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Food Security and Forced Migration: An Overview

By

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Introducing the theme

"Hungry kya"

The above advertisement for an international pizza company has perhaps caught everybody's attention in recent times. The solution is a plateful crunchy piece of a pizza with mouth-watering assortments! Doubtlessly, it also shows how a popular food chain can bring even a most traumatic (both biologically and mentally) experience of human society into its marketing strategy for sheer profit-making in a neoliberal globalised world. Such a mindless advertisement simply overlooks the fact that there is still a large chunk of people around the southern hemisphere countries, who live under the constant shadow of hunger, and many of whom are sometimes forced to flee their home in search of food to keep themselves alive. It is now well accepted that 'hunger' is pulling a vast number of people within its fold from places which following discursive cartography can be called the 'Geography of Hunger'[1]. But the greater malady, on which this paper shall try to bring light, is the confluence of these two factors: hunger and forced migration. One of the overlooked drivers behind migration is hunger/food insecurity. The 2018 edition of the *Global Hunger Index* has a special focus on the theme of forced migration and hunger.[2]

The confluence has its ominous roots from sub-Saharan Africa to West Asia to South-Asia. In the wake of the independence war of South-Sudan in 2011, a mammoth number of peoples were forced to flee their homes which culminated in the food risk nearly of seven million people.[3] In recent past Amartya Sen's seminal works like *Poverty and Famines: Essays on Entitlement and Deprivation* (1981) and *Development as Freedom* (1999) showed how governmental policies/machinery failed to mitigate hunger owing to their

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misconception on the occurrence of famines.[4] And the population started to flow towards the cities in search of food. We have also witnessed how recent famines in Syria has been used as a weapon by both the Syrian government and rebel groups which resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands of people and 4 million have fled their home.[5]

When we generally talk about forced migration, we talk of several factors those force a person to flee his/her home, but seldom 'hunger' as one of the driving forces. However, hunger often becomes a tipping point and forces people to flee their home. It happened during the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 when innumerable people forced to leave their home, mainly located in villages headed toward district towns, cities and to Calcutta and Dhaka. On the other hand, the migrants (within and beyond the borders of a country), fled by other reasons than hunger, are also subjected to starvation and malnutrition on many occasions. Thus, one may say, hunger and forced migration are concomitant of each other. Despite this, we seldom find an adequate discussion about forced migration owing to food deprivation. The 1951 Refugee Convention did not clearly mention it, or about the steps that had to be taken in case of a person who is fleeing from famine or food deprivation.

      A discussion on famine and food cannot be proceeded without mentioning of Amartya Sen's works. According to the "entitlement failure" approach of Sen, the environmental and financial crises reduce access to food and weak governmental machinery fail to generate employment opportunities. This, in turn, forces the deprived ones to flee their home. Let us take the case of Honduras for example nearly 63 percent of the population lives under the national poverty line with one in four children are stunted, or chronically malnourished. And the murder rate in Honduras is one of the highest in the world. One can find that, as mentioned in a study conducted by WFP, one of the top reasons listed for migration in Honduras is that there is "no food". In Honduras, those who have managed to cross the international boundary and get a job are in big contrast with those who were unable to find any work within the country. The migrants who succeeded in finding work are sending money back to their family. This money is called "remittances". In 2015 alone, remittances to Honduras from the United States amounted more than $3.7 billion, which is between 17 percent and 18 percent of Honduras' gross domestic product or GDP.[6] We are also witnessing how labourers and farmers in Srikakulam (Andhra Pradesh) are all opting for Tamil Nadu as they get more wages and food at an affordable cost in Amma canteens where each meal is served at Rs.13 only.[7]In a recent study, it is found that countries having the highest levels of food insecurity also have the highest outward migration of refugees.[8]In this context, this paper is a humble attempt to study the interrelationship between hunger and forced migration.

Famines and Forced Migration

Before discussing the contemporary factors that are forcing the people to flee home let us have a glance of the history of this inauspicious nexus. Famine is different from hunger and food insecurity. The former two occur when the latter fails to achieve its goal. When hunger persists for a long period, expand its magnitude by taking a huge number of people within its fold culminates in mass migration and death then it becomes famine. Famine is the extreme manifestation of hunger and both are the result of food insecurity as we discussed above. Food insecurity can be categorised as chronic and transitory. When we talk of addressing food insecurity, we have to understand that it is the chronic food insecurity that translates into a high degree of vulnerability to famine and hunger; ensuring food security presupposes elimination of that vulnerability. History reveals that slight abnormalities in the process of food production-distribution and consumption can lead these vulnerable ones to the stage of famine. Hence, there is always a chance of occurrence of famine in the conditions of chronic food insecurity.

Normally food-secured societies hardly face any famine owing to the resilience of the population. However, repeated seasonal food insecurity can make the better-off population wretched by depleting their assets which can expose them to a higher level of famine vulnerability. The last option left for the famine affected population is to flee their home. In the initial stages of famine-affected households resort to several coping strategies including, minimizing food consumption, selling near-liquid assets, cattle, utensils before haunted by the destitution and extreme starvation. Seeing no other option left they decide to migrate in order to survive. All famines force the people to flee home in search of food and in order to escape diseases. Much of the mobility of the people are from rural areas to towns. Exile owing to famine is short lived. People come back to their place of origin after the crisis is over.

However, Irish famine had a unique feature say, a permanent international migration took place due to United States' policy to welcome migrants from Ireland due to the strong demand for unskilled labour in the following periods of Irish famine 1845-1849. One thing that we should keep in our mind that mass long-distance emigration from Ireland did not begin with the famine, yet the outflow was greatly swollen by that famine and this distinguishes the Irish crisis from most historical and modern Third World famines. The migration was the product of the United States' open-door policy and Ireland's being part of the United Kingdom. No similar prospect is open to modern famine-threatened economies. The distinction raises many questions about the character and scope of the famine migration and its effectiveness as a complement to, or substitute for, the lack of other forms of famine relief.[9] Over the centuries famine has been shifted its pattern. The pre-industrial agrarian societies were vulnerable to famine when the crop failed. Then came colonial occupations that brought starvation to colonized people. Nonetheless, totalitarian regimes in the 20th century in Europe and Asia generated mass starvation through genocidal policies. Stalin's Holodomor famine and the Nazi Hunger Plan during World War II claimed

millions of lives. Great Leap Forward initiated by Mao-Tse-Dong triggered the Great Chinese Famine took 15-30 million lives while in Polpot's Cambodia 500,000 to 1.5 million lives perished and Winston Churchill's inhumane policies during Bengal famine engulfed 1.5 million lives without spending a bullet.[10]

The Great Bengal Famine of 1943 fell hardest on the rural poor. As the crises continued to haunt the people, they became increasingly desperate to survive. As we discussed above, villagers had started to sell their ornaments, jewellery and smaller items of personal property. When these measurers fell short to meet the requirement of access to food, people decided to leave the village. Eventually, families disintegrated; men left home after selling their small farms to work in the army, women and children became homeless migrants, headed towards Calcutta to find relief where many people like them were waiting to share the same destiny which was to die starving. Estimated number of distressed people who flocked to Calcutta from the villages was ranging from 100,000 to 150,000.[11] Let us also take the example of China where waves of migration have happened throughout history. The mass emigration occurred from the 19th century to 1949 was mainly caused by war and starvation in mainland China. Most emigrants are an illiterate peasant, who migrated to places such as America, Australia, South Africa, Southeast Asia, and New Zealand. Nonetheless, during the Great Chinese Famine of 1958-1961 the organised system of village migration and collective begging took place which was clearly distinguished in law and popular tolerance from ordinary (criminal) vagabondage[12]wherein the Irish Potato Famine country had fell by 20%-25% due to mortality and emigration and a permanent change in the country's demographic, cultural and political landscape occurred.

Return of Famines

By the early 2000s scholars of famines used to think that their research area was fast becoming confined to history but during 2016-17 famine made a comeback in Yemen and UN warned that it could be worse famine in 100 years if the airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition are not halted. Yemen has been facing a bloody for three years after the Houthi rebels, backed by Iran captured much of the country including Sana'a, the capital. And the Saudi-led coalition with the help of internationally recognised governments has been fighting the rebels from 2015 resulted in the killing of more than 10,000 people and million displaced. Since June 2018 more than 170 people have been killed and at least 1,700 have been injured in Hodeidah province, with more than 425,000 people forced to flee their home. Many people are having to skip meals, beg on the streets and in meantime, the country's currency has collapsed and food price has doubled, fuelling the threat of famine.[13]

Many analysts attributed the 2011 famine in Somalia, for instance, to the "worst drought in 60 years"[14] rather than to the complex interplay of violent conflict and the blocking of humanitarian access and displacement routes—factors that, when combined with the drought and the extreme destitution of people living in agricultural and agro-pastoral areas of southern

and central Somalia, led to mass starvation. In Somalia, 2011 was the driest year in the decades and the population was hardly able to face it. The drought transformed itself into major food crisis in no time and certain regions of south Somalia faced acute food insecurity so much so that the state of famine was declared in districts of lower Shabelle and Bakool by UN in July of that year. By the beginning of August, the number of people needing urgent food assistance in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda had reached 12.4 million, twice the number of the beginning of the year. The waves of the famine sailed to the other areas of Middle Shabelle, the Afgooye corridor refugee settlement and the internally displaced communities in Mogadishu. The food crisis of Somalia considered by the UN was the most serious Africa had known in the last 20 years.

Somalia, as can be seen, presents the most serious humanitarian situation, as entire areas have only limited humanitarian access while famine levels have developed in certain regions, and one quarter of the country's inhabitants are displaced. Environmental situation in Somalia had a negative effect on the population in the absence of any environmental regulations and disaster management policies. In addition, lack of national government since 1991 with the end of Siad Barre's dictatorship, explains why civilians did not received national support and assistance. All attempts to bring a solution to the policy vacuum and address the lack of administration that Somalia was experiencing were unsuccessful. Another important factor that might explain the Somalian tragedy is the demographic changes that the country has gone through in the past decades coupled with the lack of food production improvements.

If Somalia's population has more than doubled since 1970, the food production has not increased so as to satisfy the rising demand. Somalia attempted to respond to these growing needs situation by implementing development policies to enhance sustainable agriculture, but these policies were impeded by war expenses. Food shortages and the lack of economic opportunities from agriculture greatly increase vulnerabilities. Somali migrants had chosen to move to the urban areas and other countries owing to environmental degradation coupled with famine. Pastoralist communities were the worst affected community which represent more than the half of the Somali population, the consequences of the drought were the incapacity to find pastures to feed their livestock as well the lack of water. This nomadic population has always used short-distance mobility as a coping strategy in the time of crisis but the growing population in rural areas, the competition for land and water, the ecological damage to resources and the restricted mobility across political boundaries have made it harder for them to continue to depend on this as a coping mechanism. Nonetheless, in contemporary time conflict is resisting them from getting access to assistance during the time of food crisis. It will not be an exaggeration to generalise contemporary famines are by and large are the products of conflicts.

Migration to Avoid Seasonal Hunger

In contemporary time, a large number of people around the world especially in the rural areas of the global south are using migration as a strategy to cope with hunger. *The 2018 State and Agriculture* (SOFA) report published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that rural migration plays an important role in both developing and developed countries.[15]In developed regions such as North America and Europe, which have witnessed rural depopulation, outside labour in the form of international migrants constitutes the backbone of agricultural production. However, external agricultural labourers often work in informal settlements and earn less. Rural folks who are mainly dependent on agricultural works and farm chores are migrating internally to diversify the income sources and fencing against income uncertainty which can be the immediate cause for their food insecurity. The immediate cause is in the sense that agriculture is subject to fluctuations in production, income and employment due to climatic factors and its seasonal nature, and typically in rural areas, non-farm employment opportunities are limited.[16] Although agriculture plays an important role in reducing poverty and improving food security (by increased farm productivity and incomes), it alone may be insufficient for resisting seasonal migration. Thus, it has paved the way for the people to take the urban turn. Not only to the urban areas but migration to other well-off rural areas has become a well-accepted strategy in the developing countries.

However, there is also a counter-argument that in the long run rural to urban migration has a negative effect. For instance, loss in human capital and agricultural labour may have negative impacts on crop production and food availability. Agricultural production is critical for achieving food security since close to 99 per cent of food consumed is supplied by agriculture. Agriculture, on the other hand, is already under stress from environmental degradation, climate change, and increasing conversion of land for non-agricultural activities. Furthermore, the shift in population centres arising from migration has accelerated the triple burden of malnutrition—the coexistence of hunger (insufficient caloric intake to meet dietary energy requirements), under nutrition (prolonged inadequate intake of macro- and micronutrients), and over-nutrition in the form of overweight and obesity. It is estimated that by 2050, more than 50 per cent of the Indian population would be residing in urban areas. Globally, just three countries—China, India, and Nigeria—are expected to add 900 million urban residents by 2050. Since migration in India is largely from rural to urban areas, the ways in which we manage the expansion of urban areas in future will be critical for ensuring agricultural growth and global food security.

During the offseason, when their labour is not needed at home and when household food reserves risk becoming depleted, young men and, depending on the cultural group, young women, travel to seek wage employment in regional urban centres or in other rural areas with longer productive seasons. Their departure allows the household to reduce the number of people dependent on stored food, which in some areas may only

last for seven months out of the year and use remitted funds to purchase additional food. The migrants return to the country side when the next crop production season is ready to begin and their labour is once again needed at home. In Ghana, migration (mainly seasonal) to the Brong Ahafo region from the north of the country is a well-established strategy to increase access to fertile land and promote food security. In a survey of 203 migrants from the Dagara region in the north, most respondents stated that they left their homes because of the scarcity of fertile land, low crop yields and food security problems. The survey underlines the high level of distress and urgency as 48 out of the 203 respondents stressed hunger and food scarcity as the main causes of migration. In some others of the countries of global south like in Ethiopia, Mali, India, Senegal and Argentina seasonal or circular migration patterns have been identified as a coping strategy at the end of the growing season.[17]

In Malawi hunger returns every year between April and harvest time in September and the family members or entire family migrates to long distance in search of employment.[18]In some cases the poor individuals are unable to bear the cost of international migration hence they opt for internal migration to other developed areas but the poorest of the poor hesitate to move even internally as they perceive the threat to become more vulnerable and poorer. And, many times the act of migration can be the cause of food insecurity given the high cost involved, adverse travel conditions and lack of economic opportunities. They forced to stay at their home and try to avoid starvation by selling their assets like utensils, cloths, cattle, etc. Much better of households sell their single cow while families having no cows have to sell other small animals like several goats, sheep, chickens for fetching the same amount of money which they might get against a single cow. On the other hand, seasonality is not proved to be bad for everyone. It makes poor people poorer and rich people richer. Because rich ones who lend money to the poor mates also buying their lands, selling them grain, employ them in minimum amount etc. This imbalance in power sometimes reaches to the extreme point like what happened in Ghana in 1998 during the food crisis, some families 'betrothed' daughters as young as twelve to the sons of rich families for an advance bride-price payment. Being too young for marriage, these girls were destined to work in virtual slavery as house-servants for several years.[19]In Nepal, where 10 percent of the households suffer from chronic food insecurity, members of poor rural households have long engaged in seasonal migration to lowland areas and/or to Indian cities during periods of annual food shortage.[20] In many countries of South Asia, a common pattern of rural labour migration involves male outflows while the women stay behind. In turn, this pattern of migration impacts on household gender relations, with implications for food security.

In far west Nepal the village named Maulali is experiencing migration of men for last three generations. Here the case is not avoiding the seasonal starvation rather all the seasons bring the same message. In the village, the migration of adult male members of the family is the livelihood strategy to realize food security. Owing to limited agricultural opportunities and

unproductive agricultural activity rural men has been migrating to India, working as security guards, cooks, drivers while women are staying behind to take of children and homestead. The working conditions of these male migrants in India are undignified and unsafe. In many cases, it has found that remittances are not enough to raise the economic condition of the families and many families have not received remittance for years.[21] Women left behind are overburdened with the tasks of childcare, household responsibility, fieldworks those falls to them in the absence of the male family members. One other malady they are facing, owing to strict gender norms, is to hire other men for the fieldwork like ploughing and oxen. It has another negative effect that of the money sent back to families is very minimal and they have to pay the hired labourers from that money. However, though short-lived the remittances help them to realize food security and achieve minimum basic needs. Founding no other door open they have to satisfy themselves with it. The stories of West Africans and Bangladeshis also tell us that they were primarily driven to migrate due to livelihood constraints and food security. In India, rural-rural migration streams represented 55 per cent of the total migration flows—almost 250 million people—for 2011, according to the Census of India. By comparison, rural to urban migration represented only 20 per cent (90 million people).[22] Often, environmental factors like drought and water scarcity spark migration, like in the case of Anantapur district in Andhra Pradesh. To counter this, trenches, earthen bunds and farm ponds under watershed management have been constructed.

In a recent study, one author has found that the global rush for land sometimes causes food insecurity to the rural people.[23] Millions of Brazilian smallholders have been expelled from their farmland, which has been taken over by vast soya plantations that produce for export. The developers may be national or foreign corporations and individuals. One outcome has been hunger in areas where there used to be little if any hunger even if they were poor: soya has replaced black beans, which were a source of income and food for poor farmers. And many of them have had no option other than to migrate to the slums of large cities. The new hunger is further accentuated by the toxicity that large plantations bring to the surrounding area, making it difficult for the households of plantation workers to use their small plots to grow food.

Conflict, Food Insecurity and Forced Migration

In recent years, protracted conflicts around the world driving the dramatic increase in the number of forcibly displaced people——from 40 million in 2011 to almost 66 million in 2016.[24]Conflicts are often compounded by droughts and other environmental shocks that amplify the magnitude of the negative impacts on rural food security and livelihoods. During the periods of conflicts, hunger may be both the cause and consequence behind forced migration. Take the case of Syria where in 2014 every four in five persons lived in poverty and governorates that witnessed intensive conflict and had higher historical rates of poverty suffered most from poverty. Moreover,

almost two-thirds of the population (64.7 per cent) lived in extreme poverty where they were unable to secure the basic food and non-food items and the desolate ones in the conflict-affected areas severely faced hunger, malnutrition and even starvation in extreme cases.[25]

The relationship between conflict and food security is complex, ambiguous and multidimensional. Conflict limits access to food by destroying agricultural land, market mechanisms, and infrastructure on the one hand and by destroying income opportunities on the other. In addition, during the time of conflict governments diverting more money to the military spending rather focusing on the health, agricultural, education and environmental sectors which has long term negative impact on food security. While economic growth is likely to reduce the occurrence and intensity of armed conflict, economic downfall likely to be caused or increased by the natural disasters. Moreover, food security is one of the main determinants behind the occurrence of armed conflict. Thus, a vicious circle, as shown in figure 1, comes to our mind when we do think of the interrelationship among conflict, food security and forced migration.

Figure 1: The Vicious Cycle of Conflict, Poverty, Food Insecurity and Migration

Source: *AT THE ROOT OF EXODUS:*
Food security, conflict and international migration

The WFP (World Food Programme) study titled *AT THE ROOT OF EXODUS: Food security, conflict and international migration* found that countries with the highest level of food insecurity, coupled with armed conflict, have the highest outward migration of refugees. Additionally, when coupled with poverty, food insecurity increases the likelihood and intensity of armed conflicts; something that has clear implications for refugee outflows. WFP estimates that refugee outflows per 1000 population increase by 0.4 percent for each additional year of conflict, and increase by 1.9 percent for each percentage increase of food insecurity. It also came into light that food insecurity acting as a 'push' factor driving international migration along with other factors like population growth, economic inequality and the existence of established network for migration. Further, owing to lack of income

opportunities in the immediate host economies and costly travel expenses the act of migration can push the people to go food unsecured. That is why only a quarter of Syrians plan to move in neighbouring Turkey where conditions are seen as comparatively favorable. Food insecurity is a consequential factor for migration from Syria and Afghanistan. It is found in the same report that many Afghan and Syrian reported that sustained conflict had destroyed employment opportunities and access to the market, leading to a depletion of assets.

Labour Migration, Remittance and Food Security

Globally transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries or areas of origin has become a growing phenomenon. Food remitting is an important livelihood strategy. Remittances across and within international boundaries are important to food security. Remittances help households to cope with sudden shocks to food security that during a 2008 food price crisis in El Salvador, children living in households receiving remittances from abroad showed less indication of diet-related setbacks in physical development. Labour migration forms a major part of global migration flows, and is used by both urban and rural households in many low-income countries (LICs) as an integrated part of ongoing strategies to maintain food security and enhance the family's collective well-being. So much so that in many parts of the world rural recipients of cash remittances spend a significant proportion of this fund on food rather than farming not to talk of housing, education or health. This undermines the idea that rural areas are agriculturally self-sufficient or have the inherent potential to reach this state with the right dose of 'rural development' and there are also several instances from countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, which show that off-farm income (primarily in the form of cash remittances) improves levels of food security among rural households. However, results vary across the contexts. Guatemalan families reporting remittances tend to spend a lower share of total income on food and other nondurable goods, and more on durable goods, housing, education, and health.[26] But in this paper, the present author wants to show that remittance can be a weapon of arresting food insecurity in many LICs that any external intervention that tends to obstruct its normal functioning should be viewed as having the potential to trigger socioeconomic disruptions and political instability. Such factors include anthropogenic climate change, demographic change, rapid urbanization, growing global demand for food, and state restrictions on mobility.

To understand the intensity of food remittance one has to search for a 'wider lens' on the nature of urban and rural linkages, therefore, needs to move beyond cash-based, market transactions and consider bidirectional flows of goods, including foodstuffs, and their impact on the food security of urban and rural populations. These linkages and the way they are being reconfigured by the rapid urbanisation of the global South require much more attention from researchers and policymakers interested in the transformation of rural-urban linkages and the implications for food security of rural and

urban residents. In the 1990s, Uganda, Tanzania and second-tier cities in Ghana witnessed increased in rural-urban migration as the households struggled with economic crises. In the last decade, inflation, unemployment and lack of housing have led significant numbers of urbanites in Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to migrate to the countryside to pursue subsistence livelihoods.

The notion of a "rural-urban divide" in case of remittance flow is increasingly misleading, and oversimplifies a reality, which is more akin to a complex web of relations and connections incorporating rural and urban dimensions and all that is in between – often termed the 'peri-urban interface'. Bi-directional food remittances are an essential but under-explored component of this 'complex web' that characterises economic and social life across the global South. There is now considerable evidence that urban migrant households rely to varying degrees on an informal, non marketed supply of food from their rural counterpart's to survive in precarious urban environments. The importance of food remittances for poor urban food insecure households was not especially contingent on whether the food was received from rural areas or other urban areas; both were important for recipient households. Though rural-urban food remitting was significant, a study on Zimbabwe and Namibia have found that even more remitting occurred between urban areas. Only a small number received food remittances from both areas.[27]

The Urban Turn: A Solution?

Migrating to urban areas in search for better job opportunities does not always proved to be a good strategy to deal with food insecurity. For instance, among India's informal sector workers, seasonal migrants from rural areas are the most vulnerable ones as there are no protection policies enforced by the state, and are left entirely to the mercy of their labour. Migrants to urban centres face challenges around accessing nutritious food, adequate employment, social protection, housing and, water and sanitation facilities. This poses additional challenges to the government to ensure not only livelihood security for the population but also tackle challenges pertaining to food and nutrition security. The Rangpur region of Bangladesh witnesses seasonal famine popularly known as *Monga*. 57 percent of the households in the districts of this region were living below the poverty line compared to 40 percent in Bangladesh as a whole in 2005. In this province 43 percent of households were in extreme poverty, defined as individuals who cannot meet 2100 calorie food intake even if they spend their whole income to buy food. In addition to the higher level of poverty compared to the rest of Bangladesh, the Rangpur region experiences more pronounced seasonality in income and consumption, with incomes decreasing by 50–60% and total household expenditures dropping by 10–25% during the post-planting and pre-harvest season (September–November) for the Aman harvest, which is the main rice crop in Bangladesh.[28] But inhabitants of these places are less likely to migrate to the urban areas because seasonal migration is an opportunity to earn money for

the capable men, but during Monga, migration opportunities decrease, as the agricultural lean season affects all Bangladesh. The limited work at the migration destinations is mainly given to local labourers. In the major cities the demand for rickshaw pullers, which is an important work of seasonal migrants, remains stable. However, as scarcity affects many people during the Monga season, more people come to the cities like Dhaka to work as a rickshaw puller. According to rickshaw pullers in Dhaka, it becomes difficult to rent a rickshaw and some garages also increase the rent. Their income is substantially lower because there are fewer passengers per rickshaw and competition makes prices decrease. Various types of seasonal migration are done during Monga, but the profit is far lower than in other periods. Studies have also found that there is now considerable evidence that urban migrant households rely to varying degrees on an informal, non-marketed supply of food from their rural counterparts to survive in precarious urban environments.[29]

The Quest for a Durable Policy

While humanitarian aid is essential to prevent short term food crises and famines, a durable solution of the problem requires programs and policies that will address the root causes by providing people with the means to rebuild their livelihoods. Restoring agriculture, food production, and rural livelihoods before, during, and after conflict will be key to building sustainable solutions. Employing the food insecure people in their areas of origin might be a useful weapon to arrest the food insecurity. Another positive impact of this initiative will be that it will also help those people who remain in the villages owing to high travel expenses.

The *Global Hunger Index* 2018 has suggested the following ways of understanding and addressing the issues:

1. HUNGER AND DISPLACEMENT should be recognized and dealt with as political problems.
2. HUMANITARIAN ACTION ALONE is an insufficient response to forced migration, and more holistic approaches involving development support are needed.
3. FOOD-INSECURE displaced people should be supported in their regions of origin.
4. THE PROVISION OF SUPPORT should be based on the resilience of the displaced people themselves, which is never entirely absent.

It also recommends designing policies and programs that recognize the complex interplay between hunger and forced migration as well as the dynamics of displacement. For example, support flexible approaches that allow people to maintain businesses, livelihoods, and socialites in multiple locations. States have to adopt and implement the UN Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), and integrate their commitments into national policy plans.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

A sustainable solution to the issue of migration must focus on fostering rural-urban economic linkages; enhancing and diversifying rural employment opportunities, especially for women and youth; enabling the poor to better manage risks through social protection; and leveraging remittances for investments in the rural sector as viable means for improving livelihoods and alleviating distress- induced migration. Sustainable agriculture and rural development offer us a way to tackle the root causes of migration including poverty, hunger, inequality, unemployment environmental degradation and climate change, which together form a nexus.

Keeping this in mind, FAO has been playing a catalytic role in partnering with international financing institutions and state governments assisting them to design agricultural and rural development projects that brings crucial investment, technologies and knowledge sharing to rural areas of the country. With time, the population that continues to be employed in agriculture will also need to adapt to changing technologies and markets. As has been demonstrated widely, technology can greatly alleviate the hardship of farming, and also help farmers adapt to the demands of the markets.

It is, therefore, necessary to increase incomes of the agriculture workforce and productivity by focusing on the specialization of their skills, both in the production and post-production stages, like storage, packaging and transportation to reduce waste and to enhance food safety. With the hardships that small and marginal farmers have to endure, it is not hard to explain the exodus of a large youth population to the and not carrying on their inherited occupation. Unless the hardship in farming is reduced and issues pertaining to health and nutrition and other social and physical infrastructure are not addressed holistically, migration will occur due to distress and not as a prudent choice. Above all, we have to also realise that hunger and displacement are both political problems and need a strong political will if we want to achieve salvation from these maladies which are haunting the human existences in an over overzealous manner.

