Emerging Spaces and Labour Relations in Neo-Liberal India: A Review Essay

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Introduction

One of the important thrust areas in the literature on globalization and labour has been the changing notion and nature of “work”. While most of the literature tries to capture the changing landscape of labour relations through the frame of “work”; it is equally important to understand the spatiality within which the nature of the “work” is shifting, eroding or continues to exist. The changing nature of ‘work’ is closely linked to the ideas of ‘zoning’ that has been appropriated by economies worldwide and India is no exception. The following three snapshots give a brief overview of the context against which this review essay on emerging workspaces should be read.

Snapshot 1: In 2010, in an article on ‘New Work Spaces for the New Economy’ Jeremy Myerson had argued that in informational economy, transformational jobs have replaced transactional ones. Despite this shift, as far as workspace is concerned “we still seem stuck in the industrial age. The workspace template of the modern office is derived from the factory floor--indeed the white-collar workplace itself is a by-product of the conveyor belt”. Myerson (2010) argues that though there has been a shift from “process work” to “knowledge work”; there has been less innovation in design of workspaces apart from few structural changes. This article opens up interesting issues that concern the new age economy - the shifting patterns of work, its implications on “workforce” and need of a workspace that would generate “collaborative work”.

Snapshot 2: In 2004, Carol Upadhyay in her analysis of liberalization and global economy takes up the case of IT industry to show how the Indian IT industry was relatively free of state controls and emerged as a key player and in 2002, India accounted for 24% of global off-shored IT/ITes services (Upadhyay 2004:5141). In her work, Carol Upadhyay alerts us that unlike “old” economy the entrepreneurs of this new- economy whom she calls “transnationalist capitalist class” are the educated middle class with transnational connections and this class includes, “apart from NRI tech entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, the founders and top executives of large and medium size Indian IT companies, top managers of MNC software centres in India and entrepreneurs of the new breed of high- end start-ups” (ibid:5146). What Upadhyay draws our attention to in passing is how the image of the “global” gets appropriated and practised by these companies through maintenance of office spaces in U.S.A. and elsewhere while major part of the operations still remain confined to India which brings us back to the earlier logic of migration of jobs to cheaper locations, like India due to low cost of labour. In other words, ‘transactional entrepreneurial class’ has emerged with a

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transactional labour regime’ where with the decline of the on-shore practices of the IT worker, the off-shore practices operate in complex arrangements of global production systems.

**Snapshot 3:** In 1990s Kondapur, was the first village that witnessed urbanization due to IT parks. Maheswaram became famous for a watershed programme under World Bank in 1980s. Presently the place is considered to be lucrative among the real estate owners and Gopanpalle became famous for an IT Park and Special Economic Zone. Shameerpet is an old village under tank irrigation and along with Maheswaram it has a significant SC/ST population. Similarly the proportion of landless households is marginal in all these villages. What was striking was the way land was acquired. Though different strategies were adopted to acquire land, a study(Reddy and Reddy 2007: 3237) points to the way in which the real estate players entered these villages to purchase land with the help of the state much before the increase of land prices. Most of the farmers sold their land for Rs 10 lakh per acre in 1995 and by 2006 the land prices had increased to around Rs 1 crore. In some cases, land was acquired by the real estate players in the disguise of agriculture purpose which meant low registration charges. After that the land was converted to plots and transferred to individuals who would bear higher registration charges. For instance, in Gopanpalle, the government identified the lands belonging to tribal people for the purpose of a SEZ near to the village. A notice was issued by the government “asking them to hand over the land or approach the court”. According to the study, one of the pertinent questions that the people raise is “Why is the government taking their lands? Instead it can ask the industry to buy it in the open market” (ibid: 3238).

While the three snapshots are familiar accounts of liberalization and its aftermath; it is significant to note that zoning and spatial segregation are crucial to these work spaces. Snapshot 1 echoes a sense of absurdity of the reflections of factory floor images in modern-day spaces where the nature of “work” has changed. While the article merely focuses on service oriented jobs or the white collar workforce what is significant is the way the article argues for imaginative designs of workspaces and celebrates some of the fascinating images of “collaborative” workspaces of offices like Facebook, Google etc.

Snapshot 2 represents the most celebrated and discussed global industry of neo-liberal times – Information Technology (IT) based industries and its operations to illustrate that the “worker” is no more working according to the needs and demands of the domestic market but he is also expected to participate in the global commodity chain through his on-shore and off-shore participation. Through the image of a mobile IT worker, the changing nature of global capital and services become more prominent. While on one hand, we celebrate the boom of IT industry as educated youth becomes part of the “transnationalist capitalist class”, we fail to notice the increasing “alienation of work” from the embodied labour practice and processes as the “production” gets re-organised as “multi-national Corporations have been restructured through from vertically integrated bureaucratic organisations into ‘network enterprises’ composed of semi-autonomous entities that contract out work to one another”(Upadhyay and Vasavi 2006:6). The invisibilisation of labour processes is the most fascinating aspect of the IT labour processes as the individual worker is a part of the international division of labour which makes it much more difficult to understand and map of the changing nature of workspace. Allied to the IT industry is the proliferation of ITes units and of course the boom of call centres which cannot be ignored in this study. For instance potential ‘young’ workers in the Business Processing Sector (BPO) in India are lured through “portrayal of ‘work as fun’ and ‘workplace as yet another campus’ i.e., ‘vibrant ambience of workplace – with sweeping glass and concrete buildings, factory row of jazzy computers, the company of smart and trendy peers…” (Remesh 2004:492). These spaces, in other words serve a dual purpose. Through the
creation and recreation of a new space the “worker” is groomed to be part of the international commodity chain, where he is part of the labour process that has been disintegrated into various “network enterprises”.

Snapshot 3 represents the dynamics of how such spaces of work under neo-liberal regime is facilitated through zones of relaxation- the free trade zones which has taken various names across the world- Special Economic Zones, Free Trade Zones or Export Processing Zones. In recent times, zoning technologies across the world in myriad forms have been responsible for the ways in which spaces have been understood, articulated and contested. In fact much of the literature on spatializing practices revolve around the processes of development where accumulation of capital is through dispossession of livelihood and resources thereby “creating massive and chronic surpluses of labour power in a context of serious capital shortage…” (Harvey 1989: 25 in Chattopadhyay 2012 : 78). In other words, as Swapna Banerjee-Guha (2008) would argue, “the entire process of establishing SEZs in India needs to be seen as essentially a classic unfolding of the process of “accumulation by dispossession”. In this context, “space” and spatial relations of capital are evident in discourses of globalisation like “shrinking of the world”, “global village” which has to be “understood in terms of the specific necessity of a mode of production based on the relation between capital and labour expressing a time-space compression” (ibid:52). So on one hand there has been a “geographical organization of economic activities” as well as “historically evolved cultural landscapes” – a process that entails creation of “new socio-economic landscapes… for the purpose of facilitating capital accumulation” and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) can be seen as an extension of this phenomenon. Under the new international division of labour the “work” shifted from developed countries to developing countries not only through avenues of sub contracting but opening up of new enclaves, new spaces where a “drastic reorganisation of economic space and activities due to the establishment of SEZs is lending an ambiguous identity of placelessness” (Harvey 1982 in Banerjee-Guha 2008).

