

Pre-emption, Technology and Fascism: Movement and Human Logistics

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The noiseless harmony of the whole action...only makes itself know in the total result.
Clausewitz, On War (242)

The problem is not to use technology but to realize that one is used by it.
Paul Virilio, Pure War (92)

No, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (29)

The likelihood that someone in a western leadership position (i.e., George W. Bush, Barak Obama, Stephen Harper, Nicolas Sarkozy or Silvio Berlusconi) will be called a fascist today has increased (and perhaps for good reason). Underlying this trend is an abandonment of the exceptionalism of historical fascism and Nazism and either 1) the generalization of fascism as if it were a logic of politics or 2) the mobilization of fascism as an axiological marker. In this paper, I am uninterested in the second (but very likely) explanation and am more sympathetic to the possibility of the former. In fact, the desire to find *another* way to call someone or something bad, evil or alien seems to lie within the domain of an ever-proliferating logic of fascism.

A similar argument can be made about the term genocide. Although there has been a proliferating use of the term as an axiological marker (and strategy for securing global action), there has also been a parallel move away from linking genocide with the Holocaust. There are many more examples of genocidal violence that are linked, not with historical fascism, but with colonialism, totalitarianism, and imperialism. Aimé Césaire (1972) identified the fascination with the European genocide, for instance, with a discourse of colonialism that treated these horrific events as exceptional instead of as exemplary of something that was practiced and perfected on non-European. Similarly, Hanna Arendt (1951) tied the European genocide to scientific racism and bureaucratic efficiencies developed in South Africa. Contemporaneously, Mohamad Mamdani (2002) traces the origins of the populist Rwandan genocide to the production of political (not cultural) identities through direct rule (native/settler) and indirect rule (divide ethnicities and rule) during the colonial project. “If genocide is indeed” as Michel Foucault argues “the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race and the large scale phenomena of the population (Foucault 1980: 137).” In this vein, a logic of politics that replaces lived complexity with epistemological categorizations of self/other, settler/native, civilized/barbarian and friend/enemy is shared by *modern* colonialism, totalitarianism, imperialism and fascism.

Exploration of this logic of politics has proliferated with the celebration of the works of Giorgio Agamben’s work on *the life that can be extinguished without violation to the internal codes of civility* in Homo Sacer (1998). Attention to refuges, enemy combatants, infected lives and

the global dispossessed is a meaningful expansion of those earlier efforts to link fascism to broader political logics. However, it seems that a singular attention to this logic of politics (sovereignty, security and community) could benefit from some conceptual flexibility (if not liquidity). In this paper, as such, I want to turn away from a logic of politics and instead emphasize a logic of movement. I think an attention to movement, in general, and kinds of movement, in particular, is required to become adequate to the challenges of contemporary fascism. Granted, a new political imaginary is needed that does not set up questions of movement in order to celebrate the opposites of security, peace, justice and reason. Yet, privileging the political logic of sovereignty through perpetual critique seems equally stagnant. As such, this paper begins within movement, war and logistics and attempts to maintain this commitment to fluidity until the end.

From Nomadology to Clausewitz and Back Again

Deleuze and Guattari's essay Nomadology (1986) remains one of the most impressive works upon the political imaginary because it treats movement as a creative force and not as a condition to be solved. From a kind of encounter between the state, as an apparatus of capture, and the nomad, as a line of flight, Deleuze and Guattari introduce an appropriated war machine that is housed in the name of State Security. While the state operates with the assumption that it has captured the war machine in the service of its limited wars, movements towards total war remain an ever-present actuality. That the state never had a war machine of its own, is, in itself, a kind of warning; the state should not be presumed to be in control of war. The war machine retains its deterritorializing nomadism. Contrary to the Clausewitzian claim that the state may use war as a mechanism to achieve its limited political objects (establish political peace), Deleuze and Guattari introduce the possibility that the war machine takes itself as its object. They warn, "when total war becomes the object of the appropriated war machine (it) can reach the point of contradiction...(and become) unlimited (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996 118)." However, "total war is not only a war of annihilation, but arises when annihilation takes as its "center" not only the enemy army, or the enemy state, but the entire population and its economy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996 118)." Here, Deleuze and Guattari are not making a claim about the scope and scale of war; instead, nothing escapes total war's unlimited gaze because the appropriated war machine, with itself as its object, exists as a self-actualizing movement. A new logic of movement is born. In this event, even the *end* of unlimited war fails to provide a *limit* to this self-actualizing movement; peace simply becomes a point of transduction.

