulation produces on other class enterprises and the livelihood within world of the third in general. With this displacement of the idea of recompensing to a different platform, the ‘logic of development’ in the form of growth through capitalist industrialization would come under closer scrutiny and, why not, serious threat.
9 From resistance to resettlement right
Confronting ‘subjects of development’ and policy paradigms

Among all the societies in history, ours – I mean those that came into being at the end of Antiquity on the Western side of the European continent – have … alone evolved a strange technology of power treating the vast majority of [wo] men as a flock with a few as shepherds.


In its effort to understand dislocation and resettlement in development, this work moves from the hegemonic (that is capitalocentric–orientalist development) to the foreclosed of the hegemonic (to class–world of the third). It moves from class–world of the third as repudiated signifiers, as the unspoken of the hegemonic, to a form of contingent political subjectivity premised on class–world of the third. It further encapsulates a passage from the foreclosed to an ethico-politics of the foreclosed. This work is thus trying to retrieve to an extent the very thing that is excluded–repudiated–foreclosed in the discourse of dislocation. This marks a turning of the hitherto excluded ‘into the legitimate territory of ethico-politics’ (Zupancic 2000: 3), into the legitimate territory for political subjectivity. Then, such a turning away would imply a movement from prevailing subjectivities incarcerated within the hegemonic to a certain subjectivity premised on the foreclosed. Such a movement would also need to flow from an imagination of development produced by a ‘few shepherd subjects’ to an imagination produced by the ‘flock of subjectivities’. The imagination of development produced by the entire flock of subjectivities – polymorphous, heterogeneous, conflict-ridden and contradictory – is rather apposite to what could be called the difficult task of a people-centric democracy; people-centric democracy signals a rejection of the shepherd’s perspective to development and the top-down ‘reformist–managerial’ approach to dislocation. This in turn has enormous implications for meanings of resistance, policy and resettlement.

People-centric democracy

Only when the actual individual man takes back into himself the abstract citizen and in his everyday life, his individual work, and his individual
relationships has become a species-being, only when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that social force is no longer separated from him as political force – only then is human emancipation complete.

Marx (1843 [1975])

Since its inception in modern times as a movement against monarchy and aristocracy, democracy has remained a contentious category. As against the state-sponsored understanding of democracy, there has been a radical tradition of democracy. While none of the sides questions the value of universal suffrage, the radical tradition remains sharply critical of the state-sponsored tradition of democracy for alienating the aspect of governance from the social life of people and thus not striking the final blow to the political rationale of the monarchist model of governance. In other words, the emancipatory project of democratization is left incomplete and, in fact, is somewhat subsumed under state-sponsored democracy. Along with Spinoza (2000, 2001), this radical tradition has influenced Marx and, in recent times, exponents such as Luc-Nancy (1991) and Hardt and Negri (2000). It is to this radical tradition that we turn our attention.

According to Spinoza, democracy is ‘a united body of men which corporately possesses sovereign right over everything in its power’ (Spinoza 2001: 177). Reading the aspect of ‘united body’ not as given but as a movement – a movement towards the ‘being-in-common’, one could represent democracy as the moment when ‘... the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association’; democracy must thus stand against the divisions (sponsored by the hegemonic) among people grounded on envy, hate, anxiety and fear which ‘transform rational beings into beasts or puppets’ (Spinoza 2001: 223). The aspect of envy, hate, anxiety and fear, and the discriminations, hierarchies and exclusions they cause, cannot be seen as a way to fashion a ‘united body of [wo]men’ or being-in-common, where women, while they may differ, would have the right to exercise their freedom. The differences do not flow from or lead to discrimination or exclusion, but remain an integral component of the process that being-in-common is; for Luc-Nancy (1991), being-in-common is not a product but a process. However, an altogether different template is needed to create such a ‘united body of [wo]men’ and to make possible the freedom to express and act. We name this form of democracy ‘people-centric democracy’, where the template is one of self-governance and self-determination, and the operational expression of freedom, ‘democratization of democracy’.

By people-centric democracy, we mean people as makers of, and participants in, the choices and actions that constitute their forms of life. People-centric democratic practice would telescope the features of self-governance and self-determination. Self-governance and self-determination do not mean turning inwards, being parochial, not engaging with the outside or not adopting modern techniques and organizations of production, distribution and consumption. They only refer to a refusal to be governed from the outside, to be
governed from above and to be excluded from governance of their own social life including their economic life. This would emphasize collective participation spanning decision making to the implementation of decisions. It appeals to an imagination wherein people conceive, arbitrate and take responsibility for their development. Self-governance and self-determination characterize a unique understanding of democracy, which sits rather uncomfortably with the hegemonic notion of state-sponsored democracy that highlights a different model of governance.

From the perspective of a people-centric democracy, the template of the hegemonic notion of democracy is problematical because it: (i) de-links the political from the economy, thereby de-politicizing the economy (and also de-economizing the political); and (ii) takes away the possibility of the political from the people by displacing the political to the realm of statecraft; this in turn reduces questions of ethics and justice to the domain of state-sponsored rights and law. This disengagement of democratic practice from people’s lives is a crucial condition to the de-politicizing of the economy and the securing of capitalist/exploitative organizations of surplus. It also helps to put aside political questions regarding development-induced dislocation because this putting aside, as in other instances, would arrest the possibility of politicizing (in a questioning form) the logic of capitalist organization of surplus.

In hegemonic renditions, not only is the economy de-politicized, but also the possibility of the political is circumscribed in relation to the state. Because the modernist state is thought to be representative of the collective will of the people, its intervention through policy experts, in the economy, appears as stemming from ‘public concern’ and thus carries, as if, the stamp of the universal acceptance of the people. The policy making bodies literally personify the principle of deciding for the good of all persons without being vitiated by noises from public opinion that is ‘accidental’, ‘negligible’, ‘caprice’ and ‘uninformed’. These bodies take the form of an oligarchy. It is as if the monarchist model has splintered into particles including policy making bodies, which embody the rationale of the former. Such a democratic model creates a paradoxical setting of top-down governance, wherein the people are nowhere present in the ‘policy making bodies’ that institute policy in their name. Typically, people’s concerns would be met externally by the ‘knowledgeable’ policy making bodies through a practice of arbitration that would either involve dismissal of those concerns or show benevolence by partial acknowledgement of those concerns (for example, compensation and resettlement in the case of dislocation). This top-down governance model of democracy is inconsistent with people-centric democracy as it rules out self-governance and self-determination. In this model of governance, no matter the thousand reforms and corrections, the schism between the ‘policy making body’ and the ‘people’ is maintained.

Rejecting the practice of arbitration on the basis of pre-assigned rights codified in state-sponsored legal structures that tend to produce a bureaucratization of democracy, we, in the tradition of Spinoza and Marx, forward
self-governance and self-determination involving the enunciation of the political as a process of the ‘democratization of democracy’ (Balibar 2008). ‘Democratization of democracy’ delivers a unique understanding of democracy which is never

... something that you have, that you claim to possess (therefore ‘bring’ and ‘confer’); it is only something that you collectively create or recreate. It is not achieved but always coming or becoming... Democracy is not an established reality or a constitution in the material sense of the term, but also not a mere ideal: it is rather a permanent struggle for its own democratization, and against its own reversal into oligarchy and monopoly of power.

Balibar (2008: 526, 528)

Rather than being passive objects of governance, rather than being flocks driven by a few shepherds, people become active as direct creators of the social conditions in which they live. People are as much sites of effects of social conditions as they effect its production. Instead of formally belonging to democracy (as for example through citizenship and rights), people literally bring-into-being its form and thus, in their collective (yet contradictory) aspirations and endeavours, personify its creative movements. In people-centric democracy, ‘democracy is exercised rather than possessed’ (Sharp 2005: 607). This means that, in its very appearance, people-centric democracy must symbolize a process of incessant and interminable struggle directed at liberating the social from the totalizing and de-politicizing influences of state, private and international agencies that tend to reduce ‘democratic politics’ to mere arbitration for inclusion within the hegemonic symbolic. Having been founded on self-governance and self-determination as necessary conditions (not sufficient conditions), people-centric democracy would unbind decisions concerning social life from the totalizing grip of the state and any oligarchy such as the policy making bodies. It also means that the alternative space of people-centric democracy expressed through ‘democratization of democracy’ cannot but be grounded on the political subjectivity of the people.

While we acknowledge the fact that the question of subjectivity is crucial to the articulation of resistance with alternative social reconstruction through the difficult task of the ‘democratization of democracy’, we remain, however, at odds with the ‘radical–movementist’ approach regarding the nature of the political. To be more specific, our differences with the radical–movementist approach surface from its inability to theorize the economy in an anti-capitalocentric frame and hence get beyond the agriculture/industry and tradition/modern divide. Our discomfort also stems from its failure to deconstruct the meaning of ‘third world’ and ‘progress’ in the hegemonic development discourse and also the incapacity to conceptually and practically distinguish between moral commitment towards third world and ethicality towards world of the third per se. That people-centric democracy asks a fundamental question
Regarding the received architectonics of policy making bodies is also not always clearly understood in the radical–movementist approach.

In contrast, our analysis highlights the cultivation of resistance in its intimate connection with the moment of foreclosure and the process of the ‘democratization of democracy’. How are these connected? We divide this encounter into two parts: the question of political subjectivity in the spirit of a people-centric ‘democratization of democracy’ and the idea of resettlement right as a counter-hegemonic proposition.