While liberalization of the Indian economy is the most significant turning point in India’s economic history as far as the present study is concerned, there were two other major transformations in India’s economic history. According to Sunanda Sen and Byasdeb Dasgupta (2009), the first phase of transformation covers two and a half decades of independent India- a social democratic regime or a developmental state. During this time, the workers enjoyed the “right to claim job tenures as well as job- related benefits from employers”. The state also kept a constant vigil on labour related issues along with the social benefits for the workers in the informal and formal sectors of the economy. The second phase (late 1970s-mid 1980s) was “marked by a drive for liberalization in different pockets of the economy” (ibid: xiii). During this time “labour was commoditized as with other goods and services” (ibid). The third phase is marked by the economic reforms in 1991, particularly “reforms relating to labour market gradually absolved the employers of the responsibility of providing benefits which usually came with tenured jobs” (ibid:xiv). This was further endorsed by the National Commission on Labour 2002 which recommended use of contract labour in view of uncertain demand from global markets. The first two phases mark a distinct phase in the Indian economy where the Nehruvian vision of development is implemented through setting up of manufacturing industries, dams, and facilitating development. Cut to 1970s the scenario changes; and a brief overview of the labour flexibility practices will show the first instance of the spatial reorganization of workspaces in the pre-liberalization age.

This discussion begins with a brief overview of the labour flexibility practices – the transition point of the Indian economy from the old to the new. As has been seen earlier, what is interesting to note is that much of the debate on labour flexibilisation revolves around the changing notion of
“work” patterns and newer contract arrangements. Missing in this debate is the spatial contours of work that have emerged with newer work patterns. In other words, the image of an assembly line workforce gets disintegrated with newer work arrangements particularly subcontracting. Secondly, subcontracting also meant increasing use of contract workers. It is against this background and context, through a critical review of the sociological literature on the IT and its allied industry, and SEZs in India I try to understand the relations between flexibilisation of labour practices and its impact on the spatial aspects of work arrangement.

Is Labour Flexibility Anything New?

Till the introduction of liberalization policies in 1980s, industrial firms in India were driven by “state – directed industrialization”. While “reform of industrial and trade policies” continued till the opening of markets in 1991; “labour market institutions however remained outside the reform process” (Ramaswamy1999:363). Ramaswamy (1999) in this study on Indian manufacturing shows how subcontracting has paved way for flexibility in the post 1980s phase. Drawing upon the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data on 3 digit industries within the organized manufacturing sector, he tries to develop an index of subcontracting intensity to show that “sub-contracting practices are concentrated in labour-intensive industries, greater in industries producing consumer non-durables and in industries with plants below the median employment size. “The relationship between factory size and subcontracting intensity appears to be non-linear” (ibid). According to him, there are five determinants of subcontracting arrangements. They are: (i) technology and demand (ii) transactions cost (iii)labour market (iv)demand uncertainty and business strategy and (v) state policy. Of the five determinants; for the purposes of our analysis we need to understand how transaction cost and labour market are the two most important determinants of subcontracting. One of the key concerns in production organization is transaction cost and early observers of Indian industrial growth according to the author have noted the relatively high vertical integration of Indian industries. One of the reasons for the increase of production costs could be poor labour relations. In other words, segmented labour market (formal and informal) is not only responsible for subcontracting but also outsourcing. “Subcontracting is reported to be the typical response of large unionized firms in India” (ibid:364). In other words, the early phase of liberalization is marked by subcontracting arrangements which took advantage of the hugely available informal labour. According to Nagaraj (1984) there are four major forms of sub-contacting: component subcontracting (when the parent firm contracts out the manufacture of some parts or sub-assemblies to other firms), activity subcontracting (when the parent firm having an integrated plant contracts out one or more activities and then sells the final product under its own brand name), assembly subcontracting; mostly in electronic industries (almost the opposite of this and seen in the electronics industry. Production of components is capital intensive and requires high technology with economies of scale and high obsolescence. However, assembling of these components to produce the final product is highly labour and skill intensive and can be farmed out to small and even household units). Fourthly, product subcontracting is where the complete product is produced by the subcontractor and the parent essentially performs the marketing function. Various studies point to the vulnerability of the unorganized labour force that has led to rapid increase of subcontract work in labour market.

The study on impact of subcontracting on the garment industry by Jeemol Unni, Namrata Bali and Jignasa Vyas (1999) indicates the presence of segmented labour market with large variation in the size structure in the manufacturing industry. Drawing upon the garment industry in Ahmedabad, they illustrate the segmented nature of the market. There are three segments of the
market. They are: large factory sector, small units and shops and thirdly home-based garment workers. Majority of the workers are women. Though in most of the segments the work is usually sub contracted; what is interesting is how even the subcontracted work in the garment industry is embedded in gender stereotypes producing a need to rethink how “sexual division of work” perpetuates different and distinct nature of work. The authors point out, “There was a clear division of the type of garments stitched by women and men. Among the workers stitching readymade garments, while only about 12 percent of the women stitched men’s pants and shirts, 36 percent of the men did so. The majority of the women made dresses and hosiery (27 and 29 percent respectively). Only 18 percent and 24 percent of the men made these two types of garments”. (pp :51).

Other than that, most of the women in this study felt that even the sub-contractors preferred trousers sown by men compared to women. Similar pattern followed in case of preference of women tailors for salwar kameez. Usually men were employed as supervisors, worked in the cutting department and also marketed products unlike women who were mostly in the stitching line and were also involved in the finishing and ornamentation of the product. The piece rate for this kind of work was lower compared to cutting which meant the monthly income of women was less than their male counterparts. In other words, subcontracting has led to gendered experiences and gendered work spaces. What is interesting to note is the comparatively large number of women workers in the household segment unit of garment industry. What does this mean in the larger context of labour flexibility? Does this mean/ imply encouragement of non-permanent work or it implies increase of employment through involvement of non-permanent work?

