She is Currently a Law Student at McGill University, Faculty of Law.
Her Research Abstract... CLICK HER
Her Internship Report (May-July 2017)... CLICK HERE
She is a graduate in Political Science from Presidency University, Kolkata. Her research in CRG was on the Rohingya international crisis of statelessness and the kinds of violence inflicted on women by the state as part of its ethnic cleansing drive. Her primary areas of interest include gender, human rights, refugee flows, and identity formation.
Her Research Papers... CLICK HERE
Her Internship Report (February - March 2017)... CLICK HERE
Clara Atehortúa Arredondo
She is currently a student of Ph.d in Law Universidad del Rosario. She is lawyer from Universidad de Medellín and magister in politic science from Universidad de Antioquia. She is working about the relationship between cities and IDPs in Colombia in a protracted displacement context. As part of her career she has researched about topics as interurban forced displacement, forced displacement and city, urban conflict, administration of justice and private justice, inter alia. She has published several articles deal problems link with the topics above.
Her Research Abstract...CLICK HERE
Her Internship Report ( July-September 2015)... CLICK HERE
Jessica De Santi
She is currently a law student at McGill University, completing a combined Bachelor of Laws/Bachelor of Civil Law degree, with a minor in English Literature. She also holds on Honours Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from McGill. Her main research focus at CRG is on refugee law, and on legal and constitutional pluralisms as applied in international law.
Her Research Abstract...CLICK HERE
Her Internship Report ( May-July 2015)
Note of Thanks
I am incredibly grateful for the enriching experience that has been my internship at CRG, personally and academically. These past few months have been intellectually challenging and invigorating. The CRG environment and staff are supportive and friendly, and have really helped me to feel at home in a new place. Thank you for the friendship, guidance, advice, and great company this summer; I have thoroughly enjoyed every moment and I have learned so much. Thank you especially to Dr. Banerjee and Dr. Samaddar for their insight, suggestions, and guidance as I embarked on this project, and for opening this experience at CRG to young scholars.
While much of my time was spent working on my project, I was also involved in researching and editing for other ongoing projects at CRG. In particular, I provided brief overviews on the Law of the Sea and the KomagataMaru incident for ongoing research projects, and a summary of relevant provisions of copyright law in India as the CRG expands its online archive. Through these tasks, I gained a deeper understanding of the ongoing research direction of the CRG and of its commitment to public access of knowledge.
My research project sought to interrogate India’s place in the global refugee protection regime in using the lenses of legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism. India’s case as party to neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol while simultaneously one of the main refugee-receiving countries in the world, provides a unique example of how international legal norms can be translated into domestic practice, and how different sources of law can work to effectively manage serious international challenges like large refugee influxes.
Methods and Direction
The paper unfolds broadly in two parts, which reflect the methodology used. The first part seeks to paint a picture of the current state of the law, internationally and domestically in India, that govern the treatment of refugees. This part necessarily relies heavily on international conventions and declarations, domestic legislation, and especially on domestic jurisprudence. Additional context for the laws are added to demonstrate the relationships between laws, and between law and its history.
The second part of the project attempts to frame India’s place in the international refugee protection regime by examining its unique situation through two “metaphors” of international law: legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism (Buchanan 2009: 34). This part opens with an analysis of the weaknesses of the international legal regime governing refugees, before delving into whether, and to what extent legal or constitutional pluralism can provide an appropriate metaphor for India’s refugee regime in an international context. The aim of this project is to interrogate how we “think about” refugee problems and whether changing the metaphor can open up to new solutions.
She is a third-year undergraduate student at Georgetown University majoring in International Politics. Her professional ambition is to explore the nexus between refugee resettlement and national security. Apart from the economic and infrastructure strains associated with refugee inflows, the threat of spillover violence and transnational terrorism make the management of refugee migration an international priority. Her studies and experiences working for Jericho Road Ministries and Vive, Inc.— the chief refugee resettlement agencies in Buffalo, New York— have solidified her conviction that proper integration mechanisms are critical in alleviating some of the significant security threats that refugee crises can engender.
Her Research Abstract...CLICK HERE
Her Internship Report ( July-August 2014)
I traveled to Kolkata this past summer of 2014 with the intention of investigating possible livelihood intervention programming for the East Bengali refugees who had migrated to the city following 1947’s Partition and their descendants. I soon discovered, however, that members of this community were now considered illegal migrants, rendered stateless by exclusionary governmental practices. Dr. Samaddar gently informed me that intensive fieldwork in former refugee bustees and inquiries about their “illegal” residents would be unfeasible in one month.
While in the process of reconfiguring my research, image upon image of bustling informal settlements juxtaposed with luxury high-rises began to pique my interest in the relationship between illegality and informality in India’s urban spaces. I resolved to trace the development of the legal regime surrounding the East Bengali migrant in Kolkata in order to better understand how and why a rightful refugee group lost its legal status and in what ways this alarming change yielded the unique, at times contentious, relationship between the migrant and the city-space in Kolkata.
The objective of my research was to track the evolution of the legal framework around which the Central government and West Bengal state government configured their responsibilities towards East Bengali refugees in Kolkata from 1947 to 1970 and the concurrent effects on the city’s urban structure. I hypothesized that national and state authorities’ strategic ambiguity in devising legislation to define the rights of post-partition East Bengali refugees and facilitate their integration into the Indian nation resulted in increases in the numbers of stateless people and informal housing settlements in Kolkata, both of which, in turn, have impacted the city’s approach to development.
During my brief immersion in Eastern academia, I reviewed literature related to post-partition migration, postcolonial state-building, and neoliberal economic development in India that I found in the Calcutta Research Group’s (CRG) Resource Center. I also traveled to the National Library in order to examine official missives from India’s Constituent Assembly debates and West Bengal’s Legislative Assembly proceedings.
Through my scholarly and archival research on the history of East Bengali migration to Kolkata from 1947-1970, I learned of the historic flexibility that both the Central government and West Bengal state government exercised in establishing legal distinctions between “displaced person,” “refugee,” and “economic migrant.” The discursiveness of the East Bengali “refugee” figure,who was often recast as an economic migrant meant to bolster the productive power of the Indian Union, lessened the urgency of his or her demands for rightful inclusion into the body politic. Furthermore, the lack of comprehensive and binding national or state obligations to migrants allowed for extemporary and inconsistent administrative policies of relief, rehabilitation, and integration.