**Beyond the hegemonic-hegemonized subjectivity: the issue of political subjectivity**

How would we make sense of the subject’s collaboration–complicity–contestation? How do we make sense of the subject’s ‘yes’ to development and ‘no’ to dislocation; or perhaps, even an uncertain ambivalent ‘yes’ to dislocation, basking in the belief that, at the end of the road, there is, in wait, an ultimate good. What have been the hegemonic subject positions; or perhaps hegemonic subject (dis)positions, dispositions with respect to nodal signifiers of contingent suture? What would be a possible genealogy of (contingent) subject dispositions – subject dispositions that were contingently thought – thought in a milieu of radical uncertainty – thought and invoked as a form of soft pleading – pleading in an atmosphere of doubt?

Dislocation has hitherto remained a technical issue to be addressed by technocrats who, under the umbrella of policy making, make the issue of dislocation distinctly *a*-subjective and in the process *a*-political. A-subjectivization and a-politicization of the question of dislocation produces a certain disengagement of the predicament of the subject of dislocation (the *victim*) from the Subject of development (the *shepherd* – the hegemonic subject who beckons others to follow his path). There is, as if, a certain erasure of the subject of dislocation. The subject of dislocation is at best a subject of underdevelopment – a *pathetic* subject of underdevelopment – *pathetic* – because of ‘its’ moorings in a pre-capitalist and traditional third world economy–society – an economy–society driven by poor technology and caste–communal oppression – an economy–society that breeds poverty – such that the pathetic third world subject must make an effort to get ‘it’-self integrated in the logic of (capitalist Western-style) development, to emerge as the subject of development (the *flock*); and to extricate ‘it’-self from its present pathetic state, to emerge as the subject of development, dislocation is something ‘it’ will have to tolerate, have to bear with so as to be the ultimate beneficiary of the fruits of development.

The discourse of development produces and celebrates the production of the subject of development who is hemmed into a *consensus* that: (i) creates a ‘will’ for resignation to the ‘given’ of development logic; and (ii) creates a ‘will’ to resist the appearance of possibilities which put the consensus under
erasure. Consequently, the hegemonic, for all its exhibition of flexibilities in accommodating differences, produces a field of conservatism within which the surrender of the subject of development to the ‘given’ situation – the consensus – is as if a pre-destined rational outcome. Development is not just about a structural transformation; it is also encapsulating a transition of the subject of development. The subjects of development, for all their differences, remain rooted to a chain of signification expressing an advertent or inadvertent loyalty to the consensus that preserves the logic of development (with its underlying centralities of capital and modernity/West) and by showing hostility, disbelief and scorn for projects that question the logic of development. If by ‘political’ we mean the desire to embrace paradoxically what the hegemonic has ruled as the impossible, the prohibited, the excluded, the outside, then this subject of development is not in the process of becoming political and is for all purposes a technocrat. The Subject of development is the apathetic subject – whose apathy remains veiled – who in fact remains veiled – who hides behind a discourse of progress or of technological growth or of an unleashing of the forces of production. As against this given field of politics in which flexibility is produced and accommodated within the hegemonic consensus, our commitment to an ethico-politics of the foreclosed sets up a deconstructive (em)brace with the ‘political’; this in turn highlights the importance of political subjectivity rather than a technocratic subjectivity rooted to normativity–order–statism (Luc-Nancy 1991). The passage from the formal and the abstract form of ‘democracy’ to the people-centric ‘democratization of democracy’ can be only achieved through a movement from technocratic subjectivity to a political subjectivity. Such a political subjectivity would find fruition in some notion of community as being-in-common or some such collective expression.

In this regard, it is perhaps important to appreciate that, for Marx, the relevant question was to find an alternative political form in opposition to two existing forms – one, vis-à-vis the liberals who prioritized the autonomy of the self-centred individual as freedom and, two, vis-à-vis those forms of collectivity that romanticized a hypostatized form of the common/community. While the liberal position understood the individual as independent and transcendent of the social, the latter position reduced the collective to a totalitarian subsumption of the individual (which clearly happened under Stalinism masquerading as Marxism–Leninism). That is why, while being opposed to the liberals (such as Mill and Bentham), Marx was also no romantic defender of any given way of life in the community. Marx would perhaps agree with Spinoza: ‘freedom emerges in and through collective associations, which can only be enacted if that collectivity is not characterized primarily by fear, hatred and anxiety’ (Sharp 2005: 606).

In light of Marx’s understanding of community, how would one conceptualize the being-in-common that world of the third is? Could one impute positive value to world of the third? Yes and no. Yes, because world of the third is representative of an ethic and language that is outside of, beyond and
different from the circuits of global capital. No, because world of the third could harbour oppressions, hierarchies and verticalities. Thus, world of the third would not be exempt from questions of political subjectivity and ethico-justice imperatives (non-exploitation and radical need). This also means that, if being-in-common is to be a process of creative work that would at the same time stave off totalitarian slippages, world of the third cannot but be situated within a process of ‘democratization of democracy’.

However, our critical take on world of the third subjectivities is never to deny the fact that the relation between the Subject of development – the technocratic subject – and the third world subject – the subject of dislocation – is a hierarchical relation; the third world subject is lower down the slope of hierarchy and hence amenable to first world/modernist do-goodism. What one does in this context is measure the third world subject in terms of the principles of the Subject of development. The logic of this measure is such that the third world subject never measures up to the parameters of the Subject of development. The third world subject is always already the lacking—lagging other. The third world subject therefore needs to be included in the circuits of capitalist development; as if, to survive and ultimately be uplifted, the third world subject needs to be included. It is altogether a question of access. Include the third world subject in the civilizing missions of the colonizing west (as in nineteenth-century colonialism); or in the development programmes of international funding agencies (as in a twentieth-century post-colonial world); or in the democratic release of the repressed initiated by the hegemonic in the aftermath of 1989 in the form of inclusion in the circuits of the universal ‘human’ rights programme. If inclusion within the prism of capitalist development is the economic imperative upon the third world subject in the age of globalization, inclusion in the circuits of the universal human rights programme is the political imperative upon the third world subject. The above impulses, civilizational, developmental, human rights-based democratization, are not to be understood in a simple diachronic manner, as one following the next in historical time or in a simple chronological mode, as the next superseding the previous altogether, but as interrelated, as constituting the present in their mutual constitutivity. In all three impulses, the anchoring signifier that sets to work the liberal agenda puts aside the particular complexities within world of the third. In all three moments, there is also a certain ‘fetishizing of the “ought”’ (Lucas 1980: 68).

We have seen in this work how the trope of development emerges as one such crypto-theological principle, transcendentally absolute, something that ought to happen to the third world subject. How the third world subject responds to the (interpellating) call of this crypto-theological principle is another question; a no less important question. The psychoanalytic effects of foreclosure help to hook up subjectivities to the nodal signifiers of capitalist surplus value appropriation, capitalist commodity and hegemonic need. However, the constitutive unpredictability embodied in the sedimentation of psychoanalytic effects also reveals the open-ended and contingent nature of
the subject; such that, driven by a certain hermeneutics of suspicion, polymorphous subject positions, even resisting ones, could also be carved out. The subjects’ relation to the signifier(s) is thus myriad; and yet out of the ensemble of relations some emerge as hegemonic; or perhaps that is the work of the hegemonic; the hegemonic emerges as hegemonic through a production of some subject positions as hegemonic, through a foregrounding of some subject positions (the purportedly autonomous ‘subject of development’), through a veiling of some others (the ‘Subject of development’), a putting aside of some others (the ‘subject of dislocation’) and a foreclosure of the counter-hegemonic subject (the subject who questions the given of capitalist development, who instead thinks of development in terms of class–need).

In this context, against the abstract universality of general ‘human’ attributes or rights regulated by a metaphysical grounding that preserves the present and fends off challenges to the consensus, we propose the ethico-politics of the foreclosed, which is at once an encounter with the truth of hegemonic reality (Badiou 2001, 2005; Chakrabarti et al. 2009: Ch. 3, 4 and 10). For us, the concept of truth signifies a search for not what is known, but what is unknown (Lear 1998). How can truth ever be an encounter with what is known! In such instances, truth is there before our eyes; everybody can see it; it is what is known. In fact, this is not truth but the given or the familiar masquerading as truth. In contrast, for us, truth, albeit contingent and partial, is tied to the ‘foreclosed truth’ or the ‘truth of the foreclosed’. It refers to the setting up of an encounter with the signifiers that hegemonic reality has foreclosed (as against the nodal signifiers which it props up). An active engagement with foreclosed truth or the truth of the foreclosed makes possible a form of political subjectivity that the hegemonic keeps on reiterating as impossible; it is in that sense ‘politics of the impossible’; not impossible politics but the politics of what hegemonic reality has rendered impossible.

Badiou (2001) would suggest that such political dispositions and subjectivities are indeed possible. His ethico-politics of subjective truths would presume that the subject can be active; the subject can be indifferent to established or state-sanctioned differences; the subject can operate in the ‘realm of practical division’ (for or against the foreclosed, for or against the truth) and situates its affirmation precisely there where the state of the situation can see only the non-known and the non-obvious. This is thus a journey from the prevailing subjectivity, from subjectivity tuned to the hegemonic consensus to ethico-political subjectivity moored to the foreclosed. Given that such a search for truth reflects critical and self-reflexive political engagement, the appearance of this ethico-political subjectivity signals a march into the terrain of the ‘democratization of democracy’.

Ethico-political subjectivity premised on the foreclosed is subjectivity that refuses to be based and premised on the discourse and desire of the ‘reformist–managerial’ agenda; it refuses to be based on what passes as (categorical) imperative – whether in desire, in imagination or in reality. This is because
what philosophy calls the moral law – and more precisely, what Kant
calls the categorical imperative – is in fact nothing other than the super-
ego. ... In so far as it has its origins in the constitution of the superego,
[subjectivity] becomes nothing more than a convenient tool for any [master
or] ideology which may try to pass off its own commandments as the truly
authentic, spontaneous and ‘honorable’ inclinations of the subject.

