Renewal, Religion, and Development

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The Religio-Political Nexus of the Modern Age

International development as we have come to know it today is commonly said to have originated in 1949 with US President Truman's inaugural address announcing the introduction of a technical assistance programme for international development. The plan was an integral part of an international policy designed to secure US peace and prosperity nationally through securing US hegemony internationally. Novel in its specifics it was not novel in principle. If securitization has been a generative principle of formation for all modern states since the 17th century, so also have the improvement, renewal and continuous transformation of the material conditions of populations. In that sense, modernization as such has always been concerned with 'development'. Since there is no one modernity, however, and no one form of modernization, the issue has always been which modernity, and how. There has however always been an additional question. It went out of fashion for a long time. It has come back in more recently, and for obvious reasons that do not need to be labored. That additional question is the relation of religion to politics in an age of different modernization programmes including specifically, here, the biopoliticisation of development pursued by global liberal governance.

The enduring significance of the religio-political nexus is one to which modern philosophers from Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche through to Heidegger, Schmitt and Derrida have all attested, especially in the concern of the last three with the 'theologico-political'. The significance of the nexus is one to which contemporary social theorists from Habermas to Judith Butler, Charles Taylor and Cornel West also subscribe. Social and political scientists have recently turned their attention to it as well, since the policy significance it acquired after 9/11 secured considerable increase in funding for religio-political research by policy driven academics. In the religio-political nexus of the modern, the philosophical and theological therefore combine with the political to form a vexed and often-combustible field of formation. Just as the political nexus of the modern age exceeds the political rationalities and governing technologies of sovereignty and geopolitics, however, so also does the religio-political nexus of the modern age exceed the analytical categories of secularism and fundamentalism.

From the 17th century onwards, all constitutional debate, for example, addressed the question of the effectiveness as well as the legitimacy of rule; effectiveness in relation to securing the peace and prosperity of domestic populations as a concomitant of securing the best form of government. Somewhat contra Foucault, what Foucault calls the royal questions of power concerning the derivation and exercise of

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sovereignty, the division of powers and the organization of the office and of the revenues of the sovereign (Cameralism) always also addressed how the favored form of government would better improve, renew or advance the material conditions of the subjects of the sovereign, or the citizens of a republic. The issue of the commonweal, however it was construed as subject, citizen or people, and of its improvement and renewal as a matter of the good order supplied by rule, was always addressed as well. It was axiomatic that the right form of government was one that would necessarily also lead to the improvement of the conditions of populations. How people were governed was necessarily correlated, then, with how well they were governed and how well they would do under their form of government in respect of provision for their basic material mean of subsistence. There were none that argued for the rule of liberty, equality and representation, alone, or indeed for that of divine right or tradition.

Royal questions of rule were therefore always also tied-up with what Foucault called the conduct of conduct, more generally, and with welfare of the commonweal, however the commonweal was figured. Hence, from the very early days of modern political rule, sovereigns were always also in the market for strategic ideas about how to govern populations and, in particular, how to govern them in ways that also made them more productive, since productivity was closely associated both with domestic peace and tranquility at home as well as geopolitical potency abroad. The two went together. They still do. As far as the modern state was concerned, Churches could be strategic partners in this enterprise for the Christian Churches were also in the business of rule particularly at the level of governing the conduct of conduct. But they had a long track record also of being violent strategic adversaries and competitors there, with each other as well as secular authorities, as well.

Such considerations therefore set the context also for the modern work of the Christian Churches. From the very advent of modernization, the Churches themselves, responding directly to the challenges of modernization materially as well as theologically, in the realm of knowledge and social relations as much as in the realm of conscience, liturgy and observance, the reformed Churches, especially, were committed also to the improvement of the material conditions of individuals and populations equally as much, but sometimes also of course as little, as the secular authorities with whom they were related. For the Christian Churches material welfare was to be reconciled with redemption. For newly emerging states and forms of governance it had to be reconciled with sovereignty and geopolitical potency. There was a strategic intersection here between the Churches and the State, but a strategic intersection is by no means a given commonality of purpose.

This strategic intersection had always been comprised of two vectors of concern. The first was the appeal to a spiritual authority that transcended, and therefore always threatened to trump, the temporal authority of the secular power. There was however always also a second vector and this concerned the Church's responsibility for the material as well as the spiritual welfare of the faithful in fulfillment of Christ's

command and as a means of bringing souls to Christ. Conflict between Church and State could arise on either or both accounts.

