Irregular Migration in a Neoliberal Order: Ethiopian Migrants to South Africa

[FIRST DRAFT]

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September 2019

Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA

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Abstract

A closer look at irregular migration reveals that it involves different actors and institutions. It is mainly triggered by - and is a response to - growing socioeconomic inequalities within and between different regions of the world. It is also embedded within increasing forces of globalization. These forces are also creating disruptions and dislocations in impoverished countries leading to the creation of mobile populations who are prone to migrate. Juxtaposed against these are border controlsand externalization, deportations, anti-immigration policies and growing xenophobia against immigrants. These factors conspire with myriads of push factors prevalent in impoverished countries, prompting irregular migrants to dwell on transnational networks and depend on the services of human smugglers as well as succumb to the requirements of human traffickers.

Nonetheless, the convectional migration narratives position smugglers and human traffickers as prime culprits for migration related problems. Findings from this study indicate that smugglers are just one strand of the multidimensional and omnipresent actors in a complex web of smuggling networks across a transnational space. The smuggling networks are vertically extended and horizontally stretched with spatial, temporal and structural dimensions.

Smugglers also respond to demands advanced from irregular migrants that are partly created by market forces, which in turn are shaped by lopsided global political and economic order. The increasing measures that are taken in an attempt to breakdown smuggling networks and stem irregular migration (without commensurate opening for legal migration channels) are manufacturing smugglers and intensifying the risks and increasing the costs of irregular migration.

Key Words: ***Irregular Migration, Smuggling Networks, Migration Control, Globalization, Neoliberalism***

Background

EthiopianMigration to South Africa

While Ethiopia is rich in history, culture and civilization (Gill, 2010) as well as a demographic giant in Africa, with a population of around 110 million, it is also one of the poorest countries in Africa in per capita terms (The African Wealth Report, 2015). The fact that the country is at an incipient stage of a demographic transition – with a broad-based population pyramid – means that there is a mismatch between the carrying capacity of the economy and a bulging out youth population. Some 83 percent of the population lives in rural areas caught in a scissors of growing population and dwindling land size and deteriorating soil fertility resulting in a disguisedly unemployed rural population (CSA, 2010; Yordanos et al, 2011). Ethiopia also has one of the highest urbanization rates (MoFED, 2014) significantly contributing to the increase in urban population size and aggravating urban unemployment rate. Urban youth unemployment is the highest hovering around 25 percent (IMF 2013) and female youths aged 15 to 29 years olds are twice as likely to be unemployed as their male counterparts (Teller and Heilemariam 2011).

On the other hand, Ethiopia has one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, registering double-digit growth for over a decade and half (MoFED, 2014). Notwithstanding general economic improvements, the economic growth in Ethiopia is not inclusive and inequality is rather increasing hampering poverty reduction efforts in the country (Alemayehu and Addis 2014).

Many Ethiopians, particularly the youth, have been (and still are)migrating out of the country in pursuit of better life opportunities using both legal and illegal channels of migration. The migration routes out of Ethiopia can generally be classified into four main directions: the Northern route that goes to Europe crossing transit countries like Sudan and Libya as well as the Mediterranean Sea (Marchard et al; 2017; Tekalegn et al 2018); the Sinai route that goes to Israel through Egypt and the Sinai desert; the Eastern route that goes to Middle East countries through Yemen and the Red Sea (Helen 2014); and the Southern route that goes to South Africa through multiple transit countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Kanko et al 2013; Estifanos 2016; RMMS 2014; Estifanos and Zack 2019).

The migration from Ethiopia to South Africa exemplifies the push and pull factors of transnational migration. However, it goes beyond the simple push-pull model of migration to combine other drivers. Absolute and relative deprivations (Stark and Taylor 1989; Czaika and Haas 2011) that coexist alongside perceived and actual opportunities in South Africa conspire with the power of established smuggling networks to perpetuate irregular migration (Kanko et al. 2013; Estifanos 2016; F. Adugna et al 2019). Faced with financial constraints to actualize their migration ambitions, large numbers of aspiring but involuntarily immobile migrantsseek opportunities and make plans to finance their move and smugglers as well as other actors and institutions facilitate the migration and settlement processes in South Africa (Estifanos and Zack 2019; F. Adugna et al. 2019).

In this regard, the migration of Ethiopians to South Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon that started with coincidence in regime changes in two countries, in the mid nineties (Estifanos 2015). On the receiving end, the African National Congress (ANC) led government instituted progressive asylum laws that permitted migrants and asylum seekers the claim for temporary status or asylum with the right to work and study(Wehmhoerner, 2015). A regime change in Ethiopia, in 1991, also marked the end of a military regime that regulated mobility within and outside of Ethiopia through instituting access to passports and travel documents; adhering to international human rights and the right to mobility laws; and ratifying trade and mobility agreements with neighboring countries, including Kenya (Teller et. al, 2012).

Further streams of migration were evident following major events in Ethiopia and South Africa. These, among others, include the politically unstable period in Ethiopia leading up to and following the 2000 and 2005 Ethiopian National Elections; assignment of a former Ethiopian ambassador from Southern Ethiopia in 2000/2001; the 2010 FIFA World Cup hosted in South Africa; the presence of business opportunities in the informal economy of South Africa for migrants entrepreneurs; the intension to use South Africa as a transit to developed countries (IOM 2009; Gebre LT et al 2010; Teshome 2010; Kanko et al 2013; Estifanos 2015; Zack and Lewis, 2018; Estifanos and Zack 2019).

In addition to increase in absolute number of Ethiopian migrants to South Africa, there is diversification of migrants in terms of gender, age, sources of origin and socioeconomic status. The increasing feminization of migration approximates international trends both in the opening of migration routes that are often male dominated at their inception, and with alterations in women's agency and roles in households. Over time the initially male dominated migration of Ethiopians to South Africa induced the migration of prospective wives, particularly from southern Ethiopia, which has became a key migrant sending region to South Africa starting the 2000 (Estifanos, 2016).

While economic concerns are at the root of the instigation and perpetuation of the migration to South Africa, a deeper examination into the narratives of recent and former migrants reveal that the cause of irregular migration is no longer a flight from misery or absolute deprivation. The migration is also driven by relative deprivation and betterment migration is becoming an important aspect of it. In this regard, many aspiring migrants consider South Africa as a transit to enter global north countries.

This article focuses on driving factors, the agency and precarity of Ethiopian irregular migrants and their settlement processes in South Africa. This is placed within a broader context of structural factors and globalization processes that, on the one hand, provide information and reduce transportation costs (thatboost aspiration, improve capability and raise agency of migrants) and intensifying border controls, creating disruptions and dislocations, emerging deportation regimes, and establishingrigid immigration and labor policies (that restrict mobility), on the other. It specifically looks into (1) how smuggling and social networks interact with and are shaped by economic and political order;and (2) how social networks are affected by immigration and labor market policies in the settlement processes?

Conceptual Framework

International migration is often presented as a recent phenomenon that is confined to the modern era, and some researchers even went to describing the present era as "The Age of Migration" (Castles and Miller 2013). There is also an historical tendency to consider migration as a Western occurrence whereby much focus is given to European and transatlantic migrations. These approaches are contested by scholars who placed migration not as signals of the modern age, but as a continuous phenomenon embedded in the social and economic frameworks of human organization arguing that migration is neither exclusive to modernization nor is it typically a Western occurrence(Moch 2003; Lucassen and Lucassen 1997).It is also argued that the dominance of migration studies on Europe and Transatlantic migrations has led to a gross neglect of other migration system (Hoerder, 2002).