KR Shyam Sundar (2005) in a review essay on labour-flexibility debate in India maps the arguments for and against labour flexibility, concerns raised by the trade unions and the employers, followed by an in-depth analysis of the recommendations put forward by the Second National Labour Commission. Drawing upon the various macro-level and micro-level empirical studies in India relating labour flexibility like that done by Sen and Dasgupta (2009) he shows that the period between 1970s-1980s is crucial to understand the present debate on labour flexibility that has resulted into precarious work conditions – a product of opening up of markets and encounter with “global” capital. There are two explanations with regard to the declining job growth. 1980s saw a marked increase in job growth; with a sharp increase in the manufacturing sector in 1970s. In fact 1980s witnessed an impressive 7 percent output growth compared to less than 5 percent growth in the preceding decade. This “high output growth was unaccompanied by poor even negative job growth” (Shyam Sundar 2005:2276). Drawing from Fallon and Lucas (1991), Sundar notes this was due to the increase in real wages; where the employers “employ[ed] labour substituting capital-intensive measures) and stringent job security provisions” (ibid). On the other hand, some poor employment growth in 1980s was a result of decline in employment in two labour intensive industries i.e., food and textile (Papola 1994:10 in Sundar 2005: 2276). What becomes evident from the various enumerations of employment scenario (particularly how 13 percent of workforce lost their jobs in 1995-96 and 2000-01) is that of “variability of employment” as a result of liberalisation. Drawing from other studies Sundar also argues that the bargaining power of the employers had increased during this period. This is evident from the increase in lockouts which was responsible for workdays to be lost than what was lost due to strikes. Sundar draws upon three micro level studies: firstly the study by Sudha Deshpande et al (1998) which maps the labour flexibility from1987 to1988 in Bombay, secondly; the study on firms in Ghaziabad covering 1991-95 by Sharma and Sasikumar (1996) and finally the edited volume by Lalit Deshpande et al (2004) on labour flexibility practices in 10 states and nine industries in India during 1991-98 to illustrate how firms increased their employment primarily through increase of non-permanent workers. The studies range across the
time period we have delineated for our review essay. On the other, these three studies also show how market forces had started responding to capital and labour in late 80's the period that marked the pre-liberalisation era. While most post liberalization studies take the 1990s government’s attempt to liberalise the economy as the benchmark, these studies indicate a pattern of “non-standard” work conditions emerging way before era of liberalization in the manufacturing sector. These three studies reveal that “the firms were found to increase employment by increasing the share of non-permanent workers” (Shyam Sundar 2005:2277). Most of the firms resorted to increasing use of contract workers instead of permanent workers which led to increase of employment rates. This in a way also influenced wage flexibility as most of the firms could adopt ad-hoc mechanisms despite the minimum wage law. Following this review essay, Badri Narayanan G (2005) in ‘A Note on Labour Flexibility Debate in India’ highlights three other points that should be taken into consideration while talking about labour flexibility debate, they are: “Firstly, in the light of a free trade regime, existing labour reforms may act as an armour to protect our industries from non-tariff barriers. Secondly, any labour reform should be pro- worker as productivity gains have not been properly accrued to workers. Thirdly, technological modernisation, which has been taking place rapidly now, could play a lead role in improving the relations between unions and managements, rendering labour reforms reasonably redundant in the context of labour flexibility.” (Narayanan G. 2005: 4291)

Most of the literature and debate on labour flexibilisation point towards lack of effective labour protection mechanisms and at the ways in which the state was moving towards liberalizing the Indian economy. What is starkly missing in this debate are the ways in which the space and notion of ‘work’ was being re-conceptualised; with the flexible management of labour and capital. Spatial reconfiguration was not limited to the post-Nehruvian era of industrial townships and birth of city spaces like Jamshedpur, Rourkela etc. With the passage of time, the idea of a single heavy-based industry and a residential colony attached to it gave way to need of “sacred” economic spaces where the labour could be controlled and managed according to needs of capital. “Flexibilisation of labour”, “increased mobility of capital”, not only introduced casualisation of workforce through subcontracting work arrangements but also led to “de-spatialisation of production” feeding into the phenomenon of space-time compression or ‘distanciation’ that is regarded as a central feature of globalisation (Harvey 1989,Giddens 1990 in Upadhyay and Vasavi 2006:7). The de-spatialisation of production is much more evident in the functioning of the special economic zones in India which will be discussed in the following section.

Despatialisation, and Special Economic Zones

SEZs/ EPZs are one of effective ways of attracting investments across the world. Most of the developing countries have resorted to creating special legislative measures to facilitate EPZs. EPZs across the world have been seen as cheap source of labour, violation of environment rules and exemption from International labour standards and economic relaxations like tax holidays etc. World Economic Processing Zones Association, (WEPZA) with headquarters in U.S.A. classifies functional EPZs into four categories:

I. Wide Area: Large zones having resident population such as the Chinese SEZs.
II. Small Area: Zones generally smaller than 1000 hectares, normally surrounded by a fence, with no resident population, although they may contain worker dormitories.
III. Industry specific: Zones which support the needs of specific industry such as jewellery, oil and gas, electronics, textiles, banking offshore. etc.
IV. Performance specific: Zones admitting only such investors who meet certain performance criteria like degree of exports, level of technology, size of investment, research park etc.

There are at present 131 countries and territories in the world operating more than 1300 Economic Processing Zones, with most being in the small area category. India and China appear to be the only two countries in the world having zones of all the four types. Economic Processing zone policies prove most successful in middle income countries (Hayward 2003 in Modak 2007).

The history of the Special Economic Zones in India dates back to the setting up of export processing zones in India. India set up its first Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in 1965 in Kandla followed by Santacruz EPZ in 1973. These EPZs did not enjoy fiscal and custom incentives like the SEZs and foreign direct investment rules and regulations were also strict. The Tandon Committee Report in 1981 argued that free trade zones would generate export if they are exempted from various controls and regulations in place. Following this recommendation, four EPZs came up in 1984 at Noida (Uttar Pradesh), Falta (West Bengal), Cochin (Kerala) and Chennai (Tamil Nadu). Another EPZ was set up in Vishakhapatnam in 1989 (Shalti Research Group 2008). Post liberalization in 1991, the Export-Import Policy (1997-2002) introduced a new scheme from 1 April 2000 to revamp and restructure the “production” sites for export oriented services in the form of special economic zones. After five years, on May 2005 the Parliament passed the SEZ Act, which received Presidential assent on the 23rd of June, 2005. After extensive consultations, the SEZ Act, 2005, supported by SEZ Rules, came into effect on 10th February, 2006, providing for drastic simplification of procedures and for single window clearance on matters relating to central as well as state governments.