The point about the evangelically inspired Christian Churches in particular, such as the Lutherans some of whose early work is referenced below, is precisely therefore that they were therefore not confined to the spiritual realm. Their work was part of the vast reformation of Christian confession in which a foundational issue as old as Augustine had come to the very fore once more. This time however it arose under the novel conditions set by political, economic and commercial as well as scientific modernization. Modernity did not therefore settle the problem of the religio-political nexus. It refigured it in ways that continue to exceed its enframing by secularism and fundamentalism.

Foucault's analytic of modern power relations provides a better way of enframing the issues involved. Subjects of rule, a subject is simultaneously also subjected to rule and has to be configured in such a way that technologies of rule can get purchase on them. How these objects/subjects are configured – the ways in which their properties are specified – influences the formation and application of the political rationalities and governing technologies to which they are subject. A flock, for example, is not a commonwealth. A flock or a commonwealth is not necessarily the same thing as a people. A flock, commonwealth or people, is not the same thing, either, as a population. Each constitutes a different subject/object of rule. The political rationalities and governing technologies obtaining in respect of them differ.

In the same business of rule, the Christian Churches were nonetheless in it quite differently then as they are now. Albeit each is in the business of rule, Churches and States are also quite different entities. In themselves heterogeneous rather than homogenous, hence the constant, often bloody, rivalry between religious movements, they are themselves also heterogeneous to the State; hence, their equally constant and often bloody rivalries with States. Within the western tradition, the truth telling practices of Church and State, the very politics of truth that they pursue, are therefore irresolvably different as well. Have always been irresolvably different. Long preceding the modern age the religio-political aporia of the west simply finds a novel expression within the contemporary religio-political nexus of the modern age. A structural problem with an historical face the religio-political aporia is not something that has therefore been resolved. It has been substantially reconfigured historically instead. That reconfiguration is best regarded, today, as a strategic settlement the terms and condition of which are neither given nor final. It is also played-out in the global security-development complex of global liberal governance equally as much as in domestic politics, the two having always been intimately allied.

In Foucauldean terms, the religio-political nexus of the modern age is consequently a strategic field of formation and intervention the properties and practices of the parties to which are subject to tactical and strategic renegotiation. However much they may reconcile themselves to one another, however supine the churches,

however dogmatic the states, the difference between them will nonetheless find its expression. That is why their relation is a strategic and not a dialectical one. However much global liberal governance seeks to configure Churches and non-Christian religious movements as civil society organizations, they are not. The revealed religion, of Christianity in particular, I cannot speak for non-Christian movements, is no mere adjunct of global liberal governance however much it may forget that fact, and however much its strategic recruitment by global liberal governance may seek to make it so.

Here the intersection of reason, faith and public policy continue therefore to pose challenging, often violently challenging, questions to one another. Recognizing that modernity problematised the truth of rule as well as the rule of truth for religion as much as it did for politics and science, this paper does no more than broach the difficult issue of the religio-political nexus of modern times. It does so, however, through the portal of religion's participation in promoting the material in addition to the so-called spiritual welfare of populations thus raising the issue of religion's current involvement in the biopolitics of development pursued by global liberal governance.

While this paper is concerned to prepare the way for an analysis of how, what liberal governance describes as, Faith Based Organizations have been recruited into an ever more tightly drawn security-development nexus throughout the first decade of the 21st century, it begins by emphasizing that religion and politics have long been linked with the changing problematisations of security and development since the beginning of the modern age. Referencing that genealogy the paper thus seeks to add to the analysis of the security-development complex of global biopolitics today by relating it also to the religio-political nexus that has in fact long characterized it as well.

Given this genealogy, the paper moves to pose three simple questions. First, have Faith Based Organizations become complicit in one degree or another with the biopoliticisation of the security-development complex of global liberal government? If so, how, if not why not? Secondly, do Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) provide an important surface of friction, instead, within the security-development complex into which they have been so assiduously recruited by global liberal governance since 9/11? Where do surfaces of friction between FBOs and other, state parastatal and humanitarian, nodes in the security-development complex arise? Third, are they in fact both complicit with as well as an irritant within the security-development complex? My suspicion is that the latter obtains but that the character of the strategic relations of power operating within the religio-political nexus of the security-development complex have not been mapped and the complexity of the surfaces of friction have not been explored. The paper is consequently much more a prolegomena to posing these questions, offering some indicative genealogical background to the religio-political nexus that emerged in the early modern period, and illuminating it through a specific example of how evangelical Christianity

strategically aligned itself within the political rationalities and governing technologies of state formation and empire building, by powers of the North Atlantic Basin, during the course of the late 17th and 18th centuries.