Notes

[1]Josue de Castro, *The Geography of Hunger*, USA, Little Brown, 1952. Josue de Castro's ground-breaking ecological work about the political issue of hunger in Brazil.
[2] Report available at https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2018.pdf Last accessed on 15.02.2019
[3]https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/03/465052-un-relief-officials-arrive-south-sudan-amid-alarming-spread-hunger-displacement Last accessed on 15.02.2019
[4] Sen's empirical case studies of four major famines in Great Bengal, Ethiopia, Sahel and Bangladesh challenged our conception that famines are the result of lack of food availability. His argument was that factors leading to widespread famine conditions in these countries extended beyond the lack of food availability and essentially represented entitlement failures, particularly of the vulnerable sub-populations who were least able to acquire food through any means and hence were hardest hit. In fact, Sen termed the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 as boom famine.

[5]https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/09/middleeast/syria-madaya-starvation/index.html   Last accessed on 13.4.2018

[6] Orozco Manuel, Porras Laura, Yansura, Julia, Feb 2016, The Continued Growth of Family Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2015, *THE DIALOUGE: Leadership for the Americas-* retrieved from http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2015-Remittances-to-LAC-2122016.pdf Last accessed on 10.04.2018

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Discursive Bias towards Skilled Migration in Brazil during the Workers Party Administrations: Influence of the Knowledge-Based Economy Paradigm?

By

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Discursive Bias towards Skilled Migration in Brazil during the Workers Party Administrations

By 2015, Brazil was home to 2 million foreigners, among migrants, refugees and asylum seekers – that meaning less than 1% of its population. Despite its reputation as an immigration country, its favourable demographic conditions and the window opportunity resulting from demographic transition, Brazilian migration policies remain quite restrictive and selective, favouring, in a concealed way, the entry of skilled and highly skilled migrant[1].Unlike the policies of many developed countries, differentiation mechanisms linked to human capital are not made explicit in the Brazilian regulatory framework. Nevertheless, the language of skills became more and more popular in the country during the administrations of the Workers Party (PT*, acronym for Partido dos Trabalhadores*) and the discursive bias towards highly skilled migration can be easily traced within the migratory debate[2].

During this period the bias towards skilled migration in Brazil was reflected in a range of public and private-public initiatives aimed at discussing the migration-development nexus as well as ways to modernize existing policies to facilitate the recruitment of migrants with specific professional backgrounds, mostly linked to IT and science. In 2012, the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE)[3], created by former president Lula da Silva in 2008, got actively involved in the national debate on migration reform by hiring specialists to research on migration policies as well as by promoting meetings

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and seminars with relevant stakeholders, often representatives of the migration industry in the country (recruiting agencies, employers, chambers of commerce and industry, etc.). One article published by SAE, and titled *Migration Policy, Production and Development*, states that the Secretariat "is working in three fronts to find solutions to expedite the attraction of foreign talents to the national market: diagnostic of the migratory scenario; surveys with enterprises and society; and suggestions for a migratory policy reform"[4]. In addition, a Working Group was also created by SAE to contribute to the studies of the Secretariat aimed at improving the national immigration policy (Juzwiak, 2014) and to ease the recruitment of high-skilled migrants. A news article, published by *The Rio Times*, says that "If recommendations from a presidential advisory group are followed, highly-qualified foreign workers could be given VIP visa treatment [in Brazil]", just to quote the former Under Secretary of SAE, Ricardo Paes de Barros, right after: "Brazil is now an island of prosperity in the world and a lot of top-quality people want to come. But the line for visas is the same for everyone. We're not looking at people closely enough to see who will bring in the skills [needed]"[5].To the *Miami Herald*, Ricardo Paes de Barros was even more assertive: "We're not after population; we're after talent and human capital. By opening society, we can accelerate the development process"[6]. On his turn, the SAE Secretary, Marcelo Neri, stated in January 2014: "We have an agenda for the attraction of talents, which imply improving migration rules to Brazil. There are several areas where it is needed. We are preparing a transversal law[7] (…) for engineers, doctors, the technology sector"[8].

Throughout the years, other governmental departments and institutions also engaged in events to discuss (skilled) migration in the country. Only in 2015, the Chamber of Deputies (Brazil's lower chamber) created a Special Commission to discuss the migratory reform in the country[9]; in September promoted a Public Hearing to discuss migration with faith-based stakeholders[10]; in October promoted the seminar "*Novos Fluxos de Trabalhadores Migrantes para o Brasil - Desafios para Políticas Públicas*"[11]. In 2014, The Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) fostered a debate on skilled migration to Brazil[12] and the Brazil-Germany Chamber promoted a seminar to discuss the same topic[13].

At the more visible end of this preference system towards skilled inflows we find the labour migration policies put forward by the National Immigration Council (CNIg)[14]. Currently there are only few entrance channels for labour migrants in Brazil: if the person is a national from a Mercosur country she can work and reside in Brazil directly; if she is an extra-regional she will need a work permit as to get a temporary or permanent visa prior to her entrance into the territory. A temporary visa might be awarded to a variety of professionals coming to develop a temporary activity in the country, such as scientists, researchers, teachers, technicians, sportsperson on, or employees of multinationals.[15]On the other hand, a permanent visa is usually granted to directors, high-level managers, investors (who invest US$ 50.000 for a person

or US$ 200.000 for an enterprise), and researchers whose activities in the country might last more than two years.

A quick look into the data made available by CNIG (OBMIGRA, 2015) reveals the profile of those who were granted work permits in Brazil in 2015: from a total of 18.213 temporary and permanent permits issued during the first semester of 2015, 16.074 were to male and 2.139 to female. Regarding the educational profile, 6.493 had secondary education, 10.434 had a bachelor's degree, and 921 owned a master and 100 a PHD. Most of them worked in the fields of science, arts or were technicians. The 10 main countries of origin were United States (2.539 permits, mainly for persons involved in events/arts); Philippines (1.564, mainly to persons working in boats/ships); South Korea (1.227); UK (1.231); Italy (880) and France (751), India (812); Russia (642); Portugal (667); Japan (590).

But if we only look to the data provided by CNIG we might get the wrong picture of the migratory profile in Brazil back then. This is so because these data captured mainly the movement of skilled migrants[16], having left outside all nationals from Mercosur who doesn't need a work permit and from other bordering countries (Bolivia and Peru) who often are low-skilled migrants. In addition, the data also didn't reflect the inflow of Haitian nationals who were initially granted temporary residence under humanitarian considerations, most of whom would have not qualified as labour migrants neither as refugees according to the existing legal framework.

On its turn, the data provided by the Federal Police gives us a better understanding of the diversity of the Brazilian migratory context until 2015[17]. From 2000 to 2014, the Federal Police registered 833.682 permanent migrants, 485.238 temporary migrants and 14.510 migrants with provisory status[18]. Graph 1 and Figure 1 show the variation of immigration in Brazil between the first decades of the twenty-first century. Among the permanents, the main nationalities were Bolivians, Chinese, Portuguese, Haitians and Italians. Regarding the group with a temporary status, most were Americans, Bolivians, Argentineans, Colombians, Philippines and Germans. Among the provisory, most were Bolivian, Chinese, Paraguayan and Peruvian.

Moreover, the Tables 1 and 2 show that the regions that most sent migrants and refugees (asylum seekers as well as) to Brazil in a proportional way, were Central America and Africa during the Lula's government and the Caribbean and Latin America during the Dilma Rousseff's administration. For example, the Caribbean migration to Brazil increased 2252. 07% between 2011 and 2016, while the European one decreased 5.38%.

Hence, one could note that discourses on migration issued by governmental representatives linked to the Presidency and the Ministry of Labourin the period analysed didn't seem in tune with the existing migratory scenario, as a growing share of migrants were arriving from developing countries and didn't meet the criteria for receiving a working permit or even entering the country regularly. Moreover, these discourses seemed greatly disconnected from the productive structure of the Brazilian economy and its insertion in the international division of labour, still heavily dependent on the

production and export of primary products, natural resources and commodities (Naidin & Ramon, 2014).

As a matter of fact, is intriguing to observe the similarities between the Brazilian migratory frameworks with the ones of developed nations. It is indeed worth questioning how Brazil and Sweden, so distinct in terms of development, demography and market dynamics, might share similar policies regarding the entrance of labour migrants or how discourses from governmental authorities in Brazil might be so like those of their counterparts in the UK. As discussed by Anderson (2010) and Kofman (2007), restrictiveness and selectivity are defining features of most migration policies in Europe. For instance, classification and differentiation in order to select "the best and the brightest" have been openly and strongly pursued in the UK.

> Immigration policies must promote British interests. Like other developed states, the UK competes for the skilled, especially those connected with the driving force of globalization (i.e. the scientific, financial and managerial sectors, which has clear resonances with much thinking about the knowledge economy). (Kofman, 2007:130)

In Brazil, the words of the former President of CNIg are very representative of the bias towards skilled migration:

> (…) it's legitimate for the country to seek to promote migration, those flows that result more interesting for the country. I'm not saying we will not give documents to certain migrants because they don't have professional qualifications. If they are here, they are working and living normally, documents should be provided, that's one thing. Another thing is when you go abroad and recruit people to live here, and I think this is a process that places Brazilian the competition for talent, for people who have some expertise and who can make the difference to our country. (Paulo Sérgio Almeida. IN: OBMIGRA, V.1 N.1 2015)

According to Patarra (2011) the growing insertion of Brazil into the global economy in the first decades of the twenty-first century increased the need of skilled labour, generating a gap that could not yet be filled by the domestic market. On her view "there is clear evidence of the official interest of the government in the so-called qualified migration', meaning the displacement of people with complete and incomplete higher education. Currently, this modality of migration has been recurrent due to the needs imposed by an increasingly globalized labour market" (Patarra, 2011:374). In reference to Baeninger's (2010), Patarra says that there is empirical evidence indicating the insertion of the Brazilian economy in the international market due to its economic and technological development, which would justify the importance of designing public policies to supply the demand for skilled labour."However, in 2014 SAE's Secretary, Marcelo Neri, admitted that although the Brazilian economy had a very low unemployment rate (4.6%) that was true mostly for low-skilled sectors, which could be working as a pull factor for low-skilled migrants, mainly Haitians[19].

On its turn, when analysing the increase of recent inflows towards Brazil Uebel (2018) called these migratory movements as *perspective migrations*, as they were closely related to labour and economic perspectives associated to the country's economic growth, low unemployment rate and economic crisis in core countries. In this sense, they were not exactly reflecting market demands for skilled labour but a combination of factors that created a phenomenon known as the "Brazilian dream", which attracted migrants from all over the world.

For Uebel (2018), *perspective migrations* are connected to Sassen's (2007) linkages, which associate the subjective demands of the receiving country and the supply of available migrant labour worldwide. These linkages are sustained by the type of insertion of the hosting country in the countries and regions of origin of the migrants. Hence, it's not possible to infer that the influx from certain countries or regions carries an objective correlation with the subjective/discursive demands voiced by the hosting country. As the Brazilian case shows, the arrival of migrants from West Africa and Latin America in the past decade is much related to the growing insertion of Brazil in the region through south-south cooperation schemes and participation in Peace Keeping missions, such as Minustah in Haiti.

Figures 2 and 3 shows the evolution of inflows to Brazil according to the country of origin of migrants and refugees and indicate that the main regions of origin were Latin America, the Caribbean and the West Africa, as well as Western Europe - a traditional region of origin of immigrants in Brazil.

Worth mentioning is the analysis made by Tadeu Oliveira in his article *International Migration and Migratory Policies in Brazil.* Oliveira points out that the history of Brazilian migratory policies, dating from the eighteenth century to the present, is marked by "a lack of adequate planning and by mistaken readings of the objective conditions in each of the moments in which they were being applied, reason why they did not achieve the desired success, besides the fact of being based on strong racist content and highly selective and assimilationist character" (2015:21). As it happens, Brazil has a long history of combining a utilitarian and racialized approach to migration with projected economic development. This well documented fact is exemplified in Brazilian public policies from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that promoted settler colonialism by granting land to European migrants. Back then governments argued that this would be beneficial for "technological and economic progress" (Rodriguez, 2018).

The bottom-line is that by adopting a similar regulatory framework and reproducing an analogous discourse to those of developed nations, Brazilian policies restrict regular entry channels to skilled and highly-skilled migrants and force an important group of unprofitable migrants to resort to unsafe routes, perils journeys, irregular entry or stay. But as much as some stakeholders in Brazil would like to limit immigration to highly skilled people and as much as we can see an increase in the educational profile of recent arrivals (OBMIGRA, V.1 N.2, 2015), low skilled migrants will continue to come to Brazil as a consequence of different factors, some of them linked to the inherent dynamic of migrations (e.g. chain migration and network,

migrant's agency, migration lifecycle, migration industry), some linked to the restrictiveness of migration and asylum policies and the recovery of economy in developed countries and others reflecting the nature of the current insertion of Brazil in the global economy[20].

Workers Party (PT) Administrations and the Repositioning of Brazil in the Global Order

The aforementioned efforts put in place by top-rank officials as to promote high-skilled migration to Brazil are better understood if proper attention is given to how PT administrations strategically sought to reposition Brazil in the Global Order and to change the country's insertion in the international division of labour. Country Plans developed by the SAE during Lula's first and second mandate reveal expectations of how state planning and state led capitalism could bring the country to a new position by 2020.

SAE, a sort of Think Tank, gathered the country's most pre-eminent military, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and head of national research centres. In addition to publishing periodic strategic country plans, it produced analyses on several issues as to inform high-rank officials and influence long-term decisions – topics of interest ranging from nanotechnology and bio fuels, climate change topological reform and migrations. In 2005, the first long term country plan was issued – *Project Brazil 3 phases: 2007, 2015, 2022* – revealing the State's will to change the "historical destiny of Brazil" (Zibechi, 2014). Differently from former country plans, *Project Brazil 3 Phases* for the first time defined that *knowledge* would be the main axe of all future strategic development actions, not infra-structure for heavy industry like in the past[21]. In order to become a major global power Brazil should increase its competitiveness in the global market through direct State agency – basically by providing support to Brazilian's largest companies so they could compete with multinationals and occupy sectors of the international market usually reserved to companies from developed countries.

The second national long-term plan launched by SAE in 2010, *Brazil 2022* shed light, mainly, in the power gap existing between core and peripheral countries. Mirroring the Chinese process, state planning would be responsible for preventing Brazil from becoming "a mere production and export platform for the mega-multinationals located in developed countries" (Zibechi, 2014).State officials were sure that for Brazil to fulfil its potential the country should be able to expand its internal market and productivity in order to allow capital accumulation per capita and technological development. Among the long-term economic goals indicated by *Brazil 2022*were:

- Increase agricultural productivity by 50%.
- Triple investment in agricultural research.
- Double food production.
- Increase the volume of exports fivefold and increase investment in media and high technology.

- Increase private investment in research and development; increase total spending on research to 2.5% of GDP; achieve 5% of global scientific production.
- Triple the number of engineers.
- Dominate microelectronic technologies and pharmaceutical production.
- Increase the number of patents tenfold.
- Ensure independence in the production of nuclear fuel.
- Dominate satellite manufacturing technologies and launch vehicles.

In a nutshell, the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff were deliberately trying to reposition the country in the International Division of Labour by changing its historical tradition of relying on the exportation of commodities and natural resources. The official promotion of high skilled migration by state officers would go hand in hand with these long-term goals.

As a matter fact, according to the literature on migration studies (Sassen, 2007), governmental promotion of subsidized immigration has become part of a progressive global logic of integration of nations and people through the globalization of human capital. Regardless of its historical criticism of the financial and political costs of the neoliberal agenda, the PT wanted Brazil to participate of the International Systems a global power. Actually, Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lula, spoke of *positioning* the country in the international arena (Amorin, 2017).

Therefore, considering PT's past connection with leftist and anti-imperialist thinking, we believe is all more interesting and pertinent to investigate how come this Party came to adhere to discourses and promote policies produced and circulated by the Global North.

Knowledge-Based Economy Paradigm and its Impact on Migration Policies

Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) theoretical and policy paradigms[22],are relevant for our discussion both because, as a hegemonic ideology, it influences our lives in so many ways (Wodak & Meyer, 2009) and because it helps us trace back the nexus between the language of skills, economic development and migration. Actually, "analysing, understanding and explaining the impact of the Knowledge-Based Economy on various domains of our societies;[and] the recontextualization of KBE into other parts of the world and other societies" has already been indicated as an important contemporary research agenda (Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Muntigl et al, 2000; Jessop, 2008). Representing a successful economic imaginary[23], the KBE paradigm has performative and constitutive force (Jessop, 2008).

As conceptualized back in the 60s by the creator of the "knowledge economy", Fritz Machlup, *knowledge* referred to "any human (or human-induced) activity effectively designed to create, alter or confirm in a human mind – one's own or anyone else's – a meaningful apperception, awareness, cognizance or consciousness (1962:30)." Acknowledging the subjective

dimensions of knowledge, the author classified five types of knowledge: practical, intellectual, pastime knowledge, spiritual and unwanted/accidently acquired knowledge. As one can note, Machlup understanding of knowledge was not necessarily linked to formal qualifications as it is today.

However, in the makings of becoming a policy paradigm the concept of knowledge-economy was taken over and further developed through the lenses of neoliberal globalization, being eventually popularized in a much narrower sense. A business and management consultant, Peter Drucker brought significant change to the studies of KBE with his book *The Age of Discontinuity* (1969) and was the one responsible to popularize the term "knowledge Economy", reflecting on the use of knowledge to produce innovation. On the other hand, the sociologist Daniel Bell with his book *The Coming of Post Industrial Society* (1973) brought into the debate the concept of "information society", which despite being developed within a different discipline in relation to the concept of knowledge-economy, it fed greatly the debate on the role of knowledge in economic growth and development. In 1992, Drucker argued that:

> [In the knowledge] society, knowledge is the primary resource for individuals and for the economy overall. Land, labour, and capital—the economist's traditional factors of production—do not disappear, but they become secondary. They can be obtained and obtained easily, provided there is [specialized] knowledge.[24]

The parallel development of the notion of "human capital" at that time, with the publication of *Human Capital* (1964) by Gary Becker, provided extra fuel to the emerging nexus between knowledge/productivity and economic development. This intangible form of capital is defined as the result of investments in education, training and health and can result from any activity able to increase individual worker productivity. Eventually the notions of human capital and knowledge economy and society were linked to one another, as the following extract from Becker's text illustrates.

> The continuing growth in per capita incomes of many countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is partly due to the expansion of scientific and technical knowledge that raises the productivity of labour and other inputs in production. And the increasing reliance of industry on sophisticated knowledge greatly enhances the value of education, technical schooling, on-the-job training, and other human capital.[25]

As crucial intermediaries[26]in mobilizing support to the KBE paradigm, multilateral forums and international institutions have contributed to narrowing the definition of knowledge economy that is now affecting migration policies of developed and developing countries. As a matter of fact, several authors (Godin, 2006: 17-18; cf. Miettinen 2002, Eklund 2007; In: Jossep et al, 2008) state that the resurgence of the concept of KBE in the 1990s is owed greatly to the OECD, the reports it has published and the

consultants it has given voice to. In 1996, OECD published a key report called "The Knowledge-Based Economy", which stated that:

> Government policies will need more stress on upgrading human capital through promoting access to a range of skills, and especially the capacity to learn; enhancing the *knowledge distribution power* of the economy through collaborative networks and the diffusion of technology; and providing the enabling conditions for organisational change at the firm level to maximise the benefits of technology for productivity. (1996:7)

If originally the notion of knowledge-economy had a more speculative dimension regarding the future of national economies, nowadays it has acquired a "*quasi-prescriptive benchmarking*" of the central features of existing economies, such as: reflexive application of knowledge to the production of knowledge, the key role of innovation, learning, and knowledge transfer in economic performance (Jessop, 2008). It became the recipe of a desirable and unavoidable path towards development, becoming "the hegemonic representation or self-description of the economy as an emerging reality, an object of calculation, and object of governance in contemporary world society. But this does not mean that it adequately describes the dynamics of today's world market or the role of knowledge in world society" (Jessop, 2008).

Consequently, the emerging KBE paradigm allocated a decreasing role to low skilled labour based on the (unfounded) belief that manual and non-knowledge-based labour would disappear in developed societies (Kofman, 2007). Historically, differentiation mechanisms based on the human capital of migrants were found in the end of the Fordist system. After a period in the 60s and 70s of intense use of Temporary Migration Programmes (TMPs) to recruit low-skilled migrants, western countries started to focus on the need to facilitate the flow of high-skilled people that would bring in money, investments and specialized knowledge without any negative impact for the economies of receiving countries -market needs related to intense or non-knowledge labour would be outsourced. Defying expectations, though, we later saw that low-skilled workers continued to be needed in western countries to perform activities that could no longer be fulfilled domestically, both due to the aging of the population resulting from demographic transition and to the expectations of nationals to perform more skilled jobs resulting from higher educational achievements. In addition, low skilled workers remained necessary to fill in jobs created to serve the needs of the elite (Castles, 2015; Sassen, 2001; 2013).

But despite the evidence, regimes of labour migration still reflect nowadays the imaginary of national economies where low-skilled migrants are neither needed nor welcome. Gasper and Truong (2010) remind us that human movement for labour purposes (at all skills levels) is currently understood as a category of trade regulated by WTO-GATS Mode 4, although governments have committed only to the regulation of highly skilled movements in specific sectors of the economy.

What we can see is that existing regulatory migration regimes fostered by the KBE paradigm seem to promote the archetype of the "Davos Man" and favour a "male-dominated corporate sphere of work" (Beneria, 1999. In: Gasper & Truong, 2010). It shows a complete disconnection with the reality of billions of people who live in deprivation and will probably never relate to this mainstreamed imaginary. For Kofman (2007)the way in which the discourse on KBE has restricted the notion of knowledge to science and technology is due to a particular and optimistic understanding of globalization that saw in the fast circulation of knowledge the opportunity for social transformation.

> Most of the immigration receiving states have discussed at great length the knowledge economy, how to expand it and use resources such as migrants to do so. Countries such as Australia and Canada have, since the 1990s, oriented their immigration policies towards skilled migrants. In Europe, the UK has pursued this strategy even further by privileging the globalized financial and information technology and communications (ITC) sectors. (Kofman, 2007:122)

The transposition of this specific understanding of knowledge to migration policies is currently reflected in the utilitarian differentiation of migrants' skills, as the quantification and economization of knowledge can be applied to rank not only institutions but also individuals. As a result, people and things that do not favour the technologically driven growth of national economies should not be allowed to enter 1 its territory. And if allowed, they shouldn't benefit from the same rights of those who fit in the imaginary of the KBE. In this sense, migrants possess different types of human capital and are therefore entitle to different rights, according to the profitability of their skills (Kofman 2007). Therefore, defining the skills that matter is a living exercise that reflects global and local material and discursive struggles, priorities and dynamics.

Conclusion

The existence of a discursive bias that sought to promote high-skilled migration to Brazil during the administrations of the left-wing Workers Party (PT) was the point of departure of this paper. Intertwined with this discursive bias was the deliberate attempt by the Governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff to develop specific sectors of the Brazilian economy (mainly linked to knowledge and technology) in order to reposition the country in the International Division of Labour, preventing it from perpetuating its traditional course of relying mainly on the export of primary products, natural resources and commodities to developed economies. Country Plans developed by the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (linked to the Presidency) during Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff's administration revealed expectations of how state planning and state led capitalism could bring the country to this new position by 2020. So, the official promotion of high

skilled migration by state officers would go hand in hand with these long-term goals.

We saw, however, that these discourses were disconnected not only from the productive structure of the Brazilian economy at the time (and in the medium run) but also from the migratory reality that emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This scenario was marked by a sharp increase on the arrival of both skilled migrants from developed countries – who were escaping from the 2008 global economic crisis – but also of unskilled migrants from the global south. If nationals from Mercosur countries were better off when it comes to ease of mobility and access to rights, an important part of migrants from Central America, Africa, Asia and Oceania didn't have the same chance. Brazilian visa policies limited regular entry channels to skilled and high-skilled migrants and forced an important group of unprofitable migrants to resort to unsafe routes, perils journeys, irregular entry or stay.

The analytical nexus between the concepts of development-knowledge-skills-migration was accessed through the lenses of the *Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) Paradigm*, which has been fed by an optimistic view of neoliberal globalization. If originally the notion of *knowledge-economy* had a more speculative dimension regarding the future of national economies, nowadays it has acquired a *"quasi-prescriptive benchmarking"* of the central features of existing economies, such as: reflexive application of knowledge to the production of knowledge, the key role of innovation, learning, and knowledge transfer in economic performance (Jessop, 2008).International Organizations, Development Agencies, private actors, civil society, Universities, governmental initiatives and speeches are all vectors of circulation of ideas, concepts and paradigms created in the Political North and implemented at the local level at peripheral countries.

The extent that the economic imaginary promoted by the KBE Paradigm is related to restrictive policies towards low-skilled migrants remain under investigated in Brazil and elsewhere. How a left-wing party historically associated with the promotion of social justice in Brazil adhered to discourses and policies that promote the archetype of the "Davos Man" (Gasper & Truong, 2010) and favour a "male-dominated corporate sphere of work" calls for a more comprehensive analysis that surpasses the scope of this paper. Finally, a more in-depth investigation on the subjects discussed here should also pay further attention to: the plurality of voices and power struggles within the Brazilian government and civil society in order to influence the migratory debate; potential ambiguities between discourse and practice during both Lula and Dilma's administrations on the topics of migration, development, social justice and human rights; the idiosyncrasies of each administration (Lula vs Dilma) on the migration subject; and to how the new Migration Bill approved in 2017 is being implemented and its impact on actual visa policies.

ANNEX - Evolution of the Migratory Scenario in Brazil in the First Decades of the Twenty-First Century

Graph 1 - Evolution of Annual Immigration to Brazil - 2002 to 2017

Source: Uebel (2018)

Figure 1 - Map of Variation of the Number of Immigrants by Country (2000-2010)

Source: Uebel; Iescheck (2014).