Did fascism survive WWII? If so, then where did it go? Even in one of their most stunning statements Deleuze and Guattari do not seem to give an answer. They assert "this worldwide war machine, which in a way "reissues" from the State, displays two successive figures: first, that of fascism which makes war an unlimited movement with no other aim than itself; but fascism is only a rough sketch, and the second, post-fascist figure is that of a war machine that takes peace as its object directly as the peace of terror or survival. The war machine reforms a smooth space which now claims to control, to surround the entire earth (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996 118-119)." Did this transformation occur? Has the whole earth fallen to a kind of control called peace, survival, adaption and sustainability? While Deleuze and Guattari are of little help, their indebtedness to Clausewitz is instructive.

If we debase Clausewitz's false optimism about the political suppression of the drives of war (hatred, animosity, the play of probabilities and chance), it becomes possible to re-read his

text On War (1982) as a reversal of his own maxim (i.e. war as the continuation of politics through an admixture of other means). The reversal has become commonplace. However, if we now commonly reverse the maxim to read “politics as the continuation of war by other means” then we might also want to read the rest of Clausewitz’s theory of war against his initial (and historic) optimism. Against his brisk dismissal of the likelihood of total war and his exculpation of limited war, we find justification to argue that war *has* become an isolated act, limited to a single solution and contains within itself the solution perfect (Clausewitz, 1982: 106). Therefore, many different wars have been replaced by one continuous war.

The justification for such an absurdity, as Clausewitz would see it, is contained within his own identification of three reciprocal actions: First, war leads to the extreme. Second, as long as the enemy is not defeated, he could defeat me. Finally, a mutual enhancement of fear, creates a new extreme (Clausewitz, 1982: 103-5). Through these three reciprocal actions war becomes its own engine, its own end and its global promise. We might do well to remember, with Clausewitz, that each age has its own form of war precisely because of the complexity of hatred and animosity, the play of probabilities and chance, and the reciprocal nature of War itself. As such, war is not restricted to finding its end or limit in peace or politics. War can become its own final solution.

As such, we have two answers the question: “Where did it go?” Either total war becomes politics (as Benjamin, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Agamben have suggested). In this instance, the suspensions of habeas corpus, extraordinary rendition are extreme examples of a total war (or total peace) that seeks total domination as its political object. To this end, we are right identifying every form of pastoral power as a fascistic sign of our times. From humanitarian organizations and management consultants to community policing, fascism is everywhere! Or (and I mean this “or” lightly), total war transforms into one of war’s other constituent parts. If Clausewitz’s politics is less about the “who, what and when of a decision,” but instead the exceptional choice of *object*, then the broad underbelly of the war/politics synthesis might be that other part of war called logistics.

Treating logistics as the pinnacle and not the sideshow of war requires a complete reversal of Clausewitz’s theory of war. For Clausewitz, logistics are not tactical (i.e., use of military force in combat), strategic (i.e., use of combat for the object of war) nor political (i.e., deciding the object of war) (Clausewitz, 1982: 173). As such, logistics are only “conditions” and “extraneous activities” that are used for the “maintenance of troops (Clausewitz, 1982: 176).” They do include war like activities (i.e., building infrastructure in the presence of an enemy) but they also include peace like activities (i.e., maintaining camps, providing subsistence for the troops, caring for the sick and wounded, active management and administration and preparing for war). Treating logistics as the essence of war, and not the application of force to dominate the enemy, would therefore require a complete reversal of Clausewitz.