SEZ Act 2005 consists of eight chapters. SEZ Act 2005 has three defining features, firstly, it outlines the process of setting of SEZ in Chapter II and III, secondly, it deals with the functioning of SEZ and thirdly, it outlines the benefits enjoyed by the developers and functioning units of SEZs. The major thrust of the SEZ Act 2005 is targeted at the investors as the preamble to the act states: “An Act to provide for the establishment, development and management of the Special Economic Zones for the promotion of exports and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”.

The shift to “market-oriented” policies is evident in the way elements of privatization, financialisation, management, manipulation of crisis, and state redistributions are couched in the SEZ Act 2005. According to David Harvey (2006), the neo-liberal economic policies have resorted to “accumulation by dispossession” through the four elements of privatization, financialisation, management and manipulation of crisis and state redistributions. These four elements form key process of setting up and functioning of SEZs. The SEZ Act 2005 states that “Special Economic Zone may be established under this Act, either jointly or severally by the Central Government, State Government, or any person for manufacture of goods or rendering services or for both or as a Free Trade and Warehousing Zone”. This very clause shows how these zones are being created to generate “export” oriented growth through private developers. In other words, the state guided development under private investment and infrastructure is evident in the above provision. The role of the Development Commissioner justifies the financialisation, management and manipulation of crisis implicit in the neo-liberal policy as this act suggests. The Development Commissioner appointed by the Government of India will be responsible for “speedy development of the Special Economic Zone and the promotion of exports there from” (Clause 12 (1)) apart from guiding the entrepreneurs and monitoring the performance of the developers. Fourth element of State redistributive measures is evident in the Clause 50 where the state government is allowed to make amendments to the state tax laws and levies.
Clause 50 The State Government may, for the purposes of giving effect to the provisions of this Act, notify policies for Developers and Units and take suitable steps for enactment of any law:-

(a) granting exemption from the State taxes, levies and duties to the Developer or the entrepreneur;

(b) delegating the powers conferred upon any person or authority under any State Act to the Development Commissioner in relation to the Developer or the entrepreneur

(Source: SEZ Act 2005)

SN Tripathy (2008) brings to our attention how the state governments of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra have proposed to seek relaxation in some provisions of the central laws, so as to facilitate the setting up of SEZs and Special Enclaves in their respective states. These proposals broadly relate to regulating the working hours, empowering the Development Commissioner to fix minimum wages, making provisions for allowing women workers to work night shifts, etc.

According to SEZ Act 2005, “Every person, whether employed or residing or required to be present in a Special Economic Zone, shall be provided an identity card by every Development Commissioner (DC) of such Special Economic Zone, in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed”. The governance structure of special economic zones is a clear departure from the democratic process of governance; where the Development Commissioner and the SEZ Authority have the power to address matters which under other circumstances would have been addressed by the panchayats/ municipal bodies. This bureaucratisation of governance clearly demarcates these zones of exclusivity in terms of citizenship rights; particularly from the vantage of participatory nature of citizenship rights propagated by the state policies preceding Special Economic Zones in India.

C.R Bijoy (2008) argues that model SEZ Policy advocated by the central government for the state governments states that: “The State Government will declare SEZ as an Industrial Township and if necessary, relevant Acts would be amended so that SEZ can function as a governing and autonomous body as provided under Article 243(Q) of the Constitution.” (Item 10) In line with this, and because local governance is in the State List (List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution), various state policies on SEZs such as those in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal envisage the notification of these zones by the governors of the respective states as ‘industrial townships' under Article 243Q of the Constitution. This exempts them from the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution, which provides for elected local governments, that is, municipalities. Instead, an industrial township authority is constituted having the same powers and duties as a municipal body with nominees from the developer and the state government, with powers including licensing, the provision of infrastructure and planning. The developer constructs the zone and, effectively, controls the local government”.

The states have amended the respective municipal acts to allow autonomous self rule of SEZs. In West Bengal under the West Bengal Municipal Act 1993 SEZs will be regarded as “Industrial Township” and special autonomous rule of the township is guaranteed through the following Section:

Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 385B of the West Bengal Municipal Act 1993, every industrial township so declared under sub-section (1), the concerned authority shall also perform the functions of an Industrial Township Authority as specified in the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993. Upon the publication of such notification, the provisions of the West Bengal Town and Country planning and Development) Act, 1979, and the
rules, regulations, notifications, if any, framed here under, shall have no application in the area of a Special Economic Zone.

Similarly Maharashtra has declared SEZs “industrial townships” and the SEZ authority comprises of chairperson (nominated by the developer), two members to be nominated by the developer, one member from the tenant and one member nominated by the Development Commissioner. The term of office of these members is for five years. In case of West Bengal, the members of the Special Economic Zone Development Authority are Development Commissioner, two members nominated by the developer, two members nominated by the state government and the chairperson of the Committee is usually the development commissioner. The role of the Development Commissioner is extremely crucial to as he is responsible for bringing in industrial units to SEZs, for issuing various clearance certificates to the SEZ units and acting as the labour commissioner.

Most of the SEZs have been declared “public utility services” under the Industrial Disputes Act. “The term ‘public utility service’ is defined under Section 2(n) of the ID Act. It includes the railways, motor-transport, air transport, ports or docks, post, telegraph, telephone, water and sanitation services as public utility services. Workers, employed by the public utility services, have restricted rights under the ID Act. They cannot go on strike during conciliation proceedings and without giving six weeks’ advance notice. A strike by the workers of public utility services would become illegal if it is in contravention of Section 22 of the ID Act” (Iyer 2008).

The need for creating “economic zones” and to declare them “public utility services” with no index of security schemes for the workers shows that the main aim of the neoliberal state “is to create a “good business climate” and therefore to optimize conditions of capital accumulation no matter what the consequences for employment or social well-being”(Harvey 2007: 25). Thus when we talk about labour and citizenship rights in SEZ, Harvey (2005) reminds us that we need to remember “rights cluster around two dominant logics of power: that of the territorial state and that of capital”. In my previous study on Falta Special Economic Zone (2010) I show how special economic zones have produced differentiated citizenship rights through “techniques of state and governance for differential administration of localities in the interest of accumulation, and these techniques are made possible precisely because of globalisation within a national context” (Samaddar 2008). Hence “the resurgence of accumulation” is not only by dispossession but also through strictly administering and control of surplus labour in the zones. Special Economic Zones in other words is another space of accumulation to ensure “secret of the durability of the unorganized state of labour” as the situation in Falta Special Economic Zone reveals (Ibid: 24).