Figure 2 - Map of the Stock of Immigrants in Brazil According to their Country of Origin–2003-2010 (Lula da Silva's Government)

Source: Uebel (2018)

Table 1 – Immigration in Brazil according to Region of Origin during Lula's Government

Region/Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Growth 2010/ 2003
Central America	204	174	260	239	287	326	487	533	161,27%
Africa	955	1.161	1.562	1.681	1.710	2.002	4.276	2.492	160,94%
Asia	3.962	4.078	5.120	5.819	6.010	7.258	15.733	9.735	145,71%
South America	6.608	6.106	7.831	17.070	12.632	10.514	32.153	15.961	141,54%
Latin America + Mexico	7.621	7.300	9.111	18.471	14.152	12.275	34.543	18.196	138,76%
Europe	8.744	9.892	11.771	12.157	12.290	12.900	17.746	17.191	96,60%
Caribbean	366	389	391	442	443	493	822	625	70,77%
North America	4.589	4.857	5.265	4.842	4.841	5.526	6.320	6.509	41,84%
Oceania	231	171	247	278	258	290	370	256	10,82%

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the Federal Police of Brazil

**Table 2 – Immigration in Brazil according to Region of Origin during
Dilma Rousseff's Government**

Origin/Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Growth 2011/2016
Caribbean	1.062	5.027	11.795	18.389	21.537	24.979	2252,07%
Latin America + Mexico	31.966	47.576	71.585	84.510	78.995	59.662	86,64%
South America	28.519	39.513	57.065	63.433	55.276	32.646	14,47%
Africa	2.743	3.423	3.377	5.226	3.960	3.121	13,78%
Europe	22.084	26.941	29.106	30.735	24.662	20.896	-5,38%
Asia	13.394	17.460	16.468	19.348	15.046	12.567	-6,17%
Oceania	378	347	335	367	347	324	-14,29%
North America	7.840	8.530	8.083	8.247	6.708	5.926	-24,41%
Central America	845	1.116	817	750	527	586	-30,65%

Source: Elaborated by the authors with data from the Federal Police of Brazil

**Figure 3 - Map of the Stock of Immigrants in Brazil according to their
Country of Origin – 2011-2016 (Dilma Rousseff's government)**

Source: Uebel (2018)

In Lieu of a Conclusion

A sustainable solution to the issue of migration must focus on fostering rural-urban economic linkages; enhancing and diversifying rural employment opportunities, especially for women and youth; enabling the poor to better manage risks through social protection; and leveraging remittances for investments in the rural sector as viable means for improving livelihoods and alleviating distress- induced migration. Sustainable agriculture and rural development offer us a way to tackle the root causes of migration including poverty, hunger, inequality, unemployment environmental degradation and climate change, which together form a nexus.

Keeping this in mind, FAO has been playing a catalytic role in partnering with international financing institutions and state governments assisting them to design agricultural and rural development projects that brings crucial investment, technologies and knowledge sharing to rural areas of the country. With time, the population that continues to be employed in agriculture will also need to adapt to changing technologies and markets. As has been demonstrated widely, technology can greatly alleviate the hardship of farming, and also help farmers adapt to the demands of the markets.

It is, therefore, necessary to increase incomes of the agriculture workforce and productivity by focusing on the specialization of their skills, both in the production and post-production stages, like storage, packaging and transportation to reduce waste and to enhance food safety. With the hardships that small and marginal farmers have to endure, it is not hard to explain the exodus of a large youth population to the and not carrying on their inherited occupation. Unless the hardship in farming is reduced and issues pertaining to health and nutrition and other social and physical infrastructure are not addressed holistically, migration will occur due to distress and not as a prudent choice. Above all, we have to also realise that hunger and displacement are both political problems and need a strong political will if we want to achieve salvation from these maladies which are haunting the human existences in an over overzealous manner.

Notes

[1]Even though there isn't an internationally agreed definition of the term 'low-skilled', we will adopt here the definition of low-skilled migrant as someone whose educational level is lower than upper secondary. "The definition of "low-skilled" can be based either on the skills required for the job performed, or according to the educational level of the worker. In other words, "low-skilled" can be either a characteristic of the job or a characteristic of the worker." (OECD 2008).

[2]It's important to mention beforehand that the migratory debate in Brazil is marked by a plurality of views voiced by different stakeholders from the government, civil society and business groups. In the past decade or so, the debate was intensified by the revision of the former Foreigners Act2, and even within the government the topic did not inspire consensus as specific actors lobbied for different approaches (e.g. the Ministry of Justice advocated for a more human-rights based framework while the Ministry of Labour and the Presidency were in tune with a more economy-driven

point view. The Armed Forces has historically seen immigration as a potential threat to national sovereignty and the Federal Police has traditionally requested greater migratory control while seeing itself as migratory authority of the country).

[3]Lula created the Strategic Affairs Centre (NAE) in 2005, which in 2008 became the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE). This Think Thank gathered the country's most preeminent intellectuals, entrepreneurs, military and head of national research centres. SAE became the most important branch of the government during Lula's term.

[4]*Política Migratória, Produção e Desenvolvimento.* (http://bit.ly/1npUCpC)

[5]*Brazil work visas for foreigner professionals.* (http://bit.ly/1SLEo7t)

[6]*Brazil looks for ways to attract more immigrants.* (http://abcn.ws/1ROKNP3)

[7] Neri was referring to the efforts at that time put in place by different actors within Brazil to draft a new Migration Bill that would replace the one inherited from the dictatorship. The new Bill was finally approved in 2017 and was the result of complex multi-level debates and negotiations involving government, civil society, congress representatives and international organizations. Although it brought into life a more modern and human-rights driven legal framework for the protection of migrants, there were several setbacks and restrictions made to the original proposal. Of special relevance for this paper, is the fact that the article that sought to foster de entrance of high-skilled migrants in Brazil was finally not accepted.

[8]EL UNIVERSAL. *En Brasil cambiarán ley migratoria para impulsar ingreso de profesionales,* 16 Jan. 2014. Disponível em:

<http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/140116/en-brasil-cambiaran-ley-migratoria-para-impulsar-ingreso-de-profesiona>.

[9]http://bit.ly/1QukoD3

[10]http://bit.ly/1KcxkOv

[11]http://bit.ly/1JHnAvN

[12]http://bit.ly/1VtX3Tl

[13]http://bit.ly/1TpkG0F

[14] The National Immigration Council (CNIg) is linked to Ministry of Labour and is responsible for the formulation of migration policies through the regulation of migratory issues and the promulgation of Normative Resolutions (RNs). Its administrative branch, the CGI (*Cordenação Geral de Imigração*), is responsible for the issuance of work-permits for labour migrants.

[15] For the full list of categories, please visit: http://moscou.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/vistos_para_o_brasil.xml

[16]*94,6% Dos Vistos de Trabalho Concedidos no Brasil são para Estrangeiros Qualificados (http://bit.ly/1OZBXbo)*

[17] Information made available during the Seminar "New Flow of Labour Migrants to Brazil: challenges for public policies", which took place on 22/10/2015 at the Brazilian Lower Chamber. The video is available at: http://bit.ly/1NVMNSO

[18] Migrants who had irregular status and are now processing permanent residence.

[19]EL UNIVERSAL. *En Brasil cambiarán ley migratoria para impulsar ingreso de profesionales,* 16 Jan. 2014. Disponível em:

<http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/140116/en-brasil-cambiaran-ley-migratoria-para-impulsar-ingreso-de-profesiona>.

[20] As mentioned by Melde et al (2014:8)" mobility among countries in the South is likely to continue to increase, as the barriers to immigration in the North are raised higher and many countries part of the South represent emerging economies with greater job and employment opportunities (such as BRICS). [And] new migration

corridors have opened in the South-South context such as West Africans crossing the Atlantic to Argentina or Brazil".

[21] Verbete: Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos. Fundação Getúlio Vargas http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-tematico/secretaria-de-assuntos-estrategicos-da-presidencia-da-republica

[22] For the purpose of this paper we acknowledge the difference between theoretical and policy paradigms, as "policy paradigms derive from theoretical paradigms but possess much less sophisticated and rigorous evaluations of the intellectual underpinnings of their conceptual frameworks. Policy advisers differentiate policy paradigms from theoretical paradigms by screening out the ambiguities and blurring the fine distinctions characteristic of theoretical paradigms. In a Lakatosian sense, policy paradigms can be likened to the positive heuristics surrounding theoretical paradigms. (Wallies and Dollery, 1999: 5. In: Jessop et al, 2008). In the case of the KBE, "theoretical and policy paradigms tend to reinforce each other because theoretically-justified policy paradigms are widely adopted and, more importantly, acquire a performative and constitutive character, then the relevant economic imaginary will be retained through normalisation and institutionalization" (Jessop et al, 2008).

[23] In their studies of Cultural Political Economy (CPE), Jessop (2008) explain the concept and construction processes of economic imaginaries, which reflect discursive and material biases of specific epistemes and economic paradigms. In their analysis of political economy, they make a distinction between "(…) the 'actually existing economy' as the chaotic sum of all economic activities (broadly defined as concerned with the social appropriation and transformation of nature for the purposes of material provisioning) [and] the 'economy' (or, better, 'economies' in the plural) as an imaginatively narrated, more or less coherent subset of these activities. The totality of economic activities is so unstructured and complex that it cannot be an object of calculation, management, governance, or guidance. Instead such practices are always oriented to subsets of economic relations (economic systems or subsystems) that have been discursively and, perhaps organizationally and institutionally, fixed as objects of intervention. This involves 'economic imaginaries' that rely on semiosis to constitute these subsets. Moreover, if they are to prove more than 'arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed' (Gramsci 1971: 376-7), these imaginaries must have some significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to real material interdependencies in the actually existing economy and/or in relations between economic and extra-economic activities".

[24] *The New Society of Organizations, (http://bit.ly/20uu1WW).*

[25] *Human Capital Theory.* http://bit.ly/1nAwQrI

[26] Other relevant intermediaries involved in the process of legitimizing a given economic imaginary are political parties, think tanks, organized stakeholders such as trade unions, employers' associations, social movements and the mass media.

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The Idea of *Protection:* Norms and Practice of Refugee Management in India

By

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Introduction

The recent debates on citizenship note its multiple characters due to the socio-political changes at the global economic level and on the nation-state. Various scholars remark that citizenship has evolved to the notions of denationalised, post-nationalised, disaggregated, de-territorialised and cosmopolitanised. The idea is to locate the refugees and their rights within the present notion of post-colonial citizenship by carving a space theoretically through *ethics of admission* and empirically locating the performativity of state in the Indian context. And once, the admission to the so called outsider is granted either by letting them cross borders, legally giving rights of an alien or foreigner, or politically giving asylum on the basis of mutual aid. All these cases attest that the status on the basis of rights accessed might lead to a claim on citizenship.

Navigating on the theoretical foundation of disaggregated citizenship and making a claim for ethics of admission does not merely allow refugees to enter the border. But once entered they find some conception of citizenship, and this may lead to a claim for certain rights accessed by refugees by virtue of belonging to a political community. This provides narrative of the Indian state on the treatment of refugees, and how the state has accommodated refugees without any policy. This paper theoretically brings the debate on citizenship from the vantage point of rights and statuses accessed by the refugees in India.

The first section of the paper theoretically engages with the notion of morality and thus leading to larger idea of humanitarianism framework of

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Walzer (1983), making a case for refugees to enter, and legally carve a space. The second section empirically locates the debate on the performativity of Indian state, as to how it treats outsiders and what all benefit are accessed. It is this very notion of hospitality of the Indian state that further substantiates the case of being able to argue for certain rights. The third section, critically analyse the recent debates on conception of citizenship, and how various scholars have made a case for outsiders. Could these debates hold some relevance for the Indian context? The fourth section outlines, who is a refugee?, while determining the three cases of refugee groups in India from Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Tibet.

Citizenship and Refugee Rights: A Theoretical Engagement

The earlier literature on citizenship begins with the conception of citizenship of Aristotle in Greek city-states on the basis of political participation of the subject. This has been a contested literature on citizenship as to whether it stands applicable or not to the today's scenario. On the other hand the proponent theorist of citizenship T.H Marshall lucidly marks it as progressive, differentiated in terms of rights and ideal in terms of trying to form equality. These initial literatures on citizenship mark the idea of nation-state or the concept of state as central to definition of citizenship. Although much has not changed to argue where nation-states stand firm today on its sovereignty and legitimacy. The recent debates on why states take in refugees, has been lucidly argued in the European case; demography, work force, and other material reasons. But what about states those are equipped on all the above defined categories for taking in refugees; yet appears to lack proper provision related to refugees. The classical liberalism conceives refugee as a 'stranger' to the territorial construct of nation-state. Citizenship then is what discriminates an individual as an insider who belongs to such closed community or an outsider who is to be 'othered'. Most classical liberal scholars like John Rawls put forth the idea that inclusion in a closed community is not voluntary, for people "are born into it".[1] This serves as a foundation on which he extends his argument that 'justice as fairness' is a 'political' construct that can be realistically applied for the citizens in a society rather than a 'meta-physical' idea that can be universally applied to all. Such a fixation of classical liberal scholarship with closed societies of limited membership precipitated two parallel schools of which one advocated open borders for refuges and asylum seekers whereas the second for closed borders that implied regulated entry. In '*Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders'*, Carens opines that as there is no apt validation for regulating and control of borders against immigration, it bolsters the argument in favour of open borders[2] by virtue of an individual's right and liberty to move freely.

T.H Marshall conceives citizenship within liberal democracies by emphasizing on the three aspects that one attains on being a citizen- 'civil rights', 'political rights' and social rights that forms the platform for aforementioned two[3]. Such scholarship did not engage on the rights and status of the excluded. Some scholars such as Ong[4] opine that the ambit of

social rights should be broadened to include collective protection of those who have been relegated to the margins. Walters suggest that the progressive development of the idea of 'social citizenship' [5]will appear logical only if one can overlook the "treatment of groups like aliens who were often present alongside the social citizens, but did not enjoy the same level of social rights." The construct of citizenship starts to untangle in its entirety only when we consider the scenario of those individuals who are repudiated from claiming such rights on account of being underprivileged and potentially different from the conceived 'ideal' candidate for citizenship. This creates a category of lesser mortals in construct of the nation-state who can be conditionally referred to as 'partial citizens' by Salazar[6], 'informal citizens' by McCargo[7] or 'non-citizens'[8] by Gilbertson. Such discrimination becomes eventually 'routinized, legalised and legitimised' through the enactment of formal instruments of exclusion by the state.

The institution of state is the medium through which an individual can claim the right that he or she is entitled to. The notion of inalienable rights that any individual possesses by virtue of being human renders itself obsolete in the absence of a 'nation-state' as the spatial and temporal variables that form the margins of citizenship are determined by the nation state. It is here that Arendt's differentiation between "right to human rights" and the "right to be recognised as the right to have ..." gains significance. In her theorisation of Arendt's work, Seyla Benhabib elaborates on this dyad of rights in two viewpoints: first inference of 'right' is as a "moral claim to membership" and a certain form of treatment compatible with the claim to membership while second usage of 'rights' implies the privilege and prerogative of an individual who belong to "organized political and legal" community[9]. Being stateless and then to become a refugee, then to Arendt is the conjoint repudiation of both these inference of rights.

Compared to Arendt, whose conceptualisation of rights engages with those individuals who are beyond the margins of nation-state, Agamben examines the denial of rights to those who have been both socially ousted and concurrently subdued by it. Agamben depicts 'homo sacer' as antithetical to the construct of citizen. While citizen is the epitome of political membership, homosacer leads a 'bare life' stripped of legal status and banished from the larger political community. Such a theorisation largely fits the status of refugees who are excluded from the state matrix, both internally and externally. According to Agamben, those without citizenship are relegated to "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit,"[10] where the prerogative to have rights and legal assertion for protection becomes obsolete.

In envisioning citizenship as a subset of rights, Agamben suggests that citizens innately possess rights. To Agamben, rather than the human, citizen is the ultimate holder of such rights: "Rights are attributed to man solely to the extent that man is the immediately vanishing ground (who must never come to light as such) of the citizen"[11]. Consequently, the refugee who is outside the ambit of citizenship is devoid of rights as they violate the liaison between 'man and citizen'. Agamben provides considerable insight on the

linkage between evolution of the notion of citizenship and the eventual waning of the construct of 'nation-state'. These in turn raises the dilemma on how we would conceptualise beings who live the "bare life, stripped of"[12] citizenship and their inclusion via membership to the emerging complexity of asylum seekers and refugees.

This discussion above leads to following questions: why should a state accept refugees or why is it necessary for states to take in refugees? This is a normative question, unlike the first question which was empirical in nature. It brings to the fore an argument developed by Walzer, a claim for refugees' right to admission. Morality, a claim that becomes the basis in all of his works and key argument from this perspective is that all the decisions made by people, rationalists and political actors are to be based on the principle of minimal morality[13]. Moral, driven by justice and truth, and it simply means making a moral decision based on the idea of human or public interest and not restricted to mere self-interest. There is a difference between the kinds of morality, and who is to exercise this morality and how this can be done are significant for Walzer. The idea of moral minimalism, which is prevalent in everyone, describes thin morality; and there is thick morality that can only be decided after thin morality. It is argued that morality should exist all the time and Walzer critiques that it is often considered that during war morality and law are suspended rather the way one sees the world describes the morality[14]. While it may be argued the "decisions are not necessarily right and wrong but there is a way of seeing the world so that moral decision-making makes sense" (Walzer 1977:15). It might be argued that all the decision that one makes should be based on moral arguments, meanings having a strong feeling or sense of belonging to the other person. However, one may have feel strongly on moral ground for a family member but this morality should be extended to the outsider, which is then the basis of thin morality. The thin morality, which by taking Walzer's example of how one may march for other's cause and then it may lead to a larger cause, is balanced with a sense of thick morality[15]. These arguments of morality can find a way and be extended for the cause is of refugees as Walzer argues against the war[16]. So, on the thick morality one always present a case to assert that it is just and true for a state to take in refugees as they would die otherwise. Now following Walzer's cue, this is a normative argument rather it is descriptive in analogous sense and allowing the refugees to enter[17]. However, this is based on the idea of morality that is pre-given or is in the human nature rather than learnt or acquired, as everyone is born with morality. It can be critiqued as there is no surety whether individuals or states are being moral, and moreover morality could not be assured to exist. This could be argued from Agamben, with elaborating on cases of exception that excluding some by the very 'law' and 'state' who are supposed to be decision makers do not extend morality. Although, the idea of morality is normative to the chapter, linking with the idea of hospitality ensures extending a welcoming gesture to the outsiders (discussed later in the paper).

Interestingly, the shifting nature in the conceptualising citizenship has brought a grey terrain in terms of various understanding and categories of

citizens. Citizenship as a universal concept, when located in the nation-state has found the concept of aliens and citizens as imaginary. Rather some political subjects are noted with claiming or attaining certain rights in a political community. With the rising of flows of population leading to global movements due to work, or in the worst case with illegal immigrants and refugees, the focus on the categories are varied and moving from one place to another. The pertinent location of the chapter is the refugees, who are on move due to ethnic conflicts, state violence, or when their states have been non-citizens. Walzer argued that refugees is the most vulnerable category not because they are seeking shelter but because there is a political threat to his existence, "if you don't take me in I will be killed, persecuted, brutally oppressed by the rulers of my own country." (Walzer 1947: 48) It is this notion that has made refugees vulnerable because it a political category created by nation-states themselves on their perception of unwanted citizens due to various reasons of nation-building, large ethnic conflict, and citizens of another country.

When making a case for refugees rights in a country of asylum or where the refugee has taken refuge at the time of threat to his life. It is one who has lost rights as a citizen in his/her own political community and seeking some kind of admission (not only crossing border but also seeking space legally). Could such cases be addressed by nation-states? And when addressed, what is their relationship with the state? Is it in terms of care or humanitarian basis or the state that is giving asylum should be responsible in recognising the refugees. This debate finds a peculiar question as to why a nation-state giving asylum has to be responsible for non-citizens. This question can be interpreted in many ways with no defined answer, and expect finding a space within the theoretical conjuncture of mutual aid as pointed out by Rawls in Walzer's writings (Walzer 1987) and the Kantian notion of cosmopolitanism (Benhabib 2004). Otherwise, one finds an inevitable space to address refugees through the lens of nation-state perspective.

From the lens of a statist perspective where the conception of boundaries is evident and unavoidable, and understanding that political sovereignty and legitimacy is the ultimate concern of a nation is in the Weberian sense. Then the notion of cosmopolitan cease to exist, as they are unable to develop the concept of 'global citizens' and keep the conception of citizenship as national and strictly based on either *Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis.* However, it may be argued that the ethical notion of admission propounded by Walzer can initiate the argument as to how a nation-state can lead an outsider to have a legal identity in country of asylum without compromising the territorial nature of nation-state. The argument that the ethics of admission can lead to a conception of cosmopolitanism[18] and could be approached how Seyla Benhabib (2004) takes the categorical imperative from Kant and negotiates rights of others. Navigating the debate from the perspective of ethics of admission, where Walzer understands the political legitimacy of the nation-state but initiates a discussion for ethics of admission from the Rawlsian idea of mutual aid that should not only be extended to cooperating individuals rather to citizens as it is a political decision (Walzer

1987: 34)[19]. The idea of extending membership to the outsiders, or whether outsiders should be allowed or given to citizens, and they will either decide it on the ethnic affinity or mutual aid?[20] However, Walzer argues that "it is mutual aid that extends through political frontiers" and he initiates that mutual aid should be preferred rather than ethnic affinity that can address membership of outsiders (Walzer 1987: 34). And in this manner the mutual aid is derived not from the idea of political interest of the state rather the idea of morality is a foundation to the conception of mutual aid since helping each other and standing for a cause extends to the idea of thick morality.

Taking the argument forward, outsiders can be given membership on the basis of mutual aid and 'admission' here not only means letting the outsiders enter, but extends to seeking a certain kind of membership in a nation-state, which is purely to be based on the conception of morality[21]. This initiates the discussion on what kind of membership or status can be given to an outsider? Walzer again argues that he should be made citizen as there is nothing called half-citizens, one is a resident of the nation-state and an immigrant has a right to citizenship (Walzer 1987: 60). This ethical notion of Walzer helps in understanding as to why should states be morally responsible for taking outsiders and could this argument be extended empirically for the states? Samaddar cautions against being tangled in such binaries of "exception and banality"[22] while theorising on refugee subject. In '*Forced migration situations as exceptions in history?*' he opines that Agamben and Arendtian analysis considers the refugees as "exceptions" due to the excessive "force of generalisation" prevalent in the scholarship. This "idea of exception" ignores the post-colonial scenario of developing countries like India by assuming the liberal framework of refugee hood as conventional. He argues for the necessity to locate the introspection of refugees in India using a critical approach that question the conceptualisation of refugee hood in post-colonial nation like India by considering the determination of borders, refugee flows owing to partition and "refugee care by the post-colonial state"[23].

Sassen argues that there is a need to reconceptualise the concept of citizenship because of the rise of globalisation and the movement of people across borders. So the national state and its institutions needs to be addressed from the new global order. And Soysal argues that with the changes initiated in the individual rights that are attached to an individual rather than derived from the state has expanded the horizon of citizenship (Soysal 2011). On the other hand Aihwa Ong argues flows of market, technologies and population challenges the concept of nation-state and its geographical location (Ong 2006). These literatures on citizenship put forth an argument that the idea of citizenship has extended due to the changes taking place structurally in institutions both national and global, and the prior notion of citizenship was unable to explain the present contradictions. However, other scholars have argued for that due to structural changes the concept of citizenship should also be rearticulated. As Saskia Sassen elucidates, the denationalised citizenship from outside of the confines of national state (Sassen 2002) argues that there are new actors other than state that have started to play a significant role in protection of rights although nation-state remain to be exclusive. It is

denationalised in the sense of looking at actors that have initiated changes within a nation-state and its policies. Sassen critiques in a manner the post-nationalised conception of citizenship articulated by Soysal, where key conception is to look at changes initiated outside of national state (Sassen 2002). So in a way for Sassen the nation-state plays a key significant role in ensuring citizenship. Soysal understands postnational citizenship, where in the argument that political authority seems to be disbursing among the new actors and it initiates new organisational strategies for practising citizenship rights (Soysal 2011). It is embedded in the argument of rights of individuals that have played a significant role after the discourse of human rights came into existence and this very debate has led one to exercise citizenship rights. She further argues that this has also blurred the conception between aliens and citizens[24]. This debate cannot be initiated in the cases of South Asia as the states have been pertinent on denying human rights and human rights violation or interference by the third party international organisations. Ong has based specific case for flexible citizenship, which in a way argues for the deterritorialised identities and focusing on affiliation across borders. This initiates the discussion for transnationalism, where the nation-state is being challenged due to the global actors. However, keeping the statist view enunciated by Seyla Benhabib, for membership to exist one needs a state. Where Benhabib argues that state play important role through various institutions but outsiders could find space through democratic iterations and border may seem to relapse with the concept of cosmopolitanism, thus giving some space for outsiders to seek rights in a nation-state (Benhabib 2006). The argument developed in the performativity section is different from Benhabib but builds on the construct of statist perspective in the South Asian context. It is founded on the grounds of both empirical nature of the Indian state and the normative stand point of hospitality and morality practiced. A key argument on how South Asian states have been accepting refugees and keeping them within the manifestation of law without any policy or fundamental grounds. Taking the perspective of Indian case where the refugees are seen in groups through their marked ethnic identities, nationalities, and marked cultural affinity with the existing Indian citizens. The Indian state allows conflict induced refugees to enter its borders legally. But it has also acted morally with certain groups of refugees by extending the admission with some rights enunciated in the Indian constitution to foreigners and this has made them at par with the Indian citizens. Although, the state has not given a status of citizenship to the refugees but has on certain accounts made legal arrangements for their existence.

Performativity of 'Hospitality' by the State

While acknowledging that the Indian state does not give status to refugees, but its behavior, activities, and functioning when it comes to treating refugees at par with rights given to the aliens or foreigners notifies its stand on the refugee groups. This leads to a question: Why does the Indian state covertly adopt gradationally preferential practices to various refugee groups while

overtly not subscribing to a coherent refugee policy? By extending the introspection beyond the typical narrative of dualisms and binaries, we need to analyze the 'performativity' of the state in reproducing the figurative practices of extending hospitality to the various groups of people that has sought asylum within its territory. The visible ambivalence of the state towards refugees is conditioned by the notion of hospitality that habituates humanitarian concerns.

The crossing of boundaries by individuals obliquely generates conceptualization of hospitality as the process spatially creates the categories of 'host' and 'guest' by virtue of the side of the border they belong to. As this passage across borders is "everyday practice",[25] it provides a semblance of 'universality' to the concept of hospitality. Even though extension of hospitality might be deeply entrenched in the cultural practices of many nations, the modalities of laws involved, regulations made and restrictions imposed create an inherent diversity in the way it is practiced. What then is common regarding hospitality is the varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion that application of hospitality creates through permitting total unrestricted entry and access compared to relative degrees of closure. Hospitality constantly negotiates the spatial factor where by 'being inside' is privileged over 'coming from outside' where inside and outside is constantly positioned against each other. This brings us to Derrida's conceptualization where he projects the 'law of unconditional hospitality' that permits complete openness compared to the 'laws of hospitality' that conditions the access to entry through rules, norms and regulations[26]. If one is permitting unconditional inclusion, the second is creating conditioned inclusion and in its fullest, exclusion. The transgression of borders permitted by the hospitality of the state creates 'zones of coexistence in the inside' between insiders and permitted outsiders. The use of "laws of hospitality" to different groups of permitted outsiders manifests in the abstract creation of 'good outsiders' and 'bad outsiders' where state wields significant power in differentiating between the good and the bad.