Development: Improvement, Renewal and Transformation

Since the relationship between religion and politics has never been mere local matter but a global issue that manifests itself in diverse ways nationally and internationally, its analysis has to find ways of combining local as well as global research perspectives. The local-global nexus of relations established by the pietist Lutheran Francke Foundations instituted in Brandenburg-Prussia at the end of the 17th century provide just such a microcosm. It offers a fascinating insight into the early genealogy of Church-State relations in respect of newly emerging modern forms of rule on the one hand and the improvement of populations on the other. For the Lutheran Pietists were as interested in pursuing new forms of governance and self-governance as were the proponents of the civic enlightenment of 17th and 18th century, such as Christian Thomasius and intellectuals like Christian Wolff in Germany, as much as better known thinkers in France and England, and in the governance of overseas plantations and colonies as much as in the governance of newly emerging European states.

A "Pietist" was someone who was affiliated with an evangelical reform movement first initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener in the 1670s. A long and deeply entrenched historiographical tradition has portrayed the proponents of this movement—especially their leader August Hermann Francke—as zealous, yet practical, Lutheran reformers who were forced to directly confront the ideals of early Enlightenment in conjunction with the state building mandate of Brandenburg-Prussia since Brandenburg-Prussia that had first given Pietists sanctuary and support to the institution and operation of the first Orphanage in the German town of Halle in the mid 1690s. The Halle Orphanage was to become the 'mother orphanage' of a globally distributed transnational network of such institutions operating widely from North America to Russia and from the West to the East Indies where it was involved in colonial government as well.

It would therefore be wrong to see Halle Pietists as "others" cultivating their collective identity in opposition to proponents of the civic enlightenment directly involved in the development of cameralist staatswissenschaftlische experiments in governance in the very states that gave the Pietists support and sanctuary. The relation was instead reciprocal and the Halle method on educational reform in particular, as well as the meaning eighteenth century Europeans attached to philanthropy more generally, had a significant impact on the political and intellectual reformers of the period. The Pietist Orphanage promoted Pietist pedagogy designed to introduce children to the conciliatory knowledge-making strategies of the first Berlin Academy of Sciences.

These strategies championed the status of the 'heart' as an assimilatory juncture point for a reconciliatory form of governance and self-governance. It was the material expression of Halle Pietists' commitment to a "third way" not dissimilar in certain ways from the intent the of inter-faith foundation established by former Prime Minister Tony Blair in the UK, albeit the Pietists were concerned to assimilate experience and cognition as well as theology, philosophy and voluntarism to absolutism rather than global liberal governance. Thus, according to one of the most detailed accounts of the work of the Francke Foundations:

> *"Pietist orphanages were both real and imagined spaces. They did and did not house orphans. Their founders were and were not Pietists. They were funded by everyone and no one (with the exception of God). They were and were not supported by the state. They were inclusive and exclusive. They existed to regulate both the environment and the soul. The educational programming in place within these sites aimed to create a world in which there was no difference between thinking and feeling, or between knowing and doing. Here the seemingly impassable fissure imagined as existing between the world of the mind and the world of the hand had been bridged and Cartesian dualism mediated. The founding of a Pietist orphanage, or application of its pedagogies in other institutional settings, signified the pursuit of a rigorous method of action and assimilation, a middle way. Following the example of the Jesuits, whose prowess as educators was widely known, Pietists cultivated the "visual aptitudes" of children and held up the eye as the perfect conciliatory, didactic and edificatory medium. In the spaces touched by their methods, the eye and the heart became fused together into a single entity that observed, reconciled and loved." (Whitmer, 1998)*

Religious, the Francke Foundations were nonetheless also committed to the improvement of populations pursuing the renewal of their governance as well as the salvation of their souls:

