Accepting the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm: The Structure and Implementation

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The notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been around since the United Nations (UN) General Assembly unanimously adopted R2P at the World Summit in 2005. The principles first originated in a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)[[1]](#footnote-1) in 2001 and were subsequently adopted in the World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1)[[2]](#footnote-2) in paragraphs 138, 139 and 140 (Johnson 2015: 45). The idea working behind the notion of the Responsibility to protect is to enable the individual states to protect its own civilians against the risks of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Responsibility to protect was meant to act as a norm of international security and human rights to obligate the states and the larger international community of states to protect population of a specific conflict zone from the risks of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The notion has been reaffirmed and endorsed by several relevant UN documents and serves as a reminder to the states that sovereignty is not a privilege but a responsibility to care for and protect the population within the boundary of their territories. The principle of Responsibility to Protect is not legally binding on states but is supported by International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) which the countries of world are obligated to respect, follow and enforce. International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) constitutes treaties, statutes and conventions that talk about the risks that R2P mentions apart from other concerns.

**I**

The notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) stands on three pillars of responsibility. Pillar one stipulates that every state must strive to protect its civilians from threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Pillar two states that the international community has a duty to assist individual state to meet its responsibility. Pillar three suggests that if an individual state fails in its responsibility to protect its civilians from the threats mentioned in pillar one; the international community can take collective action, in accordance with UN charter, to ensure that the state fulfils its responsibility towards its own population. The UN Secretary General released a report in 2009 urging implementation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly has held debates on R2P since then and has passed a consensus resolution to this effect as well (A/RES/63/308)[[3]](#footnote-3). United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Human Rights Council have invoked the Responsibility to Protect in several of its resolutions. The principle of Responsibility to Protect has found support from most of the countries of the world. The notion of R2P promises to implement and honour its commitments. However, there have been significant problems in realising its commitments. The crimes that R2P sought to prevent have went on uninterruptedly in many corners of the world. The threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are still there.

The community of the states affirmed their legal commitment and obligations to abide by the lofty principles of the principles enshrined as Responsibility to Protect (R2P). However, the ideas of R2P had far reaching implications. Pillar two of the notion of Responsibility to Protect prods the states of the international community to help individual state to discharge it duty to responsibly protect its population if it falters in preventing crimes and atrocities and protecting the population initially. The international community is not supposed to just react but actively help the individual state. This pillar is often neglected and can extensively be used to prevent escalation of conflicts if followed during times of dispute. The third pillar makes it imperative for the international community to act decisively to enforce peace, security and stability in a conflict-ridden zone which the individual state has been unable to do and protect population from the listed crimes. Paragraph 138 and 139 of the World Outcome Document makes it amply clear of the responsibilities of the international community. The response of the international community could involve a range of measures in the form Chapter VI, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII. Chapter VI of the UN charter lists pacific measures. Collective action could be taken under Chapter VII if the pacific measures prove to be inadequate to resolve the conflict[[4]](#footnote-4). The collective action involves the use of force. Chapter VIII stresses upon the need to collaborate with regional organisations.

**II**

The international community failed to respond in a timely manner to the horrific crimes of genocide that were being committed in Rwanda in 1994. There were gruesome reports of ethnic cleansing coming from Kosovo in 1995 as well. United Nations and the larger international community’s reaction to the massacres were unsatisfactory and unproductive. Kosovo crisis ended with the defeat of the Serbian forces at the hands of the Kosovo Albanian Army (KLA) with aerial support from North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, the retaliatory attack on the Serbian forces began only in 1998 whereas the appalling accounts of the ethnic cleansing in the form of mass murder and systematic sexual violence were reported throughout the early 1990s (Cox 1998). Mass murder in Srebrenica, in the north eastern Bosnia, took place despite the UN declaring the enclave of Srebrenica ‘safe’ in 1993. The United Nations failed to demilitarise the area. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was unable to prevent the capture of the town by the Bosnian Serb Army[[5]](#footnote-5). The United Nations Protection Force was responsible for maintaining order in the area and keeping the terrified Bosniak Muslim population safe. People fleeing the violence unleashed by the Serb forces were even turned away from the UN shelters when they sought refuge. The indecisive attitude of the major powers such as Great Britain, United States of America and France could be attributed to their pursuit of a peaceful solution of the crisis. However, the unfurling of the events in conflict zone made it inconceivable for such a solution. The thing to be remembered here is that the assault on the town of Srebrenica was not a sudden one. Srebrenica was one of the six areas declared ‘safe’ by the UN forces and the first one to be declared so (United Nation Security Council Resolution 819)[[6]](#footnote-6). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 824 extended the status to Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla and Bihac[[7]](#footnote-7).