Derrida in "Of Hospitality" brings about a linkage between hospitality and sovereign power of the state[27] . Assertion of sovereignty by the state can be seen in the way 'laws of hospitality' are formulated, while it is the humanitarianism that stipulates 'the law of unconditional hospitality'. Without the assertion of sovereignty then, the state will not be able to provide the protection and resources that is required to extend the hospitality. Thus the conditional laws of hospitality become a pre-requisite to ensure the unconditional law of hospitality. Baker in The politics of Hospitality opines that this co-existence of conditional and unconditional, then becomes a "double law"[28] that are the two poles of hospitality that often determines a pragmatic poise by even acting in two different tangents such that it "defy dialectics"[29]. This conceptualisation of hospitality does not limit us to binaries/ dualisms where the rights of the state are at logger heads to the rights of the refugee individual. In contrast to the 'fixed' notion of state in the rights discourse, hospitality offers a notion of state that is permeable to the varying degree of negotiations and concessions that happen between 'host'

and the 'guest'. Hospitality befalls as a normative idea that roots the refugee practices which determine the relations between host and the guest which governs the ethical reaction that an outsider receives on crossing the border.

The notion of 'performativity' as conceptualized by Butler in Gender Trouble defies the ontological existence of gender by emphasizing that it constitutes a pre-existing self. Developing the idea of performativity as put forth by Austin and then reformed by Derrida, Butler states that "within the inherited discourse of the metaphysics of substance. Gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be."[30] The normative heterosexuality that we subscribe to is the procreation of established behavioural patterns and perceptions that are confirmed by conventions and social institutions. Gender, is constituted through the continued enactment of socially constructed behaviour that fabricates differential identity traits to both man and woman.

Butler's notion of normative representation can be applied in the state behaviour where state tries to conceive, enact and propagate the pre-existing idea it tends to represent. Scholars like David Campbell and Cynthia Weber have located the constitution of states as subjects within the framework of performativity. Weber negates the idea of sovereignty as an ontological reality in *Performative States* where she opines that state tries to create legitimacy through performing sovereignty. These scholars take the application of performativity in a different realm where the political identity of the state is being constantly shaped by the constitutive actions that it perform. Drawing further on such an analogy, one could propose that performativity of the state also manifests in the way it enacts principle of hospitality through its concerted response of providing refuge to various groups of people over the time. Accordingly state is constructing a pre-constitute idea of hospitality by acting out the individual policy response to different refugee groups. The 'conditional laws of hospitality' when enacted by the performative state, then reflects as ad-hoc nature of response towards the refugees who come in to the state. The state executes, performs and reiterates the norms of hospitality to indicate humanitarianism as the objective reality. There is a dissention between what performance of hospitality alludes and how it manifests when uncovered of its performativity. This is similar to Butler's notion that the deprivation of the performance of gender, necessarily does not reveal the "true gender[31].

India lacks an institutionalized legal scaffold for regulating the large plethora of asylum seekers and refugees within its territory. Despite having a larger framework of international institutions based on various conventions and multilateral treaties, the immediate protection of refugees are determined by the particular countries in which they are physically located. In a 'nation-state' determined world order, every country has the autonomy to frame their own policy based on their accession to international conventions, protocols and customary international law. India being a non-signatory to both 1951 refugee convention and 1964 protocol has resisted the necessity to maintain a national legislation for maintaining and protecting the refugees within its territory. Normatively, India has opened its borders for a large segment of

population fleeing their homelands due to violent conflicts, political unrest and fear of persecution. An analysis of the treatment meted out to various asylum seekers over the period of time shows the ad-hoc approach opted by Indian government based on various domestic legislations like The Passport (Entry of India) Act, 1920, The Passport Act 1967, The Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, The Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Foreigners Order, 1948[32].

  The variations made in the very nature and modalities of citizenship by individual countries are an assertion of their sovereignty to include and exclude. This creates multifarious categories of people like citizen, non-citizen, alien, refugee, and stateless. These categories are overtly or covertly created based on the contextualization of multiple variables determined by the nation-states from time to time for realizing different political objectives like cultural homogeneity, population management, resource appropriation or even foreign policy that furthers the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. Despite of being fenced with a legal substantiation created by individual nation-states such categories of people in essence convey the loftier dichotomies of inclusion and exclusion that we are situated in. Those deemed stateless owing to such exclusion are forced to migrate the hostile condition essentially making them refugees elsewhere.

  Acceptance of refugees in the Indian state can extend the argument that they are treated as legal subjects, but not at par with citizens and rights, i.e. civil, political and social rights. But they are ensured through various civil rights of equality before law, etc and it may be argued that they have a status that is attained through rights. The conception of citizenship when addressing refugees can be looked at from the perspective of rights and status. The literature on rights of the immigrants and outsiders can be understood from various vantage points. As, Benhabib elucidates that the outsider should have individual rights attached when crossing borders or finding space in another political community. This argument is an extension of Arendt's perspective where human rights will exist and they are to be exercised through some international community. Benhabib extends the arguments from Arendt and illustrates that the outsiders should be given some membership in a state through the conception of democratic iterations and on the basis of cosmopolitanism (Benhabib 2004). This stance is closer to Walzer that in admitting outsiders the citizens should be given choice in their acceptance but they diverge on the conception of cosmopolitanism.

Who is "Refugee" in India?

Subject of refugee in Indian framework should be analyzed from the evolution of 'citizenship' in post-colonial India. The spores of the liberal thought in India that projected the notion of rights and privileges was ironically cohabiting with the imperial project of ruling the colonial subjects. The physical construct of the identity based on race and ethnicity was the only element that determined one's subjectivity to rights- being British meant the prerogative to have rights in a colonial India. The British narrative of 'white

man's burden' and the moral responsibility of the civilizing mission constituted 'othering' and propagated the discrimination of being the imperial master and the colonial subject. This constructed exclusion conditioned a colonial subject as 'alien' to the imperial regime, until he was civilized enough to claim the right for self-determination, freedom and liberty. The vestiges of the same colonial legacy is instrumental in understanding how our citizenship law was a temporal and spatial project that tried to imbibe the essentialities of a modern nation-state which was habituated to 'exclude and limit' rather than to 'include and embrace'.

It is the uncertainty inherent to the construct of citizenship that creates the foibles along its 'slippery slope'[33] to create the variants like migrants, refugees, aliens and stateless. The conceptualization of citizenship in India shows how colonial past continues to leave its impression in a post-colonial nation. The partition and consequent territorial segregation of the colonial India to Post-colonial India and post-colonial Pakistan was reflected in citizenship discourse such that a person who migrated to Pakistan after March 1, 1947 and acquired Pakistani nationality could not subsequently claim Indian citizenship. This differentiation on who belonged within was thus largely conflated with cultural and religious identity and the perpetuation of this can be validated by the various cases[34] adjudicated by Supreme Court of India that shaped the legal discourse on citizenship. With the stroke of a legislation, state had further extended the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion by validating the citizenship of thousands of refugees and migrants who came to Assam before 1971 and simultaneously denying the same to those who came in after 1971. Such temporal abstractions of citizenship was further reflected in the way IMDT act was constituted to determine and differentiate the citizen from non-citizen/illegal migrant/ foreigner. The affinity for various primordial identities like ethnicity and religion is significant in the constitution of citizenship and this need to be introspected through a post-colonial lens to understand how the very same citizenship that is vital for political inclusion becomes vital in segregation, differentiation and repudiation even for refugees who seek protection. The protection regime for refugees in India still conflates them with foreigners through the *Foreigner's Act, 1946* which is an overt illustration of how our colonial past still shapes and apprises our post-colonial present.

According to 1951 UN Refugee convention, a refugee is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or return there because there is a fear of persecution". Such a definition tends to exclude the victims of persecution of non-state actors such as terrorist groups or rebels from being a 'refugee' in the strict sense of the term. Also, the need to tangibly establish 'fear of persecution' becomes vital for these people fleeing their countries to acquire a refugee status in the host country.

When analysed empirically, it can be ascertained that the determination of the refugee status by the government of India is not based

on the above variables or not by an impartial assessment of distinctions and concerns of various individual asylum seekers per se, but rather on a case to case basis of their collective identity of nation/community/religion by heavily weighing in the bilateral relations of India with the country of origin of these refugees. While the claimant Tamil refugees without valid travel documents were accorded the refugee status, and same was not given to the Sikhs and Hindus who fled Afghanistan. As Samaddar points out refugee policy for any country is an account of how it "takes care and limits care" to a segment of people who are not its citizens. So having a concerted refugee policy or not having one at all is just a reflection of how any nation state wields and extends its power to include and exclude. An objective evaluation of the treatment meted out to various refugee groups helps to further decipher India's refugee policy framework.

The Case of "Partition-Refugees": an Exception?

Over the centuries, India has hosted a large segment of immigrant populations such as the Jews and Zoroastrians who well integrated with the nation. India started its tryst with rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees along with its emergence as a newly independent nation-state. The partition of the country into India and Pakistan had created a huge inflow of 6.5 million people across the border. Though they reflected the plight of refugees of partition for the larger international community, provision of citizenship rights and exchange of property by both countries legally conditioned them to more aptly fit in to the category of 'displaced persons'. The Government of India took various executive and legislative measures such as the 'Rehabilitation finance administration act 1948' to accommodate these religious minority groups by dispelling their fears and concerns. Though normatively this episode reflected India's acceptance of responsibility in accommodating the displaced people, it also mirrored the genesis of our ad-hoc approach in dealing with refugees by categorising them as "partition-refugees"[35] and limiting it as temporal issue.

    The familiarity on the 'capable' management of such a large group of people by the government along with its predisposition on cold war politics caused India to perceive the 1951 Refugee convention as just another means to secure the interests of the power blocs. But the hospitality extended to the 'shelter/asylum seekers' laid the base for our conceptualisation of a non-principled approach to the refugee population. As much as it included being sympathetic to the plight of refugees, it simultaneously constricted the responsibility to care. This further ensured that the limited protection extended was one that was based on 'regime of charity' as conceived by the sovereign nation-state rather than the 'regime of rights' that every individual is entitled to by the virtue of being human. Framing of a coherent refugee policy by India will be a calculated and much required transition that it will make from the 'regime of charity' to a 'regime of rights'.

    Being a post-colonial state, India had to navigate around numerous contingencies and had to secure its strategic relations to preserve its hard earned independence. The nation-building project of the post-colonial states

gives asymmetrical priority to who constitute an ideal citizen in the state. Then, the collective identity of the refugee becomes instrumental in conditioning the perception of any host community that offers the protection as it signifies the gravity of what it means to be included via membership. Such organic or cultured perceptions determine the nature and extent to which the post-colonial state, already marred by its legacy of multiple and divisive fault lines would apply various variables to define the contours of its charity based protection.

The need to preserve cultural homogeneity then is conflated as a part of its sovereign right to self-preservation. As Walzer opines, the necessity to conserve 'cultural distinctiveness' creates a pre-requisite for the nation -state to emphasize on closure of its borders based on exclusion. Walzer's equivalence of 'family' that opens the doors of their house for relatives to a nation that offers asylum to 'ethnic relatives'[36] at their time of trouble mirrors the way in which India amends its citizenship laws in 2016 for to grant citizenship to Hindu, Buddhist and other non-Muslim minorities fleeing the religious persecution in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The desire to preserve its appropriated cultural homogeneity is reflected in the present ad-hoc refugee policy of India where it considers Muslim Rohingya refugees as a 'national security' threat compared to the empathy shown to certain other groups.

The Tibetan Refugee and Seams of 'Hospitality'

The influx of Tibetan refugees to India began in the 1950s following the communist china's invasion of Tibet. The suppression of 1959 Tibetan uprising for the demand of autonomy by China led Dalai Lama to flee to India and seek refuge here. This followed by a massive influx of about 80000 Tibetan refugees to India who was accorded refugee status by Indian government. They were provided with Registration certificates (RC) to validate their status, which was to be renewed once a year. The government undertook various rehabilitation and resettlement plans for these refugees with the support of various relief agencies that were coordinated by 'Tibetan Administration centre' that eventually and effectively augmented as the seat of 'Tibetan Government in exile' located at Dharamsala. While a significant number of them were successfully resettled with provision of skill development that equipped them with self-employment in handicrafts and artisanship.

Derrida's conceptualization of hospitality is noteworthy here where he aptly differentiates between 'politics of hospitality' as that involves the calculated management of material resources within the finite borders of nation's territory using sovereign authority and 'ethics of hospitality' as the extension of normative realm of empathy and care . While Tibetan refugees are issued travel documents and even permitted to duplicate a government of their own in Indian territory, it is constantly subjected to the oversight of Indian government and are strictly prevented from expressing their dissent against Chinese policies. The setting up of Indo Tibetan Border Police force, apart from providing opportunities to rehabilitate the Tibetan refugees, also

strategically tries to appropriate their knowledge of the difficult Himalayan terrain. Indian administration of Tibetan refugees is thus often that of both provision and restriction of care which can be compared to Ruth Cragg's conception of practical hospitality as often balancing between the two ends of Derrida's 'Politics and ethics' of hospitality.[37]

Sri Lankan Refugees and Notion of belonging in Tamil Nadu

The Sri Lankan civil war that was precipitated due to the sub nationalist aspirations of Tamil population in Sri Lanka to create a homeland, 'Tamil Eelam' created a protracted conflict between Government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE). -building project in Post- Colonial Sri Lanka clearly was based on ethnic homogenization that resulted in the othering and exclusion of Tamils from Sinhalese. Apart from the death, destruction and civilian causalities the civil war displaced close to 1 million people. The ethnic and cultural affinity that the Sri Lankan refugees bore with the Tamil population in India have been a causative factor among others that determined their flight to India and reciprocally the same cultural proximity along with the dynamics of regional politics has played a significant role in defining the contours of hospitality that the Indian state offered to these refugees. Sri Lankan Tamils could extend their 'notion of belonging' to a territorial construct of land in country of asylum sue to the shared space of ethnic and cultural practices. The domestic politics in the state of Tamil Nadu, pro-actively took up the cause of 'fellow Tamilians', which manifested as constant negotiations between state government and the central government. Indian aid of provisions and reliefs to various refugee camps in Tamil Nadu and even our interference in the conflict through Indian Peace Keeping force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka bear testimony to this ethnic affinity we had for Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.

Like rest of the refugee groups in India, Sri Lankan refugees who came to India were largely dealt through the ambit of *Foreigners Act 1946* and *Citizenship Act 1955*, which by default considers them as illegal migrants. The Sri Lankan Tamils who fled to India were lodged in the Rameshwaram refugee camp near Tamil Nadu. Nonetheless, Government of India has accorded them protection and refugee status that reflects the 'regime of charity' that we adopted based on humanitarian grounds. The relatively better treatment meted out to Sri Lankan refugees compared to Chins, Chakmas or Rohingyas clearly indicate the 'preferential grading' of various refugee groups in both in terms of admission and in terms of assistance and accommodation. But after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, a paradigm shift was seen in the approach towards   Sri Lankan-Tamil refugees where the hospitality shown changed to that of hostility and suspicion. With the end of civil war, there were instances of 'induced repatriations' among the Tamil refugees due to the curtailment of relief and rations by the government authorities. Despite a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulment, most of these efforts to induce voluntary repatriation are dependent on India's bilateral relations with country of origin of the refugees. Signature and ascent to a comprehensive

international refugee convention would have in the least prevented such arbitrary temporal treatment and given a more legal rationalization to our moral obligation towards refugees.

Chin Refugees in India

The conditions that created the genesis of Chin refugees from Burma are not vastly different from that of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. The transition of Colonial Burma to a Post-colonial Burma and finally to a democratic Myanmar is marred with episodes of homogenization based on ethnic and racial identities. The persecution of Chin Cristian minorities in favor of Burmese Buddhists by the Burmese government as a part of subdual of prodemocracy caused more than 3000 to seek refuge in India which has increased in steady numbers till date. The majority of these refugees are located in Mizoram apart from a few who lift in make shift camps and settlements with other refugees in Delhi. Despite of having ethnic affinity with the Mizos in India, Chin refugees do not receive the hospitality that the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees received in Tamil Nadu in the initial phase. In contrast to 'brothering' that the Sri Lankan refugees experienced Chins constantly undergo 'othering' from the indigenous Mizo population in India making their plight as refugees even more difficult. Unlike some other refugee groups, Burmese refugees are granted residence permits to stay in India. Despite this benefit, joining the formal workforce remains a serious challenge. Most refugees are from rural areas in Burma and do not have the same level of education as those from urban areas. Furthermore, they often do not speak English or Hindi, nor possess the skills to allow them to compete with Indian citizens to secure jobs.

Conclusion

Through the praxis notion of morality exercised by states that have allowed outsiders to enter border, and states most of the time have extended hospitality to such groups. The idea of hospitality that is practiced by the Indian state in terms of providing aid and assistance to the refugee groups has been remarkable. Even though there has been no formulated refugee policy in accepting and extending assistance legally but the Indian state on the basis of its performatory activities has to a certain extent provided evidence for hospitality for outsiders? The debate on allowing outsiders to enter on the basis of morality and then extending assistance on the basis of hospitality provides a ground for treatment of refugees with some rights and extending long-term visas, etc. The notion of postcolonial state becomes pertinent when this state extends assistance to refugees on the basis of some ethnic and cultural affinity. Refugee in South Asian context is a historical construct of colonialism and today becomes vulnerable due to various reasons of a post-colonial state. In bringing three refugee groups as study sample for understanding hospitality and morality exercised by the Indian state may lead

to argue that there is some space within the statist perspective of citizenship to extend certain rights and status to refugees.

Notes

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[3]T.H. Marshall, (1950) 'Citizenship and Social Class' in *Citizenship and Social Class*, London, Pluto Press.

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[11]Ibid p.128

[12]Ibid

[13] Michael Walzer, (2006) *Thick and thin moral argument at Home and Abroad.* University of Notre Dame Press Ltd.

[14]Micheael Walzer, (1977) "Just and Unjust Wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations". Chapter 1 "Against realism", see pg. 14.

[15]Walzer takes example of why should outsiders march for the people of Prague for their cause. Pg. 9. In Michael Walzer, (2006). Thick and thin moral argument at Home and Abroad. University of Notre Dame Press Ltd.

[16]It is not to say that refugees and the situation of war can be equated on each other but the argument for accepting refugees and not to start a war are moral decision that should be made.

[17]I would like to paraphrase Walzer "Moral concepts and strategic concepts reflect the real world in the same way. They are not merely normative, telling soldiers what to do. They are descriptive in terms without them we have no coherent way of talking about war. (Here, soldiers living up the inhabitants of a peasant village, men, women and children and shooting them down; we call a massacre). Now having understood this argument by making a moral decision of not going to war could have saved humans. p. 14.

[18]Discussions on how differently could one understand the ethic of admission and the theory of cosmopolitanism.

[19]The discussion initiated on how the outsider should be given membership in a nation-state is similar to attaining membership of a group, society or club. However, Walzer understands the two nation-states and clubs similar, from the idea that one

can get membership to a club from the already existing members. And these members of the club can extend the membership to outsiders. But here Walzer has compared the nature of attaining membership, and not compared the nature of clubs with nation-state.

[20]Micheal Walzer, (1983) Membership, *In Sphere of Justice, A defence of Pluralism and Equality*. Basic Books: 31-64.

[21]Walzer argues that admission is a concept initiated through morality and states, large number of refugees is often morally necessary Membership, *In Sphere of Justice, A defence of Pluralism and Equality*. Basic Books: 31-64. p. 60.

[22] Ranabir Samaddar, (2016) 'Forced migration situations as exceptions in history', in. J. *Migration and Border Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, p.99

[23]Ibid.

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Cultural Identity in Exile: Challenges Faced by Tibetan Refugees in India

By

Nilofer [*]

Introduction

Migration or population movements have been a continuous feature of the evolution of human civilisation. But, in recent history, displacement of people due to a range of factors has been taking place at unprecedented scale across the world. Now a day, issues of Migration as well as Refugees have emerged as topics of hot debate across the world due to cultural conflicts, competition for resources and ultimately changing geo-political circumstances. At present, the increasing number of refugees in various part of the world indicates that something has gone seriously wrong in world-order and worsening condition of helpless refugees is a big moral burden on civilised society across the world.

Migration and forced migration as global processes are today seen as a burning issue and an irreversible process. In general, term 'migrants' is used only for the persons who have voluntarily move away for better socio-economic prospects. However, for the forced migrants the term 'refugee' is used. The war, poverty, human rights violations, and mistreatment of minorities are the most common causes of origin of refugees and associated displacement of them. Like causes behind any other social problem, causes behind forced migration are also often found in combination with each other. As ethnic cleansing leads to war; human rights violations lead to poverty; etc. Usually experiences of discrimination, threat to life, denial of opportunities to access to the resources, and a lack of hope for the future at place of origin forces them to flee to some other area or country which they perceive better for them.

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Refugees and the Indian Nation-State

Historically, South Asia has a major share in world's refugee population and the major factors behind these displacements are political instability, armed conflict, ethnic and communal strife, lack of resources and other socio-political reasons. Large scale population displacement has been a constant feature of South Asia, and the region has suffered the ravages of population movements over the last six decades. These population drifts include refugees, economic migrants, stateless persons and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Yet, none of the countries in South Asia have signed any major convention or treaty at the international level in regard to refugees; nor have they any national legislation or regional framework to deal with these issues (Bose, 2010).

Historically, this region has witnessed substantial intra-regional movement and dislocation of regional groups fleeing ethnic or religious persecution and political instability. The empirical experience of the region shows countries can be both refugees generating and refugee hosting. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal are countries that receive refugees, while Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Tibet (China) have generated refugees. In all countries of the region, political violence and developmental policies have created huge numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and stateless persons (Chari, Joseph and Chandran, 2003). Like many other refugees in South Asia, Tibetan refugees are also product of political turmoil in their origin land i.e. Tibet.

In recent years, in India also more than 600,000 persons have been internally displaced due to conflicts. Insurgency and retaliatory operations by security forces are a major factor of displacement. Civilians have fled fighting and have sometimes been directly targeted by militant groups in Kashmir, the North-East and in several states of central India. A majority of the internally displaced people (IDPs) have not been able to return for several years, either due to protracted conflicts or unresolved issues related to land and property.

One example is India's largest group of internally displaced, the Kashmiri Pandits who have been fleeing the Kashmir Valley since 1989 due to persecution, killings and massacres. Thousands more have languished in relief camps since the early 1990s, while an undetermined number lost their lives and thousands remain displaced after the communal violence that erupted in different parts of India in past decades. Similarly, a significant number of people were reported displaced in north-eastern and central parts of India due to fighting between extremist groups/rebels and government security forces. In Gujarat and Kerala communal violence has led to temporary displacement. In recent years, due to intensified conflicts and cross-firing on Line of Control and international border in Jammu-Kashmir, several villagers have left their houses and have taken shelter in government camps. In other parts of the country also several incidents of violence and forced displacement have been reported (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre2006).

Like any other social factors, forced migration also has its social costs on both the society of origin as well as on host societies along with refugees

themselves. The acts of the country of origin in a way constitute wound to both the refugees and host society. The existence of refugees and their moral claim to protection puts pressure on the basic infrastructure of the host state. India is also facing same dilemma since its independence. Though India has neither signed the United Nations Refugee Convention 1951 nor its 1967 Protocol, she continues to host a large population of refugees from neighboring countries (Jha, 2018).

At the time of independence of India, a huge population of refugees forced in to India due to Partition. India faced similar refugee crisis again in 1960s, when the political turmoil in Tibet resulted into an unprecedented tide of Tibetan refugees in India. Thereafter, in 1971 during the Bangladesh Liberation War, carnages in Bangladesh heightened an estimated 10 million refugees fled to India causing regional conflicts in the north-eastern states. Subsequently, following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, more than 60,000 Afghan refugees took shelter in India. In recent years, many Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka and Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar have also taken asylum in India. Though, The Government of India does not officially recognise them as refugees, but it has allowed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to operate a programme for them.

Some scholars argue that there is an absence of a clear-cut policy or refugee care regime in India. In the absence of any binding international obligation, government treats refugees on a case-by-case basis. It is alleged that the response of the Indian government towards the refugees and their needs has always been a matter of calculation, discrimination, and discretion. The scope of care, as a result, got segmented, became strategically uncertain and there is an innate inconsistency in the relation between care and power. It is blamed that the nations including India have treated refugees more as strategic pawns in the geopolitical games. The issue of the Tibetan refugees has always been an issue of contestation between India and Peoples Republic of China (Acharya, 2004).

Tibetan Refugees: Historical Background

Tibet is the highest situated region in the world with population and is also one of the deserted and inaccessible regions on the earth (Craig1992:93).Therefore, for centuries, Tibet was much isolated from the outside world, thus making it vulnerable to intrusion. The Buddhism has played very important role in the history of the Tibet. The Tibetan people have a deep-seated faith in religion and Buddhism was the state religion for a major period of their history. Since 17th Century, Tibet was the democratically governed by the representatives from the major monasteries of the country with the Dalai Lama heading the government. **(**Human Right Law Network 2007). However, historically the varying degree of influence and control was exercised over the Tibetan territories by different Chinese and Mongol dynasties.

In 1914, an agreement was signed at Shimla (India) by representatives of Britain, China and Tibet. This agreement was signed formally recognized Tibet as an independent country. However, the China questions the authority of representative of China and does not recognise this agreement and claims that Tibet is integral part of China.

However, the supporters of Tibet's freedom claim that Tibet was an independent nation with its own government, economy, language and culture till 1949. Following the rise to power of the Communist Party in China, they prepared to annexe Tibet by claiming it as part of the Greater China. In September of that year, the People's Liberation Army Commander in Chief, Zhu De, received the National People's Congress unanimous approval calling for the 'waging of the revolutionary war to the very end and the liberation of all the territory of China, including Formosa...Hainan Island and Tibet'.

By October 1950 the People's Republic of China launched into a full-scale military invasion of Tibet. In establishing its power, the Chinese government imposed the '17-Point Agreement' on Tibet in 1951, in which Tibet would become part of China but maintain its political and religious freedom. The agreement is often pointed to by Beijing as legitimising China's control over Tibet and disregarded by Tibetans as an agreement forced upon the country.

On September 9, 1951 thousands of Chinese troops marched into Lhasa. The forcible occupation of Tibet was marked by systematic destruction of monasteries, the suppression of religion, denial of political freedom, widespread arrest and imprisonment and massacre of men, women and children.

The oppression of religion by the Chinese rule in Tibet is another important factor behind the Tibetan migration. According to Communist ideology, religion is of evil and hindering a country's development. Tibetan society has its core in Tibetan Buddhism, perhaps even more today, when the political struggle for an independent Tibet permeates the Tibetan exile community (Anand, 2002:20, Damm, 2003 and Dahlström, 2001 cited in Pehrson, 2003**).**

Although Tibetans began fleeing before 1950, their large-scale flight occurred in April 1959, following the failed uprising in Lhasa a month earlier. The Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, and over 85,000 Tibetans fled into India, Nepal and Bhutan. Tibetan emigration happened in three waves: one in 1959 following the 14th Dalai Lama's self-exile in Dharamsala (India), and the other in the 1980s (after death of Chinese Premier Mao) when Tibet was opened to trade and tourism. The third wave continues from 1996 to today (Corrigan, 2005).

In year 1959, while in Southern Tibet, not far from the Indian Border, the Dalai Lama announced the formation of the Tibetan Government-in-exile. At present The Dalai Lama resides in Dharamsala, a small town in the northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, where he heads the Tibetan Government-in-exile, known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) provides a Green Book - a kind of Tibetan identity certificate - to Tibetan refugees

(Corrigan, 2005).The Tibetan migration is unique in many ways; no other people in history have before had such a well-functioning government-in-exile; the establishment of the Tibetan community India involves a complex net of interesting aspects: social, cultural, economic and political, to mention a few (Pehrson, 2003).