Zupancic (2000: 1)

Ethico-political subjectivity premised on the foreclosed ‘equally refuses the
unsatisfactory option of a ‘(post)-modern’ ethics based on the reduction of the
ultimate horizon of the ethical to “one’s own life”’ (Zupancic 2000: 5).

Moreover, as our ‘normal’ conscious everyday life, our psychological status
quo – the ‘ego’s era’ – is anchored around foreclosure, access to the foreclosed
must be achieved through an ‘essential encounter’ (Badiou 2001: xvii). This
happens when interpretation hits the foreclosed. In this context, political
subjectivity would exhibit an unflinching fidelity to what Badiou calls an
‘event’, where an event is an eruption that cannot be accounted for within
given language and within always already instituted knowledge. Neither can
the usual behaviour and opinions come to terms with it. It is something
beyond what is currently comprehensible, a supplement to ‘what there is’. An
event is then an irruption in the field of consensus, which forces the subject to
account for and embrace new avenues of contemplation, decision and action.

Would we have to rely on the spontaneity of the event or is its organization
inevitable? Should the organization be from within the concerned people? Or
is outside activation indispensable? Leaving these important questions aside for
the time being, we would like to underline the point that the issue is not
simply that of hitting upon the foreclosed. Instead, the point is to fathom how this
retrieval could be turned into a productive engagement insofar as altering the
given consensus is concerned. How can the subject be made to turn away
from the given worldview in which the foreclosed reside as the outside/excluded?
How can such a turning away alter the relation of the subject to the signifier?

Further, given that the subject is an ensemble of overdetermined and con-
tradictory processes, the final trajectory of the event is not definitively known.
It is always open to hegemonic modes of appropriation and accommodation.
One is always subjected to the possibility of the opposition being circumscribed–compromised within subtly displaced versions of the proposition.
Through modes of appropriation and accommodation, we may, as is often the
case, see the resisting subject (including the organizers) talking with the policy
making body or subject of development in terms the latter would set, namely
compensation and resettlement. Such a ‘talking to’ or ‘taking with’ policy
makers re-inscribes the ‘oligarchic’ presence of policy making bodies as a
formal and abstract entity and encapsulates a rejection of the principle of
‘democratization of democracy’. That is why, not ‘contingent negotiation’
within the hegemonic but ‘standpoint politics’ is crucial for the cultivation of
resistance to the hegemonic (Achuthan 2005).
To arrive at a ‘standpoint politics’, this work tries to think of ethico-political subjectivity in relation to the foreclosed, where the foreclosed is intimately intertwined with the Marxian theorization of economy, development, primitive accumulation (as the Marxian interpretation of dislocation) and the Marxian standpoint epitomized by its commitment to appropriative justice, productive justice and development justice. The aim of this work was to ‘produce’ and in the process unveil the structure and logic of capitalocentric–orientalist development, to render visible its ‘produced’ character pertaining to dislocation and to show at the same time that it is produced through foreclosure – foreclosure of class–world of the third. This work argues for a rethinking of ethico-political subjectivity in terms of a *traversing of the fundamental fantasy* – a traversing of the fundamental fantasy of capitalist development through a concomitant setting up of an encounter with the foreclosed of capitalist development. The opening up of a class–world of the third-based alternative space enables this traversing. This inaugurates for us a Marxian standpoint, which differentiates between resistances grounded on the truth of the foreclosed and those that remain oblivious of such grounding. This is because the former offers a dramatically different view of hegemonic development and consequently a different character of resistance too. Not only does it bring into consideration a different idea of the ethico-political and its associated democratic practice, but it also challenges the given understanding of policy in fundamental ways.

**Resettlement policy: the middle path of the World Commission on Dams**

In the ‘reformist–managerial’ approach circumscribed by capitalocentric–orientalism and driven by the top-down structuralist framework, there is no scope for accommodating the democratic subject and her subjectivity. The ‘radical–movementist’ approach has taken the route of resistance and people-driven reconstruction, which encapsulates an uncompromising stance against development logic. There have been attempts to combine the two by drawing upon their respective strengths in risks and rights. This middle path of a ‘rights and risks approach’ (RRA) has been best articulated by the World Commissions on Dams (WCD).

WCD-based RRA does point to the importance of participatory decision making such that an ‘inclusive’ resettlement process involving the stakeholders can be situated and backed by suitable regulatory/legal set ups, accountability and transparency of rights. Unfortunately, the attempted alternative idea of resettlement forwarded by WCD (2000) does not confront head on the capitalocentric–orientalist frame. Neither does it comprehend, despite a call for participation, the importance of articulating the idea of resettlement in the context of the schism in perspective between policy makers and the subjects of dislocation. It leaves the oligarchic nature of policy making bodies unaddressed. In this respect, WCD maintains an ambiguity on the relation of dislocation to development and fails to address the space of dislocation as a
site of conflict. This again leaves the issue of subjectivity unaddressed, when in fact dislocation provokes contradictory subject dispositions. WCD’s effort to forward an apolitical definition of resettlement taking all sides into account comes to nought. The World Bank rejects their proposal as impractical for policy makers to implement, and ‘radical–movementists’ such as Medha Patkar voice dissent by noting that ‘even with rights recognized, risks assessed and stakeholders identified, existing iniquitous power relations would too easily allow developers to dominate and distort such processes … Understanding this takes us beyond a faith in negotiations’ (Patkar in WCD 2000: 320–21). Paraphrasing Patkar, we may wonder where within the RRA is the acknowledgement of repressive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses that are part of the development paradigm. Isn’t it wishful thinking to imagine that this paradigm will suddenly have a change of heart and would be willing to compromise its logic and mode of governance for the sake of the dislocated when it has forwarded all the good reasons not to do so?

The problem with WCD is its inability to consider dislocation as an inalienable component of the logic of capitalist development. It does not relate its theorization of rehabilitation to the theory of development and dislocation. It thus fails to realize that there cannot be any middle path on this question. You either adhere to the progressive value imputed to development logic, which makes dislocation inevitable (WCD does not question this aspect and, given its commitment to capitalism, the World Bank and the ‘reformist–managerial’ community cannot bring a halt to capitalist development). Alternatively, you stand against development logic and work towards an ‘imagination and practice of development that respects people’s existing life-worlds, value and rights’ (Dwivedi 2002: 730).

We want a way out of this impasse and so turn our attention towards an imagination of resettlement that also accommodates in its very invocation an opposition to development logic. This can only happen by ‘affirming people’s rights to planning, management and development of their own resources’ (Dwivedi 2002: 730).

There is another way to appreciate this approach to rethinking resettlement. How would we think of resettlement that, for one, is not compromised by compensation and resettlement need and, two, positions the subject in a manner that challenges the model of ‘shepherd and flock’? For this, we need to move away from resettlement need towards resettlement right. The crux of this passage is the transformation of resettlement into a radical need. Resettlement right should not be read as a model (which it is not). It is more of a counter-hegemonic approach that confronts the issue of resettlement in the face of dislocation.

**Concepts for thinking about resettlement right: concrete dislocation, notional dislocation and re-location**

We start with the difference between dislocation as a notional concept and dislocation as an actual event. Concrete dislocation is the *actual event* of
disruption emanating from say the initiation of development projects. We take a position of zero tolerance towards concrete or actual dislocation. On the other hand, we define notional dislocation as a possibility capable of unfolding but as yet not having acquired a concrete form. As such, notional dislocation can be conceived as a state concerning the condensation of perceived effects following the possible occurrence of an event. The notional state of dislocation is then *ex ante*; it is positioned before the event of concrete dislocation with its diverse forms of disruption and displacement. With zero tolerance towards concrete dislocation, we ask: what is required to prevent the notional state of dislocation from taking a concrete form?

It is important to understand that our question is not what we can do in a situation of concrete dislocation. If development-induced dislocation of world of the third is considered unethical, justice calls for the prevention of concrete states of dislocation. The relevant domain of addressing the issue of dislocation is: how do we prevent concrete dislocation? This takes the issue of addressing dislocation in a different discursive register. However, it takes us into a difficult situation if we are also saying, as we do, that movement of people is inevitable and that we do not consider industry *per se* as evil. We are led to another question: how do we think of industrialization in a scenario of zero tolerance to concrete dislocation? We focus primarily on the first question and end this chapter with the second question.

We have already moved beyond the industry–agriculture divide; any voluntary switch between sectors would make movement of people unavoidable. To clear up a possible source of confusion, we emphasize the need to distance the idea of dislocation as capturing disruption and involuntary displacement from that of movement of people, which is voluntary. To capture the distinctness of the latter phenomenon, we name it re-location.

Dislocation encapsulates the disempowerment of those whose lives are affected, but who never agreed to dislocation. On the other hand, re-location or voluntary movement of people will mean that people resettle because they want to move. Our conceptual framework on resettlement thus comprises concrete dislocation, notional dislocation and re-location.

Suppose we come across a notional state of dislocation, say the undertaking of a possible development project. As a result, the possibility of dislocation in the ‘involuntary’ or ‘concrete’ sense appears. Two scenarios are now possible. First, if the notional state becomes real, then concrete dislocation has happened. This is because people, for whatever reasons, have evidently not agreed to the possibility of the proposed resettlement plan. In this case, if the development project is still allowed to go through, concrete dislocation will occur in the sense of primitive accumulation. There is another possibility. Instead of dislocation, people might voluntarily want to re-locate and as such concur to ‘agreed upon’ resettlement and, by default, to the implementation of the development project. Given that our ethico-political standpoint condemns concrete dislocation and accepts re-location, we are
exploring the avenue that will help to keep the difference between concrete dislocation and re-location active.

There are two differences that we have highlighted: between notional dislocation and concrete dislocation and between concrete dislocation and relocation. Resettlement right must weave its proposal through these differences such that notional dislocation and re-location are acceptable while concrete dislocation is not.