> *"Halle Pietists believed in the promise of helping individuals acquire "visual aptitudes" through training in the mathematical sciences, which provided a methodological point of orientation for solving the problem of dissonance between competing regimens of truth—including competing confessional systems. Although, as Lorraine Daston has noted, "the divergence, integration and transcendence of individual perspectives were the province of moral philosophy and aesthetics" in the eighteenth century more generally, in Halle, around 1700, this group of radical Lutheran theologians attempted to link moral philosophy and aesthetics to "primitive Christianity" or the idea of a universal faith. Like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose "perspectival metaphysics" and preoccupation with harmony is well documented, Halle Pietists pursued a pansophic vision of universal harmony, justice or benevolence; only they institutionalized their*

version of this vision in an orphanage and placed it at the center (or heart) of a self enclosed "city of schools." They were participants, like Leibniz and so many others, in a culture of reconciliation, or what the noted Professor of Medicine at the University of Halle, Friedrich Hoffmann, called a "culture of understanding," and their conciliatory and vision oriented method was hugely influential precisely because of their ability to replicate it in new and existing institutional settings." (8)

Theirs was a knowledge based as well as faith-fuelled experiment in social formation and reformation. Whitmer again:

> *"…passionate inquirers, observers, consumers and assimilators of the cacophony of materials and methods so characteristic of knowledge making in eighteenth century Europe. Like Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke and other members of the Royal Society in England, they believed in the possibility of reconciling several forms of knowledge (and knowledge making) by exploiting the potential of middling objects and instruments. In doing this, they participated in the same sorts of conciliatory knowledge making as the polymaths they associated with: Ehrenfried Walters von Tschirnhaus, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Johann Christoph Sturm, Leonhard Christoph Sturm, Christian Wolff, Christian Thomasius, Friedrich Hoffman, Georg Ernst Stahl, Daniel Ernst Jablonski, even Frederick Slare (a former student of Boyle's and Royal Society member)." (Whitmer, 1998: 7)*

Trans-national in their operations and ambitions, as well, the Francke Foundations were not just locally rooted they were globally networked and they financed themselves in the selling of medicines as well as of bibles and edifying Christian tracts. Not unlike Faith Based Organizations today, missionising, medicine and teaching was their game. Equally also it was trans-national and politico-religious from the very beginning.

Inspired by the evangelical fervor of the European Reformation their Pietist beliefs were nonetheless often criticized as excessive and irrational. Their beliefs and practices created many surfaces of friction within the Lutheran Church as well as between the Lutheran and other churches. In Tranquebar they fought with other co-religionists such as the Anglicans. In the states of the North American Colonies they clashed with colonial governments and commercial interests over the question of slavery, notwithstanding the fact that notable Pietist Pastors also owned slaves.

Despite Whitmer's observations, it is evident from her work and other sources that the relation of the Foundations to early modern politics was equally also characterized by mutual suspicion and shifting strategic alliances in respect not only of their missionising work, but also the social reform pedagogy that they practiced,

the medicine that they marketed and sold, as well as well as their treatment of slaves and teaching on slavery. Inevitably so, the relationship of the Francke Foundations to the royal authorities in Brandenburg-Prussia was one in which Church and State though allied were also careful to emphasize their difference from as well as their independence of one another. Was Francke co-opted by the Prussian state or, by founding the Halle Orphanage, was he strategically manipulating the state in pursuit of his own agenda? Most commentators continue, with caveats come down on the side of the first view interweaving the story of the Francke Foundations with a Berlin rather than a Halle centered narrative. The same issues applied also to the Foundations' relations with the Kingdom of Denmark, which first housed their mission to the Coromandel port of Tranquebar in the Indian sub-continent before the Danes sold it to the British in the mid 18th century, as well as with colonial governments in North America and in the West and East Indies.

More interesting still, a point that bears comparison with the operations of evangelical churches in the United states today, the Francke Foundations were commercially astute. Missionising bankrolled by Medicine and the Bible was as much a commercial, epistemological and pedagogical enterprise as it was a religious and spiritual one. Equally as much an experiment in ruling in the service of the Lord as the polizeiwissenschaft and liberal governance were experiments in the governance of states, the Francke Foundations had continuously to check that in serving the Lord they were not simply also serving the state. The situation for Christian Churches in the 18th and 19th centuries was little different in principle than that of so-called Faith Based organizations today.