This reversal seems unfamiliar and even unwarranted. After all, we build bridges, improve supply-trade lines, and care for the sick during times of peace. However, it is not unwarranted if it is granted that war has become normalized in peace. Not only has the dominance of the military-industrial-complex been acknowledged (since Eisenhower) in economics and politics, expanding military- industrial-media-entertainment complexes (Der Derian, 2001) are also increasingly accepted as defining developments of contemporary global life. The developments in civil, economic, and scientific domains are not isolated from the scourge of war.

Yet, there is an even more insidious confirmation of this logistical emphasis in Clausewitz's treatment of affect. Clausewitz warns that "if war is an act of force, it belongs *necessarily* also to the feelings. It does not originate in the feelings, it reacts, more or less, upon them... (Clausewitz, 1982: 103 *Italics added*)" On the one hand, hatred, anger, fear and courage, for instance, are all attributes that we easily identify with a theory of warlike conduct. These emotional and moral attributes could be considered as parallels to tactics, strategy and combat in war. Interestingly, Clausewitz's theory does not rest with these feelings; instead, the proper affective conduct in war is located in a kind of management of the self. What aides in the management of the self? Not higher or transcendent qualities like wisdom (Thucydides), situational awareness (Sun Tzu) or judgement (Machiavelli). Instead, Clausewitz offers a logistical solution: Habit. "Habit," Clausewitz argues, "gives strength to the body in great exertion, to the mind in danger, to the judgement against first impressions (Clausewitz, 1982: 167)." Habit is something that is burned into being and conditions the very possibility of becoming different. In war we have habits of being and/or habits of becoming. "Habit soon blunts impressions" allowing instantaneous decisions in "the sphere of activity (Clausewitz, 1982: 160)." Habit conditions the decision, it manages the self, it wins the war and the peace.

The complete reversal of Clausewitz, therefore, would treat the capture of politics by war as a cursory moment in a much broader capture of politics *and* war by logistics. The centrality of logistics leads to the false choice between peace and war. Whereas present day neo-Clausewitzitians see the revolution in military affairs and the push to full spectrum dominance as reflections of a fundamental transformation of the nature of strategy in contemporary warfare (Rasmussen, 2006: 56), a complete reversal would push beyond relations of war and peace. Instead of contemporary warfare's new strategy being the management of multiple risks (i.e., terrorism, pandemics, bank failures, resource shocks, and mass migration) and its political object being reducing them to zero through total domination or peace (Rasmussen, 2006: 65), a complete reversal would identify contemporary fascism within a different temporal plane.

As such, the war-peace that Deleuze and Guattari identify would be located (now)here; fascism would take its time in the infinite systems of systems that function to make eruptions of war possible while managing an ever-present habit of quotidian peace. To Clausewitz's chagrin, war would be an exceptional, isolated, singular and self-referential break from a generalized terror of peace that consumes the lives of 18 million a year while waiting patiently for the surrender of the next 2.7 billion who live in extreme poverty (Pogge, 2008). It would be a constant force that maintains a kind of global apartheid. In other words, the habit of war-peace would be reflected in an automatic functioning, an operating system, a reciprocal cycle fulfilling a kind of permanent pre-emptive global logisiticity. As Clausewitz intimates, "The noiseless harmony of the whole action...only makes itself know in the total result (Clausewitz, 1982: 242)." We have yet to name this total result.