The imagination of resettlement right

What is resettlement right? How does resettlement right embody zero tolerance towards dislocation qua concrete dislocation? Resettlement right highlights two aspects.

First, with zero tolerance towards concrete dislocation, no form of development-induced disruption in general and its specific form such as physical displacement would be accepted. This is guaranteed if the people who would otherwise be dislocated agree to resettle before the actual dislocation takes place. Consequently, their resettlement is ensured prior to that moment of actual movement which, in effect, can be seen as a re-location from one place to another. Making this resettlement possible at the level of policy must entail that the state of dislocation as a notional concept must be acknowledged and integrated within the compass of policy conceptualization, policy making and policy implementation. This integration of notional dislocation within the policy ambit comes with a self-imposed constraint, namely that notional dislocation should not be transformed into concrete dislocation. Such self-imposed constraint, if applied, will not be unique to dislocation. It is in fact operational in many other domains such as zero revenue deficit (fiscal constraint) and inflation targeting (monetary constraint). However, the difference lies in the fact that the dislocation-based constraint would put resettlement right in confrontation with the development logic, as resettlement right demands that neither the dualistic frame nor the strong arm of development logic that it generates should be prioritized in the case of dislocation. This realization gets us away from the generic approaches of resettlement such as those forwarded by the World Bank and WCD, in which the inevitability of development logic is openly or silently accepted.

Second, resettlement right takes with loads of salt any comparison between the two states – before and after the movement of people. Because we contend that such comparison is extremely difficult, it is misplaced to hold that State II (say the new state after re-location) has to be better than State I (say the old state before re-location). Consequently, a rehabilitation package based on such a comparison is summarily rejected because of faulty methodological grounds. From Chapter 5, we can put forward three reasons why such a comparison between two different states is difficult.

To recap, to begin with, we have already demonstrated in Chapter 5 that no finite or absolute calculation of loss is possible; a cost–benefit model is
inadequate to account for all the effects following an event such as a development project or the setting up of an enterprise. Next, the set of needs considered desirable by the affected people in State II is not what the set of needs in State I was. In other words, the socially desirable set of needs keeps on changing across time and space, and there is nothing to suggest that the people will be satisfied with the needs available in the old state, State I. ‘There is enough empirical evidence to suggest that people losing land prefer to be compensated with jobs, those losing livelihoods prefer land’ (Dwivedi 2002: 720; also see Asif 2000). In this regard, it is not clear why people when they move to a new place (State II) should not have the right to put forward and seek a changed set of needs (in terms of both quantity and quality) that they would consider as appropriate under the new circumstances. Is it not, as Cernea pointed out, the case that, when the nation-state encourages voluntary migration to a new place, it literally builds the new place to harbour what could be considered as the socially desirable needs of the re-located? These are not necessarily the same set of needs that the migrating population enjoyed previously. Third, the new state, State II, in which people are to be resettled, is distinctly different from where they have had to move from, State I. State I is different from State II because the economic, political, cultural and natural processes are different for the two states. To impute a tangible or quantitative value to the various elements (such as cultural ones) pertaining to the different states is for all practical purposes an impossible task. The assessment of needs that would come under considerations of resettlement pertaining to the new state would also inevitably be different from the current state. For example, the resettlement need of people moving from, say, an agrarian society to a site close to a town must be construed in terms of the relevant needs pertaining to the procreation of life in the new surroundings (here the town). For all these reasons, any comparison between States I and II is fraught with problems.

The abandoning of comparison between the two states has major implications for the policy on resettlement and for the issue of dislocation. Let us start with the former. If no definite comparison can be made between the two states and if the appropriate set of needs to be accounted for in the resettled areas is also a matter sensitive to the specific needs of the people asked to move, then the set of people positioned for rehabilitation must be brought into the process of policy conceptualization, policy making and policy implementation. Because the need space becomes dependent on the subjective dispositions of the targeted populace in new contexts, needs can no longer be articulated outside of the subjectivities that feel the need of this or that. This in turn has important ramifications for the received idea of policy – policy has to be people-centric and bottom up, not top down.

If a certain form of development has negative effects on the subjects of dislocation, then it is unclear why these subjects should not be made part of the process of policy pertaining to development. If empowerment is to be considered a serious enough issue, then in the case of development projects
that cause dislocation, the affected people must be made part of the process of policy. Resettlement right then demands that the division between the policy makers and the subjects of dislocation be abolished. It is not a matter of increasing the negotiating power of the subjects of dislocation vis-à-vis the policy makers, but one of changing the very meaning of how policy making bodies are constituted. It is not a matter of what (policy), but of how (to think policy).

In drawing up this idea of resettlement right, the difference in conceiving and implementing projects in Cernea’s vis-à-vis our approach becomes apparent. First, subjects facing a notional state of dislocation must be part of the process of policy conception, policy making and policy implementation, which is not something that is accommodated within the ‘resettlement with development’ approach of Cernea. As already explored in Chapters 3 and 5, the Cernea–World Bank approach remains in the end a top-down model that takes the subject of dislocation as given and subservient to the ‘reformist–managerial’ community. There is a “speaking with” the subjects, but the centricity of the ‘reformist–managerial’ community is nowhere disturbed. The assigned schisms between policy making bodies and the subjects are not disrupted. In the end, for all the data retrieval made possible through a talking with the subjects, the discourse of dislocation and rehabilitation remains a talking to the subjects: ‘... the IRR model is insensitive to people’s voices and opinions’ (Dwivedi 2002: 720). In resettlement right, the division between the knowledge producer/implementer and the object of knowledge (here the subjects of dislocation) is put into question. ‘Policy’ is subjected to a process of the ‘democratization of democracy’; where the people bring to bear upon the debate on resettlement aspects of self-governance and self-determination.

Second, the issue is no longer simply that of making a quantum of social surplus as investment fund available for the project. As the subjects in question now play a significant role in deciding upon the rehabilitation package, the amount of investment needed for rehabilitation is a result of deliberation that is open-ended and a matter of the intervention of the subjects of dislocation. And as such sites facing notional dislocation are respectively composed of a specific cluster of processes, the resettlement scheme could vary from site to site. As such, unlike in Cernea, there is no one scheme that can be imagined as the model rehabilitation package. Third, as the effected people are overseeing the process of the implementation of rehabilitation as, say, part of a supervising committee, the actual project cannot start without the approval of the committee regarding the satisfactory completion of the rehabilitation package. Consequently, the implementation aspect is telescoped in the category of resettlement right. Moreover, without the agreed upon investment fund, the actual project (say building an industrial platform) cannot begin; so the project itself will be considered as null and void. This takes us to the fourth difference, namely the right of the subjects of dislocation to say no to concrete dislocation and re-location. Such an empowerment of subjects to say no would be tantamount to a rejection of the sacrosanct and
unquestionable position of development logic. This is distinct from Cernea–World Bank or even the WCD where development logic is either defended or left unquestioned. In contrast, resettlement right empowers the subjects to question the development logic.

Possible objections to resettlement right

At this point, it would not be irrelevant to address a few possible objections to the category ‘resettlement right’.

Why should we consider the people facing the notional state of dislocation who reside invariably in the world of the third societies to be ‘equipped’ to be made part of the process of project conceptualization, project making and project implementation?

This question, by itself, smacks of a capitalocentric–orientalist gaze of the self/modern over the other/traditional, a worldview that we question. Indeed, posing such questions is part of the process of the cultural–political construction of these people as inferior/ill-equipped/weak, as really the lacking underside of the modernizers whom the community of ‘experts’ in charge of development knowledge and policies represents. This view in turn helps to keep intact the oligarchic form of policy making bodies.

Other than critiquing this worldview, we take another route to answer this question. To the question of why the participation of the subjects of dislocation is desirable, we will turn the question around and ask: why not? Following Cullenberg (1992, 1998), we can say that, if one rejects this participation, one also rejects the right of individuals to participate on an equal footing in making decisions concerning issues that are of central importance to their lives and that are going to affect the better part of their waking hours.

The argument against the participation of people facing notional dislocation smacks of ‘guardianship’. Guardianship can legitimately be put forward as a reason for non-participation in government, as with children in a household, although even that is problematical (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2007). However, the case for guardianship is more difficult to make with respect to adult members who are considered to be capable of making decisions unless they are considered as less than human. Dahl (1989) confronts this argument against democratic participation by arguing that collective associations (such as the policy making bodies) should be governed democratically and that the justification for this goes back to the moral claim for intrinsic equality. Dahl defines intrinsic equality, following Locke, as the ‘fundamental belief that at least on matters requiring collective decisions … all persons … are, or ought to be considered, equal in some important sense’ (ibid.: 85). Dahl anticipates an immediate objection to the claim for intrinsic equality, namely why should we suppose that all members of an association are equally capable of participation in collective decision making? What about children, the mentally disabled or the
‘ignorant’ women workers? We may further invoke the categories of Adivasis, Dalits, etc., who are at the receiving end of development logic.

Perhaps collective decisions should be made by guardians, patriarchs, despotis, capitalists, economic ‘experts’, bureaucrats and so on, in the best interests of their subjects. In terms of development, it is the body of ‘experts’, state bureaucrats and international agencies (including funding agencies) who could be considered as ‘guardians’ of the process of development and hence capable of taking decisions in the interest of people including the dislocated people. The interests of the dislocated people are considered to be served by dislocation because it is claimed that their current pain will lead to future gains. The judgement of what is ‘good’, who gets what and how who gets what are fixed by the guardians themselves as part of the capitalocentric–orientalist telos within which they operate.