After the fall of the Republic of Yugoslavia, the Balkan region descended into chaos and bloodshed fuelled by political crisis and economic hardships. The scenario was plagued by militant nationalism and suspicion between different ethnic groups residing in the region. The ruthless Bosnian Serb troops wanted a racially pure population. The way to achieve that was eradication of the Muslim population by way of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Scores of people were killed, their houses torched, livelihood snatched away and countless women were sexually tortured during the fighting. The Bosnian Serb troops launched the attack on the ethnic groups in 1992 resulting in fleeing of huge numbers of people in to the areas which resisted the attack, namely the six specified areas. The number of displaced people grew every day. Srebrenica was one of them (DiCaprio 2009). The events prompted the UN to declare the areas as ‘safe areas’ (Orchard 2014). These safe zones were created but they were not adequately protected.

It cannot be said that the western powers who led the negotiations in order to diffuse the situation could have known the extent of the massacre in the years to follow. However, it can be definitely said that they should have been alarmed at seeing the duration of the siege that these areas were under. The turmoil started in early 1990s. The attack on the Bosniak Muslims started in 1992. The siege of these areas continued till 1995. The reality should have confounded the western powers if not alarmed them. The talks and the UN presence had failed to act as a deterrent for the Bosnian Serb army. They continued their attacks relentlessly. The pattern of exterminating the ethnic groups was following in similar ways. Men and boys were being separated from the women and were loaded onto trucks to be taken to places where they would be killed. Srebrenica alone had almost 8000 casualties. However, the other ‘safe areas’ were beginning to meet the same fate. Bosnia led by Prseident Alija Izetbegovic was unable to protect its own civilians and it was now up to the international forces stationed there to do it. The enclaves were swelling with the displaced persons. Food and medical supplies were running short. Injured people were not provided medical care. The Bosnian Serb troops were waiting to wipe out the entire Bosniak Muslim population. The actions of the UN forces backed by France, Great Britain and United States of America were intermittent in nature. Moreover, there were also reports of taking of 400 UN troops as hostages by the Serbs which was in retaliation to the air strikes. The UN decided not to launch attack on the Bosniak Serbs after this indefinitely. The latter decided not to slow down their onslaught. Declassified CIA files have revealed that the operatives had information of the killings. Spy planes were around too. But they allowed the slaughter to continue with no attempt at rescuing them.

Responsibility to Protect becomes a tested principle when such unspeakable violence is witnessed and allowed to happen. When the Balkan region went up in flames in the aftermath of the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Responsibility to Protect had already become an established norm in international politics with several mechanisms supporting the concept. The idea of Responsibility to Protect crosses hurdles posed by the boundaries of states. It places primary responsibility of protecting the population on its own government. However, the norm also places responsibility on the international community to protect the citizens of a particular country if its own government fails to do so. In the case of Bosnia, the conflict and the resultant loss of lives were allowed to continue for a long time. Mass murders, torture and rape took place with the sole intention of obliterating Bosniak Muslims. Prior to that Rwandan genocide had taken place. However, these genocides and the international response to them must be read together with what happened in Somalia few years before that. Somalia was witnessing a civil war under the aegis of a powerful warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed (Kent 2004: 851). UN peacekeeping forces had faced stiff resistance from the warlord’s army and had lost troops as well. United States also lost its forces which it took as a humiliation. It can be said that this led to the narrowing of the scope of involvement of United States in the humanitarian crises that followed in the years to come. Rwandan Genocide started taking place in 1994, within few months of the conclusion of the Somalian peacekeeping mission. The disengagement of United States and other western powers from the catastrophes in Rwanda can very much be attributed to the earlier misadventure in Somalia. No government showed willingness in stopping the planned genocide of the Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda.