Even today, much of the academic research and media coverage focus on the so-called South-North migrations,although South-South migrations haveequaled South-North migrations (IOM 2013). Notwithstanding political narratives and media images that focus on the purported mass migration of people from Africa into Europe, and labeling it as a migration crisis (Kühnemund 2018), the majority of African migrations happen within the continent (Flahauxa and Haas 2016). Moreover, despite the absence of comprehensive and reliable data on African migration, it is noted that 84% of the current African movements are intra-regional (Graziani 2017) and, if one excludes Africans from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, almost 80% of Africans migrating international do so on the continent (Landau, et al 2018: 4).Furthermore, it is argued that economic development in countries of the global south and a resulting rebalance in global economy will reduce South-North migration in the coming decades (Ghosh 2013).

On the other hand, scholars who position international migration within the global political and economic structure maintain that factors such as growing socioeconomic inequalities(Thomas Faist); divergence in governance, political, and demographic structures (Collier 2013; Betts 2009; Massey et.al. 1998);and, more broadly, the search for a more egalitarian economic order and a more peaceful society (Richmond 1998; Hoerder 2002) tend to keep South-North migration momentum. Recent studies also support such argument indicating that migration is driven not only by absolute poverty but also by relative deprivation (Castles 2004; De Haas 2007; Bakewell 2007; Clemens 2014). In the African context too, increasing migration out of Africa seems to be driven not only by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, but also by social transformation processes that have increased African's capabilities and aspirations to migrate (Flahaux and De Haas 2016).

Irregular Migration in a Neoliberal Order

In the prevailing neoliberal order, globalization processesoperating through the actions and inactions of deregulated multinational corporations and profit-driven investors, penetrate into developing countries' economies in search of resources and marketopportunities creating disruptions and dislocationsin the process (Klein 2014).

There is also a huge capital flight from developing to developed countries (See data on flight from Africa). It is also noted that economic globalization processes has stimulated increased inequality at global level (Jalil 2015; Stieglitz 2012)and neoliberalism intensified inequalities in socioeconomic and governance aspects leaving million of citizens in poor countries impoverished (Chomsky 2011).

The interplay among neoliberal order, border controls, smuggling and irregular migration is indicated in the works of Ruben Andersson, Paul Collier,Hans Lucht and Naomi Klein, among others. Andersson indicated that in Senegal, Dakar's Cap Vert peninsula, the fishing crisis and depletion of fishing stocks has racked the livelihoods of Senegalese youth in the neighborhoods. The biggest culprit in emptying the seas was the sale of fishing rights to other states, not least Spain. Increasing consumptive lifestyle further heightened the competition for and exploitation of African resources. Accordingly, the foreign trawlers swallowed tons of fish destined for European and Asian markets. And so many youth from the area had tried to leave Senegal since 2006, embarking on the very boats they had previously used for fishing. However, by the time they arrived at the European external borders, they were labeled as illegal migrants (Andersson 2014).

Paul Collier argued the same. He noted that governments in African coastal areas including Somalia and Sierra Leon lack the means to protect their territorial waters and so their fishermen must watch, helpless, while subsidized foreign boats deplete it. Consequently, competition for fishery resources by highly subsidized global fishing companies is affecting the livelihoods of Africans, turning Somali fisher men into fishers of men (Collier 2010).Elsewhere in West Africa, the dwindling fisheries and the sudden opening of clandestine routes had pushed fishermen from western Africa coastal areas to try their luck on the boats, where their familiarity with the sea made them useful as captains or helpers. The resulting journeys in sea-battered pirogues were but the most extreme outcome of a deepening global economic divide. Lucht captures the case among Ghanaian fishermen - turned - migrants. These migrants whose livelihoods are disrupted by subsidized foreign trawlers reach Europe, some of whom suffered in the Saharan desert, others trapped in forests in Ceuta, and yet other drowned in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea (Lucht 2012).

Barricaded for Some and Flat for Others

The same globalization processes that create disruptions and dislocations in poor countries also create ideological and material linkages attracting developing countries' citizens into developed ones (Castles 2003). International mobility, therefore, is impacted by regulation as well as by globalization. There are scholars who argue that globalization, that has brought time-space compression, has boosted movement of people across international borders (Bauman 1997; Friedman 2007). Yet, it is argued that freedom of mobility for some is only possible through the organized exclusion of others (Lucht 2012). In this regard, host country governments, mainly developed ones, are increasing efforts to restrain and deter irregular migrants through intensification and diversification of migration control strategies and the consequent disciplining of human mobility (Castles 2004; de Haas 2007; Bakewell 2007; Lucht 2012; Klein 2014; Baker-Cristales 2008; Pécoud 2013). Some are intervening in the politics of developing countries under

the pretext of national security and, at times, under the guise of establishing democracy (Blum 2004).

With international migrant numbers hovering around 3% of the total world population, the world is not as amenable to movement of people as its alleged flatness implies, aspolitical power has enforced restrictions by way of walls, fences, fortified riverbanks, and buttressed mountain ridges (Blij 2009). Moreover, failure of the powerful blocs – notably the European Union – to find effective internal responses for the so-called "migration crisis" have prompted external response resulting in European cooperation with third countries that hinges on firm control of those countries' borders (Capesciotti 2017; Graziani 2017). Accordingly, border reinforcements that had existed primarily in the global north countries are being increasingly adopted everywhere, making distinctions between global north and global south practices unstable (Nawyn 2016). It is also argued that European external borders have also become African borders (Gaibazzi et al. 2017).

In the context of dwindling legal channels of migration, irregular migration and smuggling are takenas responses to skewed global economic and political structures on the one hand, and intensifying restrictions and border controls on the other (Castles 2003; Hoerder 2002). These prompt aspiring migrants to depend on the facilitation role of smugglers (Haas 2013; Brachet 2018) making smugglinga reaction to border controls rather than a cause for irregular migration (Haas 2013). In this regard Hoerder noted, "Migrants who understand the economic interests behind cultural facades react by circumventing restrictions, by crossing borders without documents. Individually, they attempt to equalize life-course opportunities. "Illegal" migrants question the legitimacy of inequality and the morality of global apartheid" (Hoerder 2002, 578).

However, not all irregular migrants are capable of entering into countries in the global north, and there are many who remained involuntarily immobile (Carling 2014). Those who have the financial capital or those who built the required political and social capital seek to enter the global north countries. Others, especially the poorest of the poor, remain immobile. Yet others, depend on the facilitation and other services of smugglers, and make a step migration to countries of the global north. The latter is observed in the case of Ethiopian migrants to South Africa (Estifanos 2016; Estifanos and Zack 2019).