In order to counter this argument of ‘guardianship’, we may invoke Dahl’s argument for the strong principle of equality: ‘If the good or interests of everyone should be weighed equally, and if each … person is in general the best judge of his or her good or interest, then every … member of an association is sufficiently well qualified, taken all around, to participate in making binding collective decisions that affect his or her good or interest’ (Dahl 1989: 105). Again, in our terms, if, as individuals, the affected people are considered as equal to the development experts, then it is not clear why those who are negatively affected by the project should not be considered as qualified to make judgements regarding the ‘good’ of the project. By still excluding the people from the development policy, are we not saying that these people are somewhat less rational than the development experts, which would paradoxically contravene the very basis of modernity’s own foundation of treating subjects as rational and, by that parameter, as equal? Or is it indeed the case that the subjects of dislocation are considered less than human qua the Subject of development? Either way, we squarely place the argument against participation of the affected people on the shoulders of those who think that these people are incapable of making decisions affecting their own best interests or welfare.

What about specialization? Does not any planning (say for development projects) involve a degree of competence on various components of the plan?

A case could be made that not all members are equally informed and skilled to make decisions on the allocation of resources, techniques of investment, financial management and any number of other specialized and highly skilled decisions. Just as perhaps the most persuasive argument against democracy has been that citizens are not always competent to make ‘informed decisions’, many more would argue that the dislocated are not in general qualified to participate in collective decisions at the level of policy. Fanciful as this argument may seem, it goes right against the grain of democracy. For in a democracy, ‘nobody transfers his natural right [that is, his or her freedom] to another so completely that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he transfers it
to the majority of the entire community of which he is a part’ (Spinoza 2001: 179). From the perspective of a democratic being-in-common, two points need to be highlighted. First, the strong principle of equality does not imply that all members should be competent with respect to all matters or even that they agree on all matters. As members though, they can delegate responsibility for various activities (Cullenberg 1992, 1998). All that is required for the strong principle of equality to hold is that all members participate in deciding on the policy matters that affect their social life. The collective/community may decide to delegate many allocative, financial or investment decisions to highly skilled personnel of their choice, who might then insist on an array of interventions with respect to policy, which in turn would require ratification by those who have delegated the authority in the first place. Again, the point is that the delegation and ratification of such decisions is collectively made and is thus democratic. One can think of various modes of delegation and ratification. For example, in Raigarh in Maharashtra, people ratified through an overwhelming vote the decision of their leaders (whom they delegated to lead and engage with the hegemonic) to not allow agricultural land to be handed over to an Indian industrialist for setting up a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Second, there is no doubt that, if resettlement is to be included within the horizon of the planning of development projects, then the dislocated populace alone have the competence to decide about the kind of life they want to live. The dislocated will have to be part of the planning provided it is agreed that the resettlement plan and the financial investment for resettlement are to be part of any development project.

What guarantees that the people positioned to be resettled will be empowered enough to influence the decision making process?

To begin with, guaranteeing the positioning of displaced people alongside policy makers would entail that they must be empowered with (as in the case of all important policy matters) the right to say ‘no’ to a rehabilitation package (which must be made legally binding). With the rehabilitation package rejected, the consensus for the project to go through is gone. However, a question crops up at this point.

How can we include world of the third in a policy paradigm when it is itself fractured into heterogeneous groups and interests? That is, with whom do we negotiate? Interestingly, such doubts do not arise when nations are said to be negotiating with one another. We may ask, what does it mean to say that India and the USA have come to a pact when different groups or individuals in India and the USA did not endorse the pact and in fact had nothing to say regarding the pact? Yet, nations do forge pacts and we take it as the norm. Take another example. Governments claim to consider the view of a particular religion by negotiating with the ‘leaders’ of that religion. We may contest whether these are the real leaders/representatives or not, but rarely do we question the validity of representatives negotiating on behalf of the
community. Whether by democratic means or by the wielding of power or by means of established social norms, customs or given hierarchies (as in the case of religious communities), some ‘representatives’ emerge as social actors with assigned capacity to formulate and execute decisions. Why should it be otherwise for world of the third? Indeed, arrangements for inclusion could be diverse depending upon the context. In certain situations, it could be the local panchayats who could be representing world of the third. We can also have a situation where the local panchayats could be replaced by new political formations who address the issue of dislocation. Other situations may arise where, say, different caste groups (or gender groups) express their differences in such a manner that representatives from these different caste or gender groups would have to be incorporated into the ambit of development policy. Or, we could still have to contend with a community à la being-in-common that emerges as a result of political struggle.

Indeed, from a world of the third Marxian perspective, the aspect of people-centric democracy would require a constant struggle within world of the third societies to ensure that representatives or delegates would flow from the process of ‘democratization of democracy’, that is ‘representatives’ should be delegated by the people as part of their exercise of self-governance and self-determination. There is a need for serious contemplation on the part of the ‘radical–movementist’ school to reflect on processes through which the decisions and actions emanating from world of the third societies can be democratized. Given that power equations within world of the third societies may not be conducive to participation and can even work with their own set of exclusions, this exercise of the political is of utmost importance for us. Evidently, this somewhat paradoxical affinity between devaluing world of the third by displacing it into third world (a displacement made by development discourse which we question) and the innocence of valuing world of the third per se (a proposition often made by the ‘radical–movementist’ approach which we also question) is crucial and something that goes right against the grain of ‘democratization of democracy’ within world of the third.

None of these hurdles however changes the point that the question regarding ‘who among the world of the third societies is going to be the representative’ is secondary to the more fundamental issue of whether or not they will participate as policy makers, either directly or through delegates. Such doubts, as and when expressed, should be seen as a convenient excuse to avoid the principle of incorporating world of the third in the ambit of development policy. The central issue is whether we accede in principle to the role of world of the third societies to be part of the process of policy making. Once we have agreed upon the principle of participation, the rest are logistical problems. We are not undermining the logistical problems. However, the first and foremost thing is to agree on the principle. To draw upon an analogy, to agree on the principle of gender- or caste-based reservation is one thing and then, once that agreement is sealed, deciding upon the variety and manner of reservation is quite another.
Minimum criteria for resettlement right

Resettlement right then means that any person must have the freedom to enjoy two basic functions: (i) to be resettled before project implementation begins; and (ii) to become part of policy making bodies that encapsulate the right, first, to participate in the decision on the appropriate socially necessary needs to be ensured in the resettled site and, second, to say no to possible states of dislocation and hence, by default, to the project itself. In tandem, it means that any resettlement is better seen as a process, a site of constructivist engagement – a face to face sitting – that is subjected to various (often contradictory) ethico-political considerations. Under resettlement right, people never face concrete dislocation. They only encounter notional dislocation. They are not dislocated. They only decide to re-locate, if they at all acquiesce to it.

Resettlement right as development justice

As conceptualized, resettlement need is a radical need calling for zero tolerance towards concrete dislocation, which destabilizes the sanctity of the received development logic. In this regard, resettlement right can be seen as a Marxian struggle for development justice. Let us explain.

First, development justice adheres to the position that the projects causing concrete dislocation are by default disempowering. Not only is it a moment of violence, but it is realized through a dismantling of forms of life of world of the third, including the existing and possible non-exploitative possibilities with its ethical moorings in sharing, collectivity, care and responsibility. The moment of dismantling world of the third institutionalizes the capitalist forms of exploitation, enslavement and plunder. Development justice thus looks at concrete dislocation as an issue bigger than land and law. In this regard, development justice may be broadly seen, albeit with the discussed differences and departures, as placed within the ‘radical–movementist’ approach.

Second, because demands emanating from political movements must also find fruition at the legal level (among other axes), development justice internalizes the idea that neither the rehabilitation package nor the development project concerned should be activated until and unless agreed upon by the people concerned. In this regard, the voice of people facing the notional state of dislocation to say no to the actual state of dislocation could be institutionalized in law. Such projects would be seen as not accounting for the needs of the affected people and considered justifiably rejected.

Third, development justice validates struggles to make resettlement a legal right that is binding on all. Accordingly, those individuals, enterprises and countries that violate resettlement right should be prosecuted, as happens in the case of any other violations of rights. For example, when a multinational violates resettlement right, the board of directors should be prosecuted. This can happen through internationally created tribunals or agreements that would require countries to hand over the violators to the respective country in
which the resettlement right is flouted. When states indulge in similar kinds of violation, the countries concerned must be punished, with enormous fines or even partial or total sanctions (if the violation is systematic). Complete intolerance towards dislocation must be embedded in the very functioning of social institutions and the geo-political engagements.

Finally, once agreed upon, resettlement right requires a fund that must be made available for resettlement to take place prior to the project concerned. This demands an assigned sum of social surplus to be made available for the implementation of resettlement. We have already seen in Chapter 5 the difficulty of integrating resettlement finance within project financing, a difficulty that arises because of the diverse conflicts over social surplus and its associated conflict over production surplus. With resettlement right, not only would such financing for resettlement be made compulsory, but it must be invested to produce the desired results before the operations of the targeted project begin. In this regard, Marxian struggle for the desired distribution of social surplus and its usage in the implementation of the agreed upon resettlement package can be seen as a struggle for development justice in order to achieve fair distribution.

We have related resettlement right to the hegemonic logic of development. If the exigency of the modernization process qua industrialization is accepted, then there is hardly any scope to establish the right to resettlement. With dislocation as a necessary consequence of the process of industrialization, we would then be spending, as we do now, the rest of the time making accurate the algebra of resettlement need à la Cernea and the World Bank, fillings up gaps and crevices, asking for the inclusion of this or that, fretting over the exclusion of this or that, perfecting statistical measures. The discourse of resettlement would thus meet the same end as the economics of compensation. An acceptance of development logic arrests the passage of resettlement need to resettlement right. As a logical corollary, if resettlement is to be made into a radical need, the primacy and also the centricity of development logic needs to be abandoned. This is because, by the right to say no to a development project, resettlement right embodies: (i) the power to say no to the tel- eological journey, thereby turning against its logic; and (ii) the power to say no to exploitation, inequity and (cognitive) enslavement that is the hallmark of capitalocentric–orientalist development.