I presented my findings at the CRG office on August 28th. I divided the presentation into four sections in which I detailed 1) official missives 2) a chronology of refugee-related press notes and policies from between 1947 and 1970 3) refugees’ own acts of agency in the city’s political economy and housing sector and 4) the contemporary experiences of urban migrants in the wake of neoliberal development in Kolkata. In the first section, I noted thatrampant unemployment and scarcity of land in West Bengal prompted national and state policy-makers to quickly abandon invocations of kinship in favor of rhetoric that advocated marrying refugee rehabilitation to the state’s development objectives. In the second section, I acknowledged that India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, giving the country plenary authority to determine the legal status of “refugee” groups and the quantum of assistance they are to receive.Uncompelled to issue blanket-recognition of post-partition East Bengali migrants as refugees by internationally understood standards, West Bengal authorities were able to announce arbitrary cut-off dates after which migrants from East Bengal were no longer eligible to register as refugees. Among the measures I included in my analysis were the following:
· Article 6b of the Constitution of India, which stipulates that only individuals who had migrated to India before July 19th, 1948 and resided within the country’s territory since the date of migration would be granted immediate citizenship.
· A West Bengal Government Press Note that set June 25th, 1948 as the date afterwhich East Bengali migrants arriving in West Bengal could no longer be classified as “refugees” entitled to government assistance.Official opinion attributed migration after this date to economic motivations and not religious persecution or communal violence.
· AWest Bengal Government Decree that instructed all displaced persons wishing to receive relief and rehabilitation to register themselves with state authorities before January 31st, 1949. This order effectively restricted the number of migrants displaced from East Bengal who could avail themselves of the services of government-run relief camps and vocational training centers after that date.
· The 1952 Passport System, which attempted to curtail the stalwartly east-to-west flow of migration bymandating passports for inter-state travel between India and Pakistan. The passport system reversed the agreed-upon “freedom of movement” clause of the 1950 Nehru-Liaqat Pact.
· The 1958 Dandakaranya Project, which was conceived of as a way to disperse displaced personswho arrived from East Bengal during the late ‘50s and ‘60s outside of West Bengal. The project established refugee colonies in a rocky, infertile area encompassing parts of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Refugees were tasked with clearing and cultivating the land and setting the paradigm of civilization for the area’s native nomadic tribes.
I proceeded in the third section to describe howrefugees’ rejection of meager government doles and the subhuman standards of shelter, nutrition, sanitation, and water supply of government transit camps produced the jabardakhalmovement, in which East Bengali migrants established squatter colonies on vacant public and private properties. Finally, in the fourth section, I argued that the process of “othering” and societal boundary-making constitutive of nation-state formation is being repeated in the contemporary urban space as slum evictions and oppressive labor conditions point to the sustained search of urban migrants for security, livelihood, and the institutionalization of migrant rights to property and political belonging in the age of neoliberal development.
The commentary I received from Dr. Ghosh, Dr. Bannerjee, Mr. Mitra, Ms. Bagchi, Ms. Sengupta and Ms. Basuhas greatly informed my Thesis work. In brief, my Thesis aims to relate the informality that illegality in matters of migration begets to the developmental imperatives of nation-state-building by examining 1) the volatility of national, state, and local policies and practices governing the management of migration into Kolkata alongside 2) migrants’ survival strategies and 3) their resultant effect on the city’s informal economy and informal housing sector. The research will specifically engage with the migratory experiences of East Bengali refugees from 1947 to 1970, East Bengali refugees of 1971, Bihari migrants, rural West Bengalis, and Bangladeshis. The Thesis will argue that the absence of systematic, legislatively prescribed mechanisms for the political, economic, and social integration of migrants into the body politic hasone, compelled migrating populations to construct makeshift housing arrangements and participate in the informal economic sector (for example, asoperators of roadside tea stalls and barber stations, street-hawkers, cycle-rickshaw drivers, rag pickers, domestic service laborers, and handcart pullers) and two,made “possible a mode of political and economic management [that] exploits the difference between the legal and the illegal” (Samaddar 2002 44). It will address the latter point by narrating how recent efforts to transform Kolkata into a “world class city” have delimited the right of the urban migrant poor to the very same public space their labor is being used to develop.
I must also credit the opportunities I received to attend the following CRG-sponsored public lecture, workshop, and conference with stimulating my curiosity and furthering my understanding of the phenomena I witnessed first-hand while in Kolkata:
Peter Grbac received his AB (Magna cum Laude) in Social Studies from Harvard College in 2012 and his MSc (Distinction) in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies from the University of Oxford in 2013. He is currently a B.C.L./LL.B. candidate at the Faculty of Law, McGill University. His research internship was funded by the Hans and Tamar Oppenheimer Chair in Refugee and Migration Law and the Helton Fellowship (American Society of International Law).
His Internship Report ( May 2014-July 2014)
Words of Thanks
The past few months in Calcutta have been both academically productive and personally rewarding. I am incredibly grateful for the support offered by both the support and academic staff here at the Calcutta Research Group. Their encouragement, lively discussions and debates, good food, and good company have sustained me and this project since my arrival. In particular, I would like to thank Dr. Ranabir Samaddar who not only encouraged me to take up this research topic but proved an invaluable resource and mentor as I sought to learn more about the 1971 refugee influx and refugee movements to India more generally.
My research tells the story of the Indian state, namely the way in which its articulated policies on the 1971 refugees shaped, on the one hand, the state’s understanding of refugeehood and its response towards refugees, and, on the other hand, the refugees’ own understanding of this label and the implications the policies had on their sense of belonging and identity formation. Through an analysis of the decisions taken by the Indian state, the labels administered, and the bureaucratic institutions established, this paper explores the tension between the notion of charity and the notion of rights (Samaddar 2010 114) by asking: On what grounds did the Indian state justify repatriation as the only viable solution to the situation of the 1971 refugees?
My response to this question emerges from hundreds of public documents that I collected over my three month stay in the city. I carried out extensive archival research at the Bangladeshi High Commission Library as well as the National Library. My sources consisted mostly of newspaper articles (encompassing both domestic and foreign sources), political speeches, political memoirs, secondary academic research papers, and firsthand research reports gathered by foreign aid workers stationed in the refugee camps.
This paper proceeds in three sections. In the first section, Articulating the 1971 Refugee “Problem,” I outline the demographic data pertaining to the refugee influx and highlight the gendered, religious, and class dimensions of the refugee population. In the second section, Analyzing the 1971 Refugee “Problem,” I examine the concrete challenges that gave rise to the articulated “problem” - employment, public health, and law/order - and analyze how these issues call into question the nature of citizenship, the allocation and distribution of social entitlements, and the capacity of the state to exercise authority and legitimacy. In the third section, Conceptualizing the 1971 Refugee “Problem,” I situate the refugee influx within three different conceptual frameworks – the legal, the historical/political, and the managerial - and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each framework. I then propose a fourth conceptual framework, that of access, as a new way to think through the 1971 refugee influx and the state’s response.
Pursuing MA Development from Azim Premji University, Bangalore. He was interned with the Law, Governance and Development Initiative of Azim Premji University in the period, December 10th to January 10th 2014.