Migration Regimes and Risks

Studies on agency of migrants and the role of smugglers in the migration and settlement processes of irregular migrants indicate the positive roles smugglers play either in the form of providing security and protection from below (Sanchez and Natividad 2017; Tekalegn 2018); or facilitating the migration and serving as gate-openers (Fekadu et al. 2019); or providing a wide range of services, from physical transportation and illegal crossing of a border to the procurement of false documents (Heckmann 2007). However, human smugglers are still blamed for putting migrants' lives in danger (Frouws et al 2014; Albahari 2015). There is also widespread belief that smugglers trick most migrants (Friebel and Guriev 2004). But, it is also argued that most smuggled migrants know quite well what to expect in terms of the costs and non-monetary risks involved in illegal

migration (Skeldon 2000).
From the perspective the dominant literature, the risks irregular migrants encounter en route are an extension and part of the structural violence of global inequality and the deprivation of the mobility rights of migrants (Castles 2005; Gerard 2014; Backwell 2014). Accordingly, increased border enforcement, externalization and securitization measures significantly raises the risks and fatalities associated with irregular migration (Haas 2013; Estifanos 2016; Tekelegn 2018; Estifanos and Zack 2019). High risks associated with border crossings, interception, detentions and deportation also severely affected migrants' ability to move between countries, upsetting the geographic directions of transnational migration (Boenm 2016; Andersson 2014; Estifanos 2016; Backwell 2017). These measures have also affected the option for establishing transnational lives and profoundly altered the existential option of living lives across borders (Sorenes 2018).

Bright and Dark Sides of Social Networks in Settlement

Some scholars have conceptualized immigrant social networks as "social capital" and focus on the bright side of social networks (Gruviel and Friebel 2010; Massey et al. 1987; Curran et al 2005). In so doing, they argue that social networks facilitate migration in several ways including conveying information about livelihood opportunities in destinations countries (Tekalegn 2018); reducing travel and emotional costs through providing information on safe and cheap routes or smugglers as well as by reducing assimilation shocks (Chodin 1973; Sanchez and Natividad 2017); preventing deportation or increasing the demonstrative effects, such as diminishing psychic costs or familial resistance (Massey 1990; Curran et al 2005).

On the other hand, there is a concern if social networks are romanticized by researchers – stressing on support and solidarity - while power relations, exploitation and criminal activities are underestimated or ignored (Hagan 1998; Boyd 1989;Poros 2011; Cranford 2005; Estifanos 2015) prompting the need to conceptualize the dark side of social capital too (Portes 1998; Waldinger 1996). Regarding the latter, Cranford argues that social networks may also become networks of exploitation (Cranford 2005). Free rider problem and constraints on individual freedom are also identified as negative effects of social networks for immigrant entrepreneurs (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Portes and Landolt 1996).

Social networks in the host space could also be exclusionary and even exploitative (Waldinger 1996; Poros 2011). Roger Waldinger has also noted that immigrant social networks result in negative effects through exclusion from immigrant occupational niches (Waldinger 1996). In the context of ethnic enclave economies, Poros describes the exclusionary nature of social networks where immigrants used their social networks and co-ethnic social capital to participate in labor markets that primarily serve their own ethnic communities while excluding immigrants from a different ethnic group or origin (Poros 2011). The exclusionary and exploitative nature of transnational migration networks is marked for women as well, who often receive fewer benefits than their male counterparts (Boyd 1989; Hagan 1998; Waite and Lewis 2015). There is also a danger that by confining themselves in a diminishing set of personal networks, and to the strong

ties on which those networks are built, migrants weaken their pool of resources and hence reduce the benefits that could have accrued otherwise (Granovetter 1973; Hagan 1998).

It is further indicated that there is a flaw in the dominant literature, which assumes an increase in immigrants' social capital as immigrant networks grow (Massey et al. 1987). In this regard it is indicated that social relations between newly arriving migrants and hosts within transnational labor, in the context of undocumented migration, can lead to a continuum of experiences from mutually beneficial ones for the "guest" and the "host" to multiply exploitative ones for the "guest" (Waite and Lewis 2017). Cranford, therefore, suggested the need for paying attention to the contexts within which social networks become mechanisms for downgrading rather than platforms for upward mobility (Cranford 2005).

Methodology

Findings from two studies have informed this article. The first was conducted in 2014 and focused on examination of smuggling networks in the Ethiopia-South Africa migration corridor. The study was conducted as a partial fulfillment of a MA thesis that is completed in 2015. The second study was conducted in 2018 under the auspices of the Migrating Out of Poverty (MOOP)[1]Research Consortium. It focused on the migration industry that attends Ethiopian migration to South Africa. This article draws out findings from the two studies to highlight how structural factors and market forces conspire with immigration regimes and host country labor market policy to induce or reinforce emigration; boost smuggling business; and intensify the risks as well as raise the smuggling cost in the migration and settlement processes.

In the 2014 study on the operation of the smuggling networks ethnographic research was conducted with 20 Ethiopian informants in Johannesburg and its satellite informal townships in July, August and September. After analyzing findings from the fieldwork in South Africa, further fieldwork was conducted in Addis Ababa and Hosaena town with 15 informants in November 2014. Of the 35 interviews 5 were females and 30 were males. The 2018 MOOP study of the migration industry relied on 40key informants interviews conducted in Johannesburg and Durban (South Africa) and in Addis Ababa and Hosaena (Ethiopia) between August 2018 and December 2018.

In preparation for the 40 key informant interviews, five in-depth interviews were conducted with Ethiopian migrants who had been resident in South Africa for between 10 and 20 years serving as gatekeepers and opinion leaders. The information obtained from these senior informants provided insight into the socioeconomic condition of Ethiopian migrants as well as background information about the informal economy in which Ethiopian migrants entrepreneurs operate. The five in-depth interviews were conducted in the first three weeks of arrival in South Africa, i.e., during the socialization and trust building processes. Information gathered from these in-depth interviews, together with additional information obtained from the available literature, were used to frame semi-

[1] See: Migrating Out of Poverty: http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/themes/migration-industry

structured questionnaires that were used to interview the 40 key informants. Of the 40 key informant interviews (33 in South Africa and 7 in Ethiopia) 33 key informants were male and 7 were female, which is consistent with the male-dominated migration to South Africa.

Interviews are based on the informants' willingness. A few interviews were interrupted because the respondents did not feel comfortable in the middle of the interview. Almost all the respondents refused to give written consent and some interviewees refused to be voice recorded. A number of interviewees demanded that their recordings be deleted after transcription.

In both the 2014 and 2018 studies, in addition to key informant interviews, field notes, informal and formal discussions, observations, a transect walk and a literature review informed the research. Informal discussions held with different actors took place in restaurants and coffee shops owned by the Ethiopian immigrants, in shisha (hookah) and Khat (Mira) houses, inside cars during long drives to different cities and townships of South Africa.Other interactions with immigrants during the course of the research also presented opportunities for participant observation and informed the research. Previously recorded videos, such as of wedding and welcome ceremonies, which were shown to the lead author, also informed this study.

Based on the data gathered in the field as well as available literature, the study employed thematic analysis. The analysis involved transcribing the interviews, reading them initially as text, sorting segments into thematic groups arising from the content, and reading through the lenses of thematic groups to identify patterns and themes to be used as evidence. Reading and re-reading of interview material was key to the analytic process. The studies were not intended to present generalizations, but to provide a thematic analysis and to offer outlines of key issues that might be probed further or insights that may provide a more nuanced view of the dynamics of migration along this corridor.

Findings and Discussion

Manufacturing Immigrants

Economic, political and ideological processes of globalization have brought the so-called "periphery" countries into international relations and by creating material and ideological links to the places where capitals originate, the same globalization processes also attract migrants in peripheral regions to the so-called core countries contributing for the creation of mobile population prone to migrate(Massey et al. 1993; Massey 1989). The irregular migration from Ethiopia to (or via) South Africa cannot be isolated from the prevailing global political and economic relations. A skewed international relation and the power and structural imbalances rooted in history (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) on the one hand, and border control and restrictions, on the other, and the resultant favorable space created for human smugglers to operate (Source) explains the migration of Ethiopians to South Africa.