Global Logisiticity as Global Triage

What we are witnessing today is the actualization of a global triage. It is a global killing machine designed to save lives. It saves some lives at the cost of others. However, the decision between saving this life or that life is not political (i.e. deciding between friend and enemy (Schmitt, 1996)); it is logistical. If it was political, then all that would be required to

challenge contemporary fascism, for instance, would be to change the political object (i.e., life or total war) through already established political fields (i.e., the state, government, democracy, social movements or the markets). Granted it is political that some lives are deemed to be worth less and therefore others are treated as if they are worth more. Furthermore, these onto-political decisions – about the status of being – are derivative of a prior politicisation of life itself and the production of a population to be managed. However, these decisions are consistent with war being the continuation of war through politics; whereas, a global triage operates in excess of these politicizations. These decisions simply constitute cursory moments within the automatic functioning of a global logisiticity that is indifferent to the logic politics and displaces the decision into habit.

Obvious faces of the global triage have been witnessed in the H1N1 pandemic, the Avian Flu Emergency preparedness plan, the U.S. policy of full spectrum dominance and the global war on terror. Often aspects of international development policy, humanitarian intervention and human rights policy are similarly problematized. Less obvious faces of the global triage, however, operate in normal functioning global trade, finance and industry, at one level, and the production of desire, culture and fashion, at the other. The triage includes global-local collaborators from government, military, industry, media, agriculture, health, education, advocacy and entertainment. At the heart of the issue is how the globe is learning to move together. The global triage has two key components: 1) pre-emption and 2) technology. Pre-emption pushes the decision into a non-political time and technology enacts those decisions as if through habit.

Although the legitimacy of pre-emption is usually debated in military terms (i.e., the US war in Iraq in 2003 or the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967), the function of pre-emption is more closely associated with legitimacy derived from the precautionary principle and the promise of good governance. Central to these ideals is the creation of a temporal zone intended to buffer the shocks of immediate events. As such, the threat assessment that legitimizes all pre-emptive planning for pandemics, for example, requires the catch phrase: *it is not if, but when*. Tough decisions about life and death, allocation of resources, organizational structures are set in advance to as to offer legitimacy and defer the sense of immediacy. A kind of governing the future from the standpoint of the present seems normal; however, what actually occurs is a governing of the present from the standpoint of an imaginary future. Pre-emptive policy makers are, in effect, time travellers in a kind of science fiction. This temporal reversal has significant implications for how decisions are made and politics enabled.

Specifically, within the temporal buffer of pre-emption the boundary between friends and enemy disappears. While the distinction *may* be deployed in the public relations campaigns of such programs and thereby putting the issues back into a kind of language that the public ironically finds comfortable and non-threatening, within pre-emptive logistics the boundary disappears entirely. As such, it becomes possible to build momentum by harnessing and amplifying the threat of the enemy (i.e., cinema, video games). The chimera of legitimacy (i.e., democracy, civil liberty, habeas corpus) drop to reveal a well oiled war machine. Further, it becomes attractive to become like the enemy in order to destroy the “enemy” (i.e. in counter-insurgency exercises and risk management). Moreover, the enemy may actually be employed and/or enriched in order to make strategic advances (i.e., vaccine programs, research plans or investment portfolios). Finally, the objectives of the enemy become

identical and hence interchangeable with the promises of good governance (i.e., Justice, Health and Adaption) (see Massumi).

What is crucial for pre-emption to function, moreover, is the change in the nature of the decision. Whereas within a logic that defines politics by the friend enemy decision (i.e., a privileged function of the logic of sovereignty (Schmitt 1985)), pre-emption allows excessive-binary, extra-representational, and in-different distinctions to be made. In other words, pre-emption does not require the choice between this or that (or that...) it *allows* for everything. It operates within an infinite linking of connections. When nothing is denied or affirmed, *whatever work*¹ becomes a kind of operating nihilism.

If an alternative definition to the friend/enemy distinction is offered and politics requires *taking or making the time, when you have no time* (Rancière, 2009) then not only can the “political” nature of pre-emption be more fully appreciated, but it also becomes possible to imagine the unexpected kinds of political horizons operating *in and through* a global logisiticity. Pre-emption makes time by occupying, exploiting and mortgaging the future. Furthermore, to politicize logistics would require that *new time be made for a time that never “is.”* To become sufficient to that political task is exponentially more difficult (though not necessarily undesirable).