A report published in 1997 by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile outlines the migration of "new Tibetan refugees" to India. It outlines routes taken, reasons behind the decision to migrate, types of refugees arriving, and the services being offered to them. The report asserts that not all refugees may receive adequate assistance due to unspecified limitations of the government-in-exile. Although a bit outdated, this report serves to further establish the second "wave" of refugees arriving after 1979 as a distinct population within the exile community. This distinction is crucial in understanding the disparity of services offered to the Tibetan refugees today **(**Central Tibetan Administration cited by Claudia Artiles, 2011).

A 2008 documentary directed by Richard Martini claimed that 3,000–4,500 Tibetans arrive at Dharamsala every year. Most new immigrants are children who are sent to Tibetan cultural schools, sometimes with the tacit approval of the Chinese government. Many political activists, including monks, have also crossed over through Nepal to India. However, significant cultural gaps exist between recent Tibetan emigrants (*gsar 'byor pa*; "newcomer") and Indian-born Tibetans (Hess, 2009).

A study (Pehrson, 2003) has stated that in the current scenario, the decision to immigrate to India is often a complex one, with religious, political, educational, social and economic factors involved. The poor education possibilities in Tibet for Tibetan youth are one of the most important reasons. The parents send their children to India or for young Tibetans themselves to make the choice to leave. Spiritual as well as secular education in Tibet involve unfair treatment imposed on Tibetan youth and restricted admittance of Tibetans to higher education as well as to monasteries and nunneries. The presence of prominent religious leaders in India is a powerful pull factor for monks and nuns. Dalai Lama is an important factor behind the decision to migrate.

Economic opportunities are also a large pull factors in the Tibetan migration. The scarcity of work for Tibetans in Tibet is due to the fact that the Chinese are favoured and that most profits coming from development go into Chinese pockets. Tibetans inferior position serves as a serious push factor. The "sweater industry" carpet industry, tourism and working for the government-in-exile are other ways to make livings in exile.

The 2009 census registered about 128,000 Tibetans in exile, with the most numerous parts of the community living in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. However, in 2005 and 2009 there were estimates of up to 150,000 living in exile and the majority of whom live in India. Based on a CTA survey from 2009, 127,935 Tibetans were registered in the diaspora: in India 94,203; in Nepal 13,514; in Bhutan 1,298; and in rest of the world 18,920 (PTI, 2010). However, their number is estimated at up to 150,000, as mentioned by both Edward J. Mills et al. in 2005 and by the 14th Dalai Lama in 2009.

In 1960, the Government of Mysore (as Karnataka state was called at that time) allotted nearly 3,000 acres (12km) of land at Bylakuppe in Mysore district in Karnataka and the first ever Tibetan exile settlement, Lugsung Samdupling came into existence in 1961. A few years later another settlement, Tibetan Dickey Larsoe, also called TDL, was established. This was followed by the establishment of three more settlements in Karnataka state making it the state with the largest Tibetan refugee population. Rabgayling settlement was created in Gurupura village near Hunsur, Dhondenling was established at Oderapalya near Kollegal and Doeguling settlement came into being at Mundgod in Uttara Kannada district, all in Karnataka. At present, Tibetans in India live in 37 different settlements and 70 scattered communities in Himachal Pradesh, Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, South Sikkim, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Orissa. Of the settlements, just under half are based on agriculture, while one-third is agro-industrial and a fifth are handicraft-based (HRLN, 2007:5).

Tibetan Culture in Exile and Emerging Challenges

Usually, issue of preserving cultural identity of any refugee community in new foreign territory doesn't get any importance immediately after arrival due to priority for survival. Survival always remains as a major challenge for refugee community due to their vulnerable condition. Because, the social institutions of a society are not just static part of its cultural identity but are also the carrier of the society in a given environment. Turner (1997: 6) has defined social institutions as

> a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment.

In other words, it can be interpreted that social-institutions have vital role of maintaining the harmony between given environment and society's members for survival of society itself. Further, traits of a culture not only appear in a person's social life, it also makes impact on his decision-making strategies and choices in various circumstances. When a refugee leaves his homeland to take shelter in a foreign land, his existing social world which was well tuned with his original environment gets teared up. In a new host location, he tries to recreate his new social world with blending of available resources, surviving social institutions from their past and new circumstances and environment accessible to them.

If we broadly look at the strategies and efforts made by The Tibetan refugee to preserve their cultural distinction in exile. It involves: the creation of a Tibetan national identity in response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the use of education in maintaining that identity. The effect of non-Tibetan

groups on the re-creation of Tibetan national identity, and an analysis of material culture as a tangible expression of their identity (Basu, 2010).

The Tibetan refugees who arrived in India were splintered by internal political conflict over authority, cultural and linguistic differences between refugees from distinct parts of Tibet, and factional religious associations. They could hardly be called a homogenous Tibetan community. However, in exile, various adaptive efforts were made by their exiled government to foster unity in entire refugee community to present their identity as a homogenous Tibetan refugee community (Norbu, 2001).

Similarly, establishment of separate rural agricultural and handicraft-based settlements in India for the Tibetan refugee and their supervision by the Dalai Lama's administration not only saved them from identity crisis in an alien land but also protected the Tibetans from the unfamiliar culture of India for time being. As an attempt for sustaining solidarity amongst the Tibetan refugees and to pass idea of Tibetan nationalism in younger generations, education in Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) run schools were made highly focused on Tibetan Culture and language (Mallica,2007). Educational policies giving primacy to Tibetan nationalistic concerns as against pragmatic ones have deliberately been framed. As a result, 'national' consideration of survival of the traditional Tibetan language, culture and identity is prioritized in the educational policies as against 'individual' educational and economic ambitions in exile. Therefore, it is not individual choice but the larger good of the community that seems to determine the educational policy of the Tibetan refugee government in exile due to the need for preservation of Tibetan culture in the host country. The role and impact of education on a community in conflict have always been a subject of interest for the social scientists. It can be said that identity and aspirations of all refugee groups (especially the youth) in an asylum country are open-ended phenomena, subject to multiple changes. To adapt to these changes, along with preserving culture and tradition and building an education system that balances 'ligatures' and 'options', is a problem specifically faced by refugee and diasporic communities the world over. There are no clear answers to this dilemma.

In her thesis, Baker,(Baker, 2005) explores how nationalism is taught within the Tibetan refugee school system and its importance in maintaining solidarity amongst the Tibetan refugees. She argues that education and nationalism both eases and creates tensions within the exiled Tibetan community. The tensions are created as the youth fails to express the same opinions as the older refugee generation; according to Baker, this issue is attributed to outside cultural influences and flaws within the refugee school curriculum. She goes on to illustrate the perspectives and frustrations of youth in the refugee community and the consequential paths of the Tibetan independence movement. Baker's analysis provides valuable insight into the communal relationship of the Tibetan exiles, yet her emphasis on the education system may prove limiting to those searching for a broader review.

A study by Mallica (Mallica, 2007) has confirmed a difficulty amongst the Tibetans in exile in trying to reconcile individual needs and community needs can be seen. Educational policies giving precedence to patriotic

concerns as against pragmatic ones have therefore been formulated. A 'national' consideration of survival of the traditional Tibetan language, culture and identity is prioritized in the educational policies as against 'individual' educational and economic aspirations in exile. In the final go, it is not individual choice but the greater good of the community that seems to drive the educational policy of the refugee government in exile due to the need for preservation of "Tibetanness" in the host country. It is considered 'auspicious' if even one child in the family can take up monkhood.

Tibetan youth identity and educational and occupational aspirations in exile is therefore, to be understood as processes of negotiation and mediation. There are concerns of assimilation into the host society's socio-cultural milieu that is seen as defeating the very purpose of flight to India. Difficulty in trying to reconcile these two 'needs' seems to be creating palpable tensions between the old and the new generation.

But in recent years, this strategic education policy is creating tensions within the exiled Tibetan community itself. The tensions are emerging as the youth fails to express the same sentiments as the older refugee generation. This issue may be attributed to the cultural changes taking place due to Indian & western cultural influences on their culture. Another cause directly associated with growing dissatisfaction among the Tibetan youths is failure of traditional education in fulfilling their modern individual aspirations requirements. Graduates are scattering to Indian cities due to lack of employment opportunities in their rural settlements. As a result, increasing number of youngsters is leaving their settlements for better economic opportunities. Studies have reported that some schools in the settlements are on the verge of closing for lack of students. It is also evident that unemployment or underemployment among the Tibetan youth is growing very high. Job opportunities are less in general, so employment even in lower grade jobs is limited. This trend is increasing very rapidly and is a serious potential cause of concern as it may prove a possible threat to Tibetan identity and culture in exile very soon. (Lekshay, 2009).

The modernist trend among youth and the continuous large influx of migrants from the transformed Tibet in recent years for whom the CTA's articulation of 'Tibetan culture' appear obsolete have increased the pressure on CTA leadership in India. Since many have already left to the US and Europe in search of better socio-economic opportunities, their obligation to Tibetan nationalism cannot be taken for granted. Even some others in India also want to take up Indian citizenship as per the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955. However, Tibetan leadership in India generally discourages Tibetan in India to claim Indian citizenship as it considers it as negative to Tibetan road to independence. Because as a constituent of their political struggle, Tibetans have categorically refused citizenship in India and Nepal, the two countries in which the refugee community has largely resided since 1959. Tibetan administration in exile argue that accepting citizenship of any other nation would compromise their political claims to Tibet.

However, same approach is not being adopted when a Tibetan refugee tries to get citizenship of the USA or any other western country. As

Hess (2009) has noticed that even Tibetan administration in exile now see the adoption of U.S. citizenship not as detrimental but as a tool for becoming more effective transnationals political agents in the same political struggle. They see this as an opportunity to educate western world about the Tibetan cause and to travel more freely, including to visit Tibet due to their Western passport. But the implications of accepting US citizenship are not uncontroversial or uncontested. While opinions vary about the degree to which a "brain drain" has become a problem, all agree that remittances have had a large impact on Tibetans in India. Whereas many argue for their positive impacts, others suggest that remittances have led competition and tension within families. According to Nawang Thogmed, a CTA official, the most oft-cited problems for newly migrating Tibetans in India are the language barrier, their dislike for Indian food, and the warm climate, which makes Tibetan clothing uncomfortable. Some exiles also fear that their Tibetan culture is being diluted in India (Mark, 2010).

A study by **(**Adams, 2005) also focuses on newly-arriving Tibetan refugees in India and the challenge of integrating them into the pre-existing refugee community. He asserts that new refugees are often without skills or qualifications, a disadvantage that may seclude them from both the community in exile and the larger Indian host community. Adams argues that by highlighting the new arrivals' wealth of cultural heritage, they may regain their lost social capital and sense of belonging. However, Adams' solution does not take into consideration that newcomers from Tibet have been perceived as being too Chinese – a perception that would clash with the idea of newcomers as culturally rich. Although Adams is correct in emphasizing the need for effective institutions that cater to the social welfare and integration needs of recent arrivals, his integration suggestions are too simplistic and require further research.

The endeavor of the Tibetans to protect their cultural and religious identity has so far faced minimal opposition from their Indian hosts, barring a few minor incidents. However, with increasing number of Tibetan refugees in exile and limited resources available, the CTA administration is facing the growing challenges and dilemma of not only looking after the settlement of these refugees, but also preserving their religious identity from the rapid forces of modernisation in India. These challenges pose a serious problem for the Tibetans. In the days and years to come, such challenges are poised to enter a more critical Phase (Routray, 2007).

Current Scenario

The Tibetan community's one of the major concerns of Tibetans today is safeguarding this tradition. The principal reasons for Tibetans to escape from Tibet were violating educational, religious and political suppression by The Chinese regime. Tibetans in exile are living in such economic and social environment in which some characteristics of traditional Tibetan culture, such as their business and trading insight, are valuable, while others are not. Tibetan language study has also suffered a lot due toned of fluency in both

Hindi and English in India. Since these refugees are living in dominant Indian cultural environment for many decades, it is natural that long and continuous interaction with Indian culture might affect their cultural identity. It may be noted that maintaining the distinct Tibetan culture, which is the crux of the Tibetan exile, becomes even more challenging when the refugees are engaged in seasonal occupations and are constantly traveling to different places.

Similarly, dependence on foreign assistance and tourism has strongly contributed to the rise of western influence in Tibetan exile life. Prost (2006) based on study among Tibetans in Dharamsala, finds that for many Tibetans and foreigners in Dharamsala, modernity is presented as a cultural and spiritual exchange in which both parties have set roles. Tibetans share with their visitors their rich spiritual heritage of Buddhism and, in return, may profit from some of what foreign donors have to offer sponsorship to children, biomedical clinics, donations for monasteries and institutions preserving the 'traditions' of Tibetan culture.

New generations of Tibetans who are born in India have been facing multiple challenges to catch up with the requirements of modern world and changing requirements for livelihood along with the burden of expectations for preservation of their exposed culture in exile which is already perceived under attack in Tibet by Chinese regime. The Chinese Government has intensified its attempts to transform Tibetan society according to the doctrines and techniques of socialism. Despite of formation of Tibetan Autonomous Region, a large area of traditional Tibet has been already submerged in Chinese provinces. Traditional organisations and demography of Tibet have been intentionally fragmented, and an economic class basis is artificially implemented in the society. Similarly, school syllabuses have been deliberately modified in favour of Chinese claims about Tibet. Traditional form of government and associated Buddhism is being eradicated as far as possible both in its physical and spiritual forms in the name of welfare of so-called serf and slaves in Tibet. (As Permanent Mission of China in United Nations claims that in traditional Tibetan government, 95% of the populations were exploited serfs and slaves in the hand of remaining Lamas and Aristocrats.)

Now a days, the Tibetans in exile (especially the younger generations) are trying to balance individual needs and community needs. Tibetan youth identity and educational and occupational aspirations in exile is therefore, to be understood as processes of negotiation and mediation. There are concerns of assimilation into the host society's socio-cultural milieu that is perceived as defeating the very purpose of flight to India. Difficulty in trying to reconcile these two 'needs' seems to be creating tensions between the old and the new generations.

Despite the above discussed challenges being faced by Tibetan refugee on the issue of nationalism, very high number of refugees participates in their cultural and traditional festival with all spirit and enthusiasm. According to them, it helps the exile community to come together. Similarly, regular religious debates organised in various monasteries helps in developing rapport with other monasteries and settlements. A study by (Banakar,2013 as

cited in Tsekyi & Thimmaiah, 2014) reveals that such efforts by Tibetan exile community are part of their attempt to "re-establish their society in exile, so that if and when they go back to Tibet, they could carry their culture back intact".

However, all these have resulted in a situation of uncertainty of future for the group as whole and an elusive recognition and identity in the present as gap widen between CTA perspectives and youth aspiration. While attainment of 'free Tibet' is a delusion to some, to others 'cultural preservation' in its original form does not serve purpose as it alienates them from the Indians and/or prevents them from relating to present global trends. At the same time, lack of distinct identity is seen by many as defeating the actual purpose of fleeing from Tibet. For many of second and third generation Tibetans, return to Tibet is not a striking suggestion nor would they identify themselves emotionally with India. Therefore, cracks within the refugee group on issues of identity and future are very clearly visible.

Conclusion

Here it is remarkable that till date, despite of the loss of their independence in Tibet and prolonged exile in India, the Tibetans have not been lost within the "broad masses" of China or India. In the exile, they have been continuously making collective efforts to cope up with the challenges of refugee life and to adjust in host country's conditions to save their identity. In this process of adjustment, many changes are taking in their society. Despite of challenges on various fronts, their administration in exile is regularly trying to portray the community as homogenous and unified. Till date, the Tibetan refugees appear to constitute a nation within larger Indian nation, yet non-inclusive in the latter. However, with increasing geo-political influences of China, her stand on the Tibet issue does not appear to be soften in near future. At the same time ageing of current the Dalai Lama, makes it difficult to predict the fate of Tibetan Movement after him. Therefore, with rapid internal as well as external changes, identity and recognition as well as future of Tibetan refugees especially of younger generations are now on a slippery ground and its wherewithal in the face of increasing frustration among youth seems difficult. Hence, much more timely focus on the issue is required from their leadership as well as from their host nations, as this issue is directly associated on survival and identity of this culturally enriched but displaced population of refugees.

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Caring for the 'Evacuees' and 'Destitutes'? Governmentality of Migration in Late Colonial Calcutta

By

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Migration has been central to Calcutta's urban growth from its very inception. Calcutta as the capital and the 'second city' of the British colonial empire has attracted a wide range of migrants from colonial times. My paper focuses on a period of unprecedented fluidity and movement, around decolonisation from 1939 with the beginning of the Second World War till the arrival of independence and partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. I focus on three streams of migration to war-time Calcutta, beginning with refugees from the Far East (Burma, Malaya), migrants from famine stricken rural areas, and eventually those fleeing communal violence (Hindus and Muslims) around the time of the Calcutta riots in 1946. I delineate certain technologies of governmentality operating through the production of specific categories of identification for the displaced groups which shaped evolving humanitarian relief practices. Drawing on the records of colonial police archive and contemporary newspapers, my study points to three interconnected population categories brought to bear in wartime Calcutta, the 'priority classes', 'evacuees' and 'sick destitutes'. It traces how the categories were mobilised to control claims to the city and govern relief towards the displaced. This article also locates strategies of resistance to colonial governmentality by looking at migrant dissident subjectivities oscillating between tactically owning the officially imposed labels or overturning them through acts of protest and attempts to show that while the divisive control mechanisms mediated migrant resistance, the cumulative effect of unrest in relation to urban governance worked to open up the city's public spaces and public utilities in hitherto unprecedented ways.

This exploration of wartime displacements in Calcutta is positioned in relation to the literature on governmentality of migration and its corollary of humanitarianism. From the early twentieth century through the two world wars, an international regime of protection for refugees was being shaped in the context of unprecedented dislocations in Europe and elsewhere. The idea of protection of refugees evolved in tandem with the codification of human rights, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Refugee Convention 1951 closely followed each other. Discussions of protection for refugees in different contexts including a wide range of academic and activist literature on refugee camps and asylum policies, have been increasingly couched in a language of humanitarianism. While discourses of humanitarian relief as a charitable enterprise have myriad manifestations, my paper is concerned with a particular expression of this humanitarianism which portrays the city (specially in the global north) as a liberal humanitarian space, hospitable to asylum seekers. This vision draws sustenance from various urban movements like the 'sanctuary city' (in US and Canada), the 'city of refuge' (in the UK) and the 'solidarity city' (in Europe) conducted by civil society groups, religious bodies together with certain municipal and administrative processes avowedly aimed at offering hospitality to migrants. The discursive articulations of this urban humanitarianism stakes a broader claim to a general democratisation of urban life fashioned in opposition to authoritarian national regimes. A plethora of activist and academic literature have come up which contribute to this vision of humanitarianism.[1]

Enactments of sanctuary at the level of the city is taken to engender transformations in contemporary strands of citizenship. Variously termed as post/trans/de-nationalised citizenship, a related literature on migration and urban citizenship argue that the expansion of human rights discourse compels nation states to extend a wide range of membership rights to immigrants. They foreground the city as a viable locale for forms of emancipatory citizenship in place of the nation.[2] The (un)said shadowy counterpart of the humanitarian 'global city' and intimately connected to it is the third world 'mega city' where massive populations live in abject poverty.[3] In this formulation the 'mega cities' are big but powerless. They may not embody humanitarian principles themselves, but become grounds for humanitarian *intervention*. The hierarchical ranking of global humanitarian and trans/post national cities and dystopian narratives of the mega cities tend to hide connectedness of such process and complex urban formations. The present study contests this widespread vision of humanitarianism as a charitable enterprise and the associated image of the city as a liberal, hospitable and humane space. It builds on scholarship that has challenged this formulation of humanitarianism and located humanitarian governance of the 'city-camps' and asylum practices squarely within the functions of governmentality.[4]

Rather than adopting a totalitarian view of humanitarian governance reiterated by scholars like Agier[5] which implies an absolute view of governmentality,[6] I explore governmentality as a site of struggle by highlighting the role of dissident migrant subjectivities performed through acts of protest. It is my contention that such protests cannot be completely

understood as a corollary of power and leaves a residue. Recent research on Calcutta during the late colonial period, including an edited volume by Sarkar and Bandyopadhyay[7] have portrayed the city in terms of violence, conflict and contestations by focusing on facets of industrial labour unrest[8], communal riots[9] and wartime militant resistance.[10] My exploration of migration governance of the time places the figure of the migrant at the heart of such conflicts.

My article begins with a brief recapitulation of urban governance in Calcutta from the onset of the second world war, and through the years of the Bengal famine. The next section looks into three specific streams of migration to the city in the 1940s in relation to mechanisms of colonial governmentality, consisting of i) the rural poor coming from famine stricken areas of Bengal, ii) the those displaced by war in the far east and iii) finally groups dislocated due to communal violence. I explore how the moving groups were disciplined into the categories of 'evacuees' and 'sick-destitutes'/'vagrants' through which 'relief' was channeled and how it aimed to control movement and access to space and resources in various ways. The following section highlights governmentality of migration as a site of struggle by locating dissident subjectivities performed by migrants through acts of protests. I conclude with an assessment of the implication of wartime migration governance and their cumulative impact on the city more broadly.

This research has utilised files of the Special Branch (SB) of the Calcutta Police, a branch solely responsible for policing the city. The files of the SB, Political Miscellaneous Series contain day to day notes of inflow of migrants, squatting in public spaces, meetings and processions in different parts of the city, relief measures carried out by government and private relief organizations among other details. Together with this, I have used annual reports of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the Calcutta Improvement Trust. These government documents reflect the uncertainty of the moment when Calcutta was the site of dislocations, movements and daily contestations. Another important source drawn on are contemporary newspapers which bring out the concerns of colonial civil society in specific contexts, while mirroring the broader official concerns regarding migration.

Wartime Governance and Policing

With the advance of the Second World War, urban governance in Calcutta was increasingly geared to ensure the smooth functioning of the war. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) which had been largely under the control of Hindu *bhadralok* interests acquired a significant Muslim presence under the newly formed Fazlul Haq government in the Bengal province.[11] The machinery of civic bodies like the Calcutta Improvement Trust (CIT) and the CMC were geared to create and sustain a 'war infrastructure.' This included digging silt trenches in Calcutta's newly emerging parks, erection of baffle walls around important official buildings, creation of air raid shelters etc.[12] From May 1941, the government put in place lighting restrictions in the city and street lamps were extinguished at night.[13]

The powers of the Corporation were severely attenuated. New ad hoc organisations assigned the task of 'civil defence' came up which encroached on the Corporation's jurisdiction. This included the Air Raid Precaution services (ARP) and the Civic Guard for the cities in Bengal. These bodies were made of locally recruited young men who functioned as loyalist native police forces. The majority of the recruits were Hindus. The prime concern for the ARP was policing Calcutta and its suburbs and protection against enemy attacks. Both the ARP and the civic guard were answerable not to the Corporation, but to the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta. These defence forces came to be manned by locals who were more often neighbourhood roughs, feared and scorned by respected householders. They were among the most unpopular wartime innovations.[14] As the course of the war revealed, they were primarily concerned with the protection of certain industries/enterprises/services categorised as 'public utilities' deemed necessary for the smooth functioning of the war. This included the war industries, the transport network and the docks, and government establishments and services like gas, electricity etc. They were used in various ways to patrol, police and control the city. As migration gained momentum with the unfolding of war and famine, they were also entrusted with the tasks of controlling rationing of food and providing 'relief' in different capacities. Their undefined and ad hoc power far outstripped the initial declared purpose of 'civil defence'.

Following the 'civic guards' came the military. Huge internationally constituted army contingents consisting of the Britishers, Americans, Chinese, and West Africans were brought to Calcutta in large numbers. Presence of troops necessitated the creation of army encampments through 'requisition' of civilian properties under the Defence of India rule all over Calcutta. Requisition, needless to say, were forceful and was conducted with the prospect of heavy penalty under the Defence of India rule. This implied large scale population displacement. Apart from actual displacements, wartime Calcutta was rife with rumours of possible threats of displacements. The government had to issue frequent declarations and press notes denying such rumours of large scale impending civil evacuation[15] Heavy militarisation worked to create a fearful geography. The military camps, army contingents, baffle walls, slit trenches rendered Calcutta the appearance of a city under seize. With the lighting restrictions on, the city was to know many long and dark nights, dark perhaps in more than one senses where criminals had a free reign.

Together with policing the built spaces and 'public utilities' of the city, the population were sought to be classified in keeping with their function vis-a-vis the war. A very small number of the total population of the city were dubbed as 'priority classes'. They included the colonial bureaucracy, the labour force working in vital war industries, the army, corporation workers, sections of the transport workers among others. The only welfare schemes instituted in wartime Calcutta were the 'priority schemes' which included special provisions for the supply of food and other daily necessities meant for these groups, who were deemed essential for the functioning of the war. It is in relation to

the 'priority classes' that the non-priority categories of 'evacuees' and 'sick destitutes' discussed in the following section have to be understood. It was the creation of the 'priority schemes' through the various wartime imperial policies like 'procurement' and 'denial' that drained the countryside and led to large scale dislocations in the face of extreme poverty. Colonial knowledge practices sought to erase this connection between the imperial war and rural dislocations. It produced apolitical categories of human misery like 'evacuees' 'sick-destitutes' and 'vagrants/paupers' to classify large number of unsettled people, and render them governable through mechanisms of charitable humanitarian relief.

'Evacuees' and 'Destitutes'/'Vagrants'/'Paupers': Managing Migration through Humanitarian Relief

Advance of the war and the gradual unfolding of the Bengal famine of 1943 meant massive dislocations. The causes of the dislocations were manifold and the direction of population flow was just as varied. I have traced three identifiable streams of migration in this period: i) distress migration from poverty stricken rural areas, ii) those arriving to Calcutta in the face of war in the Far East from places like Burma and Malaya and iii) finally the in/outflow groups displaced due to communal violence. Such varied migratory flows came to be categorised under two official labels, 'evacuees' and 'sick destitutes' through which 'relief' was sought to be governed.

From the early colonial period, the city has experienced migration of business entrepreneurs, service groups and industrial labour. The city has also seen considerable 'distress' migration. One commonly held opinion, traditionally encouraged by the colonial administration has been that the rural peasantry in Bengal were relatively prosperous all through the colonial period. The predominance of the 'upcountry' labour from places like Bihar, Orissa and the United Province in Calcutta's industries and the relatively small Bengali presence in the labour force is invoked to highlight that Bengal peasantry did not need to supplement their rural income by seeking wage employment at factories, and the region did not see distress migration unless in rather *exceptional* circumstances. Recent studies on rural poverty have debunked much of this colonial propaganda of assumed prosperity of the peasantry and provide some idea on the existence of a floating population between the villages and cities of Bengal, often on the verge of destitution.[16] Roughly from the time of the slump of 1930s there has been lack of productivity, fall in prices of agrarian commodities like rice and jute, and increasing indebtedness. Official procurement policies ensured that the city of Calcutta was provided for at the cost of the countryside. Added to this was the policy of 'denial' which worked to cripple the countryside.[17] For a large multitude of population dispossessed due to war and scarcity, establishing a foothold in Calcutta became the only means of survival. Large migration ensued. The following table provides some idea of the migration to and from the city of Calcutta in the first half of the 20th century.