South Africa is the number one destination for international migrants on the African continent and most immigrants originate from neighboring countries (Landau et al 2018). But, unusually large numbers of Ethiopians and Somalis also migrate to South Africa (IOM 2013). However, the migration of Ethiopians to South Africa is a relatively recent phenomenon that started with coincidence in regime changes in the two countries in the first half of the 1990s, which enabled internal and international mobility (Estifanos and Zack 2019). The easing of movement across borders was, therefore, one factor in motivating mobility of Ethiopians southwards. A deeper examination of the migration dynamic from Ethiopia to South Africa indicate that there were at least three waves of migration since the fall of apartheid in South Africa and the fall of the military regime in Ethiopia (Estifanos 2015). Several factors at the sending and the receiving ends combined to instigate and intensify themigrationwaves (Kanko et al 2013; Estifanos and Zack 2019).

Inter and intra regional socioeconomic inequalities that are embedded in structural factors conspired with push and pull factors to perpetuate irregular migration from Ethiopia to South Africa. The inequalities, among others, aremanifestedinthe form of sent-back-home material artifacts, actual and perceived success of returnees and remittances sent home from South Africa. From the vantage point of economy, for example, South Africa is the wealthiest country in Africa with a per capita wealth of USD11,310 in 2015, more than 40 times higher than Ethiopia's USD 260 (African Wealth Report 2015).

Other forms of disparities augment the wealth inequality. Informants noted that the purchasing power and the desire to consume of South Africans were much higher than that of customers back home. These, combined with the apparent ease of doing business in South Africa (where there appear to be less bureaucratic procedures associated with entering the informal economy), presents business opportunities for migrant entrepreneurs. Almost all of the Ethiopian immigrants work in the informal economy where many are not required to pay tax. They compared the latter with the perceived bureaucratic complexity and tax requirements in Ethiopia that further intensify disparities in opportunities. Accordingly, large numbers of Ethiopian migrants moved to South Africa in the hope of taking short or medium term advantage of the trade opportunities. In so doing, many Ethiopian migrants joined other foreign national migrants who found opportunities - through the opening of trade with China and elsewhere and the increased availability of supply chains of fast fashion- in petty trade opportunities in metropolitan centers (Zack and Lewis, 2018). Others took advantage of the dearth of retail in outlying small towns and in black townships and informal settlements around the country. There they traded as mobile hawkers, selling linen and small items while others opened tuck shops selling groceries within townships and informal settlements (Zack 2014; Estifanos 2015).

Because of prevailing socioeconomic inequalities and disparities indicated above, migration decisions on the Ethiopia-South Africa corridor are often made at household level. Migration, therefore, is considered as an investment that not only benefits the migrants but also improves the livelihoods of relatives who remain behind. It is also expected to increases the migration prospect of other members (mainly younger siblings,

close friends or prospective wives) following the footsteps of earlier migrants. The household's vested interest in financing the migration to South Africa is manifested in the fact that the equivalent funding would not be provided for potential migrants for the establishment of an Ethiopian-based business.

Mental Images and Migration

Economic and other opportunities available in South Africa are transmitted to non-migrants and migrants' families back in the homelands using ICTs, perpetuating irregular migration to South Africa. In this regard, Madianou and Miller (2011[2]) have examined the importance of technology for migration. The means to communicate with relatives and those from whom migrants are separated is pivotal to maintaining interpersonal connections. The smart phone age has made such communications easy and possible. This is true also for majority of our informants, as many use such applications and the social media to maintain connection with relatives and friends back home as well as those dispersed in different parts of the world.

However, the mental image of South Africa created through such communication technologies is highly exaggerated. Earlier migrants in South Africa often conceal the dark-side of their migration and share the brighter aspects through photographs, wedding videos and remittances. Almost all of our informants indicated that they had a completely different picture about South Africa until after they settle there and experience it firsthand.

Migrants from southern Ethiopia who went to South Africa in their early twenties start families by having a bride smuggled from home when they become old enough to marry and have developed their financial muscle. While there are ways to make money from weddings and marriages concluded this way, the fact that the pictures and videos of such ceremonies are sent back home not only change the type of migration, sex wise, but also ensure its continuity by providing more reasons to migrate. One factor that create distorted image about South Africa, through sent-back-home wedding video,is the practice of editing by video makers in South Africa who insert superficial scenes into already luxurious and posturing wedding ceremonies. Asnaku describes the video of her own wedding:

> When people back home see the wedding videos and what is in there, they don't see how hard the process is to come here. They just imagine life is like what's in the video. There are different things in the video. For example, the video makers included all the states of South Africa including places we haven't seen when they edited my wedding video. There were helicopters included in the video, but there was not any helicopter on my wedding ceremony.

Wedding videos are edited, in an attempt by the video makers to impress the rather

[2]Madianou, M., and D. Miller. 2011. Migration and New Media: Transnational Families and Polymedia. London: Routledge.

boasting bride and bridegroom, and are sent to families and relatives back home creating an even rosier picture about life in South Africa. Some of the local smugglers also use the wedding videos as 'propaganda' to inspire migration to South Africa. There is competition amongst smugglers, and they use various marketing tactics including exaggerating the benefits of migration. For example, they exaggerate stories of successful migrants to boast about the quality of their smuggling services. These stories circulate in popular places like restaurants and coffee shops where people gather and share information.

Returnees exhibit material and physical improvements as well as refinement of language, dressing style and cleanliness. There is also an evident difference in living conditions between migrant sending families and non-migrants sending families. South Africa is painted as an imaginary place where money is abundant and success is inevitable. Consequently, many abandoned school and even teachers followed in the footsteps of their students. Others left their jobs, sold their cattle, and rented out their land. Some first sought wage work to finance their migration. Despite the difficulties for migrants in South Africa, remittances mean that their families improve their living standards. In rural areas, sending families manage to renovate old huts or even build new modern villas. They are able to send their children to school and improve nutrition and health. Remittances also boost agricultural productivity because modern farm inputs such as fertilizers and high-yield variety seeds can be purchased.

The positive changes for families of migrants have encouraged surrounding communities to send members of their families to South Africa. The financial and material improvements lead to greater social status and influence that triggers further migration. Thus the families of those who have emigrated from southern Ethiopia earn honor and respect from the community, particularly from non-migrant families. Considerable social pressure, including abuse, is put on young non-migrant adults to join the outflow.

Migration is also fuelled by religious, social and cultural factors. These are particularly strong in the case of youth migrating from Hossaena town and its surroundings. Many teenagers from the area consider South Africa as the "Promised Land". It is a notion reinforced in teachings of religious leaders and visionaries: the so-called "fortune tellers." This religious industry is significant and it has imprints in both Ethiopia and South Africa. The protestant church receives donations from the pastors and the pastors are invited to South Africa for preaching purpose. The same is the case from South Africa side. Zemenu explained that the power of money is not only changing the personalities of individual migrants but it is also adulterating the spiritual environment inside the protestant Church:

> I think it is the money and the spirit of the country that changes the behavior of the Pastors. Once I asked the spiritual leaders in our church about the problems but they told me that it was these "bad guys" who support the church with money. So, they were afraid that if they tell them what they are doing is wrong; they might stop supporting the church. The spiritual leaders give more value for money than humanity. The spiritual facilities make a lot of money and they live a luxurious life, but they don't care about the life or migrants. I have stopped going

to church long time ago.