The issue of industrialization

We end this book by addressing one final question: how do we think of industrialization in a scenario of zero tolerance to concrete dislocation? It is not a question of whether industrialization will happen or not, but of how. This book has brought into the open and indeed questioned the system of thought that is practised in the name of (capitalist) development. We have examined how the extant structure of difference–discrimination is re-produced in terms of dualisms of industry/agriculture, modernity/tradition, capitalist/
pre-capitalist. We have seen how the foregrounding of third world as the lacking other of a capitalist industrial modern West forecloses world of the third. We have seen how one arm (here industry) of the dualism is considered forward or ahead in time and the other (here agriculture) is considered backward or languishing; this in turn renders legitimate the idea of a ‘natural’ movement from agriculture to industry. Development then lets loose a particular concept of industrialization in which the massive truncation of agriculture and hence dislocation is considered indispensable. Our issue with this concept of industrialization is not just that it destroys forms of life and relationships in world of the third, an aspect we have sufficiently highlighted and critiqued. Equally important is this: this concept of industrialization destroys the possibility of any relationship with world of the third. With the foreclosure of world of the third and its foregrounding as third world, third world is treated as a ‘flock’ to be shepherded to salvation by the Subject of development. There is thus no chance of sitting face to face with the other, here world of the third; there is no chance of sitting face to face with the different and the outside; because one doesn’t face the third world; the third world follows the shepherd; the shepherd drags the third world from a lower slope to a higher one. Without the possibility of a face to face encounter with world of the third, the possibility of a relationship is also lost. The hegemonic understanding of industrialization lets loose a concept of industrialization that is bereft of respect and relationship. No matter what argument is forwarded for its necessity, which itself has been put under a critical lens by us, this aspect too cannot be ignored or demoted: a concept of industrialization that denies any idea of relationship cannot but be totalitarian. We wonder: what kind of society such industrialization would produce?

As the Indian sages said:

By a-dharma (unrighteousness) man prospers, gains what appears desirable, conquers enemies, but perishes at the root.

Powerful and wealthy civilisation with enormous material success perished because of the way their success was fashioned; they were ruined because in the frenzy of attaining material progress what was abandoned was what Mahatma Gandhi called the ‘art of living nobly’ that could only be achieved though relationship of love in the form of creative union of the one with the all (Tagore 2004). As Tagore explained civilisation that focused exclusively on the pleasure of material progress left in the wayside the corpus of coveted relationship of love, beauty, creativity, sympathy, respect, goodness, and joy, all basic aspects of human interconnectedness that cultivated the world of humanity; the shaming of humanity produced by these materialist civilisations destroyed their root, their humanity. The point is not to ignore material progress but to seek a harmony with the ethical; the fundamental issue is whether material progress can be seen within a worldview that views reality as the union of one with all and conjoins forms of life to the ethicality of ‘art of
living nobly’. A blind faith on self-propelling and self-reinforcing industrialisation that profess the supremacy and authority of material progress at the cost of the ‘art of living nobly’ somewhere puts at risk the basic facts of humanity by foregrounding what Tagore called the ‘power of the muscle’ as against the ‘relationship of love’.

As against the system of thought that capitalist development is, we have tried to forward an alternative train of thought – a train that concedes that differences–discriminations exist and that one needs to struggle against discrimination – but that does not reduce difference–discrimination to step ladder verticality or evolutionist–historicist temporality – that understands differences as related to each other in a structure of horizontality. In this alternative train of thought, the focus is turned to differences and the manner of dealing with these. As part of the alternative world of the third Marxian approach, dualism is also questioned. Giving up on dualism would mean giving up on the concept of ‘third world-ism’ that drives the teleology of development within which industrialization (through a necessary breakdown of agriculture) and dislocation (through a necessary breakdown of world of the third forms of life) appear as necessary and inevitable. It would also mean dropping the idea of industrialization premised on the assumption that agriculture is subordinated to, and an enemy of (an overprivileged), industry. Moving beyond this dualism and informed by an understanding of economy that is de-centred, disaggregated and marked by differences, Marxian justice would be concerned with the forms of agriculture and industry, principally the class forms and the radical need forms.

More pertinent for the present discussion, this shift in thought fundamentally changes the very manner of viewing world of the third; world of the third is the world of difference; it is not to be devalued; it is not the lower step in a step ladder verticality; nor is it to be transcended in terms of an evolutionist–historicist temporality. It is different; it also defers capitalist ethic and language. In a train of thought where differences exist in a relation of horizontality, one needs to sit face to face with the world of difference that world of the third is. There has to be some relation, some engagement, some amount of speaking with world of the third, and in which, as in all such face to face encounters, people would have the freedom to say no to dislocation and yes to re-location; a freedom that has no validity except in its realisation. In the process, it reclaims what (capitalist) development has denied to world of the third: choice. With sides sitting face to face and talking, what form and direction the negotiation would take cannot be anticipated or predicted (of course, as against other ethico-political positions, Marxists would work towards relationalities of being-in-common marked by standpoints of non-exploitation and fair distribution).

The discursive register of dealing with the issue of dislocation would change in the process. In this scenario, if people, satisfied with the rehabilitation package that they themselves have been a party to working out, agree to re-locate, then there cannot be any objection. Given that our Marxian
analysis cannot and does not impute any necessary value to world of the third societies per se, there is nothing to imply that people in these societies cannot be dissatisfied with their current state and will not weigh alternative options if they are available, including the option to re-locate to a new place. In fact, it is not even improbable to imagine world of the third subjects demanding industrialization and re-location. Yet something is fundamentally different here: industrialization and re-location become a process contingent on the outcome of the face to face encounter with world of the third; it becomes subjected to the outcome of the process of ‘democratization of democracy’ within world of the third, and between world of the third and those who propose the project (from within or outside world of the third). In the twenty-first century, probably the shift of industrialization from a totalitarian to a democratic engagement is not a totally undesirable pursuit. Such a shift would perhaps require a moving away from Western theologies and theological scientisms-secularisms that have come to colonize world of the third paganisms and pagan world of the thirds.
Notes

Chapter 1

1 The reports and works cited in the ActionAid paper are: (i) ‘Engendering Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policies and Programmes In India’, Report of the workshop held on 12 and 13 September 2002 organized by the Institute of Development Studies and ActionAid, India, with support from DFID (http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/KNOTS/PDFs/NarmadaWshop.pdf); (ii) Interview with Professor Shobita Jain, Professor, School of Social Sciences, IGNOU (http://www.vigyanprasar.gov.in/com); (iii) ‘India’s rehabilitation policy under scanner yet again: alternative rehab policy lost in a maze of committees’ by Nitin Sethi (http://www.downtoearth.org.in); and (iv) ‘Resettlement and rehabilitation: moving from an inadequate policy to a bad one’ by Manju Menon (www.infochangeindia.org).

2 In a speech delivered in 1958, Nehru – late, too late as it was – changed his position – ‘For some time past, however, I have been beginning to think that we are suffering from what we may call the “disease of gigantism”. We want to show that we can build big dams and do big things. This is a dangerous outlook developing in India. … the idea of big – having big undertakings and doing big things for the sake of showing that we can do big things is not a good outlook at all’. Nehru realized (albeit too late) that it was ‘the small irrigation projects, the small industries and the small plants for electric power, which will change the face of the country far more than half-dozen big projects in half-a-dozen places’ (Roy 2001: 263).

3 See http://dolr.nic.in/hyperlink/acq.htm.

4 Circuits of global capital comprise all those processes – class and non-class – capitalist and non-capitalist – that are directly or indirectly connected with the global capitalist enterprises. The circuits of global capital span a much wider space than that specified by the physical reach of all the global capitalist enterprises combined (Chakrabarti et al. 2009).

5 Camp of global capital encompasses the various state apparatuses, educational institutions, notions of individual values, entrepreneurship and consumerism, judgement of performance, gender relations, customs and mores, etc. encompassing economic, cultural, political and natural processes that are formed in relation to and for the circuits of global capital (Chakrabarti et al. 2009).

6 ‘Through the instrument of language a number of stable relations are established, inside which something that is much larger and goes much further than actual utterances [enonciations] can, of course, be inscribed’ (Lacan 2007: 13).

Chapter 2

1 (De)-familiarize is both to familiarize and to de-familiarize – familiarize one to the unfamiliar discourse of development and de-familiarize the familiar discourse of
development. What is *heimlich* (familiar) thus, as if, comes to be *unheimlich* (unfamiliar) and what is *unheimlich* becomes *heimlich*. With respect to the discourse of development, it is also to render explicit what has hitherto been concealed or kept out of sight. Rendering unfamiliar the familiar, ‘making strange the familiar’, ‘turning from within outward’ are concepts we draw and invoke from Achuthan’s work (2004, 2005, 2007).

2 As a system of thought, historical materialism and the mode of production approach of traditional Marxism are guided by a similar structure of temporality—verticality and a logic tuned to salvation/progress, although the form in which they appear is different from development.

3 Historicism is understood as the rationally ordered movement of a society from a pre-ordained origin to a known end.

4 The class-focused Marxian theory challenges the orthodox Marxian approach on epistemological grounds (on the question of methodology) and also on the question of historicism, i.e. on the idea(l) of progress, progress as a teleological movement from pre-capitalism to capitalism so as to finally arrive at communism (Chakrabarti and Cullenberg 2003). Taking the case of Soviet Union (it could be China as well), Resnick and Wolff (2002) made explicit that the Soviet economy was more a case of ‘state capitalism’ than socialism. In the Soviet style economy, those who performed surplus labor (the direct producers) were excluded from the process of appropriation which remained the sole prerogative of the bureaucrats. Because of its exploitative nature and the exclusive appropriation of surplus wealth by the state appointed bureaucrats, this economy can be termed ‘state capitalist’. The communist form, on the other hand, would have demanded the minimum condition that those who performed surplus labor were not excluded from the process of appropriation, that is, they were not exploited. Consequently, despite the claim of socialism made by the Soviet proponents and its critics, from a class focused Marxist perspective, the form that so-called socialism took in the former Soviet Union was that of state capitalism.