Falta SEZ is located at a distance of about 55 km from Kolkata in South 24 Parganas District. It is situated in Mouza Bisra (J.L. No.1) under the Police station Ramnagar. Falta SEZ comes under two Panchayat jurisdiction, Kalatalahaat Gram Panchayat and Bhadura Haridaaspur Gram Panachayat. Falta SEZ comprises the northern portion of two villages namely Nainan and Gazipur covering Sector I and Sector II. Gross area of Falta SEZ 280 acres (of which 87 acres has been acquired and 193 acres has been transferred from Calcutta Port Trust). The southern portion encapsulates the Industrial Development Centre and comprises Sector III and Sector IV. In case of Falta SEZ I had argued that the “flexibilistaion” of employment relations led to greater use of irregular and informal workers within the formal sector alongside downsizing of permanent workers (Mazumdar 2007: 38). The flexibilisation of employment takes place at two levels firstly through enhanced flexibility where the same worker is used for different tasks and secondly numeral flexibility, which refers to the ability of firms to adjust the aggregate quantity of labour used in production more easily and quickly, in response to fluctuations in demand for individual products,
through greater use of overtime, part-time employment and temporary workers (Atkinson, 1985 in Gertler 1988). Flexible accumulation according to David Harvey (1988) rests on “a startling flexibility with respect to labour processes, labour markets, products, and patterns of consumption. It is characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial and business services, new markets, and, above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological and organizational innovation” (pp 8). Drawing from Harvey, Gertler argues that in the fordist era the emphasis was on mass production of standardized goods made by highly unionized and highly paid labour and dedicated rigid machines; the post fordist era of specialized production is marked by flexible machines and flexibly deployed (and in most cases non-unionized workforce). Based on an extensive ethnography of the zone I showed in an earlier article the flexibilisation and its impact on production processes in the units (Dey 2011) What I try to see is the increasing dependency on contract based unskilled workers in certain sections of the production process like the assembling process, finishing and checking. The contract workers are under constant pressure to perform because of the availability of “surplus” labour from nearby villages in Falta.

With “production systems being made more flexible in response to variations in product demand and ‘market turbulence’, reductions in the full-time workforce and increasing weight of part-time, temporary and contingent workers led to a generalized erosion of job security” (Majumdar 2007: 8). According to Indrani Majumdar (2008) a huge proportion of contingent workers were women. The discourse on feminization of labour took predominance in 1980 with increasing proportion of women workers in export-oriented garment and electronics industries and feminization of labour became a central concept in which much of the gender debates on globalization came to be addressed. In this context Indrani Mazumdar (2008) argues that the conception of feminization of labour should be discussed from two perspectives. One of the arguments was that the female labour replaced male labour due to rapid expansion in manufacturing sector secondly the increase in feminized work was part of the larger “flexibilisation policies, or the trend of the employers to respond to market uncertainties” and “the attributes of ‘flexible’ labour resembles “characteristics associated with women’s historical pattern of labour force participation” (ibid: 34). In Falta SEZ women workers are employed in plastic units, particularly in the sorting section. As the Factory Manager of Precision Polyplast says this task requires immense patience and is a soft skilled job. Women are employed in almost all soft-skilled jobs particularly which requires immense concentration and patience. Most of these jobs are in sitting position which is a familiar physical posture associated with “women’s work” in rural domestic households. Are women recruited in export related industries because women are familiar with these jobs in their domestic space? While some activities like sorting, sweeping, dusting are part of domestic duties often unskilled women are hired in the electronic export industries? Why is it so? The reason behind feminization of workforce in export oriented market moves beyond the natural division of male and female labour. While on one hand we might argue that the activities women get involved in SEZ is an extension of domestic work we need to also introspect that “the reproduction in world market factories of the sexual division of labour typical in labour-intensive assembly operations in developed countries must therefore rest upon some differentiation of the labour force which makes it more profitable to employ female labour than male labour in these jobs” (Elson and Pearson 1980:92).

The feminization of workforce in SEZ is based on three assumptions. Firstly, gendered division of labour, secondly, lack of organizational capacity and thirdly it goes beyond ideology; “it is a material process which goes on not just in our heads, but in our practices” (Elson and Pearson 1980:94). The material process of wage differentiation in labour market of SEZ is a reality. Every unskilled worker in Falta SEZ is entitled to receive a minimum wage of Rs 81 per day from 1st July
2009. While every worker is entitled to receive Rs 81 as the minimum wage; the labour contractors I have interviewed during the course of my field trip revealed that minimum wage they have been paying the female workers is Rs 81 per day and minimum wage for male workers is Rs 92 and the nature of work varies. The demand for female workforce is based on the assumption that women are “naturally more docile and willing to accept tough work discipline, and naturally less inclined to join trade unions, than men; and to be naturally more suited to tedious, repetitious, monotonous work”. As one of the management representatives from Deltmal Safety shoes point out, “Women are more reliable; no unionbaji for women… Absenteeism is high among male workers. They are young. They will say that let’s drink and enjoy and skip work” (Dey 2010).

Urvashi Soni- Sinha (2009) in her essay examines the relationship between gendering and flexibility in jewellery production in Noida Export Processing Zone (NEPZ) and Delhi. Her study is based on thirteen handmade jewellery production units and six machine made jewellery units in NEPZ. Of the thirteen handmade jewellery units, seven have sister concerns in Delhi which informs her study. Through a comparative analysis of the strategies of flexibility she illustrates the “synchronous dynamics of gendering and flexibilisation in different sites and forms of jewellery production” (ibid:382). This study moves beyond the debates on flexibility which looks at employer-employee relationships and instead looks at the actors involved in the production process. Though women are employed in the handmade jewellery production in Delhi and in Noida EPZ what is interesting to note is the way the gendered division of labour percolates in both cases. While in cases of handmade jewellery production they continue to work as “reserve army of labour” and yet unpaid; in case of NEPZ their work is restricted to certain specific stages (primarily quality control and checking) in the production process. The gendered division of labour in other words, determine flexibility in case of jewelry production and reinstates Elson’s (1996) claim of relation between gendered division of labour and flexibility on one hand and to a certain extent Guy Standing’s (1989) claim of substitution of men’s work in a limited way. What is significant to note is the way the flexibilisation of production process excludes ‘women’ from the hierarchy of subcontracting. According to Urvashi Soni-Sinha (2009) there is a gate-keeping by age, class and gender, with male employees, youth and children in the power hierarchy and women outside it” (ibid:405). In other words, while in some cases the “work” is seen as “help” in some where women form a significant component of the workforce in three of the machine-made units. “Women are overall the more flexible by work status, and the flexible status is linked to lower wage levels” (ibid: 407). The study cautions us that the relationship between flexibility and gendering of the labour process varies across contexts and one cannot draw a unilinear relationship relating feminization of workforce and flexibilisation of production processes and contests Braverman’s (1974) thesis of three components – i.e., deskilling, homogenization, and feminization of workforce in Taylorist methods of scientific management (ibid: 385) as women’s involvement in machine made production no way substitutes men’s participation who “continue to monopolise the making of master moulds in machine-made jewellery production”. More than “deskilling” the “skill” is transferred from handmade to machine made through “discursive practices of closure used by male artisans against women” (ibid:386).