The business environment in the informal economy of South Africa that these migrants undertake their business leaves migrants in a very stressful situation. Most of these migrants depend on the church teachings and "pastors"' preaching to get some relief. That has paved a way for pseudo-pastors to take advantage of this vacuum and enrich themselves. A consequence of this industry is the reinforcing and complicating of the smuggling industry.The sum total of these factors tends to paint a rosy picture about South Africa; a place where money is abundant and success is inevitable.

Relative Deprivation as a Migration Driver

A combination of multiple factors at macro, meso and micro level have created a number of restless young people in Ethiopia who are incapable but actively searching for loopholes for migration. Efforts to apply such insights led Jørgen Carling to introduce the concept of involuntary immobility in his analysis of the gulf between the aspiration to move on the part of transnational family members and their ability to do so (Carling 20023). In their desperation, some migrants steal money from family members; take loan from micro-credit association and finance their moves; use inheritance money or use zone fiancé money to actualize their migration dream.

One desperate migrant even married a local girl in Hosaena just to finance his migration to South Africa. He picked on the girl when he discovered that she had rich relatives in South Africa who could finance his migration if and when we get stuck in transit country. Triggered by the migration of his immediate friends (elder and younger brother who used to run a profitable restaurant in his neighborhood) Sintayehu set off to South Africa. Although he too owned a small motor repair garage in Hosseana and was leading a reasonably good life, he became edgy when the two bothers departed. He sold his motor repair garage to migrate to South Africa. As he prepared for his journey he discovered that the money he raised from the sale of his garage would only pay for his journey to Malawi. He explained his tactic:

> My father gathered the family and we discussed about financing my migration, because the money I raised from the sale of my garage would only got me to Malawi. So, my father asked the remaining members of the family to contributed and finance the remaining journey. They said they couldn't afford. That's when a sudden thought of marrying a girl, who has well-to-do relatives in South Africa, occurred to me. I did marry her and her relatives in South Africa covered the smuggling money from Malawi to South Africa

The spatial and business environment as well as the wholesale and retail nature of the business that most Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa are engaged in demands the use of a car. Photos of migrants posturing with their (often fancy) cars on the wide and spacious South African roads present a strong temptation to those who remain behind and are caught in drudgeries of rural life. They are equally compelling for youth who may not

[3] Carling, J 2002, 'Migration in the age of involuntary immobility: theoretical reflections and Cape Verdean experiences', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 5-42.

be in absolute poverty but who nevertheless experience a sense of relative deprivationagainst the images conjured by the photos. If posturing pictures are not strong enough to stir a desire to migrate, there are extravagantly luxurious "welcoming" and "wedding" ceremony videos. Hence, it is partly relative deprivation that inspires decision-making at an individual, a household or a family level.

South Africa as a Transit

The coincidence of push factors of absolute and relative deprivations (Stark and Taylor 1989; Czaika and de Haas 2011) pull factors of perceived and actual success and opportunities as well as the power of established familial, ethnic and business transnational networks inspire the possibility of migration from Ethiopia to South Africa (Kanko et al 2013; Estifanos 2016). Accordingly, large numbers of aspiring migrants seek opportunities and make plans to finance their move. Brokers, smugglers and other actors and institutions facilitate each part of the migration journey to and settlement in South Africa (Estifanos and Zack 2019; Fekadu et al 2019; Estifanos 2015). Many of our informants indicated that South Africa is a transit country for them who seek better futures in the countries of global North.

Most of our informants, especially pioneer ones and those who migrated from cities and urban areas in the home country, consider South Africa as transit country in their plan to move to North American and European countries. In fact many of them headed to South Africa not because they wanted to stay there, but because their applications to be granted asylum in North American and European countries (mostly made from Kenya) were turned down. For Zemenu, and for other asylum seekers he stayed with in Kenya, South Africa was a last resort. He explained as follows:

> I didn't have any plan to travel to South Africa. I could have come to South Africa when I first got in to Kenya, but I didn't have the desire. The process my wide and I started for Canada, from Kenya, failed and most of the Ethiopians who were living with us started leaving the place to other countries. Then we too decide to leave. And we chose to come to South Africa because we didn't have anywhere else to go.

Even political migrants the likes of Kibru considered South Africa as a transit to countries of the global north. With the facilitation and financial support of his elder sister in the United States, he managed to escape from the government soldiers and became an exile in Kenya. He had the United States as his final destination in mind. But, he spent around 10 years in South Africa, and he is still waiting for loopholes to open up:

> The only reason I chose Kenya was because there was a refugee camp called Kakuma. But when I get to Kenya I had no one to welcome me. It was my sister who facilitated everything for me from America. There was a phone number she gave me. I called and meet with a guy; he was a good person he helped me a lot. I stayed for one month in Kenya in a place called East Leigh, 10th Street. My sister was planning to take me to America. She told me that the process is easier from South Africa than from Kenya. So I went to South Africa. My aim was to get to America from South Africa.

While many pioneer Ethiopian migrants headed to South Africa with the prior intension of using it as a transit to cross into countries of the global North (Gebre TL et al 2010), others had felt emboldened to consider moving beyond South Africa once they had established their financial power and had developed their social and political capital. Others were compelled to change their direction because of the stressful and risky environment in the informal economy of South Africa and yet others considered moving out of South Africa because they were concerned about the future of their children.

Manufacturing Smugglers

Borders, Market Forces and Smugglers

As opposed to global financial transactions and the global flow of goods, cross-border population flows are highly regulated by state policies. Fornon-professional labor migrants, only very few visa categories are available, typically of a short-term nature(Piper and Ball, 2001[4]; Elson, 2000[5]). Host country governments are increasing efforts to restrain and deter irregular migrants through the intensification and diversification of migration control strategies. In the interests of 'protecting' European countries from the immigration of Africans for instance, European cooperation with African countries is increasingly being tied to firm control of those countries' borders (Capesciotti 2017, Graziani 2017). And border reinforcements that had existed primarily in the global north countries are being increasingly adopted everywhere, making distinctions between global north and global south practices difficult to determine (Nawyn 2016) and in some instances European external borders have become African borders (Gaibazzi et al. 2017).

Border controls, restrictive visa and immigration policies have resulted in rising numbers of undocumented migrants and are contributing to an increase in smuggling business (Blij 2009; De Haas 2013; Brachet 2018). In this regard, it is argued that smuggling could not have grown to such proportions if powerful market forces do not support it (Aranowitz 2001). Stephen Castles argues that forced migration is related to and is a response for skewed global economic and political structures that favor industrialized countries at the expense of the underdeveloped ones. He also underlines the emergence of criminal transnational networks that are taking advantage of the vacuum created by such imbalances(Castles 2003).

While smugglers respond to the demand forwarded from migrants and help themin their migration and settlement processes, they operate in a capitalist system - their prime motive being profit making. Findings from this fieldwork indicate that, often times, it is the migrants and/or their hosts of who approach smugglers to facilitate the smuggling.

[4] Piper N, Ball RE. 2001. Globalisation of Asian migrant labour – reevaluating state and regional dynamics in human rights negotiations. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* **31**(4): 533–554.
[5] Elson D. 2000. Gender at the macroeconomic level. In *Towards A Gendered Political Economy*, Cook J, Roberts J, Waylen G (eds). Macmillan: Basingstoke.