If one accepts the above position, the race between the Soviet Union-supported countries and the USA-supported countries became one of matching each other's level of technological growth, industrialization and wealth accumulation. While the two differed on the strategy and means of implementation, the objectives were not vastly different; both were trying to reach capitalism; both were forms of capitalism founded on the process of exploitation; one was ‘state capitalism’ and the other was ‘private capitalism’. The Cold War could then be read as a struggle between two forms of capitalism.

5 Regarding its relationship with the IMF, the World Bank says:

> World Bank and IMF staff will work to give each government their views on the core impediments to poverty reduction and growth within the country, and on the policy options for overcoming these obstacles ... Closer co-ordination between the World Bank and the IMF will not only help provide more useful assistance in the short run, but also clarify the relationship between the macroeconomic framework, growth, and poverty reduction over the medium and long run.


The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of the IMF has now been substituted by (and accommodated within) the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which now links lending to the conditionality of eleven standardized areas agreed upon (Soederberg 2003). It is through this ‘conditionality sharing’ that international agencies, notably the IMF and World Bank (depending upon their areas of competence), attempt to secure policy control over the broader macroeconomic
and financial arenas, no matter the extent of the World Bank rhetoric of ‘broad public participation’ and ‘greater country ownership’. More than the conditionality aspect, the lasting impact of the World Bank is its success in influencing the policy paradigm of nations in line with the suggested ‘good economics’ of the World Bank.

It is notable that the Indian development paradigm exhibited a similar path to that laid down by us, whereby it ended up combining the two arms of growth: industrialization (Nehru–Mahanalobis Second five-year plan) with poverty alleviation (Fifth five-year plan). While India has since then moved strategically from a planned economy to a market economy and also from an import substitution regime to a globalized regime, the development goals combined through these two arms have remained intact. Indeed, it would not be far fetched to suggest that the World Bank may have been influenced by the Indian development experience and vice versa.

Chapter 3

1 Recent approaches have called for the inclusion of environmental effects into the cost–benefit framework through the contingent valuation method (which assigns monetary value to non-monetized processes), although this has been more fundamentally debated on the grounds of whether efficiency criteria and the contingent valuation method make sense for environmental effects (Bromley and Paavola 2002).

2 In this sense, one can say that the discipline of economics takes gains – immediate and ultimate – more seriously and takes loses – sudden and gradual, instant and sustained – less seriously. What we need in the context of development-connected dislocation is a deeper understanding of loss – an understanding attentive to subjectivities in their conscious and unconscious imbrications.

3 Dwivedi (1999, 2002) criticizes the concept of risk put forward by Cernea on three grounds: (i) its silence on the subjective dimension of risk conceived by the dislocated people who internalize and factor risk (stemming from class, gender, caste, age, political affiliation, etc.) in decision making and strategic actions, which in turn produces differential responses among the dislocated; (ii) exclusion of the role of risk making organizations and institutions who give rise to risks in order to then manage them; and (iii) failure to understand that risk management is a process and not a blueprint model as the event that produces risk evolves in a sequential and composite manner, with varying degrees of information.

4 By opportunity cost (taken to be the economic cost), we mean the cost of goods or services measured in terms of foregone opportunity to practise the next best alternative activity with the same time or resources.

5 This also shows us why we need to take up the question of people’s subjectivity – what they perceive, how they feel, what they think to be proper for them, what they think they like – and why a simple top-down resolution of the problem is not enough; why people’s participation is crucial; why a developmentalist approach is problematic.

6 This also shows us why an economic answer to the problem of dislocation is never enough; why the political, the cultural and the natural remain crucial to an alleviation of the pain of dislocation.

Chapter 4

1 To quote Marx (1867[1954]: 217):

The essential difference between the various economic forms of society, between, for instance, a society based on slave labor, and one based on wage-
labor, lies only in the mode in which this surplus labor is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the laborer.

2 See Chaudhury and Chakrabarti (2000) and Chakrabarti et al. (2009: Ch. 5) for details.

3 To tease out the element of surplus labour in a scenario of commodity exchange, Marx invokes the category of value. Value is the socially necessary aspect of labour time or SNALT representative of, to quote Marx, ‘the labor required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time’. Value or SNALT is simply the average amount of labour expenditure needed to produce one unit of a commodity. Value acquires a form through the sphere of circulation. Value form is the magnitude of money/price and is measured by SNALT. This means that each unit of money represents some amount of value or SNALT. When use values are exchanged in the market, the socially necessary abstract labour time or value takes the form of money expressed as price, or to put the same slightly differently, commodity exchange involving money is also an exchange of SNALT. Therefore, both value and value form are measured by SNALT, one as a direct magnitude and the other as an expression of money flow. Value form is the market equivalent for the value of a commodity. Because of overdetermined conditions at the level of production and at the level of circulation, value and value forms may or may not be equal depending upon the specificity of those conditions (see Wolff et al. 1982; Roberts 1988).

4 Productive labourers are defined as those direct producers who create surplus value for productive capitalists in the labour process. All other kinds of labourer are unproductive labourers. For example, the slaves in a slave FCP and also those who work in the banks or in trading organizations are unproductive labourers as they do not create surplus value for productive capitalists. ‘Productive capitalists’ or those who appropriate and distribute the surplus value/capital produced by productive labourers stand in contrast to ‘unproductive capitalists’ such as bank capitalists, merchant capitalists and shareholding capitalists. The latter are in the business of generating surplus value or capital (thus the name capitalists) by loaning money, trading goods and buying and selling shares, that is generating the expansion of value in arenas not concerning the production of surplus value through the consumption of labour power. The distinction between ‘productive capitalists’ and ‘unproductive capitalists’ or between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labourers is important for Marx to locate the difference between the various types of capitalists and between labourers. That ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ are in a state of overdetermination was specified by Marx (1967: 2, 126–27):

In the production of commodities, circulation is as necessary as production itself, so that circulation agents are just as much needed as production agents … But this furnishes no ground for confusing the agents of circulation with those of production … .

Accordingly, the distinction between productive and unproductive is simply conceptual and implies no value judgement.

5 Two aspects need to be noted in this context. First, surplus value is not specific to capitalist class process; value form can be articulated with other class processes as well. For example, communist class process can go with surplus value when its appropriation is collective rather than when direct producers are excluded, as is specific to the capitalist class process. Second, for simplicity, we do not account for surplus that is in the use value form and is not monetized. Inclusion of the use value form will complicate the equations, but will further buttress rather than weaken the analysis and the conclusions (Chakrabarti et al. 2009).
See Fraser (1998) and Chakrabarti et al. (2008a, 2008b, 2009) for a detailed discussion on radical need.

Chapter 5

1 Freud represents overdetermination through the analogy of weaving – ‘unseen the threads are knit together’ and ‘an infinite combination grows’. This analogy marks Freud’s distinction from an understanding of reality as a cosy plurality where discrete or segmented entities determine one another.

2 For Luc-Nancy, ‘left’ means that the political, as such, is receptive to what is at stake in the being-in-common and that ‘continues to keep open, this strange being-the-one-with-the-other’. On the other hand, for him, ‘right’ means that the political is merely in charge of order, administration, management and statecraft; here community as a single common abstract (working class, nation, family for example), as a will to realize an essence, necessarily loses the in of being-in-common; it loses the with or the together that represents community. For Luc-Nancy, the thinking of community as essence is in effect the closure and erasure of the political ‘left’. Such thinking constitutes closure because it assigns a common being to community, whereas community is a matter of something quite different, namely of existence, inasmuch as it is in common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common substance. Being in common has nothing to do with communion, with fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate identity, a substantial identity. Finitude, or the infinite lack of identity, is the constraint under which community is made. All our ‘left’ political programmes should imply this ‘making’.

3 By loss of concepts we refer, following Lear, to the loss of the central concepts with which world of the third had hitherto understood its form of life, concepts (like say the concept of sharing water or a grazing ground) that suddenly become unintelligible after dislocation. By loss of events, we refer to the loss of those happenings (like say the collective tribal dance after the reaping of agricultural produce) that no longer count. After dislocation, nothing could any longer count as intending to sow seeds, intending to take cattle to graze, intending to share in the appropriation and distribution of produce; and this would entail a loss of mental states. World of the third would run out of things to do; it would run out of things to be; and this would point to a threatened loss of identity. And along with all the above would come the loss of space and the loss of time; at times, world of the third temporality and spatiality would be reduced to modern geography; at other times, it would be reduced to modern history.

4 We are not sure in what sense Cernea is using the term livelihood. At times, we get the feeling that he is referring to the conventional definition of livelihood (Chambers and Conway 1992; Scoones 1998), epitomized, for example, in his reference to the four forms of capital as assets. However, in the original rendition of Chambers and Conway, livelihood is seen in terms of capability, assets and activities in forging a living, and where each is conceptualized in tangible and non-tangible forms, and that too as existing within a non-reductive field of multiplicative relationships and effects. This seems to be far-fetched from the usage of livelihood in Cernea’s reconstruction approach that stresses economic reconstruction and that too in a segmented manner. Anyway, courtesy his IRR framework, Cernea’s reference to livelihood must relate to the identified risks and particularly in the case of reconstruction without explicitly including aspects such as ‘social disarticulation or community breakdowns’ or marginalization. Keeping the spirit of his analysis intact, Cernea’s reference to the term ‘livelihood’ will thus be viewed in relation to the risks as and when they appear in specific forms.