While on one hand the literature on functioning of zones urge us to revisit the notion of work, and space; on the other there is a need to look at the way “skill” is conceptualized in the work available in special economic zones. In another fascinating study on Andhra Pradesh Special Economic Zone, Jamie Cross (2009) shows how young Telegu men with secondary level technical qualifications are forced to work as “precarious labour” in the SEZ. The study draws upon an ethnography of Worldwide Diamonds (a subcontracting unit for the global diamond industry that employs over a thousand people), where most of the workers “responded to the devaluation of their
qualifications and precariousness of their employment with a reaffirmation of education as a mark of cultural distinction" (ibid:368). Many of the workers entered the zone with the assumption that “factory labour would allow them to move beyond the class positions of their parents” (ibid: 375). The narratives allude to the lack of mobility and absence of “work” space where they could use the skill they have acquired in Industrial Training Institutes. The idea of education, educated man and image/s of work are evident in the narratives. For instance one of the workers shows the ethnographer a photograph from his ITI days (a photograph showing him in a slick suit and red tie) and remarks “Can you see any resemblance?” shows the way he perceived his image as an industrial worker. Similarly Cross also shows us how the way education was tied within the labour process pointing to the interest the workers took in drawing the angles with precision for illustration of “flaws, cracks, gluts in a stone that should be avoided or repaired and to identify the angles and facets that needed to be polished further” indicate their “knowledge of trigonometry and geometry” they had acquired during their formal technical education. The disillusionment among the youth and “resentment at the insecure, low –waged, labour-intensive regime imposed in Worldwide Diamonds” not only shows the responses of young men to the devaluation of their education but also speaks of a politics of labour of social aspirations and masculine ideals (ibid:374-375).

One of the common concerns raised by the studies on labouring lives in the zones is the lack of upward mobility despite the presence of factories producing similar products (Sen and Dasgupta :99). They conducted a survey across three zones i.e., Santa Cruz Electronics Exports Processing zone (SEEPZ), Noida Export Processing Zone (NEPZ), Falta Special Economic Zone (FSEZ) to illustrate the work status of the workers through a mapping of security index. For instance in Santa Cruz Electronics Exports Processing zone (SEEPZ), they argue “mobility of workers from one firm to another does not amount to moving from low paid jobs to high paid jobs for most of the workers, particularly for the unskilled” (ibid:99). Casualisation of workers across the zone is common; where the labour contractor holds a superior position. In case of Noida Export Processing Zone, like others labour contractors enjoyed an advantageous position owing to their position as intermediaries who always “receive a portion of distributed surplus in the form of commission from their capitalist owners”. The study on Falta SEZ reveals very few permanent workers in the zone. Most of the workers again are recruited through labour contractors. In Falta SEZ, the authors indicate a chain of surveillance and dominance which is as: labourers, union and or contractors, employers (ibid:109). What is common across the zones is the invisibilisation of the unskilled workforce and alienation due to flexibilisation of the production process that cuts across the manufacturing units.

Two tendencies appear to cut across the ethnographies of zoning technologies, firstly and foremost the zoning and governance- where the “state” machinery has to create “excess” measures to create and govern these spaces of “public utility”. Secondly, how these spaces participate and contribute to the “partial” production process6 and deployment of a rather non- Fordist7 production methods of subcontracting work coexisting with capitalist mode of production in these zones which reduces the cost of production. Special Economic Zones, apart from production networks are also sites of contradiction as they are sites of primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession of a largely agrarian economy and also a site that is claiming its position in the informational economy. The simultaneity of these SEZs as multi-product SEZs (5 % of approved SEZs are multi product SEZs) and IT & ITes SEZs (which account for 62 %) also hint to the ways in which “the competition for the middle –level position in the global hierarchy is conducted in large part not through the industrialization but the informatization of production” (Hardt 1999:92). Across India, 355 projects have received formal SEZ approvals, and there are 234 Notified SEZs in the IT/ITeS/Electronic Hardware/Semiconductor sector.8 In the essay on “Affective Labour”, Michael
Hardt argues that though informatization and shift towards services are most recognizable in capitalist countries, one should not think that the global hierarchy of economic development is organized along informational, industrial and agricultural economies. Commenting on the middle level position of hierarchy Hardt argues that countries like India, Brazil and Russisa “can support simultaneously all varieties of productive processes: information-based production of services, modern industrial production of goods, and traditional handicraft, agricultural, and mining production. There does not need to be an orderly historical progression among these forms, but rather they mix and coexist; it is not necessary to pass through modernization before informatization, traditional handicraft production can be immediately computerized; cellular phones can be put to use immediately in isolated fishing villages. All of the forms of production exist within the networks of the world market and under the domination of the informational production of services”. (Hardt 1999:92-93)

**Informational Services - Virtual World**

“One of the key elements in the success of the software industry in India is that its virtual nature allows it to escape government control” (Greenspan 2004:79).

At the very outset it is important to note that three sectors form an important part of the informational work: information technology(IT), information technology enabled services (ITES) and business process outsourcing(BPOs). The growth and expansion of the industry as well as growth of IT towns and complexes across the length and breadth of India and success of IT cities like Hyderabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata are testimonies to the ways in which informational economy has penetrated the burgeoning “middle” class of these cities. In a study conducted from 2003 to 2006, Carol Upadhya and A.R. Vasavi (2006) point out that there are three major characteristics of work and employment in IT industry. They are: mobility, flexibility, and individualization. The study spans across Indian IT Professionals in India and Netherlands to explore the social and cultural transformations of this mobile and flexible workforce. They situate the informational production of services within the framework of “servitisation” of the advanced economies.