Our informants indicate the power of market forces reinforcing the smuggling business. There is also emerging competition amongst the smugglers in recent years, as they are responding both to increasingly stringent regulations and policing structures erected to thwart their business, as well as to increasing business competition amongst themselves. Bisrat, a former smuggler, explained that what started as a simple travel agent type role of smuggling is turning into an aggressively competitive business:

> In the earlier years when I smuggle people I used to fetch them from the airport and buy them food and drink at a decent café. But gradually, competitions emerged amongst smugglers. Once, an Ethiopian smuggler blocked 16 migrants of mine after they arrive in South Africa. I retaliated by intercepting his migrants and demanding money for their release. This resulted in conflict between us. After that I quitted the smuggling business, because I have seen some smugglers even killing each other because of business. Even after I quitted the smuggling business, other smugglers approached me to work with them. I had a friend called Eyuel, and he asked me that he wants to work as a smuggler and send people to America. I showed him where he can get the passports and I introduced him with the immigration officer, and gave him other relevant lesson. Eyuel is Eritrean and a lot of Eritreans came and asked him for his service, and he started sending them to America via Brazil.

Majority of the informants indicated that their migration and settlement processes are connected in many ways from financing the migration to hiring smugglers and to inserting them in the informal economy of South Africa when they arrive. Examination into the operation of the smuggling networks indicates that cross border networks of smugglers and other actors are intricate. The social networks are superimposed with the so-called criminal networks where families, migrants and smugglers, and brokers and agents under them, work together to actualize the migration ambitions. There is also no clear borderline between the formal and the informal economy in the migration and settlement processes. If there were no fertile social, economic and political grounds, smugglers could not flourish in such an organized manner. Mekasha is a migrant-turned-smuggler interviewed in Hossaena. He explained linkages between formal financing and the smuggling business. He said the bank officials in source, transit and destination countries know who the smugglers are they are letting them to open accounts and make transactions:

> They know who the smugglers are. If you ask them the name of their customers who are smugglers they will tell you. If you go to the public and private banks they know a lot of secrets. I also know smugglers who have bank accounts. And many of the smugglers have accounts in many branches and diverse banks. If one of their accounts is blocked they will activate the other. Most smugglers have relation with the bank, airlines and the police.

Other informants reinforce Mekasha's point. Tadele indicated that the smuggling industry bridges the formal and informal economies. Tadele and other migrants tell how migrants, smugglers, hosts and financial institutions work together in a transnational setting to facilitate the migration, reactivate or boost the settlement of migrants in South Africa and

beyond. In Hossaena the smugglers and local agents also open multiple bank accounts to diversify risk. Tadele share his experience as follows:

> The smuggler in Malawi sent me a bank account on my phone and a name the account was a Somali person. Using Absa Bank in Johannesburg I sent the money through the account he gave me. I also sent the confirmation code I got from the bank to my brother. They sent him straight to Johannesburg and hereached South Africa after a week.

A combination of market forces, border controls, corruption, and a strong aspiration for migrationto South Africa inspire the creation of a community enterprise around the smuggling business. This is particularly the case at border towns and refugee camps across transit countries. The migrants are also active agents in the smuggling networks and they take advantage of Information Communication Technologies thrown open by globalization processes to actualize their migration. Josina arrived at Dzalleka refugee camp in Malawi:

> After I reached Dzalleka, my chief smuggler told me that I have used all the money paid for me. I stayed at the refugee camp for a while and decided to change a smuggler, because I though the former smuggler is not efficient. So I talked to another smuggler and made a deal with him. Then I called my father and he agreed to pay more money. So, my father gave the money for smuggler's family in Ethiopia. And when the smuggler hears from his family, in the form of text message, the new smuggler smuggled my cousin and me into South Africa.

Restless Migrants and Smugglers

Desperate and restless aspiring migrants contribute for the creation of smugglers en route.Biniyam is a return migrant interviewed in Addis Ababa. During his migration to South Africa, he actively participated in the smuggling networks whereby he directly flew to Kenya and bribed an officer in Kenyan Airport to transit to Mozambique. He explained the situation he and two other female migrants went through as follow:

> We plastered a VISA sticker we received from a broker in Addis Ababa. The broker also appointed me as an accidental team leader and gave me a mobile SIM-card to communicate with smugglers in transit countries and beyond. While waiting for our transit flight in Nairobi Airport, an officer approached and questioned what we were up to. He was about to send us to jail, but with a friendly chat, a 50 USD and a firm handshake, he relented and we continued our journey. When we landed in Mozambique, an officer at the airlines slipped our passports on a machine and stopped us. However, after a brief phone conversation I had with a chief smuggler in South Africa, the offices let us pass. Afterwards, we avoided the formal 'exit gate'- as we were ordered to - and directly went to meet two guys who were waiting for us. They received and drove us to a hut located in a remote jungle. There, another Mozambican smuggler welcomed us. Later on the same day, after walking through the jungle for more than three hours in complete darkness - with terror, disillusion and trance - we crossed the South African border.

In addition to border controls and anti immigration laws that are producing smugglers, there are cases where the migrants reproduce the smuggling network. Bisrat shares his experience as to how he was persuaded to become a smuggler while he was in Kenya, by migrants who have no skill and orientation about migration and migration routes:

> I used to live in East Leigh, Nairobi. One night while we were having drinks in our house a guy called Sahle knocked at our door. I knew him when I was in Ethiopia. We lived together in our house and his families are very rich. Sahle came with a lot of money, and on the same night he asked us to take him to South Africa. I was reluctant but my best friend was eager to take him. But he didn't want to go without me. They strongly begged me to go with them; they even promised me that they would give me money to return back if I didn't feel happy in South Africa. Then I agreed and we prepared a forged document and headed to South Africa.

Menfin also became an accidental smuggler driven by a demand forwarded to by desperate migrants. He explains his migration to South Africa, against his desire. He was in Kenya working in a shop when he suddenly met up with two Ethiopian ladies, and they asked him to guide them to South Africa because he knew how to speak English and was more mature than they were. He describes the situation as follows:

> One day they asked me to take them to South Africa, and we decided to go. There was some money I saved from working in a shop. So, I converted some of the money into dollar for emergency and start the journey. Two other boys joined us for the journey. I only have language skill; I have zero knowledge about the place and the route to South Africa. Some of them told me that they didn't have money and I told them if we don't any money we will die on our way. We agreed and continued the journey without the need to hiring smugglers. We reached to Tanzania but it was one of the boys and I who had an original passport with valid visa, the other was forged. Then we continue our journey to Zambia.

Desperate migrants also draw in regular residents who live in multiple transit countries into the smuggling networks. These are random people who otherwise are not part of the smuggling networks but come in to plug the loopholes created by a rather uncertain and unpredictable transnational networks. Many informants mentioned the help they received from regular residents in key transit countries when smuggling networks were cut off and they found themselves in the middle of nowhere. Some of these regular residents are not aware of their involvement but provide invaluable support for the migrants through provision of information and linking migrants with brokers or smugglers; supplying food, shelter or hiding places; provision of transport facilities in crossing strict borders; or facilitating money transfers from abroad from migrants' relatives as many of the migrants do not have valid documents to use formal banking services. They do it either on a remuneration basis or out of altruism becoming the "*Good Samaritan"* for disorientated strangers.