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, aid had poured in from the major powers. Several neighbouring countries of Rwanda had volunteered to help the refugees entering their land. Humanitarian assistance had trickled in. However, the post-conflict assistance cannot be used as a justification for inaction on the part of the international community which could have prevented the genocides from taking place. Moreover, the policy of containment, a relic of the Cold War era, was clearly discernible in the way assistance had been offered otherwise the massive flow of refugees would have spilled over into the adjoining countries which happened anyway. The displacement of people and the settlement in refugee camps in the aftermath of these crises presented the international community with another set of challenges in the following years. These were crises where international interventions were needed urgently as it was evident that the domestic leaderships were floundering in its responsibility to protect civilians. The political climate was not conducive to come up with solutions to the myriad of complex issues that were giving rise to the violence. Humanitarian assistance was not the solution to such crises and defeated the principle of Responsible to Protect. However, timely intervention could have proved to be beneficial.

The situation in Afghanistan in the face of US led invasion need to be mentioned here. Known as Operation Enduring Freedom, it was launched in retaliation of the attack on World Trade Centre in New York, USA on September 11, 2001. The operation was meant to dismantle the Osama Bin Laden led Al-Qaeda network held responsible for the attack on the World Trade Centre. Thus started one of the longest wars in the US history and plunged a part of South Asia into turmoil which saw massive human rights violations, torture, displacement, refugee flow and help in the form of humanitarian assistance as a result of all these (McInnes 2003). The military campaign was supported by a coalition of over 30 countries and it included all the NATO members. Moreover, Taliban network was destroyed but Osama Bin Laden was neither captured nor killed which was the aim of the invasion. Civilians and combatants were not differentiated which resulted in huge numbers of casualties, which is a requirement in a conflict situation in accordance with the notion of *jus in bello*.

**III**

Responsibility to Protect has seen stupendous support from several governments and disquiet too. The principle needed a lot of translations in order for it to be seen as deeds and not mere words. There are areas in the concept and the subsequent World Summit Document that could be taken as reiteration of earlier relevant documents agreeing on the same arguments. The first pillar of the principle is based on several treaties and customary international laws that require states to prevent war crimes, genocide and punish the violators. The group of crimes specified by the R2P are substantiated by a body of case law from the international courts and tribunals. This has contributed to the elaboration of their content and nature.

The impunity of the states and the state actors was an issue in the legal understanding of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Tribunal highlighted this concern (Earl 2013). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reflected this in its provisions. The Statute, like R2P, emphasises on four crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime of aggression[[8]](#footnote-8). The ICC can prosecute these four crimes in situations where the states are unwilling to act. Accountability and responsibility of the states are the two most important facts that highlight the operation of both R2P and ICC acting under the Rome Statute. These two along with the other international mechanisms underscores the fact that on the basis of ethnicity, status or belief no specific groups of people should be persecuted. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide enacted in 1948 expressed the commitment that the international community of sovereign states have

towards protection of people and prevention of crimes toward them[[9]](#footnote-9). R2P does not bring with it any newer forms of legal obligations than what is already stated in a range of obligations that are existent under international criminal law, refugee law, international humanitarian and human rights law. The normative framework of the Responsibility to Protect is strengthened by these networks of legal formulations.

A critical evaluation of Responsibility to Protect necessitates a glance at the way UN has conducted itself during the times of conflict. The United Nations has sought to restore peace and stability in the wherever it has been disrupted. The UN was established on the basis of respecting the rights of the sovereign nations (Article 2 of the UN Charter) which invariably entailed non-interference in the matters of that state to an extent. It was also recognised and understood that if there are instances of violation of human rights and aggression in one state, the international community would have to intervene in the state in order to restore peace and order. Chapter VI of the Charter asks the Security Council to call upon ‘parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’ and to resolve their differences through ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’ If these efforts do not resolve the crisis then Chapter VII of the Charter authorises the Security Council to take actions to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security,’ like ‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’ The same chapter also specifies that if such efforts fail then Security Council is empowered to ‘take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’ Apart from the charters, many of the UN Security Council resolutions have also spoken and endorsed the provisions contained in the Outcome Document.

Resolution 1674 taken in 2006 (S/RES/1674) ‘reaffirms’ the commitment to the UN Charter, calls upon the parties to the conflict to cease attacks on the civilians, ensure safe passage of return to the refugees and the internally displaced persons (IDP)[[10]](#footnote-10). The Resolution emphasises on the responsibility of the states to adhere to the obligations to protect its population. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 mandated deployment of peacekeeping force in Sudan, monitoring the ceasefires and the movements of the armed, to facilitate demobilisation and reintegration process and to investigate violation of the agreements[[11]](#footnote-11). Peacekeeping operations comprise an important part of the overall responsibility of the UN.