5 What is loss? What counts as loss? What is an experience of loss? How does one account for an experience of loss? Further, how does one arrive at a theory of loss?
What the mainstream produces is documentation and a laundry list of ‘things lost’ – the given legal frame understands the loss of tangible objects – say the loss of material property. However, loss is more than material; how does one account for the loss of a culture? Such losses do not open themselves up to the logic of a finite calculus; such losses do not get written on the superficial sheet of the mystic writing pad; they do not get written in an apparent and transparent way. They produce through sedimentation a complex web of legibility–illegibility on the wax slab underneath; they get written and overwritten, producing palimpsests, producing unfamiliar (manu)scripts.

One needs to keep in mind that the processes concerning property (private or state) are not the same as the processes of appropriation or distribution of surplus. Private ownership confers special rights and privileges on owners, but these have nothing to say on the question of appropriation or residual clemency (Dahl 1989; Ellerman 1990; Cullenberg 1992, 1998). One of the pitfalls of many Marxist approaches in the last century has been this recurring confusion between capital ownership and appropriation and the reduction of the question of appropriation to the control of ownership (see Cullenberg 1992, 1998). The process of ownership and the process of appropriation are conceptually distinct, and confusing the two is tantamount to being trapped into what Cullenberg referred to as the ‘great capitalistic deceit’. The forms of appropriation are not necessarily inconsistent with either state socialized property or private property. For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, state socialization of private property produced a society where forms of organization of surplus labour continued to remain exploitative, that is the workers remained excluded from the process of appropriating their produced surplus, which remained the exclusive prerogative of state-sponsored bureaucrats (Resnick and Wolff 2002). In contrast, in the ongoing ‘revolution’ in Venezuela, we see diverse relations between property and forms of appropriation (and distribution).

Chapter 6

1 In the German original of Capital, Volume 1, Marx had used the term Ursprüngliche Akkumulation, which could be translated as original accumulation or primeval accumulation; it is a form of accumulation that is there at the origin moment of the capitalist class process in particular and capitalism in general; in that sense, this form of accumulation is not the past of capitalism but is contemporaneous with the origin of the capitalist class process. However, Ursprüngliche Akkumulation was translated as ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ and ‘the secret of primitive accumulation’ in the English editions of the German original produced by Progress Publishers, a translation that relegated this form of accumulation to the past or pre-history of capitalism.

2 Although the authors of this work have conceptually moved away from ‘ideology’ and have moved instead to ‘standpoint’ theory (Achuthan et al. 2007), De Angelis’ point holds in this context.

3 Aufhebung was used by Hegel to characterize ‘the dialectical process in which the negation of a form transforms the negated into a new form, in which it loses its independent existence and at the same time maintains its essence, constituting the substance of the new form … Aufhebung has three main meanings: “to lift up” or “to raise”; “to make invalid” or “to cancel/eliminate”; and “to keep” or “to maintain”’ (Bonefield 2001: 4).

4 Even in its somewhat malleable form (a form produced in Read), mode of production still remains, for us, a problematical concept. First, what is a capitalist mode of production? Is it a mode of production that is altogether capitalist? The phrase ‘capitalist mode of production’ refers to the centricity of capital in the thinking of the mode of production. The representation of the economy thus
becomes capitalocentric once again. Even in our opposition to capitalism, our language of opposition is, as if, caught up in the language of the proposition (that is in capitalocentrism). In a fundamental sense, the question of what makes the mode of production capitalist (and why not something else) remains sketchy, even in the best treatment of mode of production as represented by Read. In our understanding, this also explains the momentous yet unsuccessful attempts to explain the presence of ‘non-capitalist’ organizations alongside the ‘dominant’ capitalist organization within the mode of production literature; the latest being the concepts of ‘articulation’ and ‘social formation’. Novel as they may seem, these still remain gross and too macro. Second, once the economy and the mode of production are fixed to capitalism, it is unclear as to how a transition to any other formation can be accommodated within the same theory unless we are driven by a presumed teleology, as in the case of the linear movement of forces and relations of production, which, for obvious reasons, Read cannot accept. Thus, whether in terms of a proposition (of capitalism) or opposition (to capitalism), mode of production remains afflicted by serious problems, something that we have planned to overcome with our conceptually distinct yet related class-focused rendition of economic reality. In this chapter, however, we do not highlight the theoretical deficiencies of mode of production as adopted by Read because we believe that he makes some very important contributions to the theory of primitive accumulation, which we want to preserve and accommodate in our analysis.

Chapter 7

1 The terms repressive development apparatus (RDA) and ideological development apparatus (IDA) are displaced versions of Althusser’s concepts of repressive state apparatus (RDA) and ideological state apparatus (IDA) (Althusser 1978[2002]).

Chapter 8

2 This non-recognition of ‘natural process’ as provider of a condition of existence does not simply pertain to capitalist enterprises (private or state), but could apply in the case of non-capitalist enterprises, even communist enterprises. Our example, however, pertains to HCCBPL, which is a capitalist enterprise.
3 Predominantly – because Plachimada may not be just or entirely world of the third. There may be subjects, sections of the community and/or institutions in Plachimada that are part of (i.e. within) the circuits and the camp of (global) capital. However, there is every possibility that most of Plachimada would be outside the circuits of (global) capital and hence would in all probability be world of the third.
4 Lift the veil of customary ‘sharing’, sharing in an instrumental sense, and one may be confronted with very sharp, often hideous, inequalities in the very process of sharing approved by the rules and norms functioning within world of the third. Thus, from a Marxian perspective, while, generally, collective appropriation (and distribution) by some principle of sharing is considered ethically valuable, no illusion is to be entertained regarding the overdetermined and contradictory effects emanating from aspects of caste, race, gender, age, etc. that constitute the core of the process of sharing. Thus, while Marxists value collective appropriation of surplus labour (because it puts under erasure the injustice of exploitation), they also remain sensitive and open to questions regarding the form, content and context of collective appropriation, which could be varied. Thus, from the standpoint of expanded communism, appropriative justice is said to be intimately associated with development.
justice that enforces, in turn, an ethico-justice accounting of the multidimensional nature of radical needs.

As Barlow and Clarke (2004) and Goldman (2005) explicate, the process of commoditization of water through ‘privatization’ has become a major international policy agenda making water one of the hot pursuits of global capitalist enterprises. This was inspired by what Goldman defined as the Transnational Policy Network (TPN) that was pioneered by the World Bank, IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and heavily funded by global capitalist enterprises with interest in water. Interestingly, as part of a decade-long deliberation under the TPNs, water has been repositioned as a need. Such a repositioning entails seeing water as one of the scarce goods especially for the poor, which has been mismanaged by government agencies. How can the use of water be managed in an ‘efficient’ way? The answer is ‘reform’ that took two forms: price water as in the case of any other scarce goods (even if the government is the service provider), which is ideally to be coupled with the privatization of water utilities. As the private players were global capitalist enterprises, privatization would mean handing over water – that is its production and distribution – to global capitalist enterprises. It was also argued that, as the efficient use of water needs heavy investment, this could only be done by global capitalist enterprises. Seen in this way, placing water within the domain of the market, that is making it open to competitive capitalism, will ensure its efficient usage and avoid wastage. Thus, the positioning of water as a scarce good (justifying its commoditization) and the requirement of water reform, preferably towards privatization, opens the gate for the entry of global capitalist enterprises into this ‘commodity’ world. It is notable that this entire discourse of water is a top-down approach and did not arise from a need or demand from the ground level. Since the 1990s, the World Bank’s water and sanitation loans were increasingly forthcoming with attached conditionalities of increased cost recovery from the consumers and/or privatization of water. Of the 193 structural adjustment loans approved between 1996 and 1999, 112, or 58 percent, required privatization as a condition (Goldman 2005: 252). Water is being so positioned that it will serve the global capitalist economy; as such, ‘water need’ is integrated into the set of hegemonic needs. Projected as a one trillion dollar industry by the World Bank in 2001, it is positioned to be one of the fastest growing sectors in this century. The global capitalist enterprises have been circulating around the world and competing with one another with a single-minded effort to make governments privatize the state control or society’s shared right over water and allow these enterprises to enact the capitalist appropriation of surplus value in the process of producing and distributing water through market mechanisms. Many of these enterprises are new and have formed themselves as subsidiaries of already existing global capitalist enterprises. The board of directors of such enterprises find it enormously attractive to enter the water market and so do the shareholders, as the surplus value and the profit from it remain or are projected to be extraordinarily high. No doubt, the shares of water-producing global capitalist enterprises remain a hot property in international stock markets. Some of the global capitalist enterprises engaged in producing and trading in water include Suez and Vivendi of France, Bouygues-SAUR and RWE-Thames of Germany, Enron-Azuriz and Bechtel-United Utilities of the USA and United Utilities of the UK. Other global enterprises such as Coca Cola and Pepsi have entered into a virtual war over the product ‘bottled’ water. Such enterprises of course look for ‘virgin territory’ to get free access to clean water as their input for producing ‘bottled’ water. Not only are we witnessing a global process of commoditization of water, but also its market segmentation. In a range of products related to water, the capitalist processes of performance, appropriation, distribution and receipt of surplus value are unfolding. Water marks another layer in the global expansion of the capitalist economy.
Chapter 9

1 ‘Access to the realm of truth ... is wholly subjective: it is founded only on the subjects who “bear” its trajectory’ (Hallward 2001: ix).

2 Working through the hegemonic symbolic and hitting upon the foreclosed is possible because something anomalous always shows up in language, something unaccountable, unexplainable: an aporia; aporias point to the presence of the foreclosed as kinks in the hegemonic order.

3 ‘A truth procedure can begin only with some sort of break with the ordinary situation in which it takes place – what Badiou calls an event. An event has no objective or verifiable content. Its “happening” cannot be proved, only affirmed and proclaimed’ (Hallward 2001: ix).


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