The technological component of the global triage further depoliticises and displaces the decision. The further the act of deciding is pushed into the automatic functioning of ever-emerging networks of networks the more insignificant the action becomes and the more difficult it is to politicize. The decision, as such, is no longer an exception awaiting the sovereign prerogative. Instead has become a slipstream automatically operating behind the movement. No longer a bottleneck, roadblock or gatekeeper, the decision becomes part of the general logistical flow. Coupled with the normalization of pre-emption, the decision unfolds long after the action has already taken place.

This development has been anticipated. Manuel De Landa (1991) identifies WWII as a logistical (not strategic or tactical) war because it pressed into service the entire resources of the state (De Landa, 1991: 108). However, the emergence of cybernetic systems that are automatic, adaptive and self-correcting has further changed the way and the kinds of wars that can be fought. De Landa charts the disappearance of the boundary between advisory and executive capabilities (De Landa, 1991: 1) in a process that “would see humans as no more than pieces of a larger military-industrial machine (De Landa, 1991: 3).” This development would allow a system to maintain its shape as it takes “energy from its surroundings, channelling and dissipating in through (its other) system of nested teddies (De Landa, 1991: 8).” The beginning and ending of a manoeuvre, battle, and even war becomes insignificant since the movement as a whole strengthens the logistical systems that further energizes adoptions and self-corrections.

However, the technological developments of information networks and everyday machines have far exceeded De Landa’s projections. As the boundary between military, industrial and civilian logistics collapses, what has emerged is something Alexander Galloway (2004) calls “protocol.” Galloway defines protocol the “techniques for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment (Galloway, 2004: 7).” This technique takes the shape of a “distributed network (Galloway, 2004: 11)” (which has replaced centralized and decentralized networks) functions through a logic of *whatever works*. It includes nothing but,

¹ Thanks to my student Stephanie Redden for this phrase.

quoting Eric Hall, “intelligent end-point systems that are self-deterministic, each end-point system to communicate with any host it chooses (Hall in Galloway, 2004 11).” Logistical in nature, protocol is not organized around centres or even objects, instead they simply move to the extreme in order to simply make ‘things’ work.

Such a rhizomatic circuit appears to be contingent and unstable, but ironically its contingency perpetual emergence *is* its form. This is precisely what makes the global triage as capable of operating in total contingency. Kathleen Hayles (2005) calls the aspiration of total knowledge in contingency “the Regime of Computation (Hayles, 2005: 23).” It can operate within contingency because the regime requires no foundation (i.e., god, sovereignty, geometry) to establish truth other than bare requirements of differentiating between something and nothing (i.e., one/zero) (Hayles, 2005: 22). Proponents of the regime make the strong claim that “computation does not just simulate the behaviour of complex systems; it is envisioned as the process that actually generates behaviour in everything from biological organisms to human social systems (Hayles, 2005: 19).” Not only has the boundary between friend/enemy, military/civilian and social/biological collapse but so have the boundaries between and human, animal and viral. In the midst of the global triage everything is infected life and part of a complex evolving organism.

“The problem,” Paul Virilio emphasizes, “is not to use technology but to realize that one is used by it (Virilio, 2008: 92).” Not only is it impossible to differentiate the present from the future or the past, who is friend or enemy but also what is collaborating in the overall pre-emptive movement. The technological component not only pushed the decision into insignificance it also makes the pre-emptive movement of networks automatic, habituated and self-correcting. “The thing about collaborators” he continues, “is that you do not know you are one... (Virilio, 2008: 203).” The global triage is like pure war. “Pure war no longer needs (humans) and that’s why it is pure (Virilio, 2008: 180).” The purity of the global triage operates in advance of the event in so far as it is the event. It no longer takes humanity as its object because it is not concerned with human being. It is concerned with mitigation, computation, regularities, and predictability. These characteristics come to be defined as habits of human being and these habits, in turn, become desired.