His Research Abstract...CLICK HERE
His Internship Report ( May 2014-July 2014)
At the outset I would like to thank everyone at CRG for giving me the opportunity to intern and for assisting me extensively in my study. I’m indebted to the Director Dr. Ranabir Samaddar and the President Paula Banerjee for their encouragement, assistance and useful insights into my study. The time I spent in CRG has contributed immensely to my academic learning and experience and for this I would like to thank Ms Madhurilata Basu, Mrs Debaruti Bagchi, Mr. Shuvro, Mr. Samaresh, Mr. Rajat, Ms Suchorita, Peter Grbac, Ratan Sir and Mrs Chatterjee. I cannot thank my mentors Iman Sir and Atig Sir enough for keeping me focused on my study till the very end and for introducing me to Crime fiction novels and also lending books on a regular basis. For making my stay in Kolkataan enjoyable one and being kind enough to take me around the city I must thank Iman Sir, Atig Sir, Madhurilata Madam and Debaruti Madam. Further thanks to Atig Sir who showed me around Shantiniketan and for the innumerable historical titbits about Kolkata and the surrounding towns. I owe special thanks to Mr. Ritajyoti of the Centre for Studies in Social Science (CSSS, Kolkata) for without him I did not have a line of inquiry to my study. I thank Mohanda for the endless cups of chai, coffee and most importantly his homely presence. These 2 months have been most educative and wouldn’t have been possible without the help of everyone involved at CRG. Thank you.
During my stay, I was exclusively involved in studying the UID (Aadhar card) in the context of the refugee problematic. While my topic initially dealt with the existing literature on the ‘surveillance’ aspect of the UID, I later focused on the aspect of ‘financialization’ and tried to understand the dimensions of ‘security’ and ‘welfare’ which became the principal focus of my study. The purpose of my study was to provide a broad speculative theoretical framework to understanding the implications of the UID project.
I’m extremely grateful to everyone at CRG for this internship opportunity and thank them again. I would like to wish CRG the very best for the IUCN conference and the Fifth Critical Studies Conference and look forward to continue my association with the Organization.
Graduated in Cultural Anthropology. Social, analytical, empathic, adaptable and hardworking. Acquired excellent academic writing and research skills in the course of a prestigious two-year Research Master program at Utrecht University. Demonstrated social involvement through a number of paid and unpaid jobs in the field of social work and community development.
Her Research Abstract... CLICK HERE
Her Internship Report ( January 2014-March 2014)
She had written her report in the style of an academic article. For details CLICK HERE
She received her B.A.(Hons) in International Studies from Earlham College (USA) in 2011 and her MSc (with Distinction) in Refugee and Forced Migration Studies from the University of Oxford in 2012. She is currently a B.C.L./L.L.B. candidate at the Faculty of Law, McGill University (Canada). Her research internship was funded by the Hans & Tamar Oppenheimer Chair in Refugee and Migration Law.
Her Internship Report ( May 2013-July 2013)
Note of Thanks
I would like to begin by expressing my sincere thanks to everyone at the CRG who has made my time here so memorable and taught me so much about the value of academic research in promoting social and political change. Special thanks to Madhurilata, my comrade and friend. Many thanks to Anasua, Atig, Dishari, Dr. Banerjee, Dr. Samaddar, Dr. S.P. Basu, Mohonda, Mrs. Chatterjee, Samaresh, and Ratanbabu. Whether behind the scenes or by being directly involved in helping guide my research, you have all demonstrated interest in and support for my work. Thank you. I will miss the lively discussions we have all shared - and the food and tea, too!
I helped out with various research, editing, and logistical tasks. Through these, I learned about a number of the CRG’s research areas including democracy, governance, and social justice; experiences of rural migrants in cities; and conflict and post-conflict realities for women in India’s northeast. It was a pleasure to contribute to the work of the CRG in these ways. I was especially happy to be able to help with the CRG’s bid for ICSSR recognition and wish the organization all the best in this endeavor.
While at the CRG, I prepared a legal brief on statelessness, which discussed the international legal framework on statelessness as well as the regional and national legal mechanisms available for the prevention and reduction of statelessness and the protection of stateless populations. The purpose of this research was to provide a legal analysis that compliments the extensive work conducted by the CRG over the last three years in mapping the statelessness situation in India.
Summary of Findings
Article 1 of the 1954 Statelessness Convention, a stateless person is one “who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law.”[i] Since that definition is now widely understood to be customary international law, meaning it should be applied by all states including those not party to the convention and Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution provides that India “shall endeavor to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with another,” it follows that, regardless of whether or not the state accedes to either statelessness convention, this definition of statelessness carries the weight of law in India.
However, this definition rests on an assumed binary opposition of the citizen or national against the stateless person, which fails to account for the complexity of lived realities. In practice, many stateless people are unable to have their status recognized as such and legal bonds of citizenship are not always effective. States generally operate with a presumption of nationality, which makes it impossible for those whose nationality is unknown, but who have not been found to have established that they are without nationality to access protection as stateless people. Additionally, many states have demonstrated reluctance to classify certain people as stateless and others do not recognize the stateless status of those whose citizenship they have denied. Matters are substantially complicated when the effectiveness of a person’s nationality are considered.
Despite these definitional issues, the response of international organizations and groups whose work and study concerns stateless populations is largely to continue to call on states to accede to the 1954 and 1961 UN conventions on statelessness. In the Indian context, the UNHCR calls for accession to the 1954 Statelessness Convention as “a general step to strengthen the international legal framework applicable to India,” which would “protect such individuals and would work to avoid the detrimental effects of statelessness on individuals and society by ensuring minimum standards of treatment of stateless persons, providing such persons with stability and security, and ensuring that certain basic rights and needs are met.”
In my research, I found that the legal situation of stateless people in India cannot be understood simply by the fact that India has not acceded to either of the statelessness conventions. Instead, while India’s decision not to accede is certainly part of the state’s reluctance to commit to addressing the issue of stateless, it must not be understood as meaning that India has no statelessness law. Instead, I argue that we should understand statelessness law as including both the law which produces situations of statelessness and the law which seeks to address it. If we accept this then clearly India has a great deal of Statelessness law.
On the one hand, India has numerous legal provisions with actively produce statelessness. A number of explicit provisions in the Citizenship Act of India, 1955 provide legal means by which a person in possession of Indian citizenship may lose that legal bond. First, renunciation (under section 8) entitles Indian citizens to renounce their citizenship even if by doing so, they would become de jure stateless and can deprive children of their Indian citizenship on the basis of their father’s actions in such a way that may leave them stateless until they reach the mandated age to resume their Indian citizenship by declaration. Second, termination (under section 9) leaves open the possibility that those whose citizenship is terminated end up de facto statelessness[ii], because there is no guarantee that the non-Indian citizenship that has been voluntary acquired is an effective one. Finally, in no uncertain terms, provides for creates statelessness by prescribing it as punishment for certain action and inaction.
On the other hand, India is a party to numerous human rights conventions which offer protection to stateless people. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (notwithstanding the limiting declarations India made when acceding) all provide more substantial rights protection for the stateless than the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions. So, the fact that India has not signed the statelessness conventions does not lower the bar for the level of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights to which stateless populations in India should have access.