Whereas new cameralist staatswissenschaftlishe and polizeiwissenschaftlische theories of rule proclaimed the sovereignty of the state, along with other Christian churches the pietist Lutherans ultimately proclaimed the sovereignty of God. The two had not been reconciled since the Constantine conversation of the Roman Empire lost its Christian apologist in Eusebius, gaining a very different account of the relation between the City of Man and the City of God in the teachings of St Augustine. Their reconciliation was no less difficult with the problematic of rule deeply agitated once more at the beginning of the modern period. The issues ran deep and wide, neither were they confined to the problematic of sovereign rule alone. The conduct of everyday life, the very object of Pietist teaching and practice equally as much as it was for cameralist reformers in Brandenburg Prussia, was simultaneously at issue as well. Governance, specifically self-governance, is required if sovereign will and the force of law is actually to work. Governance, specifically self-governance is equally necessary also to achieve salvation. That is why the Churches were in the business of rule equally as much as the secular authorities. For every account of truth is accompanied by some corresponding governmental imperative that specifies how one should be governed or exercise self-governance in light of the truth proclaimed. Cameralists recognized this as much as republicans.

Theorists of polizeiwissenschaft understood it just as well as physiocrats, political economists and liberal thinkers. What differentiated them was the how of rule – the how governance and self-governance - not that religious and political truth alike required there to be rule and self-rule of some description or another.

Operating within the strategic nexus of relations comprising new formations of power relations, Christian Churches, the experience of the Francke Foundations illuminating the point, were therefore not mere dupes of the State, although they could operate in part as agents of the state. Neither were they dupes of commerce and economic exploitation although they often also served the interests of colonization and imperial exploitation. Indeed their missionising was integral to the civilizational rationales that accompanied colonization and imperial rule.The Churches, too, attended scrupulously to business in order to spread their message and in the process it was often difficult also to dissociate religion as a business from the business of religion. The point is that these dangers and difficulties were as evident to Lutherans pastors in the 17th and 18th centuries as they are to Faith Based Organizations today.

Whereas the Francke Foundations, correctly, feared being recruited into the cameralist drive of Brandenburg-Prussia and other European states, FBOs today retain suspicions about the degree to which they have been assimilated into the great biopolitical recruitment drives, initiated in the 1990s, to secure their participation with other so-called civil society organizations in the tight security-development complex created by global liberal governance. Then, as now, states and secular organizations also expressed suspicion of Church involvement in the improvement, renewal and development of populations.

The religio-political nexus of the modern age has therefore always been a shifting field of strategic formation and intervention often as much adversarial as it has been cooperative. Whereas reforming political authorities were deeply suspicious of religion because it was held responsible for intractable doctrinal conflicts and protracted warfare, in a new expression of the long-established conflict between Church and State, the reformed Churches also remained institutionally suspicious of political authorities as well. For the vocation of the Church was to serve a higher authority. Having gained their freedom of belief and observance from Rome, the Reformed Churches may have welcomed the protection of political authorities from Rome, and from Princes loyal to Rome, but they remained conscious of the danger of confusing their mission with that of the political authorities. If the Church had always been concerned with the material conditions of existence of its flock, it had always also been concerned with its own specific arts of governance as well.

In short, finding themselves in the midst of historical re-problematisations of the nature of nature, and thereby also of the corresponding re-problematisation of the very origin and nature of rule and law, temporal as well as spiritual, social as well as natural, for individuals as much as for collectives, Church and State reformulated the how as well as the why of governance and rule. Indeed, the very exigencies and

pressing urgency of how to rule were at least as important as the broader constitutional and ideological questions of the legitimation and formal constitutional structures of rule. Church and State alike experimented in the pursuit of everyday governance as much as they did in formally constituting themselves as governors; governing authorities both spiritual and temporal. That they therefore shared an interest in the development of new forms of governance, did not however mean that the problematisation of governance and rule arose for them in the same ways, was based on appeal to the same sources of rule or was motivated by the same interests in ruling. These circumstances applied to absolutist as much as they did to liberal and republican regimes of rule.

Biopolitics of Development and FBOs in the 21st Century
Just as security and war make states and societies as much as states and societies pursue security and make war, so also have modernization and development been intimately involved in these processes of rule since the very inception of the modern age. By the 21st century the discourse of modernization and development, focusing increasingly also on catastrophic socio-technical and socio-natural events, is largely preoccupied with the generalized threat to developed states and societies said to emanate from the global poor. Just as the Francke Foundations were implicated in the early modern emergence of new forms of governance and rule, so also are Faith Based Organizations deeply implicated in the operations of the security-development complex of the 21st century. The terms and conditions of governance and rule have changed; so also have many of the subjects and objects of rule. While it may be an exaggeration to say that polizeiwissenschaft has been wholly superseded by liberal governance, as opposed to having entered into a complex strategic alliance with it, the biopolitics of population is nonetheless prominent in global liberal development practices where the role of capital is also central.