Human Desire as Logistics

The very forces that have become the habit of being human collaborate with the logicity of the global triage. Said differently, the very forces that define the logicity of the global triage have come to define what it means to be a desiring human being. To desire otherwise is to be suspect or disqualified. In this sense, Clausewitz’s summation, “all war supposes human weakness, and against that it is directed (341)” is still relevant. Human optimization is the organized desire to defeat human weakness. Taking the guise of innumerable pairings (i.e., civilized/terrorist, urban/rural or healthy/ignorant) humanity is habitually at war with itself. The human desire to develop a global triage as kind of logistical caring for self and others needs to be investigated.

The problem of contemporary fascism has obviously become more complicated than rehashing the political fascism of the 20th Century. Although, it is difficult to make out fascism without recourse to allegorical fictions, Michel Foucault identified a more resilient kind of *comprehensive fascism*. This fascism is a desire within us: “the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very things that dominates and exploits us (Foucault in (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: xiii).”

One of the fundamental problems, as such, is one that Wilhelm Reich rediscovers in the question “why do men (sic) fight *for* their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 29)?” Reaffirming Reich’s sentiment further, Deleuze and Guattari assert “what is astonishing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed that they *actually want* humiliation and slavery not for others but for themselves? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 29).” Ashis Nandy similarly queried the desire within colonialism (i.e., the intimate enemy) that encourages colonized peoples to release forces that alter cultural priorities to fit and even celebrate the logic of colonialism (Nandy 1987). Nandy explains, “as a state of mind, colonialism is an indigenous process release by external forces. Its sources lie deep in the minds of the rulers and the ruled (Nandy 1987:7). Guattari explains that a similar release of desire is part of “the rise of comprehensive fascism (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995: 18).”

It is not so easy to oppose human desire with comprehensive fascism. On the contrary, it is under the banner of freedom that humanity’s masses seem to desire more triage, development and security. The little fascist wants more regularity, peace-n-quite, compliance, predictability and continuity. These habits are desired and desirable. Moreover, the habit of desiring these habits has grown into a kind of global ethic of care. Care, it seems, has become an instrument of governmentality and a means of securitization (Duffield, 2007). While the global triage is now championed as an extreme form of caring for others, this caring is predicated upon an extreme disposability of embodied lives (even our own). Collateral damage in humanitarian wars, planned casualties in global human health, disposable peoples in the name of development, and tradable bodies in economic growth remain indelible images of the global triage. Mitigation, computation, regularity, peace-n-quite, compliance, predictability and continuity requires that embodied life be despised before “it” be can be cared for logistically. In humanity’s war against itself, such as love-hate desire has become synonymous with human progress, development, adaptability and sustainability. The development of the global triage requires a desiring machine that *loves to hate to love*.

Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of a desiring machine to explain how a subject is produced, not in isolation from the world, but in the midst of a social formation. Desire, they argue, is not a natural impulse instead desire is always assembled (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 399) – desire is an assemblage of “machines driving other machines, (and) machines being driven my other machines (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 1).” Desiring machines themselves, as such, “represent nothing, signify nothing, mean nothing and are exactly what one makes of them, what is made with them, what they make themselves (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 288).” To be sure, this is not a question of how desiring machine is *to be* used; the point is that desire itself is always already *using*. Desire becomes habit. “Desire,” Guattari reflects, “is part of the infrastructure (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995: 19),” As such, it is not insignificant that Deleuze and Guattari argue “people’s interest will never turn in favour of revolution until the lines of desire reach the point where desire and machine become indistinguishable, where desire and contrivance are the same thing (Deleuze and Guattari, 1995: 20).” Perhaps in just such a time a new people, not a new