Manufacturing Exploitations

Exploitations en route

Despite the increasing research focus on the agency of migrants and the positive role smugglers play in facilitating migration and settlement processes in the form of either providing security and protection from below (Tekalegn 2018; Sanchez and Natividad 2017) or facilitating and serving as gate-openers (Fekadu et al. 2019) human smugglers are still blamed for putting migrants' lives in danger (Frouws et al 2014; Albahari 2015). From the perspective of the former, the risks migrants encounter en route are an extension and part of the structural violence of global inequality and the deprivation of the mobility rights of migrants (Castles 2005; Gerard 2014[6]; Backwell 2014).

In addition to increasing the smuggling cost, there is an emerging sea route to South Africa across the Indian Ocean rim exposing migrants to a different kind of risk than is prevalent in the on land migration. This practice is tied to the closure of borders and institution of new migration regimes. Tadele, from Hossaena, indicated even some migrants were throwing themselves into the sea:

> We had nothing to talk to the boat captains. When they were hungry they stop the ship in the middle of the sea to eat. They don't care about us even when the migrants throw themselves into the sea. There was a boy with us and after we travelled a little he lost his control. He lost it. He couldn't control himself, and he threw himself into the sea. On the next day a big storm came and many of the migrants drowned into the sea. The survivors were smaller than the ones drowned. We travelled on the high sea like this and reached Malawi border to a place called Caronga.

On land border crossing are usually undertaken using a combination of walking and vehicles. In an attempt to cross borders, smugglers either hide migrants at roadblocks or border crossings or bribe officials posted there. Our informants reported extremely dangerous kinds of hiding places including slotting migrants at the bottom of large trucks or stowing inside loads of goods or cramming them in-between cattle that are transported across borders of transit countries. Tarekegn shares his experience on how he crossed from Malawi to Mozambique:

> While we were crossing Etete Bridge, on foot, one of the migrants fell sick. When we were trying to treat him the border police caught and brought us back to Malawi border. Then they told us to return to Malawi and we came back to Lilongwe. After some hours the smugglers slotted 12 of us at the bottom of a truck, between the tiers, and smuggled us into Zimbabwe.

As indicated above, the roles of migration regimes, increased border enforcement, externalization, and securitization measures that have altered migration routes and shaped

[6]Gerard, Alison. 2014. The securitization of migration and refugee women. New York, NY: Routledge.

the smuggling business in other settings (Brachet 2018; Andersson 2014; Lucht 2011; Research and Evidence Facility 2017) has also been observed in our study. One of the ways in which migrants and smugglers have responded to intensifying border controls is re-rerouting the journey. Consequently, the migration routes from Ethiopia to South Africa fluctuate depending on the physical and legal barriers erected against smugglers and irregular migrants. Informants indicated that smugglers bribe border police and immigration officials whenever possible and profitable. They also seek help from regular residents and institutions like churches and other actors along the way to find or create loopholes and continue their southern journey.

Increased border enforcement, externalization and securitization measures have significantly raised the risks and fatalities associated with irregular migration. There is also an increase in the time and cost for migrants needing to cross borders. Several informants in our study noted that one response to increasing border control and securitization policy in transit countries is shifting the migration route. Migrants and smugglers are also known to make repeated attempts as well as change the time of travel to past-midnight to cross borders. Such measures have increased the cost of migration and the risks immigrants encounter en route as well as reduced the power of irregular migrants against smugglers.

Exploitations in Settlement

Social networks play a crucial role in the settlement processes of irregular migrants. However, there are risks and dangers embedded within them. Established network of migrants can benefit some and exclude others from the group. Poros describes ethnic enclave economies where immigrants used their social networks and co-ethnic social capital to participate in labour markets that primarily serve their own ethnic communities while excluding immigrants from a different ethnic group or origin. Even within a group, there can be exploitation of recent immigrants by former ones i.e., exploitation by inclusion (Poros, 2011). This is especially predominant in the case of irregular immigrants who settle in informal labour markets. Poros adds that some immigrants face lack of upward mobility and exploitation by their fellow co-ethnics. Many of the recent Ethiopian migrants interviewed lament the exploitation they encountered in the informal economy of South Africa. These exploitations are evident amongst immediate friends, close relatives and even between family members.

Boss – Border Relations

Unlike the case in other contexts, there is no established or structured labor network for the recruitment of Ethiopian migrants into the formal economy of South Africa. Instead, Ethiopian immigrants tend to work in informal trade owning and running their own retail and wholesale businesses. Recent immigrants (borders) are often reliant on established former migrants (bosses) for business information, access to trading spaces, supply chains and distribution networks for the sale of goods in this sector. Accordingly, borders may be hired as employees for bosses on a casual and temporary basis.

In many cases the bosses are the ones who financed the smuggling of borders, and most

often, the bosses are siblings, close friend, relatives, (and brothers or prospective husbands in the case of recent female immigrants) of the borders. Therefore, the consensual agreement attached to informal employment is that borders will assist bosses in their business in return for a portion or full amount of the smuggling fee that has been sponsored by the bosses. Many male borders are often employed for a transitional period to save working capital, build their language and communication skills, established business networks and build a customer base as well as learn the operations of the business environment. Many recent migrants work in these relationships in townships, either as shopkeepers of tuck-shops (small shops that are mainly owned and run by migrant entrepreneurs from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia and Ethiopia) or as door-to-door hawkers vending linen or household goods.

Our study findings offer evidence for the presence of exploitation of borders by bosses. In their provisional relationship, the borders use the job as a training mechanism and as a source of income in their transition to self-employment while the bosses make profit from the arrangement. Once the transition period is over, and after the settlement of the smuggling fees in the case of boss sponsored migration, bosses try to hold back the borders from establishing their own business, for fear of direct competition from the newcomers and because bosses may want to extend their own profiteering from the labor of these newcomers. Temesgen's experience indicates the premeditated desire of the bosses in their choice for the nature of immigrants they want to smuggle. He narrates his migration to South Africa against his desires:

> I am the last child in the family. I have two brothers and two sisters and my brothers have migration experience. I hated migration when I was in Ethiopia and I came here without my desire. My dream was to work in my own country. It was my eldest brother who forced me came here; he had been asking me to come since I was grade-10 student. He was telling me that there are better chances here, but I didn't want to quit my education. So, I told him to give me some time at least until I finish my education. My sister wanted to come using the opportunity he offered, but my brother was not interested in her because he had a Tuck-shop in a risky place and he wanted me to work for him, and my sister will not be useful for that. After I came here my brother was reluctant to even help me obtain permit paper … end the end, which the help of a Pakistani friend, I escaped and left that place.

A related reason for the desire to extend the boss-border relation is the fact that bosses enjoy a relative peace and security by posting borders in shops that are located in dangerous places. Interestingly, our findings indicated that the financial positions of bosses are not always directly associated with sponsoring the smuggling of borders. Rather, a need for trustworthy employees to be posted in diversifying business or branching out tuck-shops; the search for relief from stress and risks in townships and hotspots areas; and the desire for soul partner (in the case of female immigrants) appear to be strong factors in the willingness to finance or even persuade the smuggling of relatives, siblings, friends and prospective wives from Ethiopia. Another interviewee (Solomon I) in Johannesburg said:

> Even though the bosses are aware of the risks en route and the dangers in South Africa, they are still willing to finance the migration of younger siblings, relatives, friends or even prospective wives. The hosts finance the migration not only driven by the acts of altruism but also because they want to release themselves from stress and risks in townships. So, by the time the border arrives he or she will suffer in the townships while the boss stay in cities and enjoys the relative peace. The same cycle continues when the border assumes a status of boss.