Drawing from Castells(1996) Upadhya and Vasavi (2006) argue that “globalization of services constitutes the latest phase in the development of global capitalism” (pp 7). They argue that “service work”/ “knowledge work” are susceptible to spatial dispersion as they are based on mental labour. So, there has been de-spatialisation of work, where work has become transnational and delocalized. Secondly, with increasing flexibilisation, ‘risk’ becomes the organizing principle for work. Apart from the global restructuring orservitisation of economy, particularly informational economy, there have been other factors for the growth of IT industry primarily migration of large numbers of highly educated Indians, especially engineers to the U.S. from the 1970s and the formation of a wealthy N.R.I. community who emerged as key players as scions of the industry. While the categories of IT work are varied it is important to emphasize that the nature of the software jobs are high end jobs like which includes products and consultancy as well as research; and low end jobs like generic software services for customers. According to this report, software service providers are Indian companies while most MNC overseas development centres in India also work on software products for the parent company’s IT products. For this reason, many software engineers prefer jobs with MNCs where they might get better pay and challenging work. Most MNCs to maintain a parity as this report suggests, tap on a range of skills from Ph.D.’s in computer science for research positions, to ordinary graduates with MCA degrees who are employed for simpler work such as testing(ibid :
Mobility; particularly physical mobility or circulation of workers continues to be a significant feature of the Indian software industry.

In a study on Indian IT workers in U.S., Varma and Rogers (2004) map the journey of the IT workers who migrate to US with H1B visas to fill in the gap in U.S. labour market in the fields of Science and Engineering. In 1990s there was a growing perception that there is a shortage of workers in the IT industry. Varma and Rogers draw from Information Technology Association of America (ITAA’s) report in 1997 that in 1996, the American IT companies could not fill 1,90,000 jobs. Following year, ITAA claimed that the ITAA (1998) claimed that there would be 3, 46,000 IT vacancies. The US Department of Commerce also projected that there would be an annual increase of around 95,000 jobs. Subsequent to the increasing demand of jobs the gap over the immigration numbers was relaxed. The 1990 Immigration Act allowed for 65,000 temporary workers (H1B visas) which was relaxed for fiscal years 1999-2000 following an intensive lobbying by the IT players and raising the quota to 1,15,000 workers. In 2000, this quota was further extended upto 1, 95, 000 for the following three years. “More than half of the H1B visas have been issued for computer-related or electrical-engineering positions” (ibid: 5647). The H1 B visa holders are predominantly young male, highly educated and skilled. Varma a Rogers points out that though companies hire IT workers from India at a discount from bodysoppers or recruitment agencies, still respective workers are supposed to pay a cut to the recruitment agencies as well. Compounding to the problem is that often workers are paid wages lower than the prevailing rate and cites the case of a Syntel Inc, which has a workforce of more than 80% H1B visa immigrants; mainly computer analysts from India. Though the company was supposed to pay 41,000 USD per year; instead paid 34,000 USD per year. Compounding to the problem is that H1B workers are indentured to the company. Usually the employee is expected to sign a contract ranging from eighteen months to two years and if he/she fails to serve the contract period is expected to pay a damage of 10,000 USD and serve an advance notice of six weeks or two months. Incase a H1B visa holder loses his/her job the Immigration and Naturalisation Services (INS) “will not allow them to transfer their visas to the new company. According to the INS, a worker is ‘out of status’ when he/she has lost his/her job, and needs to go back home” (ibid: 5650). At the most they can apply to INS for relaxation under ordinary circumstances and did allow the visa holders to stay till they find a company to sponsor them within the expiry date of the visa. Most of the dependents of H1B visa holders usually join them on H4 visas which mean that they cannot work. What is interesting and takes us to the gendered aspect of Informational Economy is the story of the Asian Indian Women and IT in US. Unlike the former migrants, the dependents on H4 visas though qualified cannot participate in the job market because of restrictions on visa. Though Varma confines his study to the plight of the “mobile” IT worker with H1B visas S. Uma Devi (2002) in her study on Asian Indian Women and IT in US looks into the two categories of women who migrate to U.S as part of the informational economy.

In this essay, S. Uma Devi, through the narratives of Sunita, Jyotsna and Lizzy who migrated to U.S on H4 visas present us three contrasting cases. Sunita and Jyotsna for instance are highly educated but resorted to H4 visas to migrate with their family. Jyotsna and Lizzy do not want to take up jobs as they want to have quality time with their children. Jyotsna a computer programmer feels that her mother who was a school teacher could not give her quality time and hence she does not want her three and a half year old son to feel the same. Similarly Lizzy says that work life in U.S is very demanding. Cooking elaborate meals, doing the household chores keeps the women occupied and needless to say, their lives revolve around their husbands who are H1B visa holders. Uma Devi points out neither Sunita, Jyotsna, Lizzy or their parents are aware that when they enter U.S on H4/dependent visas, “their legal right to stay in U.S ....depends on their wage –earner
husbands” (Chaudhury 2000 in Uma Devi 2002:4423). In other words, in cases like divorce, domestic abuse if the women want to leave their husbands they will have to leave their country as H4 visas are tied to the wage earner, in this case the husband. On the other hand, their husbands can also jeopardise their immigration status by merely changing jobs as H1 B visa is tied specifically to one job. So when the husband changes jobs he has to petition on her behalf or she might get deported.

Drawing from SAKHI, Uma Devi reports that there have been a large number of domestic abuse cases in the recent past and the only hope for H4 visa holders is under the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, the US Senate is creating a ‘T’ or ‘U’ visa “that allows people who have suffered mental or physical violence – and who have cooperated with police and prosecutors – to live and work in this country indefinitely and to apply for a permanent green card after three years. The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) could issue up to 10,000 visas each year” (Chaudhry 2000:2 in Uma Devi 2002:4423). The narratives of women on H1B visas are no different either. In one of the narratives, Malati expresses a desire to be self restraint about her career as she feels guilt for not being able to spend time with her child. Most of the respondents felt that they will give up their careers once they start a family. According to Uma Devi, “the experiences of the Asian Indian women in the US on an H1 B or H-4 visa highlight the deepening contradiction between the economic and social restructuring between the spheres of production and reproduction” (ibid: 4427). The contradiction between the spheres of production and reproduction seems to cut across jobs in Informational technology as the participation of women as call centres will reveal. There are two kinds of call centres operating in India: process based and client based. Usually call centres that are process based service the clients from the parent company and client based call centres have to service outside clients. There are two types of calls: inbound calling (where customer calls in with their queries) and outbound calling (mostly related to sales, operators are expected to get in touch with clients). The nature of call centre work is two fold: operational and technical (Singh and Pandey 2005: 685). Preeti Singh and Anu Pandey through their study on women workers in call centres in Delhi, Gurgaon and Noida examines the recent phenomenon of women working in night shifts, its impact on health and family of the lives of these study. They study is based on an in depth interview of 100 women across 12 call centres and with specific focus on three age groups 18-24, 24-35 and 35-45 years. The findings show that most of the women working in the call centres are between 18-25 (around 14 women below the age of 20 and 67 respondents were in the age group of 20-25). Women in the age group 30-40 do not take up call centre jobs because of long hours of work and night shift. Most women who work in these call centres according to this study are unmarried and women in managerial positions quit work after their marriage. The long working hours as this study reveals has its effects on health because of night shifts. Two important things about call centre work is the way a certain age group is targeted and the way they are absorbed.