Table 1 Migration to and from Calcutta 1891-1951[18]

Year	1951	1941	1931	1921	1911	1901	1891
Actual population	2,548,677	2,108,801	1,140,862	1,031,697	998,012	920,933	741,880
Immigration	1,389,023	690,550	378,776	371,575	397,274	324,914	249,891
Emigration	44,536	26,591	22,301	46,000	34,000	3,344	5,500
Natural population	1,204,190	1,444,932	784,387	706,122	634,738	599,363	497,498
Percentage variation	-16.7	+84.2	+11.1	+11.2	+5.9	+20.5	

From the beginning of 1940s, inflow of rural migrants to Calcutta gained a certain visibility. Municipal reports of the time and notes of the Calcutta police started using the term 'destitute' who were 'sick' to identify the incoming famished rural population. It became crystallised into 'sick destitute'. It erased any relation of destitution or sickness to famine and scarcity in the rural areas. By the mid-1943, the rural poor had started dying on the open streets of Calcutta and drawing international attention through press reports. Certain relief measures were gradually being instituted. They were distributed food at various government run and private *langarkhanas* and *annasatras* (food kitchen/rice kitchen). Private charitable organisations were encouraged by the government to set up food kitchens, centres of milk supply for children etc. with certain regulations. Organisations like the Marwari Relief Society, Mahila Atmaraksha Samity, Bengal Relief Committee of the Hindu Mahasabha among others played an important role in 'relief'. A government press release was issued stating that *langarkhanas* and *annasatras*, were not meant for the 'priority classes'. Only people who were not entitled to receive subsidised ration from control shops were eligible to receive food here.[19] HS Suhrawardy, the minister of Civil Supply in Bengal stressed the need to eat a 'measured meal' amidst scarcity. There were attempts to stop the same 'destitutes' from getting food from two to three kitchens on the same day.[20] In effect they were being supplied starvation ration. Within two to three months of opening the *langarkhanas*, a new policy was adopted aimed at relocating the kitchens from the city to the suburbs, in order to prevent the arrival of famished poor to the city in search of food. The government incentivised institutions that agreed to open food kitchens in the suburbs through the supply of subsidised food grains.[21] While there were no declared communal separations in the relief measures, private organisations like the Hindu Mahasabha and organisations like the Muslim Byabosayi Samity in effect catered to Hindus and Muslims separately.[22] This trend will be accentuated within the next few years with deteriorating communal situation.

A policy on shelter was also improvised. Different 'homes' were set up for the migrants on the streets. The prospective inhabitants were collected through 'round ups'. Throughout the peak of the months of the famine, migrants now categorised as 'sick destitutes' were collected from the streets in ambulances operated by the ARP and the police and discharged in hospitals. Apart from this, 'vagrants' were routinely rounded up from the streets to certain 'homes'. A large number of children were also rounded up from the

streets and taken to 'shelters'. Finally a large number of the dead were regularly picked up from the streets for last rights and disposal. This policy of 'sheltering' premised on 'round up' of the displaced from the streets of Calcutta becomes clear in the light of a new official stance towards vagrancy being fashioned during the height of the famine in Bengal. A new legal definition of vagrancy was being construed. Much was made of 'nuisance in public thoroughfares' as people started living on the pavements. The Annual Report of the CMC for 1942-43 noted:

> The magnitude of nuisance in the city caused by beggars is enormous. Apart from physical nuisance caused by presentation of ugly sores or deformed limbs to attract passers-by for alms giving, they as reservoirs of infection play an important role in the spread of disease. Acuteness of the problem drew the attention of the public and the Corporation for a long time. With the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East, this problem assumed a new importance… it was decided to establish a Vagrant Home outside Calcutta. [23]

The report did not directly equate famine victims with beggars, but its policies implicated the very same population. The public presence of deformed bodies, and the conscious use of such deformities in the city's public spaces to claim visibility, attract sympathies and alms from the passers-by was not to be tolerated. The problem of vagrancy was included in the Medical Report section of the CMC Annual administrative report indicating its pathologisation. The Bengal Vagrancy Ordinance (1942) later became codified into the Bengal Vagrancy Act, 1943 and came into force from October 1943 in parts of Howrah, Tollygunge, Behala, Calcutta and 24 Parganas. For the first time in Calcutta's urban history, beggary was conceived as a punishable 'offence' requiring municipal intervention. From August 1943, the beggars were rounded up, placed in front of a Special Magistrate and after being declared vagrants by the magistrate, sent to collection homes.[24] And it were the government's civilian police forces, that is, the ARP and the civic guard who performed the main task of rounding up the beggars.

Through the formation of categories like 'sick destitutes' and 'vagrants' whose presence on the streets worked as 'reservoir of infections', a certain pathologisation of poverty was underway. As a contemporary news report declared, such presence was degenerating the 'health of Calcutta'.[25] The 'sick destitute' and 'vagrants' were turned into diseased bodies by erasing the violence of war, scarcity and hunger. This created justification for their removal outside the city limits. The process of 'rounding up' 'sick destitutes' and 'vagrants' from the streets of Calcutta was a rather forceful one. They evaded ARP or the police vehicles to their best of their ability. They preferred to cling to the streets of Calcutta rather than facing starvation and confinement within the Vagrant Homes.[26]

While the living were sent off to confined spaces created for them outside the city, the large number of dead on the streets of Calcutta also posed a problem. Two organisations, the Hindu Satkar Samity and the Anjuman Mofidul Islam took care of the dead bodies of the Hindus and Muslims

respectively.[27] Corporation officials lamented the difficulty of ascertaining the exact reason of such death, or keeping account of their numbers. Corporation's annual administrative reports started recording the bodies that were left unclaimed, to be cremated at the expense of the Corporation. A new category of 'pauper' was introduced in the annual reports to account for these unfortunate lot whose dead bodies lay unclaimed on Calcutta's streets. Their enumeration started from mid-1943. The entry of 'paupers' on Calcutta's streets and sidewalks and in the Corporation reports proved to be a rather long term affair. After the initial few years, the street deaths that started under famine conditions had become somewhat regular and *normalised*. Table 2 provides an estimate of the number of death of paupers for the next decade or so:

Table 2: Percentage of Death of 'Paupers' in Relation to Total Annual Death in Calcutta from 1944 to 1960[28]

Year	Total Number of Deaths	Death of Paupers	Percentage of Death of Paupers in relation to Total Death
44-45	51992	8826 (average 167 per week)	One sixth
45-46	37,656	5649 (average 109 per week)	One seventh
46-47	36,859	4872 (average 94 per week)	Less than one seventh
47-48	45,310	5863 (average 113 per week)	One-eighth
48-49	44,307	4708 (average 91 per week)	Less than one ninth
49-50	43804	4756 (average 91 per week)	One ninth
50-51	55,422	6587 (average 127 per week)	One eighth
51-52	40,927	3971 (average 76 per week)	One tenth
52-53	38,501	4365 (average of 84 per week)	One ninth
53-54	36,578	4467 (average of 86 per week)	One eighth
54-55	32,197	4282 (average of 82 per week)	One eighth
55-56	32,223	4993 (an average of 96 per week)	One sixth
57-58	32,197	5315 (an average of 82 per week)	One eighth
58-59	33,269	4833 (an average of 94 per week)	One seventh
59-60	34,383	5,102 (an average of 98 per week)	One seventh

What this huge and consistent number of unclaimed bodies to be picked up from the streets and pavements of Calcutta indicate is that starvation, destitution and death raged throughout the period.

Around the same time that famine migrants were coming to Calcutta, the city was receiving other fleeing people, whose displacement was more apparently related to the war and associated violence. An ambiguous category was devised through the practices of archiving for these groups, 'evacuees', implying a population that *evacuated* in the face of *direct* or *climactic* threat of violence. The term of course precluded any straightforward acknowledgement that these groups could have claims to 'refuge'. Use of the category 'refugee'

whose meanings were being redefined worldwide in the context of the Second World War, was avoided all through the colonial period. The first major group to come to Calcutta who were categorised as 'evacuees' were those from the Far East from early 1942. When Japan began bombing Rangoon from December 1941, this generated a great exodus of population. The British military establishment secured their own flight to safety, leaving the locals to fend for themselves. The Indian population in Burma undertook a long and perilous journey, crossing the hill tracks from Rangoon to the Bay of Bengal where they could board coastal ships bound for Calcutta and Chittagong on the eastern coast of Bengal.[29] The Burmese Indians arrived in different stages of destitution by train or by steamer. Calcutta worked as a transit point in their journey. The 'evacuees' were offered provisional accommodation and food, and helped in their onward journey often to farther east to different parts of Assam. Certain entitlements of sorts were devised for the 'evacuees' through official as well as private relief measures.

An Evacuee Reception Committee was instituted by the government with representatives from all religious communities to facilitate the transit of 'evacuees' coming to Calcutta.[30] This government strategy of including representatives from 'all religious communities' was a marked feature of the time of many different government committees and boards set up for famine relief, riot relief or evacuee relief. This was devised as a way of solving acrimonious relations between the Hindus and Muslims in elected bodies. The government committees and its services were however grossly inadequate. The main work of reception were done by different private organisations affiliated to political parties. The private relief organisations catered to Hindus and Muslims separately. Thus, the machinery of the Bengal Congress together with the Marwari Relief Society, and other Hindu volunteer organisations like the Bajrang Parishad, the Nababidhan Samaj were geared to provide for the incoming Hindu 'evacuees' from Burma. Separate organisations like the Anjuman Mofidul Islam provided for the Muslims. Mr Humayun Kabir,[31] a member of the Bengal Legislative Council issued a press statement to the effect:

> a serious problem has been created by the influx into Calcutta of evacuees from Burma… the evacuees require help at the ghats and the station… it is not possible for the Marwari Relief Society to arrange different kinds of food for different communities, nor in these abnormal circumstances give Muslim women the degree of seclusion to which they are ordinarily accustomed. For this reason, the Muslim Relief Committee constituted by members representing different political opinion and under the patronage of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce… have made arrangements for Muslim evacuees at Salagi Mussafirkhana and their food at Gahar building in Lower Chitpore road…[32]

Separate arrangements were put in place for receiving Muslim and Hindu refugees in *mussafirkhanas* and *dharmashalas* respectively (both the terms literally meaning shelter for guests). They were received from the railway station or the *ghats* (river banks) by the volunteers of these organisations,

brought to the specific shelters created for each community. They were provided food and helped in their onward journey. It is interesting to note that certain services and 'public utilities' were made available to the 'evacuees'. They could take a free ride of Calcutta's tramways to reach the railway stations and were given free train tickets to proceed in their journey.[33] Their movements were closely monitored. Two broad future trends were set amidst wartime dislocations and rising communal hostility in Calcutta. Relief from this time onwards became increasingly communal.[34] The other important marker was a partial and selective opening up of the city's public space and 'public utilities' under close surveillance. These were more readily made available to groups displaced by *climactic* circumstances and much less so to people displaced by more long term *endemic* violence.

The next major round of displacement came with the Calcutta riots of August 1946.[35] By this time communal situation in the province had greatly deteriorated. While the Calcutta riots have engaged scholarly attention for different aspects,[36] for the purpose of the present discussion, the focus is on the nature of the displacement associated with the riot and some aspects of riot 'relief'.

Roughly about 10% of the city's population were dislocated by the riots. The ensuing displacement and relocation transformed and redefined the social geography of Calcutta. Minority communities were moved from 'areas under threat' by government authorities and voluntary organisations to rescue camps set up all over the city. Often vacant famine camps were made use of as relief camp.[37] As in the case of the Burma evacuees, more than government relief it were the private organisations that came in a big to cater to people affected by violence. Marwari relief society among other organisations played a prominent role in providing assistance to the Hindu migrants from Noakhali. When Muslim refugees started coming in the wake of the Bihar riots, it was the Anjuman Mofidul Islam that came forward to help. Relief societies were formed at the level of *paras* (neighbourhood), *mohallas* (neighbourhood) and *bustees* all over the city. A part and parcel of the new relief societies were 'defence committees' to protect against possible attacks. The proceedings of a meeting of the members of two *bustees* near the Ultadanga area points to arrangements typical all over the city in the aftermath of the riots:

> at a meeting… on 9.9.46… a relief committee was formed named Settbagan Relief Committee to give relief to Muslim destitutes in the said *bustee*, arrange for shelter of those Muslims who were evacuated as refugees from other parts of the city during the recent disturbances and to arrange to feed the families of those Muslims who cannot go to work in Hindu areas… It was further decided that a defence committee would organize volunteers for protecting the locality from attacks by Hindus…[38]

While the riot was officially declared to have ended on 22nd August, sporadic violence continued throughout the period. Amidst such mutual hostility the balance was gradually turning against the Muslims. While Muslim

riot victims from Bihar did come to Calcutta for shelter, the period saw considerable outmigration of Bihari Muslims from Calcutta.[39] Space for Muslims in Calcutta had already begun to shrink. Flow of 'evacuees', now mostly Hindu East Bengalis would reach a climax of sorts with the partition of 1947. But amidst such displacement, 'destitutes', groups displaced from the rural areas through long term forces of hunger and poverty continued to come to Calcutta and its suburbs. A news report in the daily Swadhinata noted.

New destitutes are coming to Calcutta again. Groups of distressed peasants from many adjoining villages are on the lookout for 'work'. All they want is 'help' or meal for one half of the day. Dhiren Das, a peasant of the village Laugachi under the Bhangar police station, was seen at the Hedua crossing with a group of 12-14 men and women seeking 'assistance and work' from passers-by. On enquiry by our reporter he revealed that hundreds of destitute peasants from his village and the adjoining villages are coming to Calcutta to find 'work'.[40]

But by this time the rural migrants have been rendered invisible once again and public attention was shifting to another group, the East Bengali Hindu 'evacuees'. As emphasised in the discussion so far, it is in relation to the 'priority classes' that 'relief' for the 'sick destitutes' and 'evacuees' have to be understood. The connection of the war and associated violence to large scale dispossession and displacement were sought to be contained by classifying the moving people into apolitical and vague categories mobilised to govern them through graded assistance. The potentially more destabilising groups of famished rural migrants, far greater in number, were rendered into diseased bodies through the categories of 'sick destitutes' and 'vagrants' and removed from the public spaces of Calcutta through various 'round ups'. In the construal of the category of 'evacuee', there was a tacit acknowledgment of displacement through 'climactic' violence, even though 'relief' still meant provisional assistance and included no promise of long term shelter in the city. Both groups fought containment and erasure to their best of their ability. The following section explores facets of resistance, whereby Calcutta's footloose migrant populations swelled the ranks of protesters at the slightest provocation.

Governmentality as a Site of Struggle: Enacting Dissident Subjectivities through Protest

The decade of the 1940s was one of all pervasive discontent. The entire period saw increasing strikes among the industrial labourers, in Calcutta's jute mills, among the tramway workers and workers in the Calcutta Corporation, and among the dock labourers. Possibilities of outbursts has been well capture by the phrases by which mid-1940s Calcutta came to be known, on the 'edge of a volcano' or on a 'heap of dynamite'.[41] While there were manifold expressions of low key and highly charged up discontent, I will briefly draw attention to two related aspects of such dissonance, shifting everyday forms of resistance and some patterns in a few of the organised protests of the times.

The streets of Calcutta were a key site where everyday contestations played out. The roads of the city came under the sway of the military establishment. But the city's lanes and alleys were also the places where migrants dwelled, moved and staked a presence. The following extract from an intercepted personal letter by Mr Ranbir Juneja, a resident of Gariahat road, Calcutta brings out the nature of everyday entanglements

> Now I will tell you something I saw with my own eyes. A boy of about 8 was walking across Chowringhee on 24th when a military lorry *went out of its way to run him over.* There were about 15 military policemen present when the boy was killed, but they did nothing at all, not even ring up for an ambulance to come and remove the body.[42]

Sikh drivers plying their taxis in Calcutta became a specific target of attack by soldiers. Daily notes of the Calcutta police record a host of incidents, where Sikh drivers, who were the most important taxi driving community in colonial Calcutta, were cheated of money or physically abused by soldiers who rode their taxis as passengers. Such military excesses were met with everyday forms of counter-conduct. The latter part of the same intercepted letter quoted above narrates an incident that is revealing

> The following incident took place on Russa road. An army lorry was running at full speed when suddenly a man wearing a Gandhi cap stepped into the middle of the street and raising his hands stood fearlessly. The driver tried to swerve past him when suddenly a second man tried to step out. He was killed immediately. All American cars now bear three or four flags each in order to distinguish them from the British so that they would not be attacked- a direct kick to the British.[43]

From the mid-1940s, military vehicles running over people, animals or private vehicles were increasingly chased, and eventually the vehicles set on fire. A crowd would assemble at the site of an accident, often pursue the vehicle, and set it on fire. On occasions when the vehicle causing the accident escaped, the military vehicles coming immediately afterwards would become the target of attack.[44] Sometimes, military men could come under attack for no apparent reason at all. Thus, a special branch file of the year 1946 notes an incident, when an Italian prisoner of war was waiting at a tram station in south Calcutta. A few men suddenly appeared, surrounded them and started shouting slogans of 'Jai Hind'. Stones were thrown at him. One of the assailants took away the belongings in his pockets. The report stopped short of identifying the assailants or their motivations for the attack.[45]

It can be said that the anonymous men wearing the Gandhi cap, or those shouting 'Jai Hind' who conjured up out of nowhere around soldiers at opportune moments to throw stones, or to set fire to their vehicles were metaphorically and really the men and women of the streets, that is, the figure of the migrant. These quasi citizens labelled 'sick-destitutes', 'vagrants' and 'evacuees' drew from the mainstream nationalist repertoire of the day to position themselves against the all-pervasive colonial regime of control,

momentarily enacted nationalist subjectivities to channelise their protests and dissipated back into the multitude. They exacted their small revenges at the smallest of opportunities.

Apart from such everyday resistance, the period also witnessed some violent mass protests, including two anti-Indian National Army (INA) trial agitations of 1945-46 and a strike organised by the communists in Calcutta in support of the naval mutiny at the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) in Bombay and Karachi in February 1946. These protests have engaged scholarly attention for their militancy and anti-colonial nature.[46] Here I wish to draw attention to some common features of these protests in and through which Calcutta's migrants momentarily shed their official categories of human misery. These protests were initially called on by political parties, often led by students and industrial labourers and later developed their own momentum. They took the form of *hartal* (strike)*,* meetings and parades led by the student wings of the political parties including the Congress, the Muslim League and the left parties. Agitators belonged to different religious communities like the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and had the support of different shades of political opinion. Symbols of colonial authority and privileges of the 'priority classes' like civil supply ware houses, ration shops became targets of attack. Clashes with the police broke out when the processionists forcefully entered prohibited areas like the administrative heart of Calcutta placed under section 144. Another special feature of the agitations was a concerted attack on all forms of public transport which included burning of vehicles, road blocks and squatting on railway tracks. Sir Francis Tucker, then General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command observed about the November anti-INA trial protest: "In November there had been riots, the worst that Calcutta had as yet experienced; they had been mainly anti British in complexion but their violence, though short-lived, had shocked all decent people."[47] The Calcutta police confirmed that the ultimate objective of the protesters was to cause *civil disorder*.[48] In view of such widespread anti-colonial militancy, the government initiated an Emergency Action Scheme to deal with future disturbances against the state. The Emergency Action Scheme aimed to protect the government and corporate interests and the 'public utilities' from attacks in case of future disturbances in Calcutta.

These violent outbursts of the mid 1940s came in response to scarcity of food, shelter and basic necessities of life. The sporadic and the excesses of these protests, opened up spaces for the most deprived of Calcutta's population, its migrants to express anger and momentarily reverse exclusion. Public spaces of the city like the streets, official buildings and other monuments of public concerns were symbolic of the exclusive 'public' of imperial Calcutta. Special protection of a small number of 'priority classes' and policing of the 'public utilities' had come to cause grievances all through the war years. The huge mass of Calcutta's informal labour, different migrant populations who were the shadowy 'other' of the 'priority classes' with dubious claims of residence to the city were left with few protections. The wartime violent protests and their excesses have to be understood in this context. It were the migrants who swelled the ranks of protesters at the

slightest provocation. An invasion of privileged spaces through huge rallies and a concerted attack on the 'public utilities' during the agitations of mid-1940s were symbolic ways of claiming back exclusive spaces and provisions. The public spaces and public utilities were appropriated through everyday counter conduct and violent protests with shifting strategies of resistance. These protests were also moments when the dominant categories of identification of the migrants officially associated with sickness and destitution were symbolically overturned.

Continued migration from across the border as well from its own countryside marked the coming of independence and partitioning in the city. The category of 'evacuee' continued to be used for the incoming population during the first few years of uncertainty. These were uncertain times, and there were suspicions regarding the role of the new 'evacuees' in Calcutta. Thus, one Radhanath Chandra, an erstwhile trainer of the Civic Guards, was apparently spreading the news that

> an attack on West Bengal is impending and that there is no knowing whether East Bengal refugees will join the Pakistan forces or the West Bengal government forces… Radhanath Chandra is reported to be organizing a band of armed men apparently for this purpose.[49]

The east Bengali 'evacuees' would to a great extent succeed in changing this uncertain status to their favour within a few years through the resourcefulness and the social and cultural capital of middle class groups among them and in turn partake in problematic urbanism implicated in dislocations of their socially disadvantaged counterparts.

Conclusion

My purpose in this article has been to trace the governmentality of migration and its ruptures through the period of decolonisation in Calcutta, which was marked by fluidity, multifarious movements and contestations. I have tried to establish that relief measures for the displaced is better understood as part of technologies of power rather than charitable enterprise concerned with the preservation of human dignity. Such an understanding provides an alternate image of the city from being a humanitarian and hospitable space to one fraught with claims, contestations and also as a terrain of political struggle. I have traced how the wartime 'relief' measures in the city functioned through the interlinked population categories of the 'priority classes' and its various pathologised 'others' and how such governance of relief primarily meant confinement and dispersal of the migrants. My article highlights that these labels of identification were tactically utilised by migrants in their everyday acts of survival like seeking alms/aid or momentarily but repetitively overturned by them through their participation in the mainstream anti-colonial nationalist imaginary of the day. Consistent presence of migrants in Calcutta's public spaces, everyday acts of protest and death left an indelible

mark on its urban fabric. Everyday migrant resistance has become an uneasy way of urbanism in Calcutta that tear away at the margins of governmentality.

Notes

[1] Linda Rabben, *Give Refuge to the Stranger: The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctuary,* Walnut Creek, Calif: Left Coast Press, 2011; Rebecca Rotter, "Hanging In-between': Experiences of Waiting among Asylum Seekers Living in Glasgow," University of Edinburgh, 2010; Stefanie Kron and Henrik Lebuhn, "Solidarity Cities: Global Social Rights and the Right to Mobility," Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, *RLS-Publications*, (2018). https://www.rosalux.de/en/publication/id/39274/solidarity-cities-global-social-rights-and-the-right-to-mobility-1/.
[2] Saskia Sassen, "Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship," in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner. London: Sage, 2002, 277–91; Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe,* Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994; Rainer Bauböck, *Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International Migration,* Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt: E. Elgar, 1994.
[3] Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums*, Paperback edition, London ; New York: Verso, 2017; Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds. *World Cities in a World-System,* Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
[4] Ranabir Samaddar, "Promises and Paradoxes of a Global Gaze," Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, *Policies and Practices* 97 (December 2018); Michel Agier, and David Fernbach, *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011; Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times,* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012; Jennifer Bagelman, "Sanctuary: A Politics of Ease?," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 38, no. 1 (February 2013): 49–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375412469314.
[5] Michel Agier, "Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government)," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 1, no. 1 (2010): 29–45, https://doi.org/10.1353/hum.2010.0005.
[6] Michel Agier, "Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects".
[7] Tanika Sarkar, and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, eds. *Calcutta: The Stormy Decades,* New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015.
[8] Anna Sailer, "When Mill Sirens Rang Out Danger: The Calcutta June Mill Belt in the Second World War," in *Calcutta: The Stormy Decades*, edited by Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015, 121–50; Siddhartha Guha Ray, "Protest and Politics: Story of Calcutta Tram Workers 1940-47," in *Calcutta: The Stormy Decades*, edited by Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015, 151–76.
[9] Nariaki Nakazato, "The Role of Colonial Administration, 'Riot Systems' and the Local Networks during the Calcutta Disturbances of August 1946," in *Calcutta: The Stormy Decades*, edited by Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015, 267–319.
[10] Sohini Majumdar, "A Different Calcutta: INA Trials and Hindu Muslim Solidarity in 1945 and 1946," in *Calcutta: The Stormy Decades*, edited by Tanika Sarkar and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2015, 235–66.
[11] Joya Chatterji, *Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947*, Cambridge South Asian Studies, Cambridge, [England] ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[12] Calcutta Municipal Corporation. "Annual Administrative Report," Calcutta, 1945-1946, 1.

[13] ___. "Annual Administrative Report," Calcutta, 1942-1943, 50.

[14] For a detailed discussion of the powers and functions of the ARP, the civic guard and the Home guard, see Janam Mukherjee, *Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and the End of Empire,* London: Hurst, 2015, pp.30-39.

[15] Records of the Special Branch (henceforth SB), Calcutta Police note many other such instances of such rumour of such impending evacuation. Calcutta Police, Special Branch. "File No PM/ 757/A/42, KPM No SB/01569/05" 1942, Calcutta Police Museum.

[16] Sugata Bose, *Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure, and Politics, 1919-1947*, Cambridge South Asian Studies 36, Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986; Crispin Bates, *Coerced and Migrant Labourers in India the Colonial Experience,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, Centre for South Asian studies, 2000; Willem van Schendel and Aminul Haque Faraizi, *Rural Labourers in Bengal, 1880 to 1980*, CASP 12, Rotterdam: Comparative Asian Studies Program (CASP), Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1984.

[17] The British denial scheme had two sides. One was the 'scorched earth policy' whose aim was to confiscate all 'surplus' stocks of rice in the vulnerable coastal districts of Bengal, in order to 'deny' an advancing Japanese army resources it could utilise in the event of an invasion. The other aspect of the policy was to destroy the local riverine transport system of Bengal delta in order to prevent a potential Japanese force from using it. For a detailed discussion of the denial policy see, Janam Mukherjee, "Hungry Bengal: War, Famine, Riots and the End of Empire 1939-1946," University of Michigan, 2011, 77-119.

[18] Government of India, "Census of India 1951," The Manager of Publications, 1957, Xviii.

[19] "Kolkatar Pothe Ghyat Bitoroner Siddhanta," *Jugantar*, July 27, 1943, 1.

[20] "Mondo Bitorone Somosya," *Jugantar*, May 8, 1943, 4.

[21] "Sraddhananda Parke Sosta Bhojanalay," *Jugantar*, May 8, 1943, 3; "Kolkatar Sastha Hani," *Jugantar*, August 21, 1943, 1.

[22] "Muslim Byabosayi Samitir Seba," *Jugantar*, March 9, 1943.

[23] Calcutta Municipal Corporation. "Annual Administrative Report, Health Report," Calcutta, 1942-1943.

[24] "Aro 9 Jon Bhabaghure Greftar," *Jugantar*, August 13, 1943, 3.

[25] "Kolkatar Sastha Hani."

[26] "Nanakotha," *Jugantar*, September 26, 1943, 2.