Gander Based Exploitation

Monica Boyd argues that little systematic attention is paid to gender in the development and persistence of networks across time and space (Boyd, 1989). From the vantage point of family ties, in the operation of ethnic enclave, she underlines that the persistence of gender division of labour and its new expressions are crucial for the success of ethnic enclaves. But success is built on a paradox, and this paradox is not yet fully incorporated in the existing research of ethnic enclaves. Hagan adds that women receive few of the benefits experienced by male co-ethnics emphasizing the presence of negative human capital returns for female workers (Hagan, 1998). She also notes that the positive outcomes of enclave economies for men might be enjoyed at the cost of women's opportunities.

Unlike the boss-border relationship witnessed among Ethiopian male immigrants, the relationship between established male and recent female immigrants may not be temporary. This is because labor relations are at times linked to long-term relationships one of which is marriage. Our findings indicate that such relationships are loaded with female exploitation. A profit oriented business model in South Africa's informal economy further molded these unequal relations. Women who migrate in order to marry men who are established migrants in the host country do not do so without any agency. In fact they may do so in order to exercise agency by taking advantage of the opportunity to migrate in anticipation of a 'better life'. Interviewees reported that in South Africa many female Ethiopian migrants who hold poorly rewarded multiple responsibilities such as management of shops, taking care of household chores, and looking after children while the males make business deals and "stock" their shops. A wife in Johannesburg summarized the routines of most married men as follows:

> A husband would get up in the morning and goes to town to meet and have breakfast, usually *dulet* [minced meat], with his friends. Then he would go to China Mall [Dragon City] to stock for the shop, which his wife runs and goes to McDonald's afterwards to have coffee and chitchat with his friends. Most males, including my husband, are just like that. If there is a husband in Johannesburg who is working from his counter in the shop, it is highly likely that either his wife has gone to Ethiopia or his kids are sick. Here, in Johannesburg, it is the females who take care of the males: not just the wives but sisters too. She would get up early morning opens and operates the shop. When the shops are closed and the wife arrives home, she will have to take care of the household chores and look

> after children. A wife will have to act like this according to the wishes of the husband. This routine continues the next day and throughout the year.

Such exploitation is embedded in the power relation between male and female migrants, recent and pioneer migrants, bosses and borders or even between spouses. Sarah's case manifests pure exploitation of her position by her boyfriend whom she went to South Africa to give a short visit. Sarah speaks:

> I was bothering my boyfriend to send me back home. But he informed me, as if he was teasing me, that if I want to return to Ethiopia I should pay him the money he paid for the smuggler to get me here. I realized I have no power but to stay. Then we start living together and I have worked for 7 years with him, but I had no penny when we divorced. He hasn't given me anything.

Other female respondents also indicated that wives who work in businesses owned by their husbands or owned jointly by the couple tend to be responsible for most business routines including managing shops or restaurants as well as the household chores, while men undertake the physically less demanding coordination, stocking and follow ups in the business.

Gendered relations and social institutions imported from home seem to reinforce exploitative conditions for female migrants who are assuming the dual role of wife and worker. In this regard, it is indicated that one of the outcomes of migration to South Africa is the role reversal between males and females in a transnational space where Ethiopian men have taken over social processes, while the women have taken on the male roles of business managers (Amel 2012). Men control the imported social processes in South Africa. They import and operate social institutions such as *Idir* and *Mahiber*, and are able to adjust and shape them to their advantage in the host space.

Thecomplicity of structural forces in creating conditions that exposed migrants to exploitations was witnessed in the narratives gathered. Migrants working in the informal sector, as many newly arrived Ethiopians, face the intersection of risks associated with working informally and risks associated with being a migrant. Restrictive migration policy limits the opportunities for work for political asylum seekers and many are restricted to working in informal trade. There they face the same risks as South Africans in that sector: restricted spaces for trade; risks of corruption by officials; exposure to crime in public spaces; limited shelter and safety for their stock; extortion by officials or leaseholders who might sell access to trading sites, and high physical risk in areas where policing is poor and crime rates are high.

In addition, migrants face the precarity of their political asylum seeking status which is renewed for periods as short as a few months, after which they are illegal migrants until the status is again renewed (and this is often done under conditions of extortion). They also face risks of xenophobic attitudes and of xenophobic attacks on their businesses and on their person. These risks create situations where those who are able to might shield themselves from risk by placing more vulnerable migrants in the businesses that are at highest risk.

Conclusion

In addition to creating disruptions and dislocations, globalization processes that originate from developed countries instill a strong desire for migration while simultaneously erecting legal and physical barriers precluding many eager locals from joining the corridors of globalization. Consequently, aspiring and restless migrants from impoverished countries sneak through legal loopholes as well as rely on smugglers to achieve their migration desires. The migration of young adults from southern Ethiopia to South Africa cannot be isolated from this migration processes, and the smuggling networks of Ethiopians migrants to South Africa are partly created by prevailing skewed global economic and political order. An indication for the interaction between South-South and South-North migration is evident from this study, because, for many Ethiopian migrants in South Africa, the latter serves as a transit country. The criminal networks that facilitated the migration of Ethiopians to South Africa also extend their horizon to create links with infamous criminal networks stretched across the Americas.

Despite a different initial cause for migration from Southern Ethiopia, the perpetuation in migration of young adults to South Africa is mainly attributable to the nature and operation of the smuggling networks. Structural factors, market forces, migration and labor market policies in host and transit countries as well as border regimes conspire one other to manufacture immigrants, smugglers and exploitations en route and in settlement. This is augmented by other factors such as increase in the size of immigrant populations, settlement in the informal economy and attendant abnormal competition, imported and modified social institutions, lack of bridging ties and lack of language and other skills to minimize the benefits and amplify the risks.

The migration of Ethiopians to South Africa is not going to attenuate for sometime to come. There are many factors that are boosting the migration to South Africa including but not limited to: there are large numbers of involuntarily immobile teenagers and adolescents many of whom are looking for loopholes and opportunities to move to South Africa. Even the better off ones feel that they are relatively deprived and are constantly making plans to head to south. At different administrative and bureaucratic structures of governments across source, transit and destination countries, government officials involve in the smuggling business and corruption is almost institutionalized providing a safety valve for migrants and lubricating their migration. The smuggling network is also transnational with the capacity to change its direction and nature if and when faced with interventions. Economically established Ethiopian immigrants in South Africa are operating in the informal economy with difficulties of leaving and re-entering South Africa because of documentation related complexities. Thus, many prefer to smuggle in prospective wives.

The politics of scapegoating smugglers and immigrants for migration and migration related risks by Ethiopian and South African governments do not stand robust. Finding from this study indicate that smugglers are just one strand of the multidimensional actors and institution that are created by a skewed global political and economic order, market forces and ever-increasing state immigration policies and borders controls against

irregular migration without concomitant opening of regular migration channels. Instead of tackling the operation of smuggling networks, governments across source, transit and destination countries creating a favorable condition for smugglers to operate while exacerbating the risks migrants encounter and raising the cost of smuggling.

In the context of growing power imbalance between states (or supranational states) and transnational smuggling networks, the argument that smugglers provide protection from below is questionable. Similarly, in as mush as social networks are important for irregular migrants in their migration and settlement processes through provision of information and advice, reducing risks and costs, extending emotional and recreational support, they could also be networks of exploitations. Irregular migrants settling in informal economies of the host countries need protection from above as well.

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