Call centre environment is targeted towards a young mobile group as the person skilled or qualified for this job has to be “computer literate, a good communicator, having good typing skills and a command over English” (Ramesh 2004:492). Secondly, designations attached to BPO work also “adds acceptability among youngsters” (ibid:493). For instance, a newly recruited agent engages in somewhat slightly elevated job of a receptionist/ computer operator or a telephone operator, the firms are found labelling the job with very attractive nomenclatures such as customer care officer, call centre executive, customer care executive, contact centre representative, customer support executive, call centre executive and so on” (ibid:493). For Ramesh, this sets the point of departure from the conventional manufacturing or service sector in terms of their socio-economic and demographic attribute. The young mobile workforce enables the dualistic nature of the structure of BPO workforce: core and periphery. The agents, are the periphery workforce where as the team leads are
the core workforce. So, according to Ramesh the vulnerabilities of BPO workforce is evident in the high attrition rates of the industry and this applies for women workers in particular who as evident from Singh and Pandey’s study have to quit jobs as soon as they enter into familial engagements particularly when they get married or post-pregnancy. As Ramesh illustrates in his work, “The profile of the existing female workforce of these firms is that of predominantly unmarried women, without much familial commitments. Those women workers, who are above 30 years of old and married are found with special circumstances (such as widows/divorcees, mothers with grown up children, married to call centre executive/similar professional and so on). All these suggest that BPO work is also equally or more women-unfriendly as compared to traditional manufacturing sector jobs” (ibid: 497).

Studies on IT/ITES and BPOs while on one hand highlight the precarious work conditions, socio-cultural adjustment, and exploitation of easily available reserve army of English speaking graduates waiting to be absorbed into the industries (Remesh 2008; Upadhyya and Vasavi 2008) there is another dimension of the new workforce and the new “work” in particular which cannot be defined in terms of alienation of work. While on one hand “mobility” particularly physical mobility or circulation of workers continue to be significant feature of the Indian software industry it is also important to re-examine the contours of work that are emerging; i.e., “the mobility of ‘knowledge work’ minus the body of the worker,”- “virtual migration”. With most of the work occurring in disembodied spaces and in virtual space how are we going to reconfigure the flexibilisation that is inherent in the production of work and the space of work? Is this shift to be located in the nature of work like the earlier studies on manufacturing or to be located in the experience of work? While on one hand we have studies on software engineers, ITES workers, and the socio-cultural spaces they embody there is a need to understand the nature of virtual migration as its impact will differ in each specific context.

Conclusion

To tie up the three aspects presented here; the contours of work have undergone a shift: the despatialisation of the worker runs parallel to the work- cultures of the new economy. In case of Informational economy the virtual nature of the work and the commodity forces us to rethink the spatial relations of capital, body of the worker and the workspace. The transnational nature of “knowledge work” has led to “liquification of labour” (Aneesh 2006:9 in Upadhyya and Vasavi 2008:20). Drawing from Beck (2000), Carol Upadhyya and A.R. Vasavi(2008) argues that while “capital is globally organized labour becomes increasingly localized”. In other words, while the initial flexible nature of Informational technology was marked by the mobile labour force popularly known as body-shopping; with passage of time an increasing proportion of work is being done off-site. This is almost similar to the way initially cheap labour was a major source for the manufacturing industries; and with passage of time the factories moved to cheaper locations. In other words, despatialisation is part of the precarious economy and the service nature of informational economy has altered the capital-space relationship.
Notes

1 Swati Chattopadhyay in the essay “Urbanism, colonialism and subalternity” refers to Harvey’s work to explain the difference between the first world urbanization and third world urbanization. According to Harvey, the third world urbanization in places and situations like Asia, Latin America and Africa is faced with the scenario where “immense quantities of labour power has to be dispossessed to release very little capital…”(pp78).

2 Though this phase of development is also marked by instances of accumulation by dispossession as studies on Bhakra Nangal Project displacees will show.


4 David Harvey ( 2006) uses the phrase “accumulation by dispossession” to illustrate” the continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had treated as ‘primitive’ or ‘originial’ during the rise of capitalism.

5 Ranabir Samaddar (2008) argues that the process of primitive accumulation in India in the first decade of twenty first century was aided and facilitated by “the existence of surplus labour and the administrative strategy of creating the special economic zones as spaces of exception to the “normal” process of capitalist accumulation and development. In this differential use of space for accumulation, we have one more secret of the durability of the unorganised state of labour. This durability is made possible through techniques of state and governance for differential administration of localities in the interest of accumulation, and these techniques are made possible precisely because of globalisation within a national context” (pp 24).

6 Drawing from Thrift (1986), Swapna Banerjee – Guha(2008) in her work points out that partial production dominated most of the literature on post 1980 spatial organization of global capital.

7 Subsequently Ettlinger (1990) uses the term non- Fordist to explain the co-existence of non-capitalist territorial production with capitalist territorial production. See Banerjee-Guha (2008) for details.

8 See Table: SEZs, Sector-wise distribution in the webportal on Special Economic Zones in India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Commerce: http://www.sezindia.nic.in/writereaddata/pdf/Sector-wise%20distribution-SEZ.pdf; (accessed on 12 November 2011)

9 For Varma and Rogers (2004) an IT worker would include the following professionals:- computer scientist, computer product designer, computer engineer, systems analyst, computer science researcher, system architect, system designer, programmer, software engineer, microprocessor designer, chip designer, maintenance programmer, tester, database administrator, help desk specialist, hardware maintenance specialist, network installer, network administrator, customer support specialist, and system consultant.

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