[27] "Kolkatar Pothe Mritodeho," *Jugantar*, July 27, 1943, 2.

[28] Figures compiled from Calcutta Municipal Corporation Annual Administrative Reports for the mentioned years.

[29] Around 600,000 Indian refugees fled Burma, with at least 400,000 forced to travel the 600 miles of perilous tracks across high mountain passes and jungle. There were few provisions along the way and as many as 80,000 died on the trail. Janam Mukherjee, "Hungry Bengal: War, Famine, Riots and the End of Empire 1939-1946," 70.

[30] Calcutta Police, Special Branch, "File No PM/ 757/A/42, KPM No SB/01569/05."

[31] Humayan Kabir was an elected member of the Bengal legislature from 1937 to 1947 as a KPP candidate. He was a strong advocate of peasant and workers' rights.

[32] Calcutta Police, Special Branch, "File No PM/ 757/A/42, KPM No SB/01569/05."

[33] ___. "File No PM/ 757/A/42, KPM No SB/01569/05."

[34] An important exception to this was the relief efforts organized by the communists often through their labour unions.

[35] Recent scholarship has shown, however, that the communal mobilisation all through the 1940s was not a one sided affair and the Hindus and Muslims had an equal share in the process. Even by conservative official estimates, about 4000 people were killed, 10,000 injured and 30,000 displaced in the Calcutta riots of 1946. For details see Nariaki Nakazato, "The Role of Colonial Administratin, 'Riot Systems' and the Local Networks during the Calcutta Disturbances of August 1946," 268.

[36] For a detailed discussion of different aspects of the Calcutta riots, see, Suranjan Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal 1905 - 1947*, Oxford University South Asian Studies Series, Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993; Janam Mukherjee, "Hungry Bengal: War, Famine, Riots and the End of Empire 1939-1946."

[37] Janam Mukherjee, *Hungry Bengal*, 220.

[38] Calcutta Police, Special Branch, "File No PM/938/46/I, KPM No SB/01817/05," 1946, Calcutta Police Museum.

[39] ___. "File No PM 937/46, KPM No SB/01814/05," 1946, Calcutta Police Museum.

[40] ___. "File No PM 845/46, KPM No SB/01655/05," 1946, Calcutta Police Museum.

[41] The first expression was used by the civil servant Penderal Moon, and the second was used by GD Birla at the end of 1945. Majumdar, "A Different Calcutta: INA Trials and Hindu Muslim Solidarity in 1945 and 1946," 251.

[42] Calcutta Police, Special Branch, "File No PM 841/45, KPM No /SB/01646/05," 1945, Calcutta Police Museum.

[43] ___. "File No PM 841/45, KPM No /SB/01646/05," 1945.

[44] ___. "File No PM 841/46/1, KPM No SB/01647/05," 1946, Calcutta Police Museum; ___. "File No PM 841/46 II, KPM No SB/01648/05," 1947, Calcutta Police Museum.

[45] ___. "File No PM 841/46 II, KPM No SB/01648/05," 1947.

[46] The first anti INA prisoner trial agitation took place between 21st to 24th November 1945. This was part of a widespread discontent against the trial of the INA officials Shah Nawaz Khan, Prem Kumar Sehgal and Gurbaksh Singh Dhillion by the colonial authorities to be held in Delhi. In Calcutta students led the anti-trial agitation between 21st and 24th November, 1945. Over 30 people were killed and several hundred injured. This was followed by a similar protest in February 1946, this time against the trial of the INA Captain Abdul Rashid Ali who had declared his loyalty to the Muslim League. While the propaganda for the release of Captain Rashid often had anti Congress and communal overtone, the agitation that resulted in the streets of Calcutta united the Hindus and Muslims. It continued from 11th to 19th February 1946. The army was called in to quell the protests and more than 3000 people died in the fight. Sohini Majumdar, "A Different Calcutta: INA Trials and Hindu Muslim Solidarity in 1945 and 1946," 239-251.

[47] Sohini Majumdar, 245.

[48] Sohini Majumdar, 262.

[49] This is an excerpt from a letter by an East Bengali refugee addressed to the Home Minister of West Bengal, Calcutta Police, Special Branch, "File No PM 918/46-48, KPM No SB/01794/05," 1946- 1948, Calcutta Police Museum.

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"File No PM 918/46-48, KPM No SB/01794/05." Calcutta Police, Special Branch, 1948 1946. Calcutta Police Museum.

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Partition and Gender in the East: Refugee Women of Bengal

By

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It has become common knowledge that the partition of India in 1947 into two independent dominions caused an unprecedented scale of migration, displacement accompanied by violence particularly against women of the other community and one's own. The imminence of the divide steadily transformed into an opportune moment for the rival communities to settle deep seated antagonisms that were political, social, and economic in nature . Dr. Suranjan Das aptly describes the 1947 riots as the convergence of elite and popular communalism[1]. Women were the chief sufferers in such a situation of turmoil in an axiomatic way. 'One of the greatest maker of communal identity is woman as symbol of the integrity of the community, which is one of the reasons why rape is such an important element of communal violence'.[2] Thus women as repository of the honour of the community makes the problematic of gender central in the study of religion, violence, and identity (major constituents of India's partition). The word 'Partition' conjures up a particular landscape of knowledge and emotion.[3]The traumatic journey of women and families plays a seminal role in the creation of such a landscape and constitutes Partition as a cultural and personal disaster or in other words a colossal human tragedy. The afterlife of this divide was characterized by a refugee generating process which induced the state to revamp its resources to meet the challenge of rehabilitation. For women the afterlife of Partition opened multifarious identities – permanent liabilities of the state, 'fallen' or raped and /or abduct women, women of abdominal deeds (forced into prostitution), besides the overarching identity of refugee women and the crisis of identity itself. Such identities meant new negotiations with the patriarchal order and creating new structures of femininity. This paper attempts to explore such gender dynamics in post-partition Bengal.

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The Partition of Bengal represents a paradox in history, in 1950's majority of the people of Bengal rejected the British directed partition of the province and fought against it.[4] Four decades later in 1947, the same majority asked for a partition of Bengal between Muslim majority and Hindu majority areas. It may be argued that that the anti-partition agitation with its heightened communalism, hastened not only the end of British rule but laid the foundation of the second partition of Bengal in 1947. The seeds of the second partition of Bengal lay in dissatisfaction of the East Bengal Muslims at the annulment of the first partition in 1911. What is even more is the fact that when in march 1947 a decision was taken to divide Punjab on religious lines, a proposal was mooted for the partition of Bengal under which all Hindu majority districts were to be given the option to remain in India. This proposal first suggested in Tarakeshwar conference of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha rapidly gathered support like a rolling snowball.[5] N.C. Chatterjee in his presidential address argued that "as the Muslims league priests in its fantastic idea of establishing Pakistan in Bengal, the Hindus of Bengal must constitute a separate province under a strong national government. This is not a question of partition. This is a question of life and death for us, the Bengali Hindus."[6]The Bengal Legislative Assembly voted for Pakistan and partitioning of the province in June 1946. The communal violence had already engulfed the partitioned provinces of Bengal and Punjab, in the Great Calcutta killings of 1946 and in a more bestial form in Punjab since March 1947.

The imperial government amidst extortions for peace and harmony by the prominent political leaders appeared helpless and incapable of controlling the conflagration that was raging in Punjab and Bengal. However, the trajectories of violence and trauma were significantly different in Punjab and Bengal. This distinction was first recognized by Urvashi Butalia who pioneered the documentation of the human history of Partition in her book ' The Other side of silence', an oral history of the testimonies of survivors of Partition in Punjab. Silence is a metaphor for not just borders but symbolic of the fact that the genocidal violence that accompanied partition was deeply gendered, with women's bodies being routinely treated as rival territory and as embodiments of the community's honour which could be marked and conquered. Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin have also made equally significant contribution in this field. Borders and boundaries; women in India's partition, authored by them reiterates the fact that in the context of partition, 'they figure in the same way as they have always figured in history; as objects of study, rather than subjects of study'. These contributions also hint at a distinction to be made between women who suffered the dislocation and violence of partition in Punjab and the Bengali refugee women. Partition and displacement have region specific dissimilarities. This was recognized by Butalia and she wrote 'A serious thing is the omission of experiences of in Bengal and East Pakistan (Bangladesh). But these require detailed attention of their own: better not to play lip service by including an interview or two'. [7]. A human dimension of the second partition with a clear – emphasis on the gender – perspective has been well documented in some important works like

the 'The Trauma & The Triumph: gender and Partition in eastern India by Jasodhara Bagchi and Suranjan Dasgupta; Gargi Chakravorty's coming out of Partition; Refugee women of Bengal and in the iconic film 'Meghe Dhaka Tara' by Ritwik Ghatak, Gargi Chakravarty uses a variety of sources to map the distinctive features of the experiences of women displaced by the partition of Bengal. She highlights their role in the public domain, their active participation in left politics and the emergence of middle-class refugee women as the main breadwinner. Bengal's experience of Partition in 1947 has been well captured in two other equally significant works – Hiranmoy Bandhopadhyays 'Udbastu' and Prafulla Kumar Chakravarty's 'Marginal Men' to name a few. These two works are significant because they show how the problem of refugee not only changed the ambience of the city of Calcutta but played a seminal role in the rise of the Communist party to power in west Bengal. However 'the serious gap' persists as far as the experiences of the migrants to East Pakistan from West Bengal is concerned. [8]

The Partition of Bengal despite same similarities differed from the partition of Punjab in four different aspects as pointed out by Jasodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta while the Partition of Punjab was a one-time event which multi violence, forced migration and an almost complete exchange of population within three years (1947-1950), the Partition of Bengal witnessed a continuous process of displacement and migration from East to West, that is from former East Pakistan and Bangladesh to West Bengal. Secondly the brutality of communal violence leading to a massive two-way exodus in Punjab was not repeated in the east. The long columns of people on the move from east Bengal to West Bengal were not matched by kafilas from west to east.[9] Moreover, even after the carnages in Kolkata and Noakhali in 1946, Dhaka, Narayanganj in 1962, it needs to be mentioned that one fell swoop in Punjab was much more bloody and destructive. In contrast, the Partition of Bengal produced a process of slow and agonizing terror and intermediate outbursts of violence.[10]Thirdly the two-nation theory which proved to be sacrosanct in Punjab was challenged for the first time in East Pakistan by the historic language movement which erupted in 1952. A policy of determined resistance against the rules of West Pakistan followed that ultimately led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The post liberation phase of East Pakistan was marked by the emergence of fundamentalists and its oppositions to the emergence of secular and democratic in Bangladesh. Lastly in the west political, strategic and military considerations have converted the entire region into two rigid divisions, the dividing lines in the East is porous and flexible. As a result the constant cross-border movement and Immigration impelled by human and economic considerations have given to this region, where the two countries meet; a composite character questions the strictly demarcated preconditions of nationalism and the nation-state.[11]

However other dissimilarities are found in the partition of Punjab and Bengal. Partition of the country with its concomitant effects of violence and migration produced the extraordinary challenge of refugee. In Punjab the problem of refugee rehabilitation was treated as a matter of national concern. In the east the influence of people from East Pakistan was treated as a

temporary affair. It was only after 1948 that the state government realized that the refugees were to become permanent members of the state. The continuous influence of refugees transformed the issue of rehabilitation into a site of contestation and struggle for rights of citizenship and refugee between the state government and the refugees. Women often became vanguards in this struggle for a meaningful existence. Bagchi and Dasgupta further state that there was a compelling similarity between the experiences of partition in Punjab and Bengal. In battle these partition states women and minors were targeted as the prime objects of persecution. Along with the loss of home, native lands and dear ones, the women in particular were subjected to defilement (rape) before death or defilement and abandonment, or defilement and compulsion that followed to raise a new home with a new man belonging to the oppressor community. Literary tests on partition focus on this distinctive tragedy of women at times chose suicide to save themselves from dishonour. Thus they constructed the tragic dialect of women in Partition 'trapped between the extremes of a life desecrated and a redemptive death'.[12] It is this notion of a redemptive death that brings to the forefront the patriarchal notion of honour and an equally compelling dissimilarity between gender perspective in Punjab and Bengal. A poignant case study can be cited as a corroborative fact in the context. The following is an excerpt of the reminiscences of Taran, a Sikh lady on 1947.

So we formed committees which met and discussed what to do. One day they were talking about what to do with all the young girls in the community. We would listen stealthily and overheard them saying that all of us should be locked up in one room and burnt alive; our own families were saying these – they had seen what Muslims had done to the women, raped and killed them. The ones who escaped and came back were in such a bad shape-disfigured mistreated. They felt it was better to kill women than have them go through this.

Should I tell you what I felt when I heard this? I loved life, was in love with it. And I saw death staring me in the face. Just a few days earlier there had been a wedding in the family and we had new clothes made. I started wearing a new suit everyday along with the jewellery. I would dress up and call my friends over. I was going to die anyway, what difference did it make? My grandmother would get furious and would say," What do you think you are up to? Why are you doing all these?" I said to her," Beji since we're going to die, why shouldn't I wear all my nice clothes now? Why should someone else wear them when I am dead?

Unlike many other women in the west, Taran survived Partition and then lived on to experience the terrible violence against the Sikhs in Kanpur after Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984.[13]

Women in partitioned Punjab and Bengal did share a collective history of genocidal violence and various forms of dishonour. It is the articulation of honour through a redemptive death that created a compelling dissimilarity between them. In Bengal there have been isolated cases of redemptive deaths in the form of suicides amongst women. But the killing of the women in the family by the male members in the name of

honour/redemptive death was an extreme form patriarchal and masculine sense of subordination which made women expendable objects in the times of the conflict. A human history of partition in Punjab has family histories of male members killing their women, crossing the borderland to start life afresh. The trajectory of gender in Bengal was different. The women of east Bengal who lived through the dislocation of partition of 1947, and the subsequent trauma of a refugee existence had mentioned earlier multiple images that gender and refugee were intertwined in the iconic refugee woman.

1st June 1947 is regarded to be the base date for the identification of the migrants as for that matter refugee up to a particular period. But 1st October 1946 stands as the benchmark as the immigrants of Noakhali and Tipperah are concerned. Violent communal riots in Noakhali and Tipperah triggered off massive refugee exodus into West Bengal.[14] According to one of the reports submitted by the state statistical bureau in 1955 "a migrant" means any person who actually came over to India from Pakistan on as after 1st October 1946 in the case of these coming from the districts of Noakhali and Tipperah and 1st June 1947 in the case of persons coming from all other districts of East Pakistan. Any family having at least one 'migrant' has been taken to be a migrant family. However massive influx of people into the state occurred even before India became independent and the country was partitioned.[15] Although Nehru considered refugee rehabilitation a national responsibility, describing it as a humanitarian act and a realistic one that would define the future welfare of India, the attitude of the national leadership was ambivalent and conflicted over the faith of the refugees streaming across its eastern border.[16] In his letter to the Chief Minister Dr. B.C. Roy, the chief minister of West Bengal in 1948 he discouraged any large scale migration from East Bengal to the West. In the Inter-Dominion conference held in Calcutta in April 1948 the two rehabilitation ministers of East Bengal and West Bengal, Ghulam Mohammed and K.C. Neogy respectfully, made a joint declaration 'that they are determined to take every possible step to discourage such exodus in either direction'.[17] In addition they established minority boards at the provincial and local level of Dhaka and one in Calcutta who would be responsible not only of citizens of their own country in a foreign land but also be open to hear minority grievances in the country.[18] To have a better sense of numbers and provide relief the west Bengal government setup the Department of Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation in mid June 1948. In addition they commissioned the Indian Statistical Institute and the State Statistical Bureau in West Bengal to conduct surveys from 1948 onwards to make a correct assessment of the size of the rehabilitation. However in June 1948 according to a government press note persons arriving into the province of West Bengal from eastern Pakistan after 25 June 1948 will not be entitled as 'refugees', nor will they be eligible for such special assistance as may have been planned by the government for the refugees. To prove that they had arrived in India before 25 June, the refugees were required to provide either ration cards in their names or tokens from district magistrates that recorded their arrival date.[19] According to B.C.Roy this decision of the West Bengal

government was 'a preventive measure against further exodus from East Bengal.'[20]

The refugee woman in Bengal was not a homogenous category. Since migration occurred in waves in Bengal the heterogeneity of the refugee women was determined by their differences in class, background and most importantly by their time of arrival and the kind of rehabilitation policies and relief or assistance that was granted to them. Refugees in Bengal were classified into 'old' and new migrants. The 'old migrants' were the people who fled to India from East Pakistan between October 1946 and March 1958 in different waves. These migrants irrespective of the efficiency or nature of government relief and rehabilitation during this period enjoyed unquestionable right of settlement in West Bengal. January 1946 and March 1971 bracketed the period of 'new migrants' when relief and rehabilitation benefits were extended by the central government to only those refugees who agreed to be resettled outside West Bengal.[21] Amongst the 'old migrants' three separate waves of influx can be distinguished, differing in their class character of the refugees as well as their immediate causes of displacement and the strategies of resettlement adopted. The first wave of Migration into West Bengal began in 1946 following the widespread riots in Noakhali and Tipperah and continued till 1949 until varying intensity.[22]

The refugees in the first wave of the influx into west Bengal belonged to the urban middle classes of the 11 million refugees who had come into West Bengal by June 1948, 350,000 belonged to the urban middle classes, 550,000 to the rural middle classes, and a little over 1000,000 artisans.[23] The concentration of refugees varied from district to district, but this first influx was pronominally centered upon Calcutta, besides this numerical preponderance Calcutta became the site of contestation and conflict of refugees until the establishment for their rights and the site of production of refugee identity.[24]The year 1958 is taken as a cut-off year as far as the refugee influx into West Bengal is considered for two reasons. The year 1957 marked the end of the tenure of the first popularly elected government in West Bengal and from then onwards the government decided to bring to a logical conclusion of its policies and programmes including refugee rehabilitation. It decided to shut off all relief and transit camps existing in West Bengal by 31st March 1958 and refused to recognise any immigrant as a 'displaced 'in need of relief and rehabilitation beyond that date. It was only after the fresh exodus in 1964 following the Hazratbal incident that the government was forced to reactivate the refugee rehabilitation programme. What is noticeable in this context is that between the years 1958 and 1963 the people who migrated to the West from the East due to communal disharmony were considered unworthy of rehabilitation and thus remained unnoticed by the government of West Bengal.[25]

As mentioned earlier the migrants had to prove not only their migration but also their victimhood. After 1955, the Deputy High Commission in Dacca was instructed to issue migration certificates to the following categories of people. The aim was to separate the legitimate victims of violence from those who wanted to migrate to India because of economic

reasons. These included (1.) Orphans with no guardians in East Bengal, (2.) unattached women and widows with no means of livelihood in East Bengal, (3.) grown up girls coming to India for marriage the migration certificates in such cases were to be issued only to the girls concerned, (4.) wives joining husbands in India, (5.) families living in isolated parts, (6)members of split families a part of which has already settled in India and (7)Persons, who are near relatives are in India.[26]

Fear of violence particularly after Noakhali and Tipperah riots coupled with the threat to the chastity of Hindu women of the bhadhalok coupled with the loss of life, loss of property and livelihood and the loss of faith was the decisive factor in large scale migration from the east to the west. "Namita (name changed) recalled how a young girl, a relative of their family was widowed at Noakhali. They were attacked by a band of Muslims, probably known to the family. The girl was wounded but somehow saved; her husband and his brother were brutally killed in front of her very eyes. Her father-in-law climbed up a coconut tree, but the killers got him too. The young girl and her mother-in-law, violently widowed came to Dhaka and took shelter with Namita's family. This made Namita hate and mistrust the Muslims 'we were in a state of mourning and panic after the event. Although we were relatively safe within the high boundary walls of our area, we literally jumped every time we heard a shot outside'.[27]This veil of fear produced an urgent need to protect Hindu women from the aggressive and leering Muslim man. Neelanjana Chatterjee points out that the 'chastity' off married and unmarried Hindu women symbolized most potently the honour, exclusivity and continuity of the community; thus also representing its site of transgression.[28] According to another testimony, "Surojit (name changed) all was well in Faridpur till 1948. In 1949, he was in Kolkata and his mother wrote to tell him that there were 'problems with Mussalmans'. His sister was eighteen years old. Some Muslims, who never dared to look up straight at her face, now started teasing her, harassing her, and threatening the family. At this point they came to Kolkata, leaving everything behind".[29]Uditi Sen argues that in the aftermath of the genocidal violence in the Punjab, coerced migration came to be defined in terms of actual experience of communal riots or violence. In the situation of relative lacks of actual violence in East Bengal between 1947 and 1949, the trope of women under threat proved to be particularly useful in the construction of a self-images as victims of communal violence and mental torture among the first wave of Bengal refugees. A classic example is found in Hiranmoy Bandhopadhyay's semi auto biographical work 'Udbastu' and its first-hand experience of dismal conditions in refugee camps as the commissioner of the Refugee Rehabilitation of the Government of West Bengal headed by Dr. B.C. Ray.[30]Migration was a perilous journey for two reasons, it was accompanied by the trauma of leaving behind one's home, source of livelihood and kith and kin. Secondly there was a fear and anxiety about the completion of the journey and future ahead. As far as women were concerned it was even more hazardous for the possibility of defilement enroute in streamers, trains, by the Pakistani militia etc. The question of honour of Hindu women was of prime concern during the disturbances of the

1950s and was an important point of discussion in meetings. On February 8, 1950, one such meeting of women was held at Deshapriya Park in Calcutta under the Presidentship of Leela Ray, where the need for a joint enquiry into matters by the governments of India and Pakistan was stressed. She stated that it was the moral duty of not only the Muslim League but also the congress to look after these women of the minority community in East Pakistan, who had been their 'own kith and kin' only two years back and had become foreigners with their own kith and kin only two years back and had become foreigners with the Partition.[31]

The journey to Calcutta and west Bengal was characterized by looting and arson, abduction of women and delivering of babies in station platforms. On April 9 1950 the relief workers at the Sealdah station were overwhelmed with the problem of would-be-mothers besides the mothers, sisters and wives of the refuges. According to the report the woman came from Barisal and went into labour during the train journey. A local clinic run by the Calcutta relief society assisted the delivery of the refugee child. For the refugees arriving in West Bengal the next phase of the ordeal began in Sealdah railway station. The railway station was not only the first half after crossing the borderland but the presence of an overwhelming number of refugees was symbolic of the enormity of the problem of rehabilitation. Relief organisations were set up to provide relief in the form of dry food and later cooked food were provided as long as funds were available. However in due course of time the ill effects of relief and rehabilitation gradually surfaced in the railway stations itself. The multiplicity of relief entries led to the establishment of an umbrella organisation, the United Council of Relief and Welfare, which tried to coordinate the activities of all relief organisations. Competition among relief organisations, domineering role of the bigger ones and the changed attitude of relief workers with the exhaustions of the resources added to the misery of the refugees. Besides the inhuman living conditions, the threat to the honour of refugee women and girls were evident in the presence of men who attempted to entice them for immoral purposes. The refugees were transferred from the railway platforms to camps across West Bengal.[32]

Camps were the next phase in the path to the rehabilitation of the refuges. It is to be noted that all those who were given accommodation in the camps were not permanent liabilities of the government. Those who occupied government camps were the unfortunate ones who had no alternate or means of livelihood to fall back upon. Camps primarily fell into two categories. The first category consisted of transit or relief camps. This camp was the migrants first home after crossing the border. Transit camps aimed to provide shelter and temporary relief in the form of doles. With the passage of time when the government realised that the refugees were to become permanent residents of the state, they set up the second category of camps- the training or worksite camps. Worksite camps were meant to train the refugees in some kind of productive work, a step towards rehabilitation. There was however a third category of camps for the permanent liabilities of the government comprising the old, infirm, women and children. It is in the case of such permanent liabilities that the paternalistic role of the government was

tested. But more significantly the nation, refugee and femininity shaped itself in an interwoven manner with which the post-colonial patriarch or bhadralok had to realign itself. This class comprising women and children were the weakest of the weak refugees. There the government with a strange obsession through checks and listings and categorizing tried to weed out the 'ineligibles'.[33]This identity of permanent liability reaffirmed the patriarchal notions of economic rehabilitation and independence, which excluded women. She is a liability, either of the male members of her family and in their absence, of the state. This marginalisation of refugee women did not go entirely unnoticed and thus evoked criticism. Renuka Ray in her autobiography described the term permanent liability 'a curious name that was dubbed to the women and children without male guardians to protect them'. The efforts of Renuka Roy as well as the Minister for Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation of the government of West Bengal and the state as the provider of hapless woman led to the establishment of training and production centres for such women and the growth of the women organizations as The All-India Women's Conference, the All Bengal Women's Union, the Nari Seva Sangha etc.[34] Initially vocational training facilities were provided only to the displaced women. The vocational training courses including trades like tailoring, weaving, knitting, mat-making, toy-making, rope making, soap-making, sericulture, manufacture of leather goods, tanning , composite printing operation, book binding, bamboo and cane work, manufacture of handmade paper and so on.[35] The aim of such centres was to economically rehabilitate the displaced women. As far as the abducted and the raped refugee women were concerned special case was taken to help them recover from the mental agony and attain economic self-sufficiency. The All Bengal women's Home served this purpose.[36]It must be noted that all migrants did not came to government camps. The inhabitants of camps were only those who had no alternative and no other means of support or livelihood to fall back on. As mentioned the earlier government in its effort to weed out all the ineligibles created norms for admission to the category of 'permanent liability'. These norms were a proof of utter destitution, old age and infirmity and absence of a male member in the family. The old people were sent to their relatives while young girls were married off. Rehabilitation of permanent liabilities required a meaningful collaboration between the central and state governments. In other words it meant rehabilitations which could match with the need and expectations of the refugee women. But the policy of rehabilitation including that of women became artificial when camp refugees who had received training found it difficult to make a space for them in the existing open market. They tried to strike a balance between the protective government regimes and the open market.[37]

The enormity of the influx of migrants over-spilled the camps and turned every bit of urban space in Bengal from railway stations to the park of the city into a living space for the refugees. In due course of time the colonies were formed which gave birth to the struggling refugee woman, a popular image in the gendered face of the partition of Bengal. Squatters' colonies were the fall out of an organised movement of land-grabbing and perhaps a

deficient policy of rehabilitation in West Bengal. The refugees forcibly took vacant land and began to establish squatter colonies. The establishment of colonies made Calcutta a truly 'migrants city'. The first squatter's colony was formed in Bijoygarh in the deserted military barracks constructed near Jadavpur.[38]The establishment of a squatters colony in Bijoygarh had an almost chain like reaction and thus emulated by establishing colonies in Tollygunge to Srirampur. Thus Calcutta and its suburbs were engulfed by the refugee wave.