The missions, international conventions, protocols and resolutions have established the standards and norms of the humanitarian laws. These methods of resolution of conflicts and protection of individuals have given rise to a clash between legitimacy of national sovereignty and defence of human rights. The United Nations sought to zealously respect the integrity of sovereign nations since its inception. The network of conventions, resolutions and international bodies has stretched the boundaries of sovereignty on the other hand. They continuously strive to broaden the scope of action in order to protect the rights of the individuals. The notion of the authority of the sovereign states is not meant to be challenged. However, there is an inherent tension between the need to create respect national sovereignty and the protection of people. The inherent tension always comes to the fore whenever there are instances of civil war, crimes of any government against its own people or a humanitarian crisis of any nature. The resolutions concerning the Responsibility to Protect, while wanting to overcome this dilemma, entrusted the Security Council with the ultimate responsibility to enforce order and stability in disturbed areas. The primary responsibility to protect rests with each state. But if it fails to ensure it, the collective action to enforce peace is to be taken through Security Council. The Security Council decides whether a situation demands intervention by the international community. The decision to intervene also, again, rests with the five permanent members of the Security Council having the power of veto. Here also it is discernible that the principle of responsibility to protect resting on a humanitarian basis is relegated to the background by giving primacy to the principle of national sovereignty.

The principle R2P cannot survive on its own and needs to be backed by the states including the permanent members of the Security Council to be able to function properly. The principle, in order to be practised, needs the support from the states. In the current times there have been two distinct cases where the principle Responsibility to Protect seen mixed reactions. Anti-government demonstrations had started in Libya following the Arab Awakening which quickly spread to other countries in the region. The pro-government forces launched counter attack on the demonstrators with ammunitions, helicopters and warplanes killing many civilians also who were not part of the demonstrators also. The intervention in Libya was authorised by the United Nations. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1970 reiterating Libya’s responsibility to protect its citizens. Thereafter it adopted Resolution 1973. The intervention in Libya saw the coercive aspect of the Responsibility to Protect for the purpose of protecting the civilians against violence and threat of violence mandated by the Resolution 1973 (Valentino 2011). NATO attacks on the pro-regime forces intensified rapidly so much that the aim of the operation was questioned. The intention of the NATO offensive was to protect the civilians in the areas where pro-regime forces had laid siege and to prevent the same forces from advancing into territories especially Benghazi which was considered as the centre of the demonstration against the government. The onslaught from the NATO proved to be equally destructive if not more. More civilians were caught in the crossfire and instead of being protected and saved they were getting killed. The intervention was supposed to protect civilians and prevent atrocities which soon turned into a mission exceeding the original mandate (Hehir 2013). The aggression of the NATO forces soon turned into an effort to overthrow the government of Libya and an attempt at change of regime, something which was not part of the adopted Resolution. An appeal for negotiations, may have seemed far-fetched but not impossible, could have been made to the parties of the conflict. In contract to the Libyan operation, international response to the war in Syria lacked enthusiasm. Libyan intervention saw a broad coalition consisting of NATO, Arab League, Organisation for Islamic Conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council demanding effective use and application of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (Paris 2014). Syrian conflict started the same way as the Libyan crisis. The government led by President Bashar Hafez al-Assad started attacking the peaceful protestors which quickly escalated. Civilians were indiscriminately attacked and killed. Security Council too suffered a deadlock when it came to decide a course of action with Russia and China voicing their reservations. However, there are strategic calculations present too. Russia considers Syria to be an ally and may have supplied it with weapons. This two contrasting examples of interventions casts aspersions on the viability of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect as is sought to be practised (Lynch 2011; Buckley 2012).

Interventions are sometimes likened to resemble ‘just war’. An intervention may not be designated as a ‘just war’. In recent times, most of the crises have been termed as intervention only. However, a question remains whether such intervention qualifies as a ‘just’ intervention. There are two important criterions by which ‘justness’ is judged. They are *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* (Elshtain 2001). A war, in order to adhere to *jus ad bellum* must be waged as a last resort, must be legally declared and in response to unjust aggression. The war must properly distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in order to be qualified as *jus in bello* (Elshtain 1992). The intervention in Libya was not classified as a war. It started merely as an intervention to stop mass atrocities of civilians by the government forces. Taking sides in an intervention is not desirable and betrays the aim of the Responsibility to Protect. It was widely reported that arms were being provided by France, Egypt and Qatar to the rebels in Libya. In an active conflict zone, such actions by outside forces results in conflagration and more loss of lives and violation of human rights. NATO, in a video released, showed on finding a tugboat stocked with arms and explosives belonging to the rebel groups upon being discovered was allowed to sail. The boat was transferring arms from Benghazi to Misrata. The NATO vessel was stationed in the Mediterranean to enforce arms embargo but did exactly the opposite (Zenko 2016).