It therefore came as no surprise to hear in August 2010, in the midst of an historically unprecedented retrenchment of public expenditure, including spending on national defence, the *Guardian* newspaper leaking an internal UK Department for International Development (DIFID) paper explaining that the new UK National Security Council had, "said that the ODA [Overseas Development Administration] budget should make the maximum possible contribution to national security consistent with ODSA rules." "Although the NSC will not in most cases direct DFID spending," the DFID paper was reported as saying, "we [DFID] need to be able to make the case for how our work contributes to national security." (Guardian, 30 August 2010). That additional national security value should be squeezed out of every aspect of the national budget when the UK fiscal military state found itself unable to sustain extensive borrowing from international capital markets to help fund overseas war, as it has done since the 18th century, should come as no surprise.

But it did. Condemned by a radically discredited Labour opposition that had done more in detail to securitize development than any previous British political

administration, an anonymous New Labour source complained that: "This document is deeply worrying, as it confirms the fears of many in the international development and humanitarian development community that the government plans to securitize the aid budget." Opposition rhetoric as this was, the statement nonetheless also indicated the extent to which liberal regimes of power routinely disguise from themselves the necessary relation between development and security of which they have long been comprised.

For, sometime during the course of the 1990s, as Mark Duffield has documented so well, a tight-knit, wide-ranging and more ideologically self-conscious, alliance was formed between security and development among the liberal societies and states of the North Atlantic basin. It increasingly targeted, and more systematically incorporated, resourced and directed, Christian and humanitarian organizations pursuing health and educational as well as poverty and disaster relief programmes globally. The genealogy of development was the history of empire. The history of empire is as involved as that of security and development as well. Christian Churches played a notable part then as they do in the security-development complexes of the 21st century.

Hence the UK Government issued a White Paper on International Development in 1997, for example, committing the Blair Government to prioritizing support for development through enrolling businesses and trades unions, faith communities, black and minority ethnic (BME) communities and Diaspora groups. The aim was to further resource a development strategy already committed to linking poverty with war and the war-poverty nexus with threats to British national security and prosperity. The Building Support for Development Strategy (BSDS), subsequently published in 1999, set out how this would be achieved. Whilst the overall policy context has developed over the intervening period the BSDS has continued to set the direction of policy. The BSDS gave priority to education and the media that were covered by seven of its objectives and the bulk of the funding. However the strategy expressed a commitment to reach hitherto unreached parts of society through innovative organizational partnerships with businesses and trade unions, churches and faiths.

A short time later Prime Minister Blair formally proclaimed the international strategy, latent within the emergence of the security-development complex, in a speech to the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999. Albeit prompted by the need to justify NATO intervention in Kosovo, Blair's Chicago speech detailed a wide-ranging doctrine of liberal interventionism on the grounds that, given globalization and the radical interdependence of the world poverty and war overseas, global interdependence threatened national security and prosperity at home. Liberal war making in pursuit of such intervention was justified on the grounds that it pursued values not territory: "This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values." Security, peace and prosperity conflated so also were international boundaries as well as international distinctions between faiths, cultures and peoples.

This recruitment drive was followed by other states as well. It was extended and intensified as part of the rollout of the war on terror after 9/11 in particular through DIFID and USAID.

Something of the same sort of tension is evident also today. However embraced by US AID or DIFID in the UK FBOs view the embrace with a suspicion matched only by that of the profoundly secular organizations nationally and internationally official and voluntary that also make up the network of the global development-security nexus. ..... Oh dear I am writing the paper for you...better get back to doing it for Kolkata...meantime...

This complex site of truth-telling is what Foucault would call diverse and heterogeneous. By that he would mean not only that a plurality of truths exist, but also, and importantly, that such a plurality of truths may co-exist strategically without necessarily being commensurable dialectically, or otherwise. There is therefore not one truth but many truths competing for attention and hegemony in the complex multi-lingual multi-institutional discourse of development. Equally also, however, since every form of truth telling is also a form of rule – subscription to a truth is subscription to a rule of one form or another and the labor of deriving the relevant rule from the relevant truth is an integral part of the profession of truth-telling itself – there is not one rule but many rules competing for attention and hegemony in development discourses as well.