humanity, can emerge to take a revolutionary cause as their point of unification (Reid: forthcoming). However, this is likely too optimistic. The difficulty is whether or not the social field that Deleuze and Guattari emphasize (capitalism as an undifferentiated abstract machine) neglects the logistical field. In this light, comprehensive fascism need not be an attack by the body politic on itself, or upon its parts. Comprehensive fascism makes 'things' work. It constitutes a kind of global efficacy. It is habitual. It is an order that operates beyond politics and is indifferent to normalized political fields (i.e., the state, government, democracy, social movements or the markets). As such, comprehensive fascism makes the world go round, not by targeting the body politic, but making humans habits that desires habit.

It is no longer clear that we live in a world where it is *only* the state and corporations that want to kill us (or some), there never was any recourse to humanity's multitude in the struggle against fascism. As Deleuze and Guattari remember "No, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted *fascism*, and it is this perversion of desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 29)." The problem is greater. Our habits, our desires are collaborators. We live in a world where eating, drinking, breathing, touching, loving conspires against the integrity of life. Our life systems, our biology, cells, nervous system and chemical balances have become ticking time bombs. Again, human being is not an object in this war; this killing is incidental. Just like the planned casualties of the global triage, it is not so much that the environment wants to kill us, but it will. Just like it is not so much that cancer wants to kill us, but it likely will.

How is it that we live so calmly? While these are processes that humans have created, they have also become motors that are indifferent to those soft bodies that they now shape. In the midst of these global-local, social-biological, war-peace feedback loops, human life as fallen below the threshold of necessity. I fear that in this fall we experience a kind of freedom and this freedom constitutes a kind of desire. Seeking favour, relevance and inclusion, it became strategic for humanity to be on the logistical side of the auto-correcting curve of total war and contemporary fascism. However, as the desire for the global triage that promises life, progress, and freedom (for some) has grown stronger, human being has become its own enemy. As humans fall below the threshold of necessity, logistics continue to work.

Back to a Future which has no Future:

The question is not "Can fascism happen again?" instead the question remains "can it be defeated (Sannard, 1992: xiii)?" This essay clearly imagines a future that will be more difficult than the past. I have argued that questions concerning logistics are now more important than past distinctions between war and peace. I have argued that contemporary logistics need to be understood as a kind of global triage that is organized around optimizing human life. However, I have also suggested that this optimization occurs through practices of mitigation and auto-correction that require becoming indifferent to specific human lives and populations. In order for humanity to thrive some other humans must die. While this should seem troubling, it isn't because the triage has become a habitual comprises that pre-emptively and technologically operates beyond politics. The habitualization of this compromise, moreover, is not an isolated event. On the contrary, habitualization is the component of logistics that desires mitigation and auto-correction. Habit and logistics are part of the same movement that makes 'things' work. Given the indifference to specific

human lives, it would be foolish to assume we (individually) are exempt from the humanity's total war on itself. On the contrary, the logistical habit constitutes a human desire to be more human. Humans desire killing machines that save lives in the name of humanity.

At the heart of contemporary fascism is the way in which different triages are learning to coordinate, communicate and integrate into seamless optimizations. This logistical desire to make 'things' work is difficult to politicize. Yet, I remain optimistic that different bodies will endure. There is no escape, as the Invisible Committee writes in their manifesto The Coming Insurrection, "to go on waiting is madness. The catastrophe is not coming; it is here. We are already situated *within* the collapse of civilization (Comité invisible 2009: 96)." They joyfully proclaim: "the future has no future (Comité invisible 2009: 23)." And here we sit. Perhaps some consolation can be taken in the following strategy: the de-politicization of logistics and the banality of life (systems) will constitute an opportunistic movement. A kind of tactical solidarity can be re-established beyond universalist strategies that claim human rights, cosmopolitan justice, democratic procedure and international law. Instead, a broader war might be re-engaged that disrupts the habitual supply chain of the global triage and enacts a kind of solidarity of creative forces.

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