It is the land grabbing movement that made the refugee problem complex in Bengal. It was not merely a contestation between the government and its liabilities but over law and humanitarian methods and right to refuge. Forcible occupations resulted in forcible eviction and clashes with refugee organisations like the Nikhil Vanga Bastuhara Karma Parishad (All Bengal Refugee Council of Action), the leading force behind the land grabbing movement. The menace of eviction through frequent raids by the hired goons of landlords became the main challenge forced by the largely middle class inhabitants of the squatters' colonies.[39] The establishment of colonies marked an important phase in the life of refugee women. The colony meant the end of segregation of women particularly of the middle class and the lower middle class because its making required active participation of both men and women. The women of colonies with varying levels of literacy suddenly entered the masculine world of public space. However this entry into the public space had a strange duality. They became breadwinners for their families and as well as perpetuated their victimhood by becoming prostitutes also. It is in the squatter colonies that the contestation of space, right to shelter, and power was articulated in complex ways and the main beneficiaries were organisations ranging from samitis to members of the opposition parties in the government of west Bengal. This has been shown in Prafulla Kumar Chakravarty's Marginal men. According to him, "these young women of the colonies travel to Calcutta during office hours. Usually people take them for college students or working girls. Actually they walk the street of Calcutta and earn between RS.600 and Rs.300 per month. What is most disturbing is that this way of life is finding acceptance among young men and women of the conformist, traditional society of West Bengal. Thus refugee women acquired their new identity of women of abominable lives. However the redeeming feature in this context was that they learned the art of protest in the public arena of men..The abysmal property of the refugee is pulling down the entire existing social order".[40] He makes a significant point here. "Finding acceptance in the conformist, traditional society of West Bengal" is symbolic of the changing notions of the bhadraloks who constituted the conformist and traditional society of femininity.

Asok Mitra acquaints us with yet another reality of the middle class refugee women, the self-sacrificing spinsters. "In the heterogeneous gendered face of the displaced in Calcutta, the girl gets up between 4:30a.m. and 5 in the morning; one brother leaves for work at 6:15, so whatever cooking has to be done by 6; after serving tea and some breakfast to mother and other brothers, she hurriedly gets ready. Two tuitions have to be crowded in before 9.....she has to change buses at Sealdah, and at this time it is very much crowded....it is

dusk; she collects some vegetables and sundries at Sealdah and now fatigue and dust and perspiration each nearly indistinguishable from the other, bus to Garia. Back home a brief wash and the household chores left over from the morning.... The brothers go to the Maidan meetings, or join the processions; but for her such slogan mongering is vicarious....this Bengali girl's is nobody's desire....spinster dam is going to set in early".[41] These women were denied the authority of the earner in the family, larger society or community and the consideration that was traditionally reserved for the wellbeing and health of the male bread winner.[42] The visibility of women in public space had the dualism of trauma and triumph. When migration dislodged them from domesticity and the feminine world of private space it added to the burdens of their lives. The relationship between the public and professional space and the process of socialization lay in the concepts of house and home in the dichotomies of private and public.[43] The house is symbolic of the physical structure of the residence whereas home represents particular social relations both inside and outside the physical structure, relations which link residents to other families, to communities and to the state. The concept of home conjures up images of family, warmth, security and emotion and stability. In the concept of partition and Bengali culture home meant not only a traditional and emotional attachment but memories of an idyllic life in the ancestral home also meant that the place was assigned to women 'who are responsible for forging relationship between the physical and social aspects of the built environment.[44] They are responsible for making a house into a home and imbuing it with love, warmth and the smells of cooking. Women's domain, sphere and place have traditionally been inside the home and they across epochs and cultures, been associated with a private world juxtaposed with a public world of men.[45] This is dualism of the female private world and the male public world has been endowed with socio-economic features of morality, devotion, care and selflessness on one hand with self-interest, unscrupulousness and domination on the other hand.[46] The division between the private and public space breaks down during socio-political turmoil. In the context of partition and the concomitant trauma of forced displacement in the east, women in a much more aggravated form not only crossed a national boundary and broke down the barriers of space but forged a new atmosphere of home by entering a new religious and cultural space.[47] This cultural space differentiated the Bengal (East Pakistani/ Bengali Culture) and ghati (native or West Bengal culture). In this reconstruction of life in their promised land they not only forged new identities but created pleasant memories of their ancestral homes with their male counterparts. This back and forth shift of past and present reflected not only their emotional attachment to their native or original identity but the permeability of borders.[48]

    The emergence of the educated, working middle class women or the bhadramahila brought to the forefront the question of the 'responsibility of women's work. The bhadralok culture tried to keep alive the bhadramahila as part of the machinery of patriarchal central even when the economic basis of the family structure became shaky. Moreover, both as a prostitute and as the chief bread winner, the working refugee women destabilize the orthodox and

patriarchal middle class value system. The challenge posed by this figure is contained within a disclosure of immortality in the first instance and within the discourse of a social tragedy in the second instance. These two images are in a sense the flipside of the construction of the refugee woman in official discourse as economically unproductive and therefore unrehabilitable. This paradox can perhaps be explained in terms of the contradictions between the social ideal and social reality in post-partition Calcutta. As mentioned earlier, the ideal place of the woman in Bengali middle class was undoubtedly within the family, in the sphere of domesticity. A reaffirmation of this social ideal is at the rest of the denial of economic productivity to the refugee woman in the official discourse. The same value is challenged in the image of the refugee woman as a working woman. Partition was not merely a watershed in the history of South Asia. It was a critical socio-economic juncture its consequent atrocities provided practical reasons to pursue education and careers. Women habituated to domesticity or ill-equipped to build careers expressed an eagerness to accept partition as a transformation in their mundane lives. The Bengali refugee woman carrying the onus of victimhood in their traumatic journey from migrants to refugees, agitators for rehabilitation and against forcible eviction and finally as earners or breadwinners not only broke the barriers of femininity and masculinity, but firmly established the victimhood of men in post-partition gender dynamics. The feminization of labour through the rise of female domestics in post-partition Calcutta and West Bengal reiterated the notion of the woman's earnings being essential to the perpetuation of family life across class and caste boundaries thus marked a very important shift in the space allowed to a working woman within a patriarchal society. This moving out of refugee women did not however lead to a transformation of social norms or any change in the tradition bound position of women in the family. But their struggles in a limited way paved the future women of Bengal to enter the public sphere and challenged the identity of permanent liabilities or the nation's unproductive force. The analysis remains incomplete without a comparative study of the refugee women of Punjab because it still commands a considerable influence in partition historiography. History has shown that partitions across the world acquire significance because of its refugee generating process. Refuge is also a tool to understand the transition from victimhood to a survivor. However a gender specific analysis of the partition holocaust in Punjab and Bengal shows that Bengal catapulted refuge to an iconic status through the afterlife of refugee women and at the same time expanded the sweep of victimhood in the class and caste differences and in the 'paternalistic' role of the state. Cinema plays a crucial role in this context because Ritwik Ghatak's path-breaking film 'Meghe Dhaka Tara' together with 'Komal Kandhar' and 'Subarna Rekha'. It may be reasonably argued that it is here that he surpasses the literary stalwart Sadaat Hussain Manto as far as the rendition of partition in literature is concerned. However a deeper understanding of the role of refugee women in shaping the afterlife of Bengal can be enriched by establishing an ethnographic discourse on the subject.

Notes

[1]Suranjan Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal,* Oxford University Press, 1991.

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Challenges of Sustainable Livelihood for Migrants in the Raniganj Coalfield

By

Shatabdi Das [*]

Introduction

Ravenstein's Laws of Migration (1885) asserts that migration is the outcome of aspirations of higher wage rates; also in the models of Harris and Todaro (1970) migration had been assumed as the result of expected higher wage rates than actual wage differentials.[1] Migration thus can be considered as often resulting from the certainties of finding greater satisfaction in wage earning together with alternatives for economic activity. Abundance of natural resources in the physical environment presents humans with myriad opportunities of livelihood which mostly modify natural environs into social landscape rendering further support to the economy. Migration has been evident in the mineral endowed regions of India since these are opportune areas of making a living out of mining. Employment at the collieries being mostly contractual in nature, with mineral extraction by artisanal workers sans authorisation makes documentation and availability of records dearth, thereby, turning the understanding of the count of workers migrating to the coalfields to work in an extractive industry difficult and elusive at times. Development of settlements and industrial growth induced by the expansion of coal mining industry go hand-in-hand with social implications that are concomitant with the economic activity, looming large upon the health and survival of workers migrating to the area and the residents settled near collieries.[2] The coal belt of Raniganj, boasts the location of an industrial-urban corridor that grew subsequent to the expansion of coal mining industry. Therefore an inquest into the dichotomy of development and sustainability in a province inhabited by more than 25 lakh people[3] becomes interesting. The Raniganj Coalfield (RCF) in Paschim Barddhaman district is the oldest coal mining region with the second largest reserve of coal in India following Jharkhand's Jharia

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Coalfield.[4] The Eastern Coalfields Limited (one among the 11 subsidiaries of Coal India Limited) formed in 1973 after the nationalisation of coal mines is the largest land owner and major mining authority operating in RCF.

The paper attempts to explore the opportunities of livelihood at hand for the workers migrating to the coal belt and the risks associated with the economic activity. The research also seeks to look into the challenges of protection and healthcare provision for the migrants in the coalfield. The research paper is divided into two broad sections: the first section looks at the trend of migration among workers coming to the Raniganj coal belt for earning a livelihood. The second section goes on to appraise the risks associated with working the coal seams, along with the challenges faced and efforts of mining authority and government towards sustainability through the provision of rehabilitation, healthcare and environment management plans for the Raniganj Coalfield in West Bengal.

Migrant Workers in the Coalfields

Regions in India rich in natural resources have witnessed the growth of allied industries like thermal power generating plants, iron and steel industries, ferro-alloy plants, cement industries - which in turn have shaped urban-economic hubs like Jamshedpur-Bokaro, Asansol-Durgapur, Raipur-Bhilai and others. The urban industrial corridor of Asansol-Durgapur situated within the confines of Raniganj coal belt witnessed the extension of rail track upto Raniganj from Howrah, with Asansol established as a railway division in 1925[5] when impetus was conferred on the demand of coal for running steam locomotives.[6] The collieries under ECL, sprawling across an area of 443.50 sq. km[7] employs more than 6 lakh workers.[8] Seasonal, short-term migration of circular type by tribal castes was prominent in the coal mines of Raniganj in the last years of eighteenth century. Majority of the labour force in the coal mines came from lower castes of agricultural communities and artisan groups or tribal societies (commonly Bauris and Santhals) who had migrated to Bengal from the neighbouring districts of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh.[9] Despite lower monthly earnings mining provided agricultural peasants with work throughout the year unlike the seasonality and poor harvest in case of cultivation. Miners not only had to work for indefinite time inside the coal pits, until 1920s they had to live in grim, dingy living quarters.[10]

Towards the closing of the eighteenth century, collieries and mining towns were populated by people migrating from the districts of Bengal that closely surrounded the zamindari settlement of Searsole (now Raniganj) such as Puruliya, Bankura, Birbhum. People living in rural areas as well as those from tribal communities with accessibility to market towns like Raniganj, constituted the major share of mining labour force – most resorting to short term migration back to their agricultural land during sowing or harvest seasons. In the later years of the nineteenth century mine workers would mostly work beyond fixed 'shift of work' or 'set hours' earning average monthly wages of rupees 5.50 – 6.0 to about rupees 24.[11] In the last decades of nineteenth century, 20 percent of the district's population were migrants

employed in industry, commerce and services of various kinds.[12] The decades of 1950s and '60s recorded overwhelming influx of migrants to the Raniganj Coalfield bordering the Chota Nagpur plateau, when this part of the country was metamorphosed to a hub serving as the seat of large and medium scale manufacturing industries providing employment to migrant workers. The mining industry helped engage local and short-distance migrants largely from rural areas in the early decades of twentieth century.[13] Female workers who had supported about a third of the total work force in the decade of 1920, by 1950s had dwindled in number - working informally either in the peripherals of open cast mines or on the surface scavenging through coal stock yards or burnt coal ash dumps. While work at the mines saw gradual mechanisation, there was a fall in the count of women workers; under the pretexts of 'safety issues' and mining being a 'man's job' the importance of female workforce was reduced.[14]

The lives of migrants are more often swathed in uncertainties of the feeble possibilities of sustenance and the risks that change of place of residence and relocation to newer working environs present.[15] In the coal mines of Bengal, the composition of immigrants had suffused to being dominated by 'males from north or central India', replacing the count of local adivasis among mine workers by 1950s.[16] The so-called 'peasant workers' who were mostly of tribal origin and gave preference to the pick and shovel over the plough, returned to the cultivation of plots after their experiences of vulnerable work life at the shafts holding the black diamond. With progress of production at coal mines, after 1970s agricultural practitioners settled in and around the collieries started declining in number as they transited to non-farming practices as wage labourers for contractors.[17]

The sand miners are another section of labour migrants in the region, who work at removing sand from river bed; both dredging off the excess river load to supplement a river's carrying capacity and collect and supply sand for construction sites at the same time. The economy of mining sand from river bed operates on the basis of accrual of large profits with limited capital investment.[18] In the Raniganj coalfield, sand mining is prominent along patches of sand depositions locally called "chars" in the river courses of Ajay and Damodar. Sand mined from depositions across river channels that meander close to the coal mines is largely used for stacking up the voids generated after coal extraction from underground inclines. Abundance of sandy deposition along river courses provokes migrants not only to indulge in unchecked sand mining without sanction and knowledge of endangering river dynamics but also exposes labourers to the vulnerability of losing life in accidents at the rivers.

Employment for Migrants in the Coal Belt of Raniganj

The industrial corridor of Durgapur traverses the Raniganj coalfield for a stretch of about 70 kms from east to west in the Paschim Barddhaman district. It had recorded influx of migrants from the rural districts and the neighbouring states of West Bengal after 1950, as industries under Public

Sector Undertaking (PSU) were established in Durgapur following the second five year plan period of 1956-61. Durgapur and its surrounding coal region have had conspicuous waves of migration between 1960s and 1980s. Conversely, migration among industrial workers came to be less marked with the gradual over-saturation of employment openings at the large manufacturing plants such as locomotive works, iron and steel units. Since 1980s with industrial sickness trickling in - some of the medium scale industries like glass factory, paper mill and cycle factory had departments serving notices of closure, further constricting the market for job in that decade. The region ushered in recovery of industrial performance only after merger of iron and steel plants with the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) in 2006.

The decades of 1970 and '80, recorded 20 to 30 percent migrants out of the urban population in the cities of the coal region namely Asansol, Durgapur, Kulti, Raniganj and Jamuria.[19]

Table 1. Migrant Population in the Cities of Raniganj Coalfield
1971, 1981 and 1991

In-Migrants	Asansol	Durgapur	Kulti	Raniganj	Jamuria
1971	48358 (20%)	59925 (29%)	18775 (28%)	10828 (27%)	2504 (26%)
1981	75847 (25%)	68596 (22%)	43563 (32%)	14611 (30%)	4199 (34%)
1991	56389 (13%)	72392 (17%)	30534 (12%)	7874 (13%)	1805 (12%)

Data Source: Ghoshdastidar 2011
N.B.: Values in percent show share of migrants in urban population.

**Migrants in the Cities of Raniganj Coalfield, 1971 to 1991**

Fig. 1   *Data Source: Ghoshdastidar 2011*

Interestingly, mine workers in the Raniganj Coalfield held around 13 to 15 percent of the migrant population between 1970s and 1990s, falling to nine percent in 2001.[20] This shift in the major reason for migration – from 'settling down at collieries' earlier to 'employment in manufacturing industries' is mainly due to the growth in the number of micro and small scale industries (that operate as ancillary industries to the large-scale manufacturing units such as iron and steel plants and coal mining industry) as well as contractual nature of employment at the coal mines, additionally with migrants working undocumented at mine fringes. The inflow of migrants to informally work at mines continues, but there is lack of documentation of the size of such migrant population because it is both difficult to record and document and there is lack of registration as factory workers employed at units of manufacturing, household and non-household industries are mostly under contracts of employment.

Raniganj, Kulti, Jamuria and Asansol have higher count of migrants in mining and quarrying compared to Durgapur - with greater proportion of migrants engaged in industrial sector (mostly at the small and micro-scale industries skirting the collieries). Census data shows that intra-state migration initially occurred at a slow pace but in the recent years more people have been migrating from the neighbouring districts of Barddhaman in West Bengal to the coal belt of Raniganj and industrial zone of Durgapur[21] than from beyond the state boundary as used to be prominent earlier.

Table 2. Migration in Major Urban Settlements of Raniganj Coalfield, 2001

Urban Settlement	Urban Population	Migrants	Share of Migrants (%)	Mine Workers among Migrants	Share of Mine Workers among Migrants (%)	Industrial Workers among Migrants	Share of Industrial Worker among Migrant (%)
Asansol Urban Area (AUA)	10,05,942	25,624	2.55	2418	9.44	4978	19.43
Durgapur MC	4,93,405	26,906	5.45	522	1.94	8392	31.19

Data Source: Census of India 2001
N.B.: MC – Municipal Corporation

Artisanal Workers in Coal Mining

Migration of mine workers both temporary and permanent into the surroundings of the coal mines has become obscure in present times by reason of contractual nature of employment provided in most instances by the mining authority ECL; this has resulted from the transformation of formal work commitment at mines into a lesser assured and temporary source of income. Coal mining by artisanal workers operates closely aligned to legalised practice of coal extraction and even in the face of victimisation and ill-effects 'informal mining' continues at most mine areas.[22] Migrant labourers support the base of coal mining practised by small scale and artisanal workers referred to as informal mining. Capital accumulation from the labour input of those engaged in informal practice of mining transcends borders whenever labourers migrate or remittance is sent back home.[23]

Informal mining has taken over as an industry running parallel to nationalised coal mining, with the gradual dwindling of the count of permanent mine workers.[24] Often termed as 'illegal' and loosely governed in terms of legal action, the informal practice of coal procurement makes obtainment of the resource easy and quick (although at the risk of placing lives at stake). Individuals involved in the informal practice of coal extraction most often migrate to the region for the opportunities of income either as miners or as entrepreneurs who engage labourers on contract-basis for coal collection. Coal collected is sold to local users for both domestic and commercial purposes.[25] Transit labourers who move into the coal belt affect the availability, composition and wage determinants for labour, and moreover modify the circumstances both physical and social under which people endeavour to gain economically through changes in the surface configuration in mine areas depending on the method of coal extraction that they resort to. Coal India Limited (CIL) reports indicate decrease in the strength of manpower engaged in extraction of coal under ECL from 1996 to the year 2000, in addition to the waning of females in the workforce.[26] Such a situation leaves the female migrants with little opportunity of work and hence they find themselves working the coal seams informally.[27] Extractive industries create gender gaps between male and female workers – mainly based on the nature of physical labour involved. Women are not employed as mine workers today, raising questions of ethics of social welfare and leaving women to fend for themselves as part of the economy of mining industry. The question that comes up is whether approaches and planning for sustainable livelihood practices can help absorb women miners into the workforce in greater number not only for support with income but also with assurance of work that is safe. Both informal mining in the form of unsanctioned acquisition of coal and pilferage which includes unrightfully picking up coal from stock pile yards, coal washeries or from points of coal haulage or during transhipment by rail and road, root for financial losses for mining company and also infuse dangers of injury, accidents, mine fire break-outs, death, property damage and in a way conveys trespassing and social disturbances.

Ganguly-Scrase and Lahiri-Dutt in their work 'Rethinking Displacement: Asia Pacific Perspectives' bring forth the work conditions of migrant labourers in the informal industry of mining – where they are considered as 'preferred' (which comes from informal conditions of the agreements of contract and casual terms of work) by contract providers because it helps control and keep wage rates from rising and does away with the protection schemes that government jobs grant.[28] Occurrence of accidents and mishaps like mine roof collapse and setting ablaze of coal seams when casual, unscientific methods of coal extraction is engaged, not only induce environmental problems but also aggravate concerns of protection for migrant labourers.

Issues of Sustainable Livelihood in the Coal Mines

The method of coal extraction is largely controlled by the geology of coal deposit, specification of site, economic considerations[29] as well as depth of coal seams and the availability of technology. When land is acquired for coal mining – mostly agricultural land, forested areas and vacant plots are taken over. Failure of relocation of the inhabitants of such region enhances vulnerability of inhabitants to damage and life-loss.[30] The environmental management plans of ECL in the late 1990s for the Raniganj Coalfield fell short at addressing issues of safety and concern for health of workers and protection of local environment. Tree plantation covering over-burden dumps and leasing out vacant land for construction of residential facilities for employees were the only facilities provided by the mining company two decades ago.[31]

The Risks of Working the Coal Mines

Despite the lucrative opportunities of income that the economic activity of coal mining has to offer, it brings with it environmental problems such as land degradation, land subsidence, mine fires, air, water and noise pollution and issues of resettlement and rehabilitation and life risks. 19 environmentally hazardous open-cast mines providing employment to more than 12000 people had been recognised in the Raniganj belt.[32] The coal mines are hazardous, insecure and uncomfortable as work place. Procurement of mineral becomes difficult under conditions of poor ventilation, smoky chambers and insufficient lighting conditions, giving way to health ailments. As late as 1940s, the underground voids of coal mines had very limited coverage of lighting by electricity.[33]

In the early decades of opening of the collieries in Raniganj, work condition and implications on health had not been subjects of worry for the employers, neither was there planning for environmental protection. Mine workers had to put up in crowded makeshift huts constructed by themselves, close to the mines, known as 'dhowrahs' in place of the dingy housing provided by their employer, far away from markets, having scarce amenities like water supply, sanitation, medical care till the 1940s.[34] Circulation of air is

insufficient inside mine shaft, and this endangers health of workers. The absence of organised, collective protest among colliery workers for the betterment of work condition and the deplorable plight of working and living condition was common scene till the nationalisation of mines in 1973.[35]

More than 8.0 sq. km of inhabited area in the Raniganj Coalfield is under the threat of subsidence.[36] Indulgence in unscientific and unlawful means of coal collection from operational or abandoned mine areas by informal workers as well as development of voids underground after coal extraction by the mining authority often leads to subsidence, giving way to fall of mine roof, crumbling of structures inside mines. Workers who migrate to the coalfield or settle down in towns in close proximity to the collieries remain exposed to possibilities of disasters.

The break out of mine fires from burning coal seams put the lives of local communities at stake. Mine fires add particulate matter and gases to the air, increasing liability of workers to suffer accidents and even casualties in certain cases. Relocation of inhabitants residing in the surroundings of coal mine, deployment of caution and use of protective gears among miners is necessitated.[37] Air pollution from mine fires affect lung functioning; presence of trace elements in ambient air and the duration of exposure during mine fire outbreaks controls the magnitude of damage to health. Concentration of particulate matter persists above the World Health Organisation standard of $50\mu g/m^3$ for all the coal mines in Raniganj Coalfield. Around 1.8 lakh residents are affected by mine fires and subsidence[38] raising concern, because multitude of residents in the region remain vulnerable to disasters and are in want of legal measures and adequate approaches.

Efforts towards Sustenance

Acquisition of new land for expansion of coal mines comes out as a serious problem faced by government. Forested land is the category of land cover that commonly holds the deposits of coal.[39] Ecological consequences have to be borne while reclaiming the natural cover of vegetation for coal extraction; this however economically, socially and ecologically affects the lives of tribal population. It often becomes difficult to relocate families who are left without homes owing to complications of finding economic alternatives and several social bindings; compensation often does not pan-out successfully as proposed in rehabilitation schemes or environmental management plans. Those displaced from villages while land is reclaimed for opening coal mines, either claim absorption into the mining workforce or pose for their share in infrastructural investment.[40] Villagers often resort to coal collection illegitimately for easy and quick income, because they fail to migrate out of the region to engage in other economic activities or return back to agriculture. Since 1960s, resource management has brought upon ECL, the responsibility of looking into the complexities of social liabilities, thus bringing to prominence the prospects of protection of workers.[41]

Healthcare Provision and Rehabilitation for the Coalfield Migrant Workers

Health issues loom large in the coal region more so for those migrating to work the mines. Health status of workers affects the work performance of labourers. Ventilation, lighting, scheduled and overtime working hours, lack of access to clean drinking water, have implications on health. Having to work under unprotected environmental conditions in the collieries invites ill-health; and such workers are mostly rendered as surplus or 'extra' workers. Such 'out of work' folks fail to return to agricultural practices or economic pursuits based on forest produce because of their comparatively diminishing returns.[42] Sound vibrations from dumpers, dozers, shovels, loaders affect hearing capacity of employees at mine sites;[43] this calls for exercise of caution because use of earmuffs for protection is a rare sight. The only way out of the menace can come from adoption of protective gears like masks or dust respirators, gloves for protection of skin, safety helmet and rubber boots that are necessary for underground mine workers and protection of ear while working with drills.

Medical facility and housing at well-ventilated living quarters with clean supply of water becomes important for ensuring healthy living of miners. The plans for health and infrastructural benefits and also economic and social welfare besides coming from the government should also be the lookout of agencies engaging labourers to extract coal on contractual-basis. Field study reveals that, in the present time, employees of mining authority are facilitated with residential quarters, health centres and colliery hospitals in addition to markets with provisions of ration and fuel. However, looking into the needs of protection at work is equally essential. Primary Healthcare Centres (PHCs) in mining towns and regional colliery hospitals under government administration have increased in number; number of beds in the regional hospitals has also risen.[44] Although there has been an increase in both number of health centres and their capacity to hold patients, the numbers are still low compared to the population size dependent on them for healthcare services. This sketches a morbid health scenario in colliery areas regardless of efforts being put-in and introduction of healthcare services; infrastructural inadequacies need to be scrutinised for upgradation of healthcare options.

Despite regular monitoring of noise level and concentration of pollutants in ambient air and water by the Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (CMPDI) at the colliery area offices of ECL, the measures taken fall short in creating strong shields of protection for natural setting and human habitation and necessitates the adoption of sustainable planning. Location and land requirement, constriction on the use and accessibility of local resources and civic amenities; loss of tree cover and greenery for rehabilitating population in newly developed satellite townships are worrisome issues that need careful consideration of local authorities. Programmes for resettlement and rehabilitation have grown important owing to the critical condition of environmental pollution in the urban stretches around Raniganj coalfield. Gradation and tree plantation along stretches of land that have subsided[45] and

efficient solid waste management for backfilling depressions created by abandoned open cast pits are among the conservation initiatives of ECL.[46] Use of water sprinklers at loading and unloading points of coal is one of the pollution control measure under environmental management plan for receiving clearance of mines from the pollution control boards.[47] With passing time distress of displacement and strain of relocation of residences, search for alternate livelihood, issues of health, responsibilities and accountability keep mounting, and therefore calls for immediate combat of hazards for establishment of safe working environment - both for migrant workers and people residing in the coalfield.

Conclusion

Migration of workers to areas with extractive industries and manufacturing plants is prominent in industrial regions. The industrial space enclosed by the coal belt in Raniganj beheld migration surge after the commissioning of PSUs between 1920s and 1960s, thereafter registering decline in the number of migrants, due to the movement of migrants turning obscure as a result of employment largely becoming contractual in nature. It is evident from field study that migration to the region is continual but due to larger proportion of migrants joining the informal sector of mining and quarrying as artisanal workers and occupants of small-scale industries it becomes difficult to corroborate the size of migrant population in the coalfield. There is concern for health and social issues that ensue at nodes of coal production. Plans of protection could help prevent hazards and schemes of welfare are essential because it becomes difficult on the part of government, and mining authority alone to prevent informal operations at mine sites. Ensuring the safety and protection of miners needs to be given due importance in order to bring down the susceptibility to accidents, especially when demand of coal is on the rise. In this age of environmental protection and ratification of global protocols, lowering the dependence on coal needs to be sought; thereby policies of management and sustenance of operations at coal mines requires strengthening.

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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