As such, while acceding to the two statelessness conventions would no doubt be a decision welcomed by the international community of agencies and organizations concerned with those who are stateless, there is much for India to do to address their plight besides acceding to either convention. First, India must stop legally sanctioning the production of statelessness. It should revise its citizenship laws such that citizenship cannot be revoked from those who would be rendered stateless by such an act. Second, India should act on its human rights commitments. By acceding to the ICCPR and the ICSCER conventions, India has already promised to protect a wide range of civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights of the stateless. It should turn those international commitments into domestic law and policy.
In the end, however, it must be remember that addressing statelessness in India, like elsewhere in the world, is not merely a legal question. The existence of effective rights and entitlements goes much beyond the courtroom to the political arena and socio-cultural milieu.
[i] This definition of de jure statelessness generally covers those who are not automatically granted nationality at birth by the application of state legal instruments, those without nationality who are unable to obtain it through establish legal provisions for its acquisition, and those whose nationality is revoked or terminated for any reason and who do not have a second nationality.
[ii] Generally, this term refers to those who are unable to disprove the assumption that they have nationality and those whose legal bonds of nationality are ineffective. However, there is no legal meaning for the term de facto statelessness.
Masters Student of Tata Institute of Social Science, Guwahati,
Her Internship Report ( May 2013)
I interned in CRG for a period of one month in May, 2013. The experience for me was quite enriching as it helped me to understand the basic concept of forced migration and its related issues. My work involved
Preparing an index for the articles published in the journal REFUGEE WATCHfor 40 issues,from 1998-2012. The index was based on sub themes viz “ India” , “South Asia” , “ Rest of the world”, “ IDP” , “Refugee”, “ Partition , Border and Conflict” , “Gender and Age”, “Health and Education” , “Law” , “State ,Governance and Policy” , “Camps” , “Statelessness”, “Security”, “UNHCR “ , “Climate, Environment and resources” “Research Methodology”, “Memories and Narratives” , “Return” and “Trafficking”. This exercise helped me understand the key words better.
Secondly I am writing an article on “The issue of dam proliferation in North-east India”. It would emphasize on the social cost of development projects like mega dams which involves displacement of large scale and also the R and R policy of such projects . This wouldcertainly help me in Masters Dissertation, which is somewhat related to this issue.
I would like to thank everyone at CRG for helping me immensely and guiding me at every step. The experience of interning was certainly a pleasant one in a place like CRG.
Her Article... CLICK HERE
Student of Comparative study of development at the EHESS (School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences): research project on Bangladeshi migration to West Bengal (dir. L. Kennedy). He was worked as Youth services Camp councilor with teenagers from 2008 to 2010 during summer holidays Since 2010, working for the City of Paris in municipal schools.
His Internship Report ( November 2012-December 2012)
Bangladeshi Migrants in West Bengal since 1971 : A Study through the Question of Migrants’ Networks
Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal is a complicated topic for research, for it can be difficult, on an empirical level, to study the integration of migrants as an autonomous process, distinct from the social and political systems that characterize the whole state. Indeed, this population flow is unique because it is happening in a somewhat culturally united space, Bengal, though it involves crossing an international border. Contrary to other migrations, migrants from Bangladesh can rely on networks which are older than the border and thus better manage to get out of their isolation.
To lead my research, I have tried to meet people who have crossed the border at different moments after 1971. I have been in the colonies of Santipur, which have been created just after this date; then I have visited the colony of Kakdwip which has been growing mostly during the 90’s; I have also tried to meet very recent migrants in slums, like in Rajarhat and Habra. I was thus trying to get an overview of the evolution of migrants’ behavior, partly to see its correlation with the more obvious evolution of the political perception of the border and the migrants. It was also made in order to have a chronological understanding of migrants’ strategy of integration. Indeed, some studies on the post-Partition refugees’ movements have shown how long can be the processes, which can last for several generations.
In this work, I have chosen an approach closed to the migratory theories that include the cultural features of the population flows. They have made it easier to take into account the historical evolution of migration’s conditions, as well as the question of migrants’ networks. This notion of network is quite central in my study, because it appears to be a useful tool to analyze migrants’ strategies in developing countries and especially in India. In the following paper, network will be understood as the social groups an individual belongs to according to different sort of characteristics (which can be an ethnic group, a religion, a geographical origin, a family name, etc.) that this individual has. But he or she can pretend to endorse such a feature to enter into a network and thus get some facilities. According to this approach, we can see the migrant as an individual deprived from the networks which were related to his or her location and forced to find new ones to replace them. What I find interesting in this approach, concerning this migration in West Bengal, is that it allows to study migrants’ relationships with the hosting society.
Moreover the network theory emphasizes greatly on the question of information which have become central in Economy. For poor migrants, or people forced to move, the information’s deficiency is natural. Therefore they are mainly guided in their movements by their scarce networks. The migrant cannot be associated to a rational actor taking decision according to a united job market and in possession of all the information that he or she needed.
Political and Cultural Framework of the Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal
The West Bengal borderland is specific for two reasons I would like to emphasize here. First considering that the border is the more radical expression of the Nation-State and its territorially-based identity, the India-Bangladesh border bears the stamp of the Central government and its perception of the “outside”. This perception is embodied by the Border Security Forces which mostly come from other parts of India, and are then non-Bengali speaking. This is to be related to a method of ruling inspired by Machiavelli and introduced in India by the British before it was used by the Indian State, which states it is better to rule a region, to use soldiers from another place in order to avoid any emotional commitments of the forces.
Partition of Bengal has been quite different from the Western situation and the decision to divide Bengal seems to have been, to some extent, imposed by the Centre and the Congress. On a political level, it was obviously a main objective to keep West Bengal and Kolkata away from becoming a part of a Muslim nation, which would have been another threat at India’s gates. The regular history books I have read before were presenting Partition as an inescapable process due to the reality of the slogan “two nations, two states” and the communal violence of the mid-forties. But as Tagore states in his speech about Indian nationalism, India is composed of many nations gathered in a country, and the notion of nation-state, and the nationalism that comes with it, is a legacy of the particular European history which could hardly fit to the Indian subcontinent situation. It is therefore possible to see the Bengal Partition as the action of the Central State to divide the Bengali nation, who has also been for the British rulers a source of preoccupation. Furthermore, the erection of a fence can also be related to this original desire to keep Kolkata and West Bengal away from a Muslim’s ruling.
This has been especially brought to my mind after my visit at the NGO Banglar Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (MASUM). According to the member of the association I have met, the central State’s action on the border is driven by a high cast, Hindi speaking and nationalist mindset. Moreover, as the India-Bangladesh border is a very populated area and considering the importance of the crossborder trafficking, the BSF is also ruling a part of the India population, which is then deprived of some fundamental rights. This exceptional situation is brought by several Acts, like the Border Security Forces Act and its Amendment of 2011, or the use of the 144 Section of the Criminal Penal Code (that was also used during the violent events in Tehatta in November, 2012) to provide the police extended powers and restrict the population’s rights in some circumstances. “Since January 2007, MASUM has documented 61 cases of alleged killings of Indian nationals by the BSF in West Bengal” one can read in the Amnesty International report Trigger Happy. When a state comes to allow the killing of its own citizens, this is clearly a case where State’s and nation’s interests are in conflict.
The second specific feature of the area is its high population density and the restless crossborder flows of population and goods. Thus, in the everyday life, the affirmation of the Nation State is challenged and the border is fouled. But this population, as it has been said, is under a special rule, from the Central government which is staying far from them. In the border districts, according to the facts reported by MASUM on its website for the last four years, BSF makes no distinction between Indian and Bangladeshi people. Thus, one could say that this specific area which cannot fit the official expectations in terms of distinction between the inside and the outside is more or less outlaw. According that the majority of the population of the border district is relying on smuggling or any other crossborder traffic to live, people there are all illegal migrants and treated this way.
There, migrant’s statute is experienced by the population as an everyday reality. The international border that have been imposed on these pre-Partition interactions have greatly affected the networks, marginalized the actors, and endangered many activities. The connections with the local police and forces (more than with politics), are quite different from those I have seen in Santipur or Kakdwip. The greater political tension and the distance between BSF and the population force the later to constantly renegotiate their rights and capabilities, which stick them in a day-to-day struggle and a restless uncertainty.
Thus migration denies every day the reality of the border. But, in another hand, migrants and their growing fear to be pushed back, as well as the bribing of the BSF, actualize the same borderland. It is therefore interesting to analyze the impacts of this international limit and its political treatment over the migrants’ networks. For example, the relentless growing security along the border since the India-Pakistan War of 1962, has considerably endangered the crossborder activities. The transnational channels that carry humans and goods from one side to another have then changed to more organized and more infiltrated structures, in the aim of reducing the risks. But the borderland has naturally affected every migrant, concerning the way to send remittances or the information costs. Now, information is mostly detained by these criminal networks which are present on both side of the border and it has become more and more costly over the year (nevertheless, the increasing of the price is also partly due to the growing prices asked by the police and BSF because of the awareness of the corruption of the area).
Migration Produces a Network Deficiency
What can be seen as a specific landmark to study this population flow are the discontinuities induced by migration in their life story. This is often embodied in the processes of self- organization of the migrants, from the formation of colonies to the change of their names through their enrollment on voter list, which imply a reconstruction of their identity and a long, even often life lasting, dialectic work in order to complete their integration.
Indeed, migration forces people to renegotiate their place in society. This is obvious in the creation of colonies in West Bengal. A woman I have met in Santipur told me how her family left her village after selling the house for a very low price. They took a train, and then crossed the border on a river. There, they bribed the Border Security Force and came in Santipur where they stayed in their relatives’ house. Then they rented a house until some spontaneous leaders among the refugees who have come within the same time lead them to a wasteland owned by the state, that they shared equally between the households. It is noteworthy that old dwellers from the village join the refugees as they settled down in the colony and then became refugees themselves in a way (This point shows that the “refugee” identity is imposed from above according to predefined criteria; nevertheless, the migrants were distinct from these dwellers by their fear of being pushed back to Bangladesh). They clear the place from the bushes and help each other to build their houses. In the colony, many people who used to be carpenters started their former occupation again. It took more than two decades for the refugees to get dalil for their property and the Indian citizenship that comes with it. In this woman’s story, it is hard to see any prepared strategy of integration from the migrants who seem to act in a day-to-day struggle. Deprived from the capabilities they could enjoy in their former residence, they have no security nets outside of the colony. This explains the “sense of unity” expressed by the refugees about this period through the lack of the usual social supports.
This example shows how the self-organization processes of the refugees are spontaneous and strongly related to the social and political framework. Even if the migrants have an obvious lack of networks outside the colony, it is wrong to assert that their perspectives end with its boundaries. Thus, during my visit of the illegal migrants’ settlements in Rajarhat’s suburbs, which look like an extreme case of migrants’ marginalization and isolation, inhabitants of the colonies were enjoying networks beyond their community. It could be the religious network, embodied by the mosque which the migrants visit for festivals as well as networks brought by their profession like housemaid in the nearby buildings.
The Self-Organized Networks of Migrants
It is clear that in Bengal, migration was a slow process. During my research, most of the people I have met had taken the decision to leave considering several factors and successive events, rather than one decisive point. Nevertheless, often the decision has been made after a precise fact that can be told by the migrants as the turning point which made him or her leave (as a quarrel with Muslim neighbors over the share of fishing rights in an irrigation channel, or a long decrease in bidi selling on which the family is relying). But it is clear that this is more about a subjective limit of people beyond which they consider it is not any longer worthy to stay and protect their capabilities implied in their situation. And this limit is all but a predefined set of conditions. It must be considered as an evolution in the subjective perception of the situation, which is also fed by the collective discussions over the issue, and the evolution of the political framework. Indeed, through official statistics and different discussion, it is clear that the increases in population flows from Bangladesh can often be related to the deterioration of the communal relationship in the country. But even concerning this more objective point, the Bangladeshi political framework, one can find many differences in people’s perception of State’s behavior toward them.
Thus, migrants chose at one point to give up their social and spatial situations, in terms of outcomes and networks, to move on the other side of the border, which can be attractive as it is not seen as a real foreign country. This migration doesn’t plan to ever come back and aspires to reach a similar condition from its previous one (this is actually partly true and as we will see, mostly depends on a religious bias; thus, many Muslims who cross the border plan to come back after an undefined time of staying; they are therefore not looking for the same facilities and the same degree of integration than the migrants I am presently talking about). Indeed, the migrants have tried to use their skills and to find themselves in an environment where they can reproduce, in some part, their former networks and social behaviors. This is clearly embodied in the gathering of migrants according to their place of origins or their caste as long as it was possible to them.
I have seen an example of migratory niche in Kakdwip, South 24 Parganas. The city has been growing very fast over the last decades, due to a large inflow of migrants from Bangladesh. This is no secret there. Most of the migrants are involved in job related to fishing, and many of the names one can read on the shops’ boards are titles from the jalia caste, and more especially from the sub-caste of the jalia-Kaibartya. There, I have talked to the headmaster of one of the colony’s school, which indicated that the government, through its help for the building of the school, has recognized these illegal migrants. He explained to me that when a new and young migrant is coming, an old migrant who already has got voter card from the local administration, presents himself as the father or the mother of the newcomer. With the help of a local political leader, the migrant is given a new name according to his new parent’s and enrolls on the voter list by the same token. Thus, the homogeneity of the migrants’ community is strengthened by this process of regularization and solidarity. There, the migrants have an opportunity to realize themselves according to their skill and their former situation in Bangladesh, which can highly contribute to their identity resilience. This is interesting to notice the role of the names in this process. The new name given to the migrant legitimizes him for the government, but also in order to find work and maybe to socialize in his new place of living, the migrant has to endorse a new identity.
The importance of belonging to such a community to be recognized by the Indian government clearly appeared to me as I met a boat-maker in Debnagore, South 24 Parganas, who has left Bangladesh in 1987. This man has not changed his name as he crossed the border and after some time, he went to this area where he could live from his skills in boat-making (as the jalia of Kakdwip are gradually coming South to find an environment similar to their place of origin and where they can realize themselves in their former occupation). Therefore he is the only one in the area to have his title and it has till today made impossible for him to get any official Scheduled Caste certificate from the State and the facilities that come with it. Nevertheless, as he has found a place to sell the boat he is making himself in his house, he is able to develop his abilities and his family’s perspectives.
The Migrants’ Networks in the West Bengal Political System
The issue of migration from Bangladesh has been an important social and political debate in West Bengal, as it questions the relationship between Indian and Bengali identity and the legacy of Partition. It must also be replaced in the context of the newly independent state construction and the struggles to negotiate a new place in the society from its different groups. Indeed, the migrants have to fit to the national and federal conditions to claim for their regularization. There is therefore a dialectical relationship between migrants and the politics in West Bengal, to get the votes of the formers in exchange of their integration in the system. The emergence of the Left Front, which has ruled West Bengal for almost 40 years, is thus strongly correlated to the organization of the refugees’ movements in the late 60’s. Nevertheless, the political commitments of the refugees cannot be reduced to the Left Front or even to the official political sphere.
I have seen the stamps of this connection in a village of Nadia. There I have met the current chairman of the city, as well as the former chairman of the 70’s and other politically involved people from different parties. They told me that until the late 70’s, it was considered as “natural”, for both the state and the population, to provide help to the new comers, on the behalf of a sense of solidarity toward other Hindus. Some of the people I have met had also come from East Bengal in the early times of Partition to be able to lead their professional activities. At that time, the political leaders used to provide ration and voter cards to the migrants in exchange of some help for their campaigns. If you have someone of your family already enrolled on the lists, it was easy to get enrolled and to produce official papers thanks to your relative. Such practices are still going on nowadays, as I have been told. To enroll new people, some political leaders don’t erase dead people from the voter lists and then provide their identity to the migrants.
The very old relationships between local politics and the migrants in their integration have created networks which are now working without their conditions of birth, like the emergence of the Left Front or the official “natural sense of solidarity toward the migrants”. This is also partly due to the clientelist features of the political system of West Bengal, where being a member of a party clearly increases one’s capabilities. Nowadays, as the Central State position over migration from Bangladesh has deeply changed, local political leaders cannot overtly speak about their current relationships with migrants. Once I have been told that migration was not a problem in West Bengal anymore and in the same time, that it was not a good idea to lead a research on this topic, for it won’t please the authorities.
The Religious Bias
It is important to me to stress the religious bias I have noticed in the study of this population flow. Though the Muslim migrants are, according to the officials, far less numerous than the Hindus, they have been crossing the border from nearly 60 years in a constantly growing flow. Moreover, Muslim migrants cannot claim for the same rights than the Hindus, as they are not raising any sense of solidarity, except the noteworthy case of the Liberation War when the population of West Bengal has provided help to the refugees from East Pakistan (but at that time, it was clear in every minds that this migration was temporary, as I have been told several times by the then political leader I have met). I have met in Habra a man who talked for a long time about the many Muslims who were living in the area under an Hindu name, and were thus enjoying the State’s facilities (especially the education system), with the help and silence of the local party. It is interesting to notice that words that are used in the official policies as well as in the informal conversations, such as refugees or illegal migrants, clearly refer to a religious based population. In spite of this, people are reluctant to overtly talk about the religious factor of the migration. Here I can refer one more time to Hannerz’ work on networks. In his book, Exploring the city, Hannerz writes that the networks that one person can enter are limited by his or her characteristics, such as the ethnic group, the religion, the social class etc. But another specific feature of West Bengal political life is that people rather like to talk in terms of social classes, than in terms of castes or religions. This is mostly due to the official communication of the Left Front as it was ruling the State.
Moreover, since the eighties, the Muslim migrants have been more and more stigmatized in the official speeches. This process have been especially fed by the movements in Assam in the late 70’s, the propaganda and ruling of the BJP that have led to the erection of the border fence, and the terrorist paranoia of the 21st century. Thus, it is getting harder and harder for a Muslim migrant to show clearly his religion. He cannot also raised an obvious sense of solidarity among Indian Muslims as they are facing a dilemma, according to their struggle to get more considerations in Indian policy and to avoid any suspicion about their loyalty to the State. Muslim migrants can therefore either choose to disguise themselves in Hindus (by changing their names for example), either to gather themselves in small communities in the suburbs not to raise attention and to preserve an inner solidarity.
As a multiethnic country, India’s government has to manage a balance between the different groups of the nation. Through a static conception of demography, it is trying to keep a statu quo in the religion’s share in the whole population. Muslim migrants, adding to the natural superior growth rate of the population, are then perceived as a threat to the demographic balance on which “communal harmony” and political power is constituted. We can compare this evolution with Israel’s case, where such considerations are backing the refusal of the right to return for the Palestinians and encouraging the “return” of the Jewish diaspora. In India, it is also considered by the government that Hindu migrants must enjoy facilities to get citizenship. So it is possible to find new categories which, beyond the notions of legality/illegality (which only refer to the legislation of the Central State), define migration according to its impact on the demographic balance of the immigration country, and thus reveal the vision of the Indian society carried by the government.
The Muslim migrants I have met are generally poorer than the Hindus and their motives are mainly economic. They seem to live in a great uncertainty expressed in their fear when I asked them. These migrants are living on small earning. The people I have met in Rajarhat are earning between 500 and 1000 Rs. a month with important irregularities in their incomes and a significant share of the women are working outside of the colony. They are spending between 200 and 400 Rs. per room to the owners of the parcel who are living in the same part of the city. They are saving very few money and their remittances are therefore quite low. Nevertheless, they are not planning to go back to Bangladesh before many years. They have paid an average of 1000 Rs. to cross the border and cannot visit their relatives on the other side. But they are regularly joined by people coming from the same area. Most of their financial networks are limited to their colony and the small grocery shop of an Indian family that is just besides it. The physical appearance of the colony is reflecting the isolation of its inhabitants as all the rooms are turned toward the inside and then looking like a fence. It is even possible to see doors at the entrance of some of the colonies. I have not been surprised when in Habra, I have been told that many Bangladeshis nationals, especially students, are pretending to be Hindus by changing their name in order to register in school or enjoy wider networks.
It is natural for me to try to see the diversity and the complexity of the phenomenon. It is obvious, after meeting these different actors that all the people who are crossing illegally the borderland since 1947 cannot be analyzed under the same paradigm and the same approach. Moreover, this process cannot be understood without a historical perspective that shows how the hosting conditions have gradually changer in one hand, and how the profiles of migrants have determined their strategies of integration or surviving. It is therefore necessary to clearly identify which characteristics are relevant to divide the migrants’ population into different groups, according to the networks they can mobilize and thus to the degree of free choice in the decision they are making.
During my research, it has appeared clearly that the religious factor was very important in this approach. Indeed as they cross the border, the migrants will naturally fall into one of the religious groups that form Indian society and then beneficiate from the facilities provided by the statute of this group in the whole society. But the geographical location of the migration is also of a great importance. Because I have not been able to lead a proper enquiry on the very border areas, I have not referred to this point as often as it would be necessary in a paper on this subject. Nevertheless, I have read and heard that the specific ruling of these areas, added to the great poverty there, has noteworthy consequences on the everyday life of the hosting and migrating populations and that they were unable to establish safe and long lasting networks to face the uncertainties. Furthermore, for many of the border inhabitants, crossborder activities and migrations are part of the routine and a necessity to survive.
Nevertheless, I have clearly seen that the first three decades of an overtly welcome policy toward the refugees from the then East Pakistan has contributed to create networks which nowadays make the migration easier and harder to find for those who represent the Central State. This situation is specific to West Bengal and cannot be broadly associated with the situation of the other North-Eastern States. The current migration is therefore a part of the broader history of post-Partition population flows.
I would like to warmly thank Parnab Das and Ayanangsha Maitra, who have been my guides during this research in West Bengal, as well as the Calcutta Research Goup’s members
Refugees in West Bengal : The State and Contested Identities,
Pradip Kumar Bose, ed., Calcutta, Calcutta Research Group - 2000
and Transition in a Bengali Refugee Settlement : 1950-1999”,
Dipankar Sinha in Refugees in West Bengal : The State and
Contested Identities, Pradip Kumar Bose, ed., Calcutta, Calcutta
Research Group - 2000
Her Internship Report (October 2011-March 2012)
I would like to warmly thank the Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (CRG) for accepting me as a Visiting Research Scholar in the organization, from the beginning of October 2011 until the end of March 2012.
I am extremely grateful that I have had the opportunity, the honor as well as the pleasure of working with such a group of intelligent, good-hearted, deeply motivated, and passionate people.
As a part of my post-doctoral research on social movements against neoliberal development in India, I have greatly benefited from the CRG’s expertise on issues such as forced migration, development induced internal displacement, and social movements. The opportunity to be part of the research group has helped me to establish important contacts with both academics and activists who are relevant to my study.
The hospitability that I have experienced at the CRG has been beyond my expectations.
First and foremost, I want to thank Dr. Ranabir Samaddar, the Director of the CRG, for his invaluable help and encouragement that he has given me for conducting my research. I also want to express my deep appreciation for Professor Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury for assisting me with my research as well as for inviting me to give a lecture at the Rabindra Bharati University. The lecture, titled ‘Critical Theory in Political Practice? Rethinking Theories of Global Resistance through the New Anti-War Movement’, was based on my PhD thesis (2010), and I gave it on 30 January 2012 at the Department of Political Science.
Special thanks belong to Dr. Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, who was of great help to me when I was looking for an organization where to do some voluntary work. Anasua helped me to get in contact with Dr. Jana of the Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee (DMSC), for which I did three small case studies by interviewing trafficked girls and women who had been rescued by the DMSC. Additionally, I wrote a funding application (draft) for the DCSC’s anti-trafficking program.
From the CRG, I thank also Suhit K. Sen, Madruresh Kumar, Mitilesh Kumar, Paula Banerjee, and all others, who have shown their support and interest in my work.
I want to express my warm appreciation for wonderful and amazing M. Chatterji for all the help I have received form her in regard to various practical and organizational issues.
During my visit at the CRG, I have gathered a lot of empirical material for my research on resistance against neoliberal development in India, and particularly the case of Rajarhat New Town Project in Kolkata.
I have concentrated on one of the most active and radical social movement organizations of the area – the Sanhati Collective. It is an autonomous collective which explicitly declares that it ‘fights neoliberalism in Bengal and beyond’. Sanhati was founded in 2006, and ever since it has been involved in many different kinds of struggles dealing with, for example, land ownership issues, development projects, dams, and nuclear plants.
For the purposes of my study, I have conducted several in-depth interviews and discussions with the main coordinator of Sanhati as well as women activists who are involved in struggles against forced land acquisition and displacement caused by neoliberal development projects. Moreover, I have interviewed (twice) Mr. Pramod Gupta, the director of the documentary film Aamader Jomite Oder Nagari [Their Township on Our Land] which deals with land acquisition and displacement of people in Rajarhat. Mr. Gupta is an independent documentarist who knows many Sanhati activists, and has given the Sanhati Collective permission to post his documentary films on the Sanhati website.
I have also interviewed Mr. Nilotpal Dutta, the Secretary of the Rajarhat Jami Bachao (Save the Rajarhat Lands) Committee, and while visiting villages in Rajarhat with him, I have talked with altogether 17 (ex-)farmers, (ex-)fisherman, activists and villagers. In addition to these materials, I have collected books and articles published by Sanhati as well as videos and documentaries that deal with development and land acquisition related struggles in West Bengal.
During my stay, I have presented two research papers. The first one I presented at the “Cultural Transformations: Development Initiatives and Social Movements’” Conference, organized by the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society (IACSS) at the BRAC University, in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 17–18 December, 2011. My paper was titled ‘Women against Development: An Outline for a Case Study of Grassroots Movements in India’.
The second paper I presented at the CRG research seminar on 15 March, 2012. It was titled ‘Movements against Neoliberal Development in India: The Case of Rajarhat New Town Project in India’. In the same seminar also my colleague Dr. Leonie Ansems de Vries, presented a paper titled ‘On (Im)mobility of Political Life’.
From Kolkata, I will now continue to Kathmandu where I will be a Visiting Research Scholar at the Nepal Institute of Peace (NIP) for the next 3 months, until the end of June 2012. While in Nepal, I will continue my research, and hope to keep in close contact with people at the CRG. I am also interested in publishing a paper on my research, for example, in the CRG’s Policies and Practices -series.
I hope that the contact between us will remain close, and that in future there could be more collaboration between the CRG and the University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Finland.
Her Internship Report
If one is to look beyond the past two and half decades, one is able to see that language and cultural recogniton of the Gorkhas was the main cause of the various political and civic bodies that sprung up in Darjeeling. Bodies such as the Pranta Parishad headed by literary figures like IB Rai were focused solely on the recognition of the Nepali language. The CPI (M) with its large following among the tea plantation workers was mainly concerned with the working class cause. What the GNLF did then was to claim that it represented all the aspirations of the Indian Nepalis in Darjeeling. Ghisngh brought up questions of citizenship and the security of Nepalis in India following the exhortion of a large number of Nepalis from the neighboring states of Assam, Bhutan, Meghalaya. Ghisngh played into the fear of political marginalization in the Indian Nepalis. The multitude of causes that it claimed torepresent allowed the GNLF to move into trade unions, started a women’s wing, a youth wing and moved into other bodies including organizations based on language. The separate state demand encompassed a myriad of other demands. If alternative voices sprung up, violence was used to silence them. After the formation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, as scholars like Subhash Ranjan Chakravorty have noted, there was the consequent weakening of the voices of the different alternative voices in Darjeeling. The opposition, the CPRM, a regional offshoot of the CPI M lost following.
With this backdrop in mind I looked at the recent movement. The GJM like the GNLF was able to mobilize its following with the claim that the demand for a separate state encompassed every other demand of the people of Darjeeling. The inetersting question here is what made it possible for the GJM to mobilize people under the not so new demand of Gorkhaland 20 years after. While the silencing under Ghisingh created a desperate need for the vocalization of discontent among the people of Darjeeling, the issue of identity re emerged after the popular TV show, Indian Idol featured a Indian Nepali called Prashant tamang who won the show through popular voting mainly in the Darjeeling hill region. While the TV show itself might not have been the most important factor in the movement, it created discussions of citizenship and marginalization of Indian Nepali. *** So what we see here again is the rallying the same sort of emotive responses towards fear of marginalization as was the case of Ghisingh. The GJM’s ways of rallying people are not entirely different from the GNLF’s in the 80s. Like the GNLF, the GJM formed its women’s wing within a couple of months of its formation. The GJNM (nari morcha) played a crucial role in rallying the support not only of the more cosmopolitan women of Jwalapahad in insisting that at least a woman from a family must attend its meetings and rallies, but also by rallying the women tea plantation workers through its collaboration with trade unions. It was the women’s wing of the GJM the Gorkha Nari Morcha that obstructed Madan Tamang, the president of the ABGL or Akhil Bharatiya Gorkha League from making his public speech in June 2008. Similarly the Gorkha Janamukti Yuba Morcha was formed to rally the youth of the region under GJM.
A particularly interesting slogan from the movement goes like this:
Agi Agi hida Yuba, Cheli Timro Saath Chinn
The women formed a key part of the movement but I’ve found that even as a part and wing of the GJM, they do not have a distinct voice. On asking a member of the Nari Morcha why there were few to none women in the tripartite talks, the respondent replied that she could not answer that question and one would have to ask the central committee regarding this.
The systematic creation of political wings with the membership of specific interest groups allowed the GJM to co-opt alternative interest groups into the movement. The membership of the GJM after 2008 was diverse, ranging from members of Ghisingh’s party, lawyers, academic intellectuals willing to chart out a plan for Gorkhaland, businessmen and others. In 2008, a civil society forum was started in Darjeeling. But as the chairman notes it has been difficult for the forum to maintain a membership that does not overlap with that GJM (the power center). The close kinship and patron client relations in Darjeeling’s closely bound community, as many of my interviewees noted makes it even more difficult for alternative and dissenting voices to resist. The idea that one has to participate in the movement even just to “show his face” to his neighbor runs strong. Before the signing of the Pintail agreement, The GJM sent out notices to organizations like the Hotel Owner’s association to be present at the signing and also stipulated the dress code for the event. One of the members of the hotel owners association noted, “Bimal Gurung would have probably not even noticed that we weren’t there but because the owner of the next door hotel would be there, I had to go.”
Mechanisms like social ostracism where neighborhoods decide not to talk to families that do not send a participant in the GJM rallies are coercive social mechanisms of rallying people. However, it was not only through the subtle coercion of members from a diverse range of fields that the GJM was able to rally its support, underneath the seemingly Gandhian methods (as Gurung put it) of revolt was violence and terror. Not only were the houses of Journalists who were critical of the GJM ransacked, there were outright verbal warnings given to The clear example is of course Madan Tamang, The GNLF leader hacked in the middle of the day at Chowrasta in May 2010. Madan Tamang’s murder is symbolic of the silencing of the critical alternative voice against the GJM. Madan Tamang as close sources claim had 2 years ahead of the recent GTA agreement warned the public of the the possibility of an agreement less than an a separate state. Although a candle rally took place after Tamang’s death and his funeral saw popular anguish against the alleged GJM, the anguish watered down. The curious escape of the alleged Nickole Tamang from the CBI and the state and central government’s inadequacy in providing a substantive justice to Tamang are indicative of the state’s unwillingness to deal with alternative political figures in the region. It is interesting to note that although parties in the opposition such as the CPRM and the ABGL in some ways voice their critical opinions of the GJM, these parties are weakened to the point that they are not taken into account by the state and central government. The democratic mechanisms of dialogue have failed in Darjeeling with the emergence of power structures such as the GJM and the democratic process is put further at risk by the state and central government’s failure to bring into account the alternative voices in the hills. There is a certain silent skepticism in the hills regarding the recent agreement. On the day of the signing of the agreement I asked a businessman who runs a famous café in Darjeeling whether the agreement is what the people of Darjeeling mobilized for. He replied, “well it is better if you ask political people but the GJM says it is a step towards a separate state and it probably is so.”
Rajni Soren was an
intern at CRG in the month of May 2006 . She is a law
student at NALSAR, University of law, Hyderabad. She works
on issues of displacement and refugee flows. At CRG she worked under
the supervision of Dr. Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury. She also assisted
various other work in CRG. During her internship she completed a fact sheet
on "Displacement in Jharkhand".
Her Internship Report (May 2006)
The report is available on
Rajni Soren was an intern at CRG in the month of May 2006 . She is a law student at NALSAR, University of law, Hyderabad. She works on issues of displacement and refugee flows. At CRG she worked under the supervision of Dr. Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury. She also assisted various other work in CRG. During her internship she completed a fact sheet on "Displacement in Jharkhand".
Her Internship Report (May 2006)
The report is available on Refugee Watch Online.
Christopher Bass was a trainee researcher at CRG in the month of June 2006.
He is an English and French major at Millikin University,
Illinois, USA. In addition to interning with the Calcutta Research
Group, he has studied in Paris and Montpellier, France. In spring
2006, Chris was awarded his honors in English for his thesis, [In]Sanity and
Discontent: A Postcolonial Inquiry into Jean Rhys' Wide Sargasso Sea. In
this project he inquired into both the postcolonial and feminist critical
interpretations of Rhys' West-Indian text. Chris Bass also received
the Conant Award, for the strongest interpretive and critical paper in the
Millikin English department, for his thesis. His presentation of a cameo of
this paper at the 2006 Illinois Philological Association Conference, held at
DePaul University, was well received by the academic community. Chris
is also the recipient of the 2006 Summer Undergraduate Research Fund (SURF),
which was made available by Millikin University. This funding secured the
financial support for his internship at the CRG. Currently, Chris is
involved in a collaborative research and the writing of a related article
comparing the representation of immigrants in American and Indian newsprint.