The international community seemed to be uncomfortable with the mass atrocities committed in Libya necessitating the intervention (Chivvis 2013). However, the same reaction is not seen in case of Yemen where the situation has reached a level of ‘humanitarian disaster’ (Borger 2015, The Guardian). People are displaced, killed, and there is an imminent danger of famine. The intervention was launched by Saudi Arabia led coalition of Arab and Middle East countries with Iran also giving support to the rebels. The emerging scenario has resulted in a proxy war being fought in Yemen with innocent civilians being victims.

**IV**

The notion of Responsibility to Protect is still evolving. The practices associated with the concept are emerging. The notion of R2P faces many challenges and is riddled with contradictions. The notion of Responsibility to Protect has been operationalised in such a way that it has not been institutionalised as a tool for capacity building, protection and prevention of crimes. The notion puts utmost responsibility upon the states to take every decision and action responsibly so that it can build and nurture the lives of its population. However, the Responsibility to Protect has mostly been used on the pretext of coercive action.

The concept of Responsibility to Protect posits that states should attempt to take care of the concerns of the individuals. The state’s protection responsibilities should encompass wider spectrum of security of individuals and not only from threats of violence. The Responsibility to Protect as was envisioned remain restricted to a narrow list of atrocities. But if the list is not kept narrowed, there is a danger of interference in domestic affairs and scope for infringing on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the weaker states. R2P puts little weight on the need of intervention as the paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document stipulates, the coercive enforcement measures can be undertaken as part of Chapter VII of the UN charter when other measures have been proved as ineffective. However, the efficacy of the principle of R2P will always be questioned if it is not applied in cases where humanitarian abuses are being reported and are only applied to cases where the interventionist powers feel it is convenient to them. The United Nations have wide-ranging tools to advance and safeguard human rights and humanitarian norms. They range from conflict management, conflict prevention, protection of civilians in armed conflict to peacekeeping and peace building. However, they have not proved effective on many occasions as many of the crimes listed in the R2P have been committed with impunity.

Stress on capacity building can advance the cause of substantially as that would mean the states working in synergy with agencies, programs and departments on cross-sectoral issues involving human rights promotion, gender equality, rule of law and promotion. Undertaking such activities help build and rebuild institutional capacities in fragile states too. Conflict prevention is also to be addressed if Responsibility to Protect as a principle is to be effective. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) coordinates initiative for humanitarian assistance involving both UN and non-UN agencies bringing into focus the places which might need assistance in future[[12]](#footnote-12). Though, all these mechanisms depend on coordination of the agencies involved, flow of information and timely monitoring and merits attention to the improved communication between General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding commission. R2P’s efficacy and success also related to the fact that a timely response is needed from both the international community and the particular state. Financial, material and military resources are not available adequately to support a state in need of help. The response from the international community falls somewhere between peacekeeping and armed engagements giving thus rise to a protracted conflict (Holt and Berkman 2006).

The urge to maintain status quo has slowed the progress of the Responsibility to Protect. The principle will have to be backed by robust system human rights and humanitarian norms in order to become institutionalised. The stress need to be given on the first two pillars of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine i.e. state responsibility and providing assistance to a state to meet its protection responsibilities which gives importance to factors such as capacity-building and prevention. The notion of responsibility to protect needs to be made a sustainable practice by the states by not considering sovereignty as a privilege but rather as a duty towards its population.

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1. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\_RES\_60\_1.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Resolution%20RtoP(3).pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The UNPROFOR’s mandate and activities in former Yugoslavia can be found in http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof\_b.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. http://unscr.com/files/1993/00819.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. http://unscr.com/files/1993/00824.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Article 5 of the Statute states that, ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:

(a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression. https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Article I of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that, ‘The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. Article III states, ‘The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide. Article IV states that, ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/S-Res-1674%20on%20protection%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20(28Apr06).pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. http://unscr.com/files/2006/01706.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The IASC compiles a report on places where humanitarian assistance is required. The IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness and Contingency Planning is entrusted